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THE WORKS

OF

JOHN C. CALHOUN.

YOL II,

NEW YORK:
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY,

S46 & 348 BROADWAY.
M.DCCO.LX.

<**

SPEECHES

JOHN C. CALHOUN

DELIVERED IN THE

HOUSE OF KEPBESENTATIVES,

AND IN THE

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

EDITED BY

EICHAED K. CKALLE.

NEW YOKK:
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY,

846 & 348 BKOADWAT.
M.DCCO.LX.

ENTERED, according to act of Congress, by
JAMES E. CALHOUN,

in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the district
of South Carolina.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE collection of the Speeches of Mr. Calhoim, here offered to the
public, includes, it is believed, all delivered by him in Congress of any
general interest — or rather, all, of which any reliable reports have been
preserved. Many, no doubt, especially during the war of 1812,
through carelessness and the want of competent reporters in the
House of Representatives, have been lost — a fact the more to be re
gretted, as the period was marked by events of much moment to the
country. For the comparatively few which have been preserved, the
public is chiefly indebted to the Hon. Mr. Simkins, at that time a
member of the House from South Carolina, who, for his own gratifi
cation, took notes and drew out the sketches (for they are by no
means full reports) which appear in this collection. For the use of
these, the Editor is indebted to the kindness of the Hon. Francis W.
Pickens — to whom he takes this occasion to return his acknowledg
ments. Others, belonging to the same period, have been copied from
manuscripts found among the papers of Mr. Calhoun, though not in
his handwriting.

Of the Speeches delivered in the Senate, between the years 1833
and 1850, a much larger number has been preserved. They are, for
the most part, better reported ; and not a few were published in pam
phlet form at the time, under his own inspection. Still, so constant
and pressing were his engagements — so incessant the demands on his

VI ADVERTISEMENT.

time, that it is impossible he could have bestowed much attention,
except on those connected with the more important subjects of discus
sion. Many were left to be drawn out by the reporters ; and his pe
culiar position, in regard to the two great contending parties of the
country, was any thing but favorable to fulness and fidelity. Not a
few (and among them some on questions of much interest) were never
reported at all, or otherwise so mangled and garbled, — to serve a tem
porary purpose, — as to render them unworthy of this collection. A suffi
cient number, however, it is hoped, has been preserved from the ravages
of time, and the still more ruthless spirit of party, to insure, as a tribute
to his virtues, the love of the Patriot, the admiration of the Statesman,
and the gratitude of the Historian and the Philosopher.

As many of the questions discussed during the war of 1812, both
of a foreign and domestic character, have probably, to some extent,
faded from the public memory, the Editor has prepared a brief intro
ductory note to the Speeches delivered in the House of Representa
tives, which he hopes will be acceptable to the general reader. It
was deemed unnecessary to adopt the same course in regard to
Speeches of a more recent date.

April 8, 1853.

CONTENTS OF VOLUME II.

Speech on the Resolution of the Committee on

Foreign Relations, . . . • - . . Dec. 12, 1811. 1

Speech on the Petition of the Citizens of Albany, May 6, 1812. 13

Speech on the Repeal of the Non-importation Act, June 24, 1812. 20
Speech on the subject of Merchants' Bonds, . Dec. 4, 1812. 31

Speech on the new Army Bill, • . . A . Jan. 14, 1813. 43
Speech on the Bill to encourage Enlistments, . Jan. 17, 1814. 56
Speech on the Loan BUI. . . . . .. Feb. 25, 1814. 69

Speech on the Repeal of the Embargo, . ^ . April 6, 1814. 103
Speech on the Increase of the Direct Tax, . . Oct. 25, 1814. 110
Speech on the Military Peace Establishment, . Feb. 27, 1815. 117
Speech on the Commercial Convention with Great

Britain,

Speech on the Repeal of the Direct Tax,
Speech on tne United States Bank Bill, .
Speech on the Tariff Bill, .
Speech on the Compensation Bill,
Speech on the Internal Improvement Bill, .
Speech on the Revenue Collection (Force) Bill,
*•**• Speech on his Resolutions in support of State

Rights, ....... Feb. 26, 1833. 262

V Speech on the Remova*' of the Public Deposits, . Jan. 13, 1834. 309

Jan, 9, 1816. 123
Jan. 31, 1816. 135
Feb. 26, 1816. 153
April 6, 1816. 163
Jan. 17, 1817^- 173
Feb. 4, 1817. __. 186
Feb. 15-16, 1833. 197

^

VU1

CONTENTS.

Speech on the Bill to recharter the United States

Bank,

^Speech on the Bill to Repeal the Force Act.

••Speech on the President's Protest,
Speech on the subject of Removals from Office,
Speech on the Report relating to Executive Pa
tronage,

--f-i Speech on Abolition Petitions, .

Speech on the Bill to preserve the Public Records,
o Speech on the Power of the States in respect to

Aliens,

-4— > Speech on the Circulation of Incendiary Papers,
Speech on the Bill to regulate the Public Deposits,
Speech on the Bill to extend the provisions of the

Deposit Act,

Speech on the Application of the Surplus Revenues,

* Speech on the Bill for the Admission of Michigan,

* Speech on the same subject, .. . . . »
Speech on the Motion to recommit the Land Bill,

I- -.Speech on the Reception of Abolition Petitions,
Speech on the Bill to cede the Public Lands, .

Page

March 21, 1834.

344

April 9, 1834. _

376

-~~___

May 6, 1834.

"405

Feb. 1835.

426

Feb. 13, 1835.

446

March 9, 1836.

465

March 26, 1836.

490

April 2, 1836.

496

April 12, 1836.

509

May 28, 1836.

534

Dec. 21, 1836.

569

Dec. 28, 1836.

581

Jan. 2, 1837.

586

Jan. 5, 1837.

597

Feb. 4, 1837.

617

Feb. 6, 1837.

625

Feb. 7, 1837.

634

SPEECHES.

SPEECH

On the second Resolution reported by the Committee
on Foreign Relations, delivered in the House of
Representatives, Dec. 12, 1811.

[NOTE. — The Committee on Foreign Relations, on the 29th of
November, 1811, submitted a report, which, after an able examination
of the causes of war with Great Britain, concluded by recommending
to the House the adoption of a series of resolutions, among which was
the following :

" 2. Resolved, That an additional force of ten thousand >regulai
troops ought to be immediately raised to serve for three years ; and
that a bounty in lands ought to be given to encourage enlistments."

This resolution having been amended in committee of the Whole,
by striking out the word " ten" was reported to the House, where an
animated debate ensued. A majority of the committee avowed their
object to be a preparation for war ; and the discussion took the widest
range, embracing almost every topic of foreign and domestip policy.
The principal speaker, on the part of the opposition, was Mr. Randolph"* .
of Virginia, to whose remarks Mr. Calhoun seems to have confined
his reply. The resolution was finally adopted — Yeas, 109 ; Nays, 22.]

MR. SPEAKER : — I understood the opinion of the Com
mittee on Foreign Relations, differently from what the gen
tleman from Virginia (Mr. Randolph) has stated to be his

VOL. II. — 1

2 SPEECHES.

impression. . I. certainly understood that the committee re-
• comraerxleck the measures now before the House, as a pre
paration for war; -and such, in fact, was its express resolve.
-Agreed 'to3-i Belie1 ve, by every member, except that gentleman.
I do not attribute any wilful misstatement to him, but
consider it the effect of inadvertency or mistake. Indeed,
the Keport could mean nothing but war or empty menace.
I hope no member of this House is in favor of the latter. A
bullying, menacing system, has every thing to condemn and
nothing to recommend it. In expense, it almost rivals war.
It excites contempt abroad, and destroys confidence at home.
Menaces are serious things ; and ought to be resorted to with
as much caution and seriousness, as war itself ; and should,
if not successful, be invariably followed by it. It was not
the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy) who made this
a war question. The resolve contemplates an additional
regular force ; a measure confessedly improper but as a pre
paration for war, but undoubtedly necessary in that event.

Sir, I am not insensible to the weighty importance of
the proposition, for the first time submitted to this House,
to compel a redress of our long list of complaints against one
of the belligerents. According to my mode of thinking,
the more serious the question, the stronger and more unalter
able ought to be our convictions before we give it our support.
War, in our country, ought never to be resorted to but
when it is clearly justifiable and necessary ; so much so,
as not to require the aid of logic to convince our understand
ings, nor the ardor of eloquence to inflame our passions.
There are many reasons why this country should never resort
to war but for causes the most urgent and necessary. It is
sufficient that, under a government like ours, none but such
will justify it in the eyes of the people ; and were I not satis
fied that such is the present case, I certainly would be no
advocate of the proposition now before the House.

Sir, I might prove the war, should it ensue, justifiable,

SPEECHES. 3

by the express admission of the gentleman from Virginia ; —
and necessary, by facts undoubted, and universally admitted ;
such as he did not pretend to controvert. The extent,
duration, and character of the injuries received ; the failure
of those peaceful means heretofore resorted to for the redress
of our wrongs, are my proofs that it is necessary. Why should
I mention the impressment of our seamen ; depredations on
every branch of our commerce, including the direct export
trade, continued for years, and made under laws which pro
fessedly undertake to regulate our trade with other nations ;
negotiation resorted to, again and again, till it is become hope
less ; the restrictive system persisted in to avoid war, and in
the vain expectation of returning justice ? The evil still grows,
and, in each succeeding year, swells in extent and pretension
beyond the preceding. The question, even in the opinion and
by the admission of our opponents is reduced to this single
point — Which shall we do, abandon or defend our own com
mercial and maritime rights, and the personal liberties of our
citizens employed in exercising them ? These rights are
vitally attacked, and war is the only means of redress. -*
The gentleman from Virginia has suggested none, unless we
consider the whole of his speech as recommending patient
and resigned submission as the best remedy. Sir, which al
ternative this House will embrace, it is not for me to say.
I hope the decision is made already, by a higher authority
than the voice of any man. It is not for the human tongue
to instil the sense of independence and honor. This is the
work of nature ; a generous nature that disdains tame sub
mission to wrongs.

This part of the subject is so imposing as to enforce
silence even on the gentleman from Virginia. He dared /
not deny his country's wrongs, or vindicate the conduct of
her enemy. Only one part of his argument had any, the
most remote relation to this point. He would not say,
we had not a good cause for war ; but insisted, that it was

SPEECHES.

our duty to define that cause. If lie means that this House
ought, at this stage of its proceedings, or any other, to specify
any particular violation of our rights to the exclusion of all
others, he prescribes a course, which neither good sense nor
the usage of nations warrants. When we contend, let us
contend for all our rights ; the doubtful and the certain ; the
unimportant and essential. It is as easy to struggle, or even
more so, for the whole as for a part. At the termination of the
contest, secure all that our wisdom and valor and the fortune
of the war will permit. This is the dictate of common sense ;
such also is the usage of nations. The single instance allu
ded to, the endeavor of Mr. Fox to compel Mr. Pitt to define
the object of the war against France, will not support the
gentleman from Virginia in his position. That was an ex
traordinary war for an extraordinary purpose, and was not
governed by the usual rules. It was not for conquest, or for
redress of injury, but to impose a government on France,
which she refused to receive ; an object so detestable that an
avowal dared not be made.

Sir, I might here rest the question. The affirmative of the
proposition is established. I cannot but advert, however, to
the complaint of the gentleman from Virginia when he was
first up on this question. He said he found himself reduced
to the necessity of supporting the negative side of the ques
tion, before the affirmative was established. Let me tell
the gentleman, that there is no hardship in his case. It is
not every affirmative that ought to be proved. Were I to
affirm, that the House is now in session, would it be reason
able to ask for proof? He who would deny its truth, on
him would be the proof of so extraordinary a negative. How
then could the gentleman, after his admissions, with the facts
before him and the country, complain ? The causes are such
as to warrant, or rather make it indispensable, in any nation
not absolutely dependent, to defend its rights by force. Let
him, then, show the reasons whv we ought not so to defend

SPEECHES. 5

ourselves. On him lies the burden of proof. This he has
attempted ; he has endeavored to support his negative. Be
fore I proceed to answer hint particularly, let me caUrthe at
tention of the House to one circumstance ; that is, — that
almost the whole of his arguments consisted of an enumera
tion of evils always incident to war, however just and neces
sary ; and which, if they have any force, are calculated to
produce unqualified submission to every species of insult and
injury. I do not feel myself bound to answer arguments of
this description ; and if I should touch on them, it will be
only incidentally, and not for the purpose of serious refuta
tion.

The first argument of the gentleman which I shall notice,
is the unprepared state of the country. Whatever weight this
argument might have in a question of immediate war, it
surely has little in that of preparation for it. If our country
is unprepared, let us remedy the evil as soon as possible.
Let the gentleman submit his plan ; and if a reasonable one,
I doubt not it will be supported by the House. But, Sir, let
us admit the fact and the whole force of the argument. I
ask whose is the fault ? Who has been a member, for many
years past, and seen the defenceless state of his country
even near home, under his own eyes, without a single en
deavor to remedy so serious an evil ? Let him not say, " I
have acted in a minority/' It is no less the duty of the minor
ity than a majority to endeavor to defend the country. For
that purpose we are sent here, and not for that of opposition.

We are next told of the expenses of the war ; and that
the people will not pay taxes. Why not ? Is it from want
of means ? What, with 1,000,000, tons of shipping ; a com
merce of $100,000,000 annually ; manufactures yielding
a yearly product of $150,000,000 ; and agriculture of thrice
that amount, shall we be told the country wants capacity to
raise and support ten thousand or fifteen thousand additional
regulars ? No ; it has the ability ; that is admitted ; and

6 SPEECHES.

will it not have the disposition ? Is not the cause a just
and necessary one ? Shall we then utter this libel on the
people ? Where will proof be found of a fact so disgrace
ful ? It is answered ; — in the history of the country twelve
or fifteen years ago. The case is not parallel. The ability of
the country is greatly increased since. The whiskey-tax was
unpopular. But on this, as well as my memory serves me, —
the objection was not to the tax or its amount, but the mode
of collection. The people were startled by tKe number of
officers ; their love of liberty shocked with the multiplicity
of regulations. We, in the spirit of imitation, copied from
the most oppressive part of European laws on the subject
of taxes, and imposed on a young and virtuous people all the
severe provisions made necessary by corruption and long-
practised evasions. If taxes should become necessary, I do
not hesitate to say the people will pay cheerfully. It is for
their government and their cause, and it would be their
interest and their duty to pay. But it may be, and I be
lieve was said, that the people will not pay taxes, because
the rights violated are not worth defending ; or that the de
fence will cost more than the gain. Sir, I here enter my
solemn protest against this low and " calculating avarice "
entering this hall of legislation. It is only fit for shops
and counting-houses ; and ought not to disgrace the seat of
power by its squalid aspect. Whenever it touches sovereign
power, the nation is ruined. It is too short-sighted to defend
itself. It is a compromising spirit, always ready to yield a
part to save the residue. It is too timid to have in itself the
laws of self-preservation. It is never safe but under the shield
of honor. There is, Sir, one principle necessary to make us a
great" people, — to produce not the form, but real spirit of
union ; — and that is, to protect every citizen in the lawful pur
suit of his business. He will then feel that he is backed by the
government ; — that its arm is his arm ; and will rejoice in its
increased strength and prosperity. Protection and patriot-

SPEECHES. I

ism are reciprocal. This is the way which has led nations to
greatness. Sir, I am not versed in this calculating policy ;
and will not, therefore, pretend to estimate in dollars and
cents the value of national independence. I cannot measure
in shillings and pence the misery, the stripes, and the slavery
of our impressed seamen ; nor even the value of our shipping,
commercial and agricultural losses, under the orders in coun
cil, and the British system of blockade. In thus expressing
myself, I do not intend to condemn any prudent estimate of
the means of a country, hefore it enters on a '/par. This is
wisdom, — the other folly. The gentleman from Virginia has
not failed to touch on the calamity of war, that fruitful source
of declamation by which humanity is made the advocate of
submission. If he desires to repress the gallant ardor of our
countrymen by such topics, let me inform him, that true
courage regards only the cause, that it is just and necessary ;
and that it contemns the sufferings and dangers of war. If
he really wishes to promote the cause of humanity, let his elo
quence be addressed to Lord Wellesley or Mr. Percival, and
not the American Congress. Tell them if they persist in such
daring insult and injury to a neutral nation, that, however
inclined to peace, it will be bound in honor and safety to
resist ; that their patience and endurance, however great, will
be exhausted ; that the calamity of war will ensue, and that
they, in the opinion of the world, will be answerable for all
its devastation and misery. Let a regard to the interests of
humanity stay the hand of injustice, and my life on it, the
gentleman will not find it difficult to dissuade his country
from rushing into the bloody scenes of war.

WeL.are. next told of the dangers of war. I believe we
are all ready to acknowledge its hazards and misfortunes ;
but I cannot think we have any extraordinary danger to
apprehend, at least none to warrant an acquiescence in the
injuries we have received. On the contrary, I believe, no
war can be less dangerous to the internal peace, or safety

8 SPEECHES.

of the country. But we are told of the black population of
the Southern States. As far as the gentleman from Virginia
speaks of his own personal knowledge, I shall not question
the correctness of his statement. I only regret that such 'is
the state of apprehension in his particular part of the country.
Of the Southern section, I, too, have some personal know
ledge ; and can say, that in South Carolina no such fears in
any part are felt. But, Sir, admit the gentleman's state
ment ; will a war with Great Britain increase the danger ?
Will the country be less able to suppress insurrection ? Had
we any thing to fear from that quarter (which I do not be
lieve), in my opinion, the period of the greatest safety is dur
ing a war ; unless, indeed, the enemy should make a lodg
ment in the country. Then the country is most on its guard ;
our militia the best prepared ; and our standing army the
greatest. Even in our revolution no attempts at insurrection
were made by that portion of our population ; and however
the gentleman may alarm himself with the disorganizing ef
fects of French principles, I cannot think our ignorant blacks
have felt much of their baneful influence. I dare say more
than one half of them never heard of the French revolution.
But as great as he regards the danger from our slaves, the
gentleman's fears end not there — the standing army is not less
terrible to him. Sir, I think a regular force raised for a period
of actual hostilities cannot properly be called a standing army.
There is a just distinction between such a force, and one raised
as a permanent peace establishment. . Whatever would be the
composition of the latter, I hope the former will consist of some
of the best materials of the country. The ardent patriotism of
our young men, and the reasonable bounty in land which is pro
posed to be given, will impel them to join their country's stan
dard and to fight her battles ; they will not forget the citizen
in the soldier, and in obeying their officers, learn to contemn
their government and constitution. In our officers and sol
diers we will find patriotism no less pure and ardent than in the

SPEECHES. 9

private citizen ; but if they should be depraved as represented,
what have we to fear from twenty-five thousand or thirty thou
sand regulars ? Where will be the boasted militia of the gen
tleman ? Can one million of militia be overpowered by thirty
thousand regulars ? If so, how can we rely on them against
a foe invading our country ? Sir, I have no such contemptuous
idea of our militia — their untaught bravery is sufficient to
crush all foreign and internal attempts on their country's lib
erties.

But we have not yet come to the end of the chapter
of dangers. The gentleman's imagination, so fruitful on
this subject, conceives that our constitution is not calculated
for war, and that it cannot stand its rude shock. This is
rather extraordinary. If true, we must then depend upon the
commiseration or contempt of other nations for our existence.
The constitution, then, it seems, has failed in an essential ob
ject, " to provide for the common defence." No, says the gentle
man from Virginia, it is competent for a defensive, but not for
an offensive war. It is not necessary for me to expose the er
ror of this opinion. Why make the distinction in this instance ?
Will he pretend to say that this is an offensive war ; a war
of conquest ? Yes, the gentleman has dared to make this as
sertion ; and for reasons no less extraordinary than the asser
tion itself. He says our rights are violated on the ocean, and
that these violations affect our shipping, and commercial rights,
to which the Canadas have no relation. The doctrine of re
taliation has been much abused of late by an unreasonable
extension ; we have now to witness a new abuse. The gentle
man from Virginia has limited it down to a point. By his
rule if you receive a blow on the breast, you dare not re
turn it on the head ; you are obliged to measure and return
it on the precise point on which it was received. If you do
not proceed with this mathematical accuracy, it ceases to be
just self-defence ; it becomes an unprovoked attack.

In speaking of Canada the gentleman from Virginia intro-

10 SPEECHES.

duced the name of Montgomery with much feeling and inter-
est. Sir, there is danger in that name to the gentleman's argu
ment. It is sacred to heroism. It is indignant of submis
sion ! It calls our memory back to the time of our revolu
tion, to the Congress of '74 and "75. Suppose a member
of that day had risen and urged all the arguments which we
have heard on this subject ; had told that Congress, — your
contest is about the right of laying a tax ; and that the
attempt on Canada had nothing to do with it ; that the war
would be expensive ; that danger and devastation would
overspread our country, and that the power of Great Britain
was irresistible. With what sentiment, think you, would such
doctrines have been then received ? Happy for us, they had
no force at that period of our country's glory. Had such
been then acted on, this hall would never have witnessed a great
people convened to deliberate for the general good ; a mighty
empire, with prouder prospects than any nation the sun ever
shone on, would not have risen in the west. No ; we would
have been base subjected colonies ; governed by that impe
rious rod which Britain holds over her distant provinces.

The gentleman from Virginia attributes the preparation
for war to every thing but its true cause. He endeavored
to find it in the probable rise in the price of hemp. He re
presents the people of the Western States as willing to plunge
our country into war from such interested and base motives. I
will not reason on this point. I see the cause of their ardor,
not in such unworthy motives, but in their known patriotism
and disinterestedness.

No less mercenary is the reason which he attributes to
the Southern States. He says that the Non-Importation
Act has reduced cotton to nothing, which has produced
a feverish impatience. Sir, I acknowledge the cotton of
our plantations is worth but little ; but not for the cause
assigned by the gentleman from Virginia. The people of that
section do not reason as he does ; they do not attribute it to

SPEECHES. 11

the efforts of their government to maintain the peace and in
dependence of their country. They see, in the low price of
their produce, the hand of foreign injustice ; they know well
without the market to the continent, the deep and steady
current of supply will glut that of Great Britain ; they are
not prepared for the colonial state to which again that pow
er is endeavoring to reduce us, and the manly spirit of that
section of our country will not suhmit to be regulated by any
foreign power.

The love of France and the hatred of England have
also been assigned as the cause of the present measures.
France has not done us justice, says the gentleman from
Virginia, and how can we, without partiality, resist the ag
gressions of England. I know, Sir, we have still causes of
complaint against France ; but they are of a different charac
ter from those against England. She professes now to re
spect our rights, and there cannot be a reasonable doubt but
that the most objectionable parts of her decrees, as far as they
respect us, are repealed. We have already formally acknow
ledged this to be a fact. But I protest against the princi
ple from which his conclusion is drawn. It is a novel doc
trine, and nowhere avowed out of this House, that you can
not select your antagonist without being guilty of partiality.
Sir, when two invade your rights, you may resist both or
either at your pleasure. It is regulated by prudence and
not by right. The stale imputation of partiality for France
is better calculated for the columns of a newspaper, than
for the walls of this House.

The gentleman from Virginia is at a loss to account for
what he calls our hatred to England. He asks how can
we hate the country of Locke, of Newton, Hampden, and
Chatham ; a country having the same language and cus
toms with ourselves, and descending from a common ances
try. Sir, the laws of human affections are steady and uni
form. If we have so much to attach us to that country,

12 SPEECHES.

potent indeed must be the cause which has overpowered
it. Yes, there is a cause strong enough ; not in that oc
cult courtly affection which he has supposed to be enter
tained for France ; but it is to be found in continued and
unprovoked insult and injury — a cause so manifest, that
the gentleman from Virginia had to exert much ingenuity
to overlook it. But; the gentleman, in his eager admira
tion of that country, has not been sufficiently guarded in
his argument. Has he reflected on the cause of that admi
ration ? Has he examined the reasons of our high regard
for her Chatham ? It is his ardent patriotism, the heroic
courage of his mind, that could not brook the least insult
or injury offered to his country, but thought that her in
terest and honor ought to be vindicated at every hazard
and expense. I hope, when we are called upon to admire,
we shall also be asked to imitate. I hope the gentleman
does not wish a monopoly of those great virtues for England.
The balance of power has also been introduced, as an
argument for submission. England is said to be a barrier
against the military despotism of France. There is, Sir,
one great error in our legislation. We are ready, it would
seem from this argument, to watch over the interests of for
eign nations, while we grossly neglect our own immediate
concerns. This argument of the balance of power is well
calculated for the British Parliament, but not at all suited
to the American Congress. Tell the former that they have
to contend with a mighty power, and that if they persist
in insult and injury to the American people, they will
compel them to throw their whole weight into the scale of
their enemy. Paint the danger to them, and if they will
desist from injuring us, we, I answer for it, will not disturb
the balance of power. But it is absurd for us to talk about
the balance of power, while they, by their conduct, smile
with contempt at what they regard our simple, good-natured
vanity. If, however, in the contest, it should be found that

SPEECHES. 13

they underrate us — which I hope and believe — and that we
can affect the balance of power, it will not be difficult for us
to obtain such terms as our rights demand.

I; Sir, will now conclude by adverting to an argument of
the gentleman from Virginia, used in debate on a preceding
day. He asked, why not declare war immediately ? The
answer is obvious : because we are not yet prepared. But,
says the gentleman, such language as is here held, will pro
voke Great Britain to commence hostilities. I have no such
fears. She knows well that such a course would unite all
parties here — a thing which, above all others, she most
dreads. Besides, such has been our past conduct, that she
will still calculate on our patience and submission, until
war is actually commenced.

SPEECH

On the Petition of the Citizens of Albany to repeal
the Embargo, delivered in the House of Repre
sentatives, May 6th, 1812.

[NOTE. — On the 4th of April, 1812, a bill, on the recommenda
tion of the President, was passed by Congress, laying an embargo,
for sixty days, on all vessels then in port, or thereafter arriving. Soon
after its passage, petitions were presented from various parts of the
Union for its repeal or modification. Among these, was one from the
citizens of Albany, presented by Mr. Bleecker of New- York, praying
a repeal of the act. Motions were made to postpone it indefinitely,
and to refer it to the Committee on Foreign Kelations. On these
motions, a debate of considerable interest ensued, involving the whole
course of policy recommended by the Executive, and pursued by the
majority during the session. The principal speakers for the postpone
ment were, Messrs. Calhoun, Rhea of Tennessee, Johnson of Ken
tucky, Grundy of Tennessee, and Wright of Maryland. In opposi-

14 SPEECHES.

tion, were Messrs. Randolph of Virginia, Bleecker of New-York, and
Fisk of Vermont. On the motion to postpone indefinitely, Mr. Calhoun
submitted the following remarks.]

MR. SPEAKER : — It is not my intention to discuss the
merits of the embargo law, or to follow the gentleman from
Virginia in that maze of arguments and assertions through
which he has thought proper to wander. The House must
be wearied, and can receive no additional light on a subject
which, through the zeal of some gentlemen in opposition,
has been so frequently dragged into discussion. I cannot
suppose that our opponents, in their importunity, are gov
erned by an expectation that a change will be made in the
opinions of any individual of the majority. This, they must
see, is hopeless. The measure has been too recently adopted,
and after too much deliberation, to leave to the most san
guine any hope of change. To reply, then, to the arguments
of gentlemen on the general merits of the embargo, would
be an useless consumption of time, and an unwarranted in
trusion on the patience of the House. This, as I have
already stated, is not my intention ; but it is my object to
vindicate the motion now under discussion from unmerited
censure, and to prove that it cannot be justly considered as
treating the petitioners with contempt. I am aware that
the right to petition this body is guaranteed by the Consti
tution, and that it is not less our interest than our duty to
receive petitions expressed in proper terms, as this is, with
respect.

Two propositions have been made relative to the dis
position of the petition now before us : one, to refer it to a
committee ; the other — that now under consideration — to
postpone the further consideration to a day beyond the
termination of the embargo. It is contended, not by argu
ment, but assertion, that the former would have been more
respectful to the petitioners ; but the reasons have been left
to conjecture. I ask, then, why would it be more respect-

SPEECHES. 15

ful ? Would it present stronger hopes of success, or admit
as great latitude of discussion on its merits ? Gentlemen
know that it would not ; they well know, when the House
wishes to give the go-by to a petition, it has been usual to
adopt the very motion which, in this instance, they advocate.
On a motion of reference, debate on the merits is precluded ;
and, when referred, the committee, where there are no hopes
of success, usually allow it to sleep. But, Sir, I ask what is
the necessity for referring this petition to a committee ?
What are the objects of a reference ? I conceive them to
be two : one to investigate some matter of fact, and the
other when a subject is much tangled with detail, to digest
and arrange the parts, so the House may more easily com
prehend the whole. This body is too large for either of those
operations, and therefore a reference is had to smaller ones.
In the present case, neither of these furnishes a good reason
for the reference asked for. The facts are not denied, and
as to detail, there is none ; it ends in a point — the repeal of
the embargo law — and it has been so argued in opposition.
This House is as fully competent to discuss its merits now,
as it would be after the report of any committee, and the
motion to postpone admits of the greatest latitude of discus
sion on its merits. This, the speech of the gentleman from
Virginia (Mr. Randolph) has proved. He has argued not
only on the merits of the petition, but on the embargo, and
almost every subject, however remotely connected. I know
that the motion is tantamount to that of rejection, in the
present instance. In fact, it has been vindicated by the
mover on that ground. He has justly said : as we cannot
grant the relief prayed for, we ought to act with promptitude
and decision, so that the petitioners may know what to ex
pect. This motion has that character ; it leaves no expecta
tion where there can be no relief. I know, Sir, we might
have acted very differently : we might have spun out the
hopes of the petitioners. Some may think that it would b<-

16 SPEECHES.

sound policy ; but, in my opinion, it would be unworthy of
this House. Candor, in our government, is one of the first
of political virtues. Let us always do directly, what we in
tend shall finally be done.

Since there can be no objection to the motion now before
the House, it remains to be considered whether the relief
prayed for ought to be granted. I am sensible that the
maxim is generally correct, that individual profit is national
gain ; and that the party interested is the best judge of the
hazard and propriety of a speculation. But there are ex
ceptions ; there are cases in which the government is the best
judge ; and such are those where the future conduct of gov
ernment is the cause of the hazard. It certainly is the best
judge of what it intends ; and, in those cases, where it -fore
sees a hazard, it ought, in humanity to the party interested, to
restrain speculations. Such is the present case. Many of
our merchants labor under a delusion as to the measures of
government : nor can this seem strange, since some gentle
men, even in this House, have taken up such mistaken views
of things. With such conceptions of the course of events,
as the gentleman from New- York (Mr. Bleecker) entertains,
I am not surprised that he should advocate the prayer of the
petition. He believes that the embargo will be permitted to
expire without any hostile measure being taken against Great
Britain ; and that, in the present state of our preparations,
it would be madness to think of war in sixty days, or any
short period. When I hear such language on this floor, I
no longer wonder that merchants are petitioning you to aid
them in making speculations, which in a short time must end
in their ruin. I ask the gentleman from New- York, who
are the true friends to the petitioners — the majority who,
foreseeing the hazard to which they would be exposed, re
strain them from falling into the hands of British cruisers, —
or the minority, who, by suppressing the evidences of danger,
induce them to enter into the most ruinous speculations ?

SPEECHES. 17

By the one, the merchants still retain their property, depre
ciated, it is true, in a small degree ; by the other, it will be
lost to themselves and their country, and will go to augment
the resources of our enemy. For, Sir, let me assure the gen
tleman that he makes a very erroneous estimate of our pre
parations, and of the time at which we will act. Our army
and measures are not merely on paper, as he states. And
were this the proper time and subject, it could be shown that
very considerable advances have been made to put the coun
try into a posture of defence, and to prepare our forces for
an attack on our enemy. We will not, I hope, wait the ex
piration of the embargo to take our stand against England —
that stand which the best interests and honor of this coun
try have so loudly demanded. With such a prospect, I again
ask, would it be humanity or cruelty to the petitioners to
grant their prayer, and, by relaxing the embargo in their fa
vor, to entice them to certain destruction ?

The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Eandolph) stated, —
to induce us to repeal the embargo law, and to make it odi
ous, I suppose, with the community, — that it operated less
severely on the merchant than on the farmer and miller. He
did not prove very distinctly how this unequal pressure was
produced. But I understood him to say, that eastern vessels
could be had with so much facility to make shipments to any
European port, and that flour had risen so much already in
consequence of the embargo, that the rise in price nearly
compensated for the additional risk and costs of exportation,
I observe the gentleman shakes his head in disapprobation
of the statement. I suppose I misunderstood him. How
ever, I could not mistake the conclusion which he drew, —
that the merchants, by eluding the embargo, had prevented
the depreciation of the price of wheat and flour on hand.
This, Sir, is sufficient for my purpose. The gentleman from
Virginia must know that, from the character of trade, the
profit of such trade, if it really exists, cannot be confined to
VOL. n. — 2

18 SPEECHES.

the merchant. It would soon raise the price of breadstuff's
in the hands of the other classes of the community, and
would prove that his statement of the distressed condition of
the millers and farmers cannot be correct.

In his zeal against the embargo, the gentleman from Vir
ginia says, it was engendered between the Committee on For
eign Kelations and the Executive. Engendered ! The gen
tleman must be sensible of the impropriety of such language,
as applied to the Executive, or a Committee of this House.
No, Sir, it was not engendered, but adopted by both the Ex
ecutive and committee, from its manifest propriety as a pre
lude to war. There is no man in his reason, and uninflu
enced by party feelings, but must acknowledge that a war,
in this country, ought, almost invariably, to be preceded by
an embargo. The very persons most loud against that mea
sure, would be the most clamorous had it not preceded the
war. There has been, Sir, much false statement in rela
tion to the embargo. I remember, when it was under dis
cussion on a former occasion, that a gentleman then observed,
he had certain information that the French minister had
been importuning our government to stop the exportation of
breadstuff's to the Peninsula. I know not whether he in
tended to insinuate this as one of the causes of the embargo.
Be it as it may, I assert, from the highest authority, that
no such application has ever been made, directly or indirectly,
on the part of the French government. The statement was
of such a nature as induced me to inquire into its correct
ness ; and the result is such as I have declared. I can
scarcely suppose, that the gentleman intended to convey the
idea that French influence had any thing to do with the
measure. He must know that the Executive, as well as a
majority of this body, would resist, with the greatest indig
nation, any attempt to influence the measures of govern
ment. But such has been the use made of it by certain
prints, either from the manner in which it was connected in

SPEECHES. 19

debate with the embargo, or the very imperfect and unfair
reports of the secret proceedings of Congress.

One would suppose, from the language of the gentleman
from Virginia, that he was much in the secrets of govern
ment. He says, the plan now is, to disband the army and
carry on a predatory war on the ocean. I can assure him, if
such is the plan, I am wholly ignorant of it ; and that,
should it be proposed, it will not meet with my approbation.
I am decidedly of opinion that the best interests of the coun
try will be consulted by calling out the whole force of the
community to protect its rights. Should this course fail,
the next best would be to submit to our enemy with as good
a grace as possible. Let us not provoke where we cannot
resist. The mongrel state — neither war nor peace — is
much the worst.

The gentleman from Virginia has told us much of the
signs of the times. I had hoped, that the age of superstition
was past, and that no attempt would be made to influence
the measures of government, — which ought to be founded
in wisdom and policy, — by the vague, I may say, supersti
tious feelings of any man, whatever may be the physical ap
pearances which may have given birth to them. Are we to
renounce our reason ? Must we turn from the path of jus
tice and experience, because a comet has made its appear
ance in our system, or the moon has passed between the sun
and the earth ? If so, the signs of the times are bad in
deed. It would mark a fearful retrograde in civilization — it
would show a dreadful declension towards barbarism. Sir,
if we must examine the auspices ; if we must inspect the
entrails of the times, I would pronounce the omens good. It
is from moral, and not from brutal or physical omens, that
we ought to judge ; and what more favorable could we desire
than that the country is, at last, roused from its lethargy, and
that it has determined to vindicate its interest and honor.
On the contrary, a nation so sunk in avarice, and so corrupt-

20 SPEECHES.

ed by faction, as to be insensible to the greatest injuries, and
lost to all sense of its independence, would be a sight more por
tentous than comets, earthquakes, eclipses, or the whole cata
logue of omens, which I have heard the gentleman from Virgi
nia enumerate. I assert, and gentlemen know it, if we submit
to the pretensions of England, now openly avowed, the inde
pendence of this country is lost — we will be, as to our com
merce, re-colonized. This is the second struggle for our lib
erty ; and if we but do justice to ourselves, it will be no less
glorious and successful than the first. Let us but exert our
selves, and we must meet with the prospering smile of
Heaven. Sir, I assert it with confidence, a war, just and
necessary in its origin, wisely and vigorously carried on, and
honorably terminated, would establish the integrity and pros
perity of our country for centuries.

SPEECH

On the proposition to repeal the Non-Importation
Act, delivered in the House of Eepresentatives,
June 24th, 1812.

[NOTE. — On June 23d, 1812, immediately after the Declaration
of War, Mr. Cheves, Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means,
reported a Bill, " Partially to suspend, for a limited time, the several
acts prohibiting importations from Great Britain, her dominions,
colonies, and dependencies; and of the produce and manufactures
thereof:" which was read, and referred to the Committee of the
Whole on the state of the Union.

Mr. Richardson of Massachusetts moved to amend the first sec
tion, by striking out all the words after the enacting clause, and in
serting others proposing a total repeal of the whole restrictive
system, as being no longer applicable to the existing state of the

SPEECHES. 21

country. This proposition was negatived by a vote of 69 to 53, when
Mr. Williams of South Carolina moved to strike out the first section
of the Bill, without proposing to insert. Mr. Johnson opposed, and
Mr. Macon supported the motion ; when the committee rose, reported
progress, and asked leave to sit again ; which the House refused to
grant. Mr. Eichardson then renewed his motion to amend ; and Mr.
Williams moved an indefinite postponement of the Bill. This latter
motion was lost by the same vote, and the House adjourned.

June 24. — The House resumed the consideration of the Bill —
Mr. Richardson's proposition being under consideration. It was sup
ported by Messrs. Pearson, Widgery, and Calhoun, and opposed by
Mr. Wright of Maryland, and finally negatived — Ayes, 58; Noes, 61.

On the failure of Mr. Richardson's proposition, Mr. Goldsborough
moved to amend the Bill, so as to permit the importation of all goods
not owned by British subjects. This was lost by a vote of 59 to 60.
Mr. McKini then moved to postpone the Bill to 1st of February, 1813
(a virtual rejection), and the motion prevailed. Mr. Richardson, how
ever, on the day following, offered a resolution for the appointment
of a Select Committee to bring in a Bill to repeal the Non-Importa
tion Act ; which, after a warm debate, was lost by the casting vote of
the speaker, Mr. Clay.]

MR. SPEAKER : — I am in favor of the amendment pro
posed by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Richard
son) ; and, as I differ from many of my friends on the sub
ject, I feel it a duty to present the reasons that will govern
my vote. But, before I proceed to discuss the question, I
wish it to be distinctly understood that, to avoid taxes, forms
no part of my inducement to advocate the proposed repeal.
I am ready to meet them. We are at war. It is wisdom
to make it efficient ; and that system will meet with my
hearty support which renders it the most so, be it more or
less burthensome. I fear not the effect of taxes on the
public mind. The people will support any taxes short of
oppression. Sir, I am not disposed to deny that the Non-
Importation Act has a very sensible effect on the resources of
the enemy : and am willing to admit, that restrictions on

22 SPEECHES.

commerce, as a means of annoyance, ought not to be neglect
ed. I cannot, however, agree with the gentlemen who op
pose this amendment, that a repeal of this act would leave
the trade with Great Britain unembarrassed, or would afford
a great relief to her manufacturers. A state of war is itself
a severe restriction on commerce. The new and circuitous
channel through which trade is compelled to flow ; the ad
ditional hazard and expenses incident to that state ; and the
double duties proposed to be laid on imports, present very
serious impediments — equal, or nearly so, to the Non-Impor
tation Act itself. If, Sir, in some parts of this country,
English goods can now be had at 60 per cent, on the invoice
price, — as I have been informed by some commercial gentle
men, — by repealing this act you will produce no relaxation ;
for the expense and hazard of introduction will, at least, equal
that per cent. By the repeal, the price of such goods will
not sink ; the consumption will not be increased ; nor will
the manufacturer be relieved. We are in the habit of think
ing that prohibition in law is prohibition in fact. It is a
great mistake, which I daily see contradicted in our mer
chants' shops, lined with English manufactures. So far
from entirely preventing their introduction, I believe that
to prohibit is not the most effectual mode to exclude them.
I venture the assertion with confidence, that duties are, at
least, equally effectual. The greatest commercial pressure
that can be obtained, I believe, will be found in duties as
high as the articles introduced can bear, that is, as high as
possible without smuggling. Goods can be introduced
cheaper (of course more abundantly and with a greater con
sumption) under the Non-Importation Act by smuggling,
than under such duties. It is a fact of importance, that
smuggling is more easy under the former than the latter sys
tem ; and, consequently, can be carried on at a less cost.
I beg the attention of the House while I establish this point.
The hazard of smuggling depends on the laws against it, —

SPEECHES. 23

their rigid execution, — the public sentiment, and the in
terests of the mercantile class to permit it. I begin with
the last, for it is the most important, as it controls the others.
Where duties are not so high as to drive the honest trader
from the market, the merchants, as a body, have an interest to
prevent smuggling'. Goods, so introduced, not only defraud
the revenue, but the honest and regular trader. The higher
the duty, the more powerful this principle ; and in this country,
where there is not much competition between many articles
of foreign supply and of domestic manufacture, the duties
may be made very high. In this state of things every honest
merchant becomes a vigilant custom-house officer, stimulated
by a sense of interest. It was this principle which made
smuggling unknown to your laws, previous to the commence
ment of the restrictive system. It was not the number, or
vigilance of your officers. They bore no proportion to the
extent of your coast. But it was hard to smuggle, where
every merchant considered each bale of goods, or cask of
wine, so introduced, as so much loss to his profit. Very
different is the effect of entire prohibition. I cannot speak
of it more concisely or justly than to say, it is the reverse.
Under it, the honest trader of necessity disappears. The
desperate adventurer supplies his place. Commerce ceases
to be a trade — a business of fair and regular gain ; it be
comes a matter of hazard and adventure. The whole class
concerned in carrying it on have one common interest — to
discover flaws in your revenue laws, or elude their operation ;
to lull the vigilance of your custom-house officers, or corrupt
their integrity. Smuggling ceases to be odious. It is no
longer the occupation of an insulated individual, who care
fully conceals from all the world his violation of the laws.
JSTo, it becomes the business of a society, of an entire class of
men, who make a jest of fraud, and consider ingenuity, in
this lawless occupation, as the highest honor. The corrup
tion ends not here ; its infectious influence spreads and con-

24 SPEECHES.

taminates public opinion. But, Sir, under the operation of
heavy duties only, it is reversed. Interest, it is true, con
trols opinion in this, as well as in the other cases, but it pro
duces the opposite effect. Here the smuggler is ranked
with the thief, or with that description of men, who, in
violation of the law, live on the honest gains of others.
From the merchant, the rest of the community takes the
impression, and the smuggler becomes universally odious.
Interest has wonderful control over sentiment. Even the
more refined and elevated — the moral and religious senti
ment — may be considered as ultimately resting on it ; not,
it is true, on that of any one individual, or class of men, but
on the enlarged interest of our kind. Correspondent to
public sentiment will be the laws, or, what is of more import
ance, their execution. In all free governments the laws, or
their execution, cannot be much above the tone of public
opinion. Under the restrictive system, the laws are either
cried down for oppression, or are not executed. Under the
operation of duties only, the merchant himself demands
severe laws, and aids in their rigid execution. He is a
party concerned with his country, and has a common interest
with government. He sees in the laws a friend and pro
tector, and not an oppressor.

Sir, I think the conclusion is strong, that you cannot
extend your commercial pressure on the enemy, beyond, or
at least much beyond, the operation of high duties. It
seems to me to be the ultimate point ; and, if it is a fact
that the double duties are as high as can be borne (of which
I pretend not to have certain knowledge), then, the con
tinuation of the Non-Importation Act will not give much
additional pressure. The repeal, so far from relieving the
English manufacturer, will be scarcely felt in that country.
It is by no means like a repeal in peace, and, without addi
tional burthens, would be unfelt.

But, Sir, I may be asked. Why change, why repeal the

SPEECHES. 25

Non-Importation Act ? If it does not produce any good, it
will not much harm. As it regards our enemy, I readily
admit there is not much reason for its repeal or continuation,
I feel not much solicitude on that point. But, Sir, as it
regards ourselves, the two systems are essentially different.
In the one, the whole gain is profit to the adventurer and
smuggler. The honest dealer is driven out of employment,
and government is defrauded of its revenue. In the other,
an honest and useful class of citizens is maintained in com
fort and ease, and the treasury enriched. Even suppose the
difference in the pressure on the enemy to be considerable,
yet these incidental advantages ought not to be disregarded.
I would not give up for revenue what I suppose to be a good
system ; but when the effects of two measures are nearly
equal in other respects, I would not overlook the exchequer.
It is there, after all, we will find the funds, the sinews of
war. I know the zeal and resources of the country are
great ; but we have not been in the habit of paying taxes ;
we have no system of internal revenue ; and the nature of
the country, and the conflict between the States and general
government, render it difficult, I may say impossible, to
originate one that will not excite discontent. The measure
I advocate will yield you more additional revenue than the
whole of the internal taxes ; and this on goods which would
be introduced in spite of your laws. Consider the relief it
would afford you. The internal taxes might, in a great
measure, be dispensed with ; or, if we choose to give it to
our gallant little navy, the millions thus gained from com
merce, would add to it considerable strength. Bestowed on
our army, it would be better appointed, and enabled to act
with greater vigor and promptitude. Or, if you choose a
different destination, you might keep down the increas
ing volume of public debt ; a thing that ought so nearly
to interest each one of us. The sum of my opinion
then is, that a repeal of the Non-Importation Act will not,

26 SPEECHES.

under existing circumstances, afford much relief to the dis
tresses of England ; and that a commercial pressure, equally
sure and as entire prohibition, and far more salutary for
this country, may be produced by the operation of heavy
duties. There are many who are ready to acknowledge the
truth of this opinion, but fear that the effect on the public
mind both here and in England would be unfortunate.
They dread a change. But I will not admit, that the repeal
would be a material change. Our fixed determination is to
resist England. Can war, can all the impediments to trade
incidental to that state, be considered a change, a yielding ?
No, if they imply a change, it is a wise one — one advancing
from a lower to a higher degree of resistance. We need not
fear any evil effect on public opinion. If there should be
any, it will be but momentary. Our duty is, to pursue the
wisest and the most efficient measures ; — it is the duty of
the people to understand their character — to condemn the
pernicious, and to approve the wise. This they will finally
do. Delusion cannot long exist. As to the impression on
our enemy, he will not find much relief to his starving
manufacturers in a war with this country. He will under
stand the impediments in the way of commerce, — and they
present but little to encourage his hopes.

But, Sir, I condemn this mode of legislating, which does
not adopt or reject measures because in themselves good or
bad, but because of some supposed effect they may produce
on the opinion of our enemy. In all games it is hazardous
to play on the supposed ignorance of your opponent. In
a few instances, it may succeed ; but, in most, he sees your
intention and turns it against yourself.

Sir, I am in hopes, if the measure I advocate should
succeed, it will tend to produce harmony at home. It will
go far to reconcile the mercantile class. Your restrictive
measures have become odious to them ; and though they
may not approve the war, yet they cannot but respect the

SPEECHES. 27

motives which dictated it. The merchants, I hope, will come
to reflect that this is the favorable moment to assert their
rights. The single fact that the parts of the country most
remote from the ocean and least connected with commerce
have entered into this contest for commercial rights with an
ardor and disinterestedness which does them the greatest
honor, proves it to be, of all others the most auspicious
moment. It more than counterbalances all want of prepa
ration. For it is more easy to prepare for war than to
obtain union ; and the former is not more necessary to
victory than the latter. I now tell the commercial gentle
men, if their rights are not protected, theirs is the fault.
With hearty co-operation on their part, victory is certain.

It now remains for me to touch on another and far more
interesting topic ; one which, I confess, has the principal
weight in the formation of my opinions on this subject.
The restrictive system, as a mode of resistance, and a means
of obtaining a redress of our wrongs, has never been a
favorite one with me. I wish not to censure the motives
which dictated it, or to attribute weakness to those who
first resorted to it for a restoration of our rights. Though
I do not think the embargo a wise measure, yet I am far
from thinking it a pusillanimous one. To lock up the
whole commerce of this country ; to say to the most trading
and exporting people in the world, " You shall not trade ;—
You shall not export ; " — to break in upon the schemes of
almost every man in society, is far from weakness, very far
from pusillanimity. Sir, I confess while I disapprove this
more than any other measure, it proves the strength of your
government and the patriotism of the people. The arm of
despotism, under similar circumstances, could not have
coerced its execution more effectually, than the patience
and zeal of the people. But, I object to the restrictive
system ; and for the following reasons : — Because it does-
not suit the genius of our people, — or that of our govern-

28 SPEECHES.

ment, — or the geographical character of the country. We
are a people essentially active. I may say we are pre
eminently so. Distance and difficulties are less to us than
any people on earth. Our schemes and prospects extend
every where and to every thing. No passive system can suit
such a people ; — in action superior to all others ; — in
patience and endurance inferior to many. Nor does it suit
the genius of our institutions. Our government is founded
on freedom and hates coercion. To make the restrictive
system effectual, requires the most arbitrary laws. Eng
land, with the severest penal statutes, has not been able to
exclude prohibited articles ; and even Bonaparte, with all
his power and vigilance, was obliged to resort to the most
barbarous laws to enforce his continental system. Burning has
furnished the only effectual remedy. The peculiar geography
of our country, added to the freedom of its government, greatly
increases the difficulty. With so great an extent of sea-
coast ; with so many rivers, bays, harbors and inlets ; with
neighboring English provinces, which stretch for so great an
extent along one of our frontiers, it is impossible to prevent
smuggling to a large amount.

Besides, there are other and strong objections to this
system. It renders government odious. People are not in
the habit of looking back beyond immediate causes. The
farmer, who inquires why he cannot get more for his produce,
is told that it is owing to the embargo, or to commercial
restrictions. In this he sees only the hands of his own gov
ernment. He does not look to those acts of violence and
injustice, which this system is intended to counteract. His
censures fall on his government. To its measures he at
tributes the cause of his embarrassment, and in their removal
he expects his relief. This is an unhappy state of the public
mind ; and even, I might with truth say, in a government
resting essentially on opinion, a dangerous one.. In war it
is different. The privation, it is true, may be equal, or

SPEECHES. 29

greater ; but the public mind, under the strong impulses of
such a state, becomes steeled against sufferings. The differ
ence is great between the passive and active state of mind.
Tie down a hero, and he feels the puncture of a pin ; but,
throw him into battle, and he is scarcely sensible of vital
gashes. So in war. Impelled, alternately, by hope and
fear ; stimulated by revenge ; depressed with shame, or ele
vated by victory, — the people become invincible. No priva
tions can shake their fortitude ; no calamity can break their
spirit. Even where equally successful, the contrast is
striking. War and restriction may leave the country equally
exhausted ; but the latter not only leaves you poor, — but,
even when successful, dispirited, divided, discontented, with
diminished patriotism, and the manners of a considerable
portion of your people corrupted. Not so in war. In that
state the common danger unites all ; strengthens the bonds
of society, and feeds the flame of patriotism. The national
character acquires energy. In exchange for the expenses of
war you obtain military and naval skill, and a more perfect
organization of such parts of your government as are connected
with the science of national defence. You also obtain the
habits of freely advancing your purse and strength in the
common cause. Sir, are these advantages to be counted as
trifles in the present state of the world ? Can they be meas
ured by a moneyed valuation ?

But, it may be asked, why not unite war and restriction,
and thus call the whole energy of the country into action ?
It is true there is nothing impossible in such an union ; but
it is equally true, that what is gained to the latter is lost to
the former ; and, Sir, the reverse is also true, — that what
is lost to restrictions is gained to the war. My objections to
restrictions without war, equally hold against them in con
junction with it. Sir, I would prefer a single victory over
the enemy, by sea or land, to all the good we shall ever
derive from the continuation of the Non-Importation Act.

30 SPEECHES.

I know not that it would produce an equal pressure on the
enemy ; but I am certain of what is of greater consequence,
— it would be accompanied with more salutary effects on
ourselves. The memory of a Saratoga or Eutaw is immortal.
It is there you will find the country's boast and pride : the
inexhaustible source of great and heroic actions. But what
will history say of restrictions ? What examples worthy of
imitation will it furnish posterity ? What pride, what
pleasure will our children find in the events of such times ?
Let me not be considered as romantic. This nation ought
to be taught to rely on its own courage, its fortitude, its
skill, and virtue, for protection. These are the only safe
guards in the hour of danger. Man was endowed with these
great qualities for his defence. There is nothing about him
that indicates that he must conquer by enduring. He is
not incrusted in a shell ; he is not taught to rely on his
insensibility, his passive suffering, for defence. No, no ; it
is on the invincible mind ; on a magnanimous nature, that
he ought to rely. Herein lies the superiority of our kind ;
it is these that make man the lord of the world. It is the
destiny of our condition, that nations should rise above
nations, as they are endued, in a greater degree, with these
shining qualities. Sir, it is often repeated, that if the Non-
Importation Act is continued, we shall have a speedy peace.
I believe it not. I fear the delusive hope. It will debilitate
the springs of war. It is for this reason, in part, that I wish
it repealed. It is the fountain of fallacious expectations.
I have frequently heard another remark, with no small mor
tification, from some of those who have supported the war ;
viz., that it is only by restrictions we can seriously affect
our enemies. Why then declare war ? Is it to be an ap
pendage only of the Non-Importation Act ? If so, I disclaim
it. It is an alarming idea to be in a state of war, and not
to rely on our courage or energy, but on a measure of peace.
If the Non-Importation Act is our chief reliance, it will soon

SPEECHES. 31

direct our council. Let us strike away this false hope ; let
us call out the resources of the country for its protection.
England will soon find that seven millions of freemen, with
every material of war in abundance, are not to be despised
with impunity. I would be full of hope if I saw our sole
reliance placed on the vigorous prosecution of the war. But
if we are to paralyze it ; if we are to trust, in the moment
of danger, to the operation of a system of peace, I greatly
fear. If such is to be our course, I see not that we have
bettered our condition. We have had a peace like a war.
In the name of Heaven, let us not have the only thing that
is worse — a war like a peace. I trust my fears will not be
realized.

SPEECH

On the Report of the Committee of Ways and Means,
in reference to Merchants' Bonds, delivered in the
House of Representatives, Dec. 4th, 1812.

[NOTE. — This speech so fully explains the circumstances under
which it was delivered, as to make a note unnecessary. It will suffice
to say, for the satisfaction of the reader, that the Committee of the
Whole refused to agree to the Report of the Committee of Ways and
Means, by a vote of 52 to 49: and that, subsequently (Dec. 15th,
1812), a Bill was passed by the Senate, directing the Secretary of the
Treasury to remit the forfeitures incurred by the merchants, — which,
after considerable opposition, was finally agreed to by the House —
Yeas, 64; Nays, 61.]

MB. CHAIRMAN : — The subject now under discussion was
first brought to the notice of Congress, by the following para
graph in the President's Message at the commencement of
the present session :

32 SPEECHES.

" A considerable number of American vessels, which were
in England when the revocation of the Orders in Council
took place, were laden with British manufactures under an
erroneous impression that the Non-Importation Act would
immediately cease to operate, and have arrived in the United
States. It did not appear proper to exercise on unforeseen
cases of such magnitude, the ordinary power vested in the
Treasury Department, to mitigate forfeitures, without pre
viously affording to Congress an opportunity of making, on
the subject, such provision as they may think proper. In
their decision they will doubtless equally consult what is due
to equitable considerations and the public interest."

So much of the message as has been just read, was re
ferred to the Committee of Ways and Means. Their report
constitutes the subject of present deliberation, the material
part of which is as follows :

" On a view of the whole subject, the committee are of
opinion that the Secretary of the Treasury has full power to
remit or mitigate the penalties and forfeitures incurred, should
an interposition, in either way, be called for by the circum
stances of the case ; and, therefore, recommend that it be

" fiesolved, That it is inexpedient to legislate upon the
subject, and that the petitions with the accompanying docu
ments be referred to the Secretary of the Treasury."

My object in presenting to the view of this committee
the President's Message and the Keport, is, to call their at
tention to a total want of accordance between them. It is
almost an abuse of language to call it a report. A report
ought to comprehend the subject of reference, and be, to it,
as a conclusion is to its premises. On reading the report
only, the natural conclusion would be, that we were consulted
as lawyers, and not as statesmen ; that the point of doubt,
in the Executive mind, turned on the construction of our
acts, and not on what justice, humanity, and sound policy
demand. The report informs us, that the Secretary of the

SPEECHES. 33

Treasury has power to remit or mitigate the penalties incur
red ; and, from this fact, it draws that negative proposition
on which we are now deliberating. It is not a little curious
to observe how formally and fully the committee have decid
ed on this power of the Treasury Department, — doubted
neither by the President nor Secretary, — nor, indeed, by any
one ; — while they overlook those interesting considerations,
towards which the Executive has directed the attention of
Congress, viz. : — " What is due to equitable considerations
and to the public interest," in relation to " unforeseen cases of
such magnitude" They are, in truth, cases of magnitude.
Twenty millions of property await your decision ; — a sum
equal nearly to half of the annual exports of this country ; —
and quite equal to the entire export, in the best years, of the
whole country between Washington and New Orleans. It is
difficult to realize magnitude when expressed in numbers
only. To form a just conception, we must aggregate the
whole annual products of cotton, rice and tobacco, with a
large proportion of the breadstuffs of this country. I would
be happy to know on what principle of policy or reason so
large an amount is to be left to the decision of any individual.
Is more wisdom, more virtue, or public confidence to be found
in the Treasury Department, than in the assembled represen
tatives of the Union ? What constitutes a feature in this
report, still more extraordinary and objectionable, is, the
apparent understanding between the committee and the
Treasury Department. They coyly refuse to recommend any
positive act of legislation ; while they, indirectly, intimate
what they wish and expect the Secretary of the Treasury to
do ; — or, in other words, we are called on, really and virtually,
to legislate ; while, at the same time, we are informed that
it is improper for us so to do. For, among the documents
reported by the Committee of Ways and Means, as forming
the basis of their opinion, is a letter of the Secretary of the

VOL. II. — 3

34 SPEECHES.

Treasury of the 23d of November, which contains the follow*
ing paragraph :

" Upon the whole, I continue in the opinion, submitted
with great deference to the committee, — that one-half of
the forfeitures which would otherwise fall to the collectors,
ought to be remitted ; but that, with respect to the one-half
belonging to the United States, justice to the community re
quires, that, when remitted, at least an equivalent may be
secured to the public for the extra profit beyond that on
common importations, which arises from the continuation of
the Non-Importation Act."

Here, Sir, the opinion of the Secretary is explicitly stated
relative to these unforeseen cases of such magnitude, and the
conclusion is irresistible, that the committee, in referring
them to his decision, must have known and approved of it.

The true question, then, before the committee, is not to
be found in that negative resolution reported by the Commit
tee of Ways and Means,- — that it is inexpedient to legislate
on these cases, — but in that part of the letter of the Secre
tary of the Treasury which I have just read. Yes, Sir ;
we are now deliberating, in effect, on the proposition whether
it is proper to exact of the merchants their extra profit ;
and whether, in such case, this ought to be done through the
agency of the Treasury Department. I presume the truth
of this opinion will not be controverted ; should it be, how
ever, ample proof will be found in almost every sentence of
the report of the speeches of the gentlemen in support of it.
They are literally compounded of laborious investigations to
ascertain the extra profit of the merchants on their late im
portations.

Now, Sir, — without pretending to controvert the policy
of taking extra profit, — I assert that it cannot be legally ef
fected through the Secretary of the Treasury. It exceeds
liis powers. The Non-Importation Act, under which the for
feitures accrued, refers to the Act of 1797 to ascertain the

SPEECHES. 35

powtrs of the Secretary in relation to cases of this kind. On
reference to that act, his power will be found to be strictly
a mitigating and remitting power, and has for its object the
remedy of an imperfection incidental to all human laws. The
best worded act must comprehend many cases within the let
ter, that are not within its spirit or intention. In every well
regulated government, an equity exists somewhere to remedy
this defect — to mitigate the rigor of the law. The act of
'97, for greater security of the revenue, vests this power, in
relation to our revenue laws, in the head of the Treasuiy
Department. The real object of those laws is, to punish
only the negligent or wilful violators ; but, like other penal
acts, they are couched in general terms, and comprehend
those who by necessity or ignorance violate them. That the
Treasury might be secured, and the law, at the same time,
administered in its spirit and intention only, and not in its
letter merely, this power was delegated to the Secretary of
the Treasury. To establish the correctness of this exposi
tion, I will read the Act of '97.

[Here Mr. C. read the Act.]

Now, Sir, though I admit, with the report, "that the
Secretary of the Treasury has power to mitigate or remit,"
I do most unequivocally deny, that he has legal power to ef
fect what is proposed to be done by the committee ; — viz. : —
to levy the extra profit. The two powers are essentially dif
ferent. The one is of a judicial and equitable character, and
has for its object guilt or innocence ; — the other that of as
sessment or taxation, and has for its object, not guilt or
innocence, but profit. The latter is strictly a moneyed trans
action ; the former relates to the administration of the
penal laws of the country. The one is fully and faithfully
administered, when due regard is had to all the circumstan
ces as they constitute guilt or innocence, and the law applied
accordingly ; — the other, when a proper and correct estimate

36 SPEECHES.

is made of the actual profits of trade, compared with those
on the late importations, and the difference only levied.

The power of the Secretary, under the Act of '97, is not
arbitrary ; — to be exercised or not according to his pleasure ;
but he is bound to exercise it according to the rules of a
sound discretion. If guilt appear, he cannot arrest the law ;
if innocence, he cannot apply it. The effects of the two
powers strangely mark their contrariety. When circum
stances of guilt or innocence only, govern the Treasury in
the exercise of this power, the consequence is, love and rev
erence for the laws ; — but if they are disregarded, and the
profits of the merchants only considered, in the place of such
sentiments, there will be disgust and hatred. You may, in
deed, have a full treasury, but you will find empty affections.
More need not be said, I hope, to prove that the extra pro
fits cannot be taken from the merchants, under the power of
the Treasury Department to mitigate or remit forfeitures.
If it be essentially a taxing power, it not only has not been
delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury by the Act of '97,
but cannot be by any act of ours. It is a power which the con
stitution has sacredly deposited in Congress. It is incommu
nicable. I am aware, that the extra profit may be taken under
the semblance of the mitigating power ; — that the forfeiture
may be made subject to its operation. But this cannot change
the nature of the transaction. The question will still be, — Is
it a moneyed transaction, or a fair administration of the penal
laws of the country ? Is the object profit, or the execution of
the laws ? The circumstances of the case will readily decide
its character. Profit and justice are not easily confounded.
It is not an unusual thing for power to assume a guise ; and
even to appear to be the very opposite of what it really is.
I impute no blame to the Committee of Ways and Means.
They have overlooked the character of the power which they
wish the Secretary of the Treasury to exercise. It is an act
of inadvertence ; but not the less, on that account, to be re-

SPEECHES. 37

sisted. Precedent is a dangerous thing ; and it is not unu
sual for executive power, unknown even to those who exercise
it, to make encroachments of this kind. What has heen the
end of all free governments, but open force, or the gradual
undermining of the legislative by the executive power ? The
peculiar construction of ours by no means exempts it from
this evil ; but, on the contrary, were it not for the habits of
the people, would naturally tend that way. The operation
of this government is an interesting problem. I wish to see
the whole in full possession of its primitive power, but all of
the parts confined to their respective spheres. These, Sir,
are my reasons for rejecting the report of the committee. I
know, it will be said, that it is much easier to censure than
to advise — to reject the report, than to point out what
ought to be done. I am ready to acknowledge it, and to
confess, that I have felt much solicitude and difficulty on
this subject. But the view which the committee has pre
sented, has constituted no part of my embarrassment. I am
entirely averse to taking any part of the extra profit, whe
ther through the agency of the Treasury Department, or of
this House.

If our merchants are innocent, they are welcome to their
good fortune ; if guilty, I scorn to participate in their profits.
I will never consent to make our penal code the basis of our
Ways and Means, or to establish a partnership between the
Treasury and the violators of the Non-Importation Act. The
necessity of causing our restrictive system to be respected,
while in existence, and the difficulty of applying its penal
ties to " cases of such magnitude" constitute my embarrass
ment. On the one hand, if the law should be rigidly en
forced, thousands will be involved in ruin ; on the other, if
an act of grace should be done, your restrictive system will
be endangered. Had the conduct of the merchants been
dictated by any open contempt of the laws, or had it been
entirely free from blame, our course would have been plain.

38 SPEECHES.

No one would have hesitated, in the one case, to have let the
vengeance of the law fall on the guilty ; or, in the other, to
extend its protection to the innocent. I am ready to ac
knowledge that the importers were not sufficiently circum
spect and guarded. The nature of the restrictive system,
the posture of affairs, the decision of this House on a motion
to repeal the Non-Importation Act, ought to have put them
on their guard. Candor also compels me to state, that I
cannot admit any arguments on this question to prove the
impolicy of the Non-Importation Act, or the advantages to
the community from the late importations. I can never ad
mit, as an apology for the violation of the law, what was
considered as an insufficient reason for its suspension.
Neither can I doubt that even the worst of laws ought to be
respected, while they remain laws. But, Sir, the difficulty
on the other side appears to me more formidable. An indis
criminate forfeiture would not, I fear, be considered as pun
ishment. It would be thought oppression. Punishment,
by the infliction of a partial evil, proposes to avoid a greater
— by making some the subjects of its pains, to make all the
subjects of its terrors. The culprits, in this case, are too nu
merous for example ; particularly as the infraction of the law
is of a doubtful character. This is by no means an unusual
case ; numbers have often brought impunity. It is so in
the worst of crimes, even in treason, where, in some instances,
a considerable portion of the community is involved. Some
gentlemen who have felt this embarrassment, have proposed
to distinguish for punishment the head and leaders of this
infraction of the law. My friend from Kentucky (the
Speaker) has designated two classes to be favored — the pur
chasers of British goods before the 2d of February, 1811,
and the shippers before the first of August last ; that is, be
fore the declaration of war had reached England. The first
class is to be favored, from a supposed innocence of pur
chase ; the other, from innocence of shipments. It is not

SPEECHES. >

necessary to prove the error of the discrimination. If true,
it does not extend as far as it ought to do. For, if innocence
of purchase is a sufficient reason for exemption, how can we
condemn the goods purchased before the first of August ?
If shipments might be made before that period, surely pur
chases might ; and if the last, then, according to the dis
tinction in favor of purchases before the 2d of February,
they also ought to be exempted from the forfeitures. The
cases, then, are too uniform for discrimination, and nothing
remains but to condemn or acquit the whole. I feel myself
compelled to yield to the magnitude of the case. I cannot
find it in me to reduce thousands to beggary by a single
stroke, nor do I suppose there is one in this House in favor
of so stern a policy. I am ready to acknowledge that an act
of grace will weaken the non-importation law ; but this is
a less evil than the alienation of the whole mercantile class.
It is left us to regret, that the wise foresight of my two
honorable friends and colleagues was not adopted at the last
session. It was then proposed to suspend the law for the
introduction of this very property ; but the proposition was
borne down by the clamor of the day. Had that been
done, we would not have been reduced to our present state.
Our laws would have been saved, and our merchants con
tented.

A subject not necessarily involved in that under dis
cussion, has been introduced by those who have preceded me
in the debate. In imitation of the example, I will be ex
cused, I hope, in offering my sentiments on the restrictive
system. It is known that I have not been a friend to that
system to the extent to which it has been carried. My ob
jection, however, is neither against the inequality nor the
greatness of its pressure. It is the duty of every section to
bear whatever the general interest may demand ; and I, Sir,
am proud in representing a people pre-eminent in the exer
cise of this virtue. Carolina makes no complaint about the

40 SPEECHES.

difficulties of the times. If she feel embarrassments, she
turns her indignation not against her own government, but
against the common enemy. She makes no comparative
estimate of her sufferings with those of the other States. She
would be proud to stand pre-eminent in suffering, if, by this,
the general good could be promoted ; and she, this day, pre
sents the noble spectacle of a people acquiring increased
union and energy from the force of the pressure ; and, so far
from growing tired of the restrictive system, or war, as inti
mated by the gentleman from Kentucky, she would willingly
bear a superadded embargo, if the public interest should de
mand it. But, Sir, my- objections are of a general and
national character. Your character, your government and
country, forbid a resort to this system for a redress of wrongs.
It requires a sternness of execution approaching despotism.
It first offers a vast premium for its violation, and then
has to combat with the spirit of speculation, the cupidity
and capital of the mercantile classes. To render its execu
tion perfect, you must not only remove the inducement, but
arrest speculations, particularly those which are founded on
the probable course of political events. The subject before
us is in point ; and you will, from the same causes, be in
volved in this very dilemma annually ; nay, more frequently,
should the treasury participate in the profits. To render
your system perfect, you must imitate its successful execu
tion in another country. Bonaparte is the only man who
has a perfect knowledge of its genius. Burning and confis
cation are the only effectual securities. A partial execution
involves the most pernicious consequences. The conclusion
is irresistible. The system does not suit you. You are too
enterprising, too free, and your coast too extended, with too
many indentations of rivers, bays, and harbors. The effects
of a few years' operation will change your mercantile charac
ter. In such a state of things, the honest merchant must
retire. He cannot live ; but his place will not be unoccu-

SPEECHES. 41

pied. The desperate adventurer and the smuggler •will suc
ceed him. Unaided by the virtue of the citizen, no law,
however severe its sanctions, will be able to stem the torrent.
There is, indeed, one species of restriction, which, in a British
war, ought never to be neglected. Whatever pressure can
be produced on her manufacturing and commercial interests,
through heavy duties, ought to be effected. The reason is
obvious : it is both restriction and revenue. So much of
the capital of this country is turned towards foreign com
merce, that you cannot safely neglect this source of revenue.
Nor is its restrictive character inconsiderable. The assertion
may seem strange ; but, in my opinion, this system secures
the highest practical and continued pressure that can be pro
duced. To say nothing of the perpetual violations of pro
hibitory acts by smuggling, they are subject to occasional re
laxations, by which the country becomes inundated with
British goods. At the end of the last session, I recommended
high duties as a substitute for the Non-Importation Act. Un
der that system, the quantity of goods imported would not
have been greater than it now is ; but your treasury would
have been in a much better condition ; nor should we have
had the present contest about extra profits ; they would have
passed into the treasury in the shape of duties. High duties
have no pernicious effects, and are consistent with the genius
of the people and the institutions of the country. It is thus
we would combine, in the greatest degree, the active resources
of the country with pressure on the manufactures of the
enemy. Your army and navy would feel the invigorating
effect. The war would not sicken the patriot's hope, and de
feat some of its most valuable anticipated consequences.
You would have the means of filling the ranks of the regular
army, and be no longer compelled to rely on the hazardous
aid of volunteers and militia. Victory, peace, and national
honor, — I was going to say, glory, — (but experience has
taught me how that word is received in this House), would

42 SPEECHES.

be the welcomed result of a vigorous war. But, Sir, if we
must have one or the other, — either all war or all restrictions.
— I would prefer the former. Suppose either would bring
the enemy to our terms. Even in victory they are unequal.
By restriction, you have nothing but the success ; while the
assertion of our national rights by arms, creates those quali
ties which amply compensate for the privation and expense
incidental to that state. Admit that the Tripolitans could
have been coerced to terms by non-importation acts, and that
we had resorted to restriction rather than arms, could we have
this day boasted of our naval victories ? The Mediterranean
war was the school of our naval virtue. It has elevated the
hopes of our country. We may now look forward to the day,
with confidence, when we shall be no longer insulted and in
jured on the high road of nations, with impunity. Besides,
the non-importation system, as a redress of wrongs, is radi
cally defective. You may meet commercial restrictions with
commercial restrictions ; but you cannot safely confront pre
meditated insult and injury with commercial restrictions
alone. I utter not this from the fervor of my feelings, but
it is the deliberate result of my best judgment. It sinks the
nation in its own estimation ; it counts as nothing what is
ultimately connected with our best hopes — the union of-
these States. Our Union cannot safely stand on the cold cal
culations of interest alone. It is too weak to withstand politi
cal convulsions. We cannot, without hazard, neglect that
which makes men love to be members of an extensive com
munity — the love of greatness — the consciousness of strength.
So long as American is a proud name, we are safe ; but the
day we are ashamed of it, the Union is more than half
destroyed.

SPEECHES. 43

SPEECH

On the New Army Bill, delivered in the House of
Representatives, January 14th, 1813.

[NOTE.— Dec. 14th, 1812. The Committee on Military Affairs
reported to the House, a Bill to raise twenty additional regiments of
infantry to serve for one year, unless sooner discharged. This Bill,
both in Committee of the Whole and in the House, had a very full
discussion, which, as usual, turned more on questions connected with
the policy and expediency of the war, than on its own intrinsic
merits. Mr. Calhoun delivered this speech near the close of the
debate. The Bill passed by a vote of ayes, 77 ; nays, 42.]

MR. SPEAKER : — I can offer nothing more acceptable,
I presume, to the House, than a promise not to discuss the
Orders in Council, French decrees, blockades, or embargoes.
I am induced to avoid these topics for several reasons. In
the first place, they are too stale to furnish any interest to
this House or the country. Gentlemen who have attempted
it, with whatever abilities, have failed to command attention ;
and it would argue very little sagacity on my part, not to
be admonished by their want of success. Indeed, whatever
interest may have been at one time attached to these sub
jects is now lost. They have passed away ; and will not
soon, I hope, return into the circle of politics. Yes, Sir,
reviled as have been our country's efforts to curb belligerent
injustice — weak and contemptible as she has been repre
sented to be in the scale of nations, she has triumphed in
breaking down the most dangerous monopoly ever attempted
by one nation against the commerce of another. I will not
stop to inquire whether their triumph is attributable to the
Non-Importation Act, or to the menace of war, or, (what is
more probable,) to the last, operating on the pressure pro-

44 SPEECHES.

duced by the former, — the fact is certain that the Orders in
Council of 1807 and 1809, — which our opponents have
often said, that England would never yield, as they made a
part of her commercial system, — are now no more. The
same firmness, if persevered in, which has carried us thus far
with success, will, as our cause is just, end in final victory.
A further reason why I shall not follow our opponents into
the region of documents and records, is, that I am afraid of
a decoy ; as I am induced to believe, from appearances, that
their object is to draw our attention from the merits of the
question. Gentlemen have literally buried their arguments
under a huge pile of quotations ; and wandered so far into
this realm of paper, that neither the vision of this House has
been, nor that of the country will be, able to follow them.
There the best and worst reasons share an equal fate. The
truth of the one, and the error of the other, are covered in
like obscurity.

Before I proceed further, I will make a few observations
in reply to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Kandolph),
who spoke yesterday. He complained of the desertion of
his former associates from the minority principles of "98.
These principles, he said, consisted in an opposition to the
general government, in relation to the States, — and to poli
tical rights, in relation to individuals.

I was, at one moment, almost induced to suspect the
gentleman of a desertion of his own principles ; for scarcely
had he finished this part of his subject, before he passed a
highly-wrought eulogy on the Father of his Country — on that
man whose whole life indicated the strongest leaning on the
side of the government of his country. I beg the gentleman
to reflect whether his definition of minority principles suits
the character of Washington's administration ? and if not,
with what propriety both can be praised almost in the same
breath. Whether, indeed, the principles of "98 are such as
the gentleman has represented them to be, I will not inquire,

SPEECHES. 45

because not necessary to my argument. But if they are, in
truth, those of the gentleman and his present associates,
I should be happy to know with what countenance they
can request the people of this country to put the government
into their hands. Trust the government to those who are
hostile to it ! who prefer their own interest and rights, to
its interest and rights ! If our opponents are, in reality, in
favor of such principles, patriotism ought to persuade them to
add one other, — and that is, ever to remain in a minority.
There they may, perhaps, be of some use ; at least, they
will not be dangerous ; but put them in power, and let them
act up to what they profess, and destruction would be cer
tain. If the gentleman from Virginia is anxious to know
the real cause of the separation of his former associates from
him, he must look for it in his present political creed, and
that of those with whom he is now united. He will there
find an article which had no place in his, in '98 : and which,
then, as well as now, was reprobated by those who consti
tute the present majority. This article is only an enlarge
ment of the minority principles, as defined by the gentleman ;
— it is, opposition to our country in relation to England.
The proof of this article is of the same kind, and no less
clear than the others. For, what encroachment of England
on our neutral rights, from the interruption of our carrying
trade, down to the moment that war was declared — which
one of the innumerable insults and injuries to which we have
been subjected, has the opposition either not palliated or
justified ? and what effort of our country to resist, which has
not been reprobated and opposed ?

I will not multiply proofs on a course of conduct, the
bad effect of which was too sensibly felt to be easily for
gotten, and the continuation of which was but too apparent
in the present discussion. For what is the object of the
opposition in this debate ? To defeat the passage of this
bill ? It has been scarcely mentioned ; and contains no-

46 SPEECHES.

thing to raise that storm which has been excited against it.
The bill proposes to raise twenty thousand men only, and
that for one year ; and surely there is nothing in that calcu
lated to lay such strong hold on the jealousies or fears of the
community. What, then, is the object of the opposition ?
Gentlemen certainly do not act without an intention ; and
wide as has been the range of debate, it cannot tte so lawless
as to be without an object. It is not, I repeat, to defeat the
passage of this bill ; no, but what is much more to be
dreaded, to thwart that which the bill proposes to advance —
the final success of the war ; and, to effect this purpose, I
must do the opposition the credit to say, they have resorted
to the most effectual means. In a free government, — in a
government of laws, — two things are necessary for the effec
tual prosecution of any great measure : the law, by which
the executive officer is charged with the execution, and
vested with suitable powers ; and the co-operating zeal and
union of the people, who are always indispensable agents.
Opposition, to be successfttl, must direct its efforts against
the passage of the law ; or, what is more common, and gen
erally more effectual, to destroy the union and the zeal of
the people. Either, if successful, is effectual. The former
would, in most cases, be seen and reprobated ; the latter,
much the more dangerous, has, to the great misfortune of
republics, presented, at all times, a ready means of defeating
the most salutary measures. To this point the whole argu
ments of opposition have converged. This gives a meaning
to every reason and assertion which has been advanced,
however wild and inconsistent. No topic has been left un
touched ; no passion unessayed. The war has been repre
sented as unjust in its origin, disastrous in its progress, and
desperate in its further prosecution. As if to prevent the
possibility of doubt, a determination has been boldly asserted
not to support it.

Such is the opposition to the war, which was admitted,

SPEECHES. 47

on all sides, to be just ; and which, in a manner, received
the votes even of those who now appear to be willing to ruin
the country in order to defeat its success. For, let it be
ever remembered, that the bill to raise twenty-five thousand
men passed this House (January, 1812) almost unanimously,
though it was distinctly announced for what object it was
intended. How will gentlemen relieve themselves from this
dilemma ? Was it their object to embarrass the adminis
tration ? Will they dare to make a confession, which would
so strongly confirm the motive that has been assigned to
them ? A gentleman from New- York (Mr. Emmot) felt
the awkwardness of the situation ; and, in his endeavor to
explain, has made an admission which ought ever to exclude
him and his friends from power. He justified his vote on
the ground that he was in favor of the force as a peace es
tablishment. A peace establishment of thirty-five thousand
men ! [Mr. E. explained that he did not mean as a peace
establishment ; but that the posture of affairs, at that time,
demanded it.] At any rate (continued Mr. C.), I hope to
hear nothing more about the enormous expense of the war ;
since the principal expense ought to have been incurred, in
the gentleman's opinion, even had it not been resorted to.
Well might the opposition admit the justice of the war. For
years the moderation of the government (I might almost
say), its excessive love of peace, strove to avoid the contest.
We bore all that an independent nation could bear ; not,
indeed, with patience, but in the hopes of returning justice
on the part of our enemy.

I cannot omit noticing the attempt made by the gentle
man from New-York, to palliate the conduct of England in
relation to one of the causes of the war. I allude to the
blockade of 1806. The gentleman contended that it was a
relaxation of the law of nations in our favor ; and, of conse
quence, must be considered by us in the light of a benefit.
It surely cannot be necessary to trace the gentleman through

48 SPEECHES.

his laborious discussion on this point, in order to expose the
error of so extraordinary a conclusion. What ? That an
advantage to this country, which we have struggled so much
to avoid ! That a relaxation on the part of England, which
she has so obstinately refused to yield ! Flushed with his
supposed victory on this subject, the gentleman undertook,
what might be considered even a more difficult task, to
remove the Orders in Council as a cause of war. Sir, I de
spair o'f replying to such arguments.

But it is objected, that the report of the Committee on
Foreign Kelations has stated the orders of 1807, as a cause
of war, though repealed by those of 1809. It is a sufficient
justification of the report, that it has stated the facts on
this, as well as all other points, precisely as they existed ;
and well might the report enumerate the orders of 1807 as a
cause of war, when those of 1809 openly avow the principles
of the former, and only modify their operation to the then
existing circumstances. But, says another gentleman from
New- York (Mr. Bleecker), we were inveigled into the war by
the perfidy of France. She did not fairly repeal her decrees.
Be it so ; and what then ? Were we bound *to submit to
England, because France refused to do us justice ? Have we
no power of election between ruffians ? Where will the
absurdity of such arguments end ? The right to select was
perfect in us ; and, without reference to the conduct of
France, the selection might, and ought to have fallen on
England.

If, Sir, the origin of the war furnish no sufficient justifi
cation for opposition to it, in vain will our opponents fly for
refuge to its continuation. The Orders in Council, say they,
are now no more ; and why should the war be persisted in,
after its cause is removed ? My reply to the question is, —
that it is continued from no project of ambition, or desire of
conquest ; but from a cause far more sacred, — the liberty of
our sailors, and their redemption from slavery. Yet the war

SPEECHES. 49

is opposed — even attempted to be defeated — by the friends,
connections and neighbors of these brave defenders of our
national rights and honor. It is even asked, why should we
feel so lively an interest in their fate ? In vain are such ar
guments urged. The country will not forget its duty, — the
first of political duties, — that of protection. Our opponents
may find no motive in connection or neighborhood ; but the
country will in its obligations. The friends of commerce
may evince their attachment to its profits and luxuries
only ; but the government will not, on that account, cease
to respect the liberty of the citizen, and the enlarged in
terests of commerce, by protecting from English slavery
the sailors, by whose toil and peril it is extended to every
sea. Provided they have commerce and profit, it seems the
injury and insult go for nothing with the opposition. Such
a commerce may, indeed, bloat the country, but it will not
contribute to its real strength. It subtracts more from the
spirit, than it adds to the wealth of the community.

But, say our opponents, as they were opposed to the war,
they are not bound to support it ; and so far has this opin
ion been carried, that we have been accused almost of vio
lating the right of conscience in denying the position as
sumed by gentlemen. The right to oppose the efforts of our
country, while in war, ought to be established beyond the
possibility of doubt, before it can be justly adopted as the
basis of conduct. How conscience can be claimed in this
case, cannot be very easily imagined. We propose no Bill
of pains and penalties ; we only assert, that the opposition
experienced cannot be dictated by love of country ; and that
it is inconsistent with the obligation which every citizen is
under to promote the prosperity of the republic. Its neces
sary tendency is, to prostrate the country at the feet of the
enemy, and to elevate a party on the ruins of the republic.
Until our opponents can prove that they have a right which
is paramount to the public interest, we must persist in deny-
VOL. n. — i

50 SPEECHES.

ing that they are justified in their attempts to thwart the
success of the war. War has been declared by a law of
the land ; and what would be thought of similar attempts to
defeat any other law, however inconsiderable its object ?
Who would dare to avow an intention to defeat its opera
tion ? Can that, then, be true in relation to war which
would be reprobated in every other case ? Can that course
be right, which, when the whole physical force of the country
is needed, withdraws half of that force ? Can that be true
which gives the greatest violence to party animosity ? What
would have been thought of such conduct in the war of the
Kevolution ? Many good citizens, friendly to the liberty of
the country, were opposed to the declaration at the time ;
but could they have been justified in such opposition as we
now experience ? To terminate the war through discord and
weakness is a hazardous experiment. But, in the most un
just and inexpedient war, it can scarcely be possible that
disunion and defeat can have a salutary operation. In the
numerous examples which history furnishes, let an instance
be pointed out, in any war, where the public interest has
been promoted by divisions, or injured by concord. Hun
dreds of instances may be cited of the reverse. Why, then,
will gentlemen persist in that course where danger is almost
unavoidable, and shun that where safety is almost certain ?

But, Sir, we are told that peace is in our power without
a farther prosecution of the war. Appeal not, say our oppo
nents, to the fear, but to the generosity of our enemy. Eng
land yields nothing to her fears ; stop, therefore, your prepa
rations, and throw yourself on her mercy, and peace will be
the result. We might indeed have pardon, but not peace on
such terms. They, who think the war a sacrilege or a crime,
might consistently adopt such a course ; but we, who know
it to be in maintenance of the just rights of the communitj',
never can. We are further told, that impressment of sea
men was not considered a sufficient cause of war ; and are

SPEECHES. 51

asked, why should it be continued on that account ? Indi
vidually (said Mr. Calhoun) I do not feel the force of the
argument ; for it has been my opinion, that the nation was
bound to resist so deep an injury, even at the hazard of war.
But, admitting its full force, the difference is striking be
tween the commencement and the continuance of hostilities.
War ought to be continued until its rational object — a per
manent and secure peace, is obtained. Even the friends
of England ought not to desire the termination of the war,
without a satisfactory adjustment of the subject of impress
ment. It would leave the root, that must necessarily shoot
up in future animosity and hostilities. America can never
quietly submit to the deepest of injuries. Necessity may
compel her to yield for a moment, but it will be to watch
the growth of national strength, and to seize the first favor
able opportunity to seek redress. The worst enemy to the
peace of the two countries, could not desire a more effectual
means to propagate eternal enmity.

But it is said, that we ought to offer to England suitable
regulations on this subject, to secure to her the use of her
own seamen ; and, because we have not, we are the aggres
sors. Sir, I deny that we are bound to tender any regula
tions. England is the party injuring. She ought to confine
her seamen to her own services ; or, if that be impractica
ble, propose such arrangements, that she might exercise her
right without injury to us. This is the rule that governs all
analogous cases in private life. But we have made our offer ;
it is, that the ship should protect the sailor. It is the most
simple and only safe rule. But to secure so desirable a
point, the most liberal and effectual provisions ought and
have been proposed to be made on our part, to guard the
British government against the evil it apprehended, viz., the
loss of its seamen.

The whole doctrine of protection, heretofore relied on,
and still recommended by the gentleman from Connecticut

52 SPEECHES.

(Mr. B.), is false and derogatory to our honor ; and under no
possible modification can effect the desirable object of afford
ing safety to our sailors, and securing the future harmony of
the two countries. ISTor can it be doubted, that if governed
by justice, England would yield to the offer of our govern
ment, particularly, if what the gentleman from New- York
(Mr. Bleecker) says, be true, that there are ten thousand of
her seamen now in our service. She would be greatly the
gainer by the arrangement. Experience, it is to be feared,
however, will teach that gentleman, that the evil lies much
deeper. The use of her seamen is a mere pretence. The
blow is aimed at our commercial greatness. It is this which
has animated and directed all of her injurious councils to
wards this country. England is at the same time a trading
and a fighting nation ; two occupations naturally at variance,
and most difficult to be united. War limits the number
and extent of the markets of a belligerent — makes a variety of
regulations necessary — and produces heavy taxes, which are
inimical to the prosperity of manufactures, and consequently
commerce. These causes combined give to trade new chan
nels, which direct it naturally to neutral nations. To coun
teract this tendency, England, under various, but flimsy
pretences, has endeavored to support her commercial supe
riority by monopoly. It has been our fortune to resist with
no inconsiderable success this spirit of monopoly. Her prin
cipal object in contending for the right of impressment, is to
have, in a great measure, the monopoly of the sailors of the
world. A fixed resistance will compel her to yield this point,
as she has already done her Orders in Council. Success will
amply reward our exertions. Our future commerce will feel
its invigorating effects.

But, say gentlemen, England will never yield this point,
and every effort on our part to secure it is hopeless. To
confirm this prediction and secure our reverence, the proph
ecies of the last session are relied on. I feel no disposition

SPEECHES. 53

to disparage the talents of our opponents in this line ; yet I
very much doubt whether the whole chapter of woes has been
fulfilled. I ask, for instance, whether so much as related to
sacked towns, bombarded cities, ruined commerce, and revolt
ing blacks, has been realized ? I am sorry to find a gentle
man from Virginia (Mr. Sheffey) not yet cured of his fears
in relation to tlu's last prediction. I would be glad to know
what are his intentions. — His assertions give equal notice to
the House, the enemy and the country. If clanger indeed
exist, he has acted with such imprudence as ought to subject
him to the censure of every reflecting man ; but I acquit the
gentleman, as I do not apprehend any danger. I cannot
admit an increased danger from a state of war — a state in
which the public force and vigilance are, of necessity, the
greatest. But to return to the point, our cause is not so
hopeless as represented by our opponents. On the contrary,
if we only persevere, we have every reason, under present
circumstances, to anticipate ultimate success. The enemy
is engaged in a contest in Europe, which requires his whole
power. We have already compelled him to yield a point,
which, but the last year, it was prophesied, he never
would. The Orders in Council are now no more — that sys
tem* by which it was vainly attempted to monopolize our
trade, and to recolonize the American people. But if Eng
land will not yield, we can perish as well as she. Our
republican virtue is as obstinate as her imperial pride, and
our duty to our citizens as unyielding, as her prerogative
over her subjects.

An attempt has been made to shake our fortitude by a
cry of French alliance. It has been boldly said, that we are
already united with that country. We united with France ?
We have the same cause ? No ; her object is dominion,
and her impulse, ambition. Ours is the protection of the
liberty of our sailors. But, say our opponents, we are con
tending against the same country. What then ? Must we

54 SPEECHES.

submit to be outlawed by England, in order that she may
not be by France ? Is the independence of England dearer
to us than our own ? Must we enter the European struggle
not as an equal, consulting our peculiar interest, but be
dragged into it as the low dependant, the slave of England ?
The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Kandolph) has told
us, that we are contending against religion in the person of
England — that she is, in a word, the patroness of Christianity.
Unhappy country ! Doomed to submission to preserve the
purity of religion ! Doomed to slavery, that England may
be independent ! Because Bonaparte is not a Protestant,
you must surrender your rights ! Because he is a despot,
you dare not resist ! What does the gentleman intend ? Is
it his wish, by thus dragging into the heat of political debate
the sacred cause of religion, to promote its interests or that
of a faction ? If the former, let him point out an instance in
ancient or modern times when the junction of religion and
politics has not been fatal to the interest of both. It is this
unnatural union which has engendered the foulest progeny of
human woes. History is full of its disasters, and the gentle
man is too familiar with its pages to require a particular
recital. If the gentleman's intention is not to advance the
cause of religion, but to promote the views of a party, words
cannot truly describe its real character. It is a trick that
has been, and still continues to be practised on the too easy
credulity of our nature. Its frequency, however, does not
change its nature ; it may indeed furnish some apology, that
those who practise it are led into it without due reflection on
its character ; but when understood, what can be more shock
ing, than that this, the most sacred of all things, the medium
of divine communion, our consolation as mortals, should be
prostrated to the gratification of some of the worst feelings
of the human heart ? Such then is the cause of the war
and of its continuation ; and such the nature of the opposi
tion experienced, and its justification. It remains to be seen

SPEECHES. 55

whether the intended effect will be produced ; whether ani
mosity and discord will be fomented, and the zeal and union
of the people to maintain the rights and indispensable duties
of the community, will abate ; or, describing it under another
aspect, whether it is the destiny of our country to sink under
the blows of our enemy or not. I am not without my fears
and my hopes.

On the one hand, our opponents have manifestly the ad
vantage. The love of present ease and enjoyment, the love
of gain, and party zeal, are on their side. These constitute
a part of the weakness of our nature. We naturally lean
that way without the arts of persuasion. Far more difficult
is the task of the majority. It is theirs to support the dis
tant but lasting interest of our country. It is theirs to ele
vate the minds of the people, and to call up all of those qual
ities by which present sacrifices are made to secure a future
good. On the other hand, our cause is not without hope.
The interest of the people, and that of the leaders of a party,
are, as observed by a gentleman from New- York (Mr. Stow),
often at variance. The people are always ready, unless led
astray by ignorance or delusion, to participate in the success
of the country, or to sympathize in its adversity. Yery dif
ferent are the feelings of the leaders of the opposition : on
every great measure they stand pledged against its success,
and almost invariably consider that their political conse
quence depends on its defeat. The heat of debate, the spirit
of settled opposition, and the confident prediction of disas
ter, are among the causes of this opposition between the in
terest of a party and of the country ; and in no instance un
der our own government have they existed in a greater degree
than in relation to the present war. The evil is deeply root
ed in the constitution of all free governments, and is the
principal cause of their weakness and destruction. It has
but one remedy : — the virtue and intelligence of the people.
It behooves them, as they value the blessings of their free-

56 SPEECHES.

dom, not to permit themselves to be drawn into the vortex
of party rage. For if, by such opposition, the firmest gov
ernment should prove incompetent to maintain the rights of
the nation against foreign aggression, they will realize too
late the truth of the proposition, that government is protec
tion, and that it cannot exist where it fails of this great and
primary object. The authors of the weakness are common
ly the first to take the advantage of it, and to turn it to the
destruction of liberty.

SPEECH

On the Bill making further provisions for filling the
ranks of the regular Army, encouraging enlist
ments, &c., delivered in the House of Representa
tives, January 17th, 1814.

[NOTE.— On the 10th of January, 1814, Mr. Troup, from the Com
mittee on Military Affairs, reported to the House, — among others, a
Bill to authorize the President to raise for five years' service, or dur
ing the war, fourteen of the regiments of infantry which had been au
thorized by the act of the 29th of January, 1813, and for other pur
poses. Being referred to the Committee of the Whole, it was called
up, successively, on the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 17th, and discussed with
much warmth. Party feelings were highly excited, and every effort
was made to embarrass the Administration by defeating the Bill. But
in vain ; it was ordered to a third reading on January 21st, and final
ly passed the House by a vote of 90 to 15.]

MR. CHAIRMAN : — I do not rise to examine on what
terms the President has assented to negotiate with the Brit
ish government ; because I conceive it neither pertinent to
the present question, nor proper at this time. I deem it;

SPEECHES. 57

however, my duty to state, that I wholly dissent from the
construction which our opponents give to the documents
connected with this subject. If a proper opportunity should
hereafter occur, I will be happy to present the reasons for
my opinion on this point.

I am induced to occupy the time of the committee at
present, to correct two essential errors, which gentlemen in
the opposition have introduced into the discussion of this
question ; and, although not immediately connected with the
merits of the bill, I think it proper that they should be an
swered ; because, from all that I have ever heard, as well on
this as on former occasions, it seems to me that they consti
tute the basis on which the minority rest their justification.
I allude to the character which they give to the war ; and
the claim set up, in a political and constitutional point of
view, to justify their opposition. Gentlemen contend, that
this is not a defensive, but an offensive war ; and under this
character undertake its denunciation, without ever conde
scending to state what, in their opinion, constitutes the
characteristic difference between the two. I claim the at
tention of the committee while I examine this point ; and I
hope that it will not be considered as a mere verbal criticism,
since our opponents have made the distinction the foundation
of so much declamation against the war. The inquiry, in
another point of view, I believe, will be useful. The people
of this country have an aversion to an offensive war (which,
I suppose, interprets the meaning of the vehemence of the
opposition on this subject) ; while they readily acknowledge
the possible necessity and justice of one that is defensive.
It is therefore proper, that our ideas on this point should be
fixed with precision and certainty.

I will lay it down as an universal criterion, that a war is
offensive or defensive, not by the mode of carrying it on,
which is an immaterial circumstance, but by the motive and
cause which lead to it. If it has its origin in ambition,

58 SPEECHES.

avarice, or any of the like passions, then it is offensive ; but
if, on the contrary, designed to repel insult, injury, or op
pression, it is of an opposite character, and is defensive.
The truth of this position will not require much discussion.
I conceive that it may be safely rested either on the authori
ty of the best writers on the subject, or on its own internal
evidence. It is only in this view that the prevalent feelings
on this subject can be explained. If the distinction taken
be a correct one ; if the two species of war are distinguish
able in their cause and motive, then our condemnation of the
one and approval of the other is no longer a mystery ; it is
founded in the nature of things. But if, on the contrary, it
be true that they are distinguished by the mere accidental
circumstance of the mode of carrying them on ; that the
scene of action should make them the one or the other ; then
the feelings of the country, by which it condemns or approves
of either species, are a profound mystery never to be ex
plained. In the view which I have presented, the difference
between an offensive and a defensive war is of the moral
kind ; and that sense of justice which marks the American
people, accounts for their feelings. Their exemption from
ambition and love of justice preserve them from the former ;
while their manly spirit and good sense will always make
them cheerfully meet the other whenever it becomes neces
sary. What, then, is the character of the war in which we
are now engaged ? Was it dictated by avarice or love of
conquest ? I appeal to our opponents for a decision. They
have already decided. When the resolutions of the gentle
man from New Hampshire were under discussion at the last
session, it was repeated, till the ear was fatigued, by every
one on that side of the House who took any part in the de
bate, that if the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees had
been communicated in time to the British government, the
Orders in Council would have been repealed also ; and had
the last event happened, the war would not have been de-

SPEECHES. 59

clared. They then have acknowledged, that the Orders in
Council, and not the conquest of Canada, as they now pre
tend, were the cause of the war ; and it would be idle to in
quire whether, to resist them, was in its nature offensive or
defensive. It would be to inquire whether they were or were
not an injury to our commerce — a point I have never heard
denied by the most obstinate debater. It would be equally
so to examine whether the cause of continuing the war, — to
protect our seamen from impressment, — is of an offensive or
defensive character. Very few have the hardihood to deny
that this is an injury of the most serious kind, both as re
gards the government, and the unhappy subjects of its ope
ration. It involves the most sacred obligation which can
bind the body politic to the citizen : — I mean that of protec
tion, due alike to all ; to the beggar in the street, and much
more, if susceptible of degrees, to our sailors, that class of
the community who have added so much to the wealth and
renown of this country.

Having thus established the character of the war, in
its origin and continuance, I lay it down as a rule not less
clear, that a defensive war does not become offensive by being
carried beyond the limits of our territory. The motive and
cause will ever give the character ; all the rest are mere
unessential incidents. When once declared, the only question,
even in a defensive war, is, how can it be carried on with the
greatest effect ? The reverse of this involves the most glaring
absurdity. It supposes that we have determined to compel
our enemy to respect our rights ; and, at the same time,
voluntarily renounced, what is acknowledged to be the best
and most effectual mode of producing that effect. On this
point, as well as the cause of the war, the opinion of our
opponents may be arrayed against themselves. What have
they advised as to the mode of carrying on the war ? With
draw your troops from Canada, reduce your army, and limit
your operations to the ocean. What ! to the ocean ? Carry

60 SPEECHES.

the war beyond our own territory ! make it offensive ! The
gentlemen surely do not intend to support an offensive war ?
To use their own language, it is too immoral for a virtuous
and religious people. It is then admitted that it does not
cease to be defensive by its being waged at sea ; how then
can the carrying it into Canada change its character ? I
again remark that it is a mere question of expediency where
and how the war ought to be prosecuted. For my part, so
long as it continues, I think no effort should be spared to
reduce Canada. Should success accompany our arms, we
will be indemnified for the privations and expenses of the
war, by the acquisition of an extensive and valuable territory,
and by the permanent peace and security which it would
afford to a large portion of our country ; and, even in the
worst event, should we fail of conquest, the attempt will not
be without great advantages. The war in Canada is the
best security to every part of our country. We have a very
extended, and, from the thinness of the population, in many
places weak, sea-coast. I do not believe that it has been
neglected, as has been represented by the gentleman from
New Hampshire ; but I do believe that many points are,
and must, from necessity, be without efficient protection. Let
me, however, ask that gentleman, how it happens that this
coast, so easily assailed by a maritime power, has sustained
little or no damage, in a war that has continued upwards of
eighteen months. If he is at a loss for an answer, the
scheme of his political friend from Virginia (Mr. Sheffey),
to confine our troops to the defensive, should it be adopted,
would, in the next summer, amply explain the fact. The
truth is, that the war in Canada is the security of the coast.
It compels the enemy to concentrate the whole of his dispo
sable force there, for the defence of his own territory. Should
the absurd policy be adopted of confining the operations of
our troops within our own limits, the whole of the enemy's
force in Canada will be liberated from its defence, and the

SPEECHES. 61

entire line of our sea-coast menaced with destruction. The
enemy, master on the ocean, could act with such celerity,
that it would be either impossible to defend ourselves, or it
must be done at an expense greater than would be necessary
to reduce his possessions. Thus, even under this limited
view of defence, the most effectual mode is that which has
been adopted : to carry the war into the enemy's country ;
and our opponents ought, according to their own distinction,
to grant every aid in men and money.

Although not immediately in point, I cannot refrain from
observing that, of all the arguments I have ever heard since
I have had the honor of a seat in this House, those were by
far the most extravagant, which have been urged against the
conquest of Canada. I have heard it characterized by every
epithet of crime or weakness. The advancers of such argu
ments surely do not reflect, that in their zeal to assail the
majority, they are uttering libels on the founders of our
freedom and independence. This scheme of conquest, this
project of ambition, this offspring of folly and vice, as it has
been liberally called, originated with those men to whom
America owes so much, and whose wisdom and virtue is
acknowledged by the world. It was by them thought an
object worthy the expense of the treasures and the best blood
of the country ; and finally relinquished by them with reluc
tance, and from necessity only.

It now remains to consider the defence which gentlemen
have made for their opposition to the war and the policy of
their country, — a subject which I conceive to be of the greatest
importance, not only as affecting the result of the present
contest, but our lasting peace and prosperity. They as
sume as a fact, that opposition is in its nature harmless ;
and that the calamities which have afflicted free states,
have originated in the blunders and folly of the government,
and not from the perverseness of opposition. Opposition,
say they, is a very convenient thing ; a wicked and foolish

62 SPEECHES.

administration never fail to attribute all of their miscarriages
to it ; and, in support of this doctrine, they appeal to Lord
North's administration. I do not intend to examine the
particular case, to which gentlemen have, with so much
parade referred, as it is not in the course of my argument ; but
I think it could be easily proved, that the opposition in
the case cited, was essentially different, in character and
consequence, from the opposition in this country. I conceive,
however, that it will be proper, before I examine the general
position taken by gentlemen on the other side, to make a
single remark in relation to the British government on this
subject. It strikes me, that all arguments drawn from it,
on this point, must be essentially erroneous. A more deter
mined and vehement opposition there is not only justifiable,
but in some measure required. The difference in the two
governments, in this respect, results from a difference in the
organization of their respective executives. In England,
such is the power, patronage, and consequent influence, of
the executive ; such the veneration, which its hereditary
quality and long descent possess over the subjects of that
empire, that her most enlightened statesmen have ever
thought that it endangered the other branches of her govern
ment, and have, with much wisdom, ever since the dawn of
liberty in that country, strenuously opposed its encroach
ments. Very different is the case here, in a government
purely republican. Our Executive presents neither the cause
to justify such vehemence of opposition, nor possesses the
means of restraining it when excited. But, even as applied
to our government, I will readily acknowledge that there is
a species of opposition both innocent and useful. Opposition
simply implies contrariety of opinion ; and, when used in
the abstract, admits of neither censure nor praise. It cannot
be said to be either good or bad ; useful or pernicious. It is
not from itself, but from the connected circumstances, that
it derives its character. When it is simply the result of that

SPEECHES. 63

diversity in the structure of our intellect, which conducts to
different conclusions on the same subject, and is confined
within those bounds which love of country and political
honesty prescribe, it is one of the most useful guardians of
liberty. It excites gentle collision ; prompts to due vigilance, —
a quality so indispensable, and, at the same time, so opposite
to our nature, — and results in the establishment of an enlight
ened policy and useful laws. Such are its qualities when
united with patriotism and moderation. But, in many
instances, it assumes a far different character. Combined
with faction and ambition, it bursts those limits, within
which it may usefully act, and becomes the first of political
evils. If, Sir, the gentlemen on the other side of the House
intended to include this last species of opposition, as I am
warranted in inferring they did, from their expressions when
they spoke of its harmless character, then have they made an
assertion in direct contradiction to reason, experience, and
all history. A factious opposition is compounded of such
elements that no reflecting man will ever consider it as
harmless. The fiercest and most ungovernable passions of
our nature — ambition, pride, rivalry, and hate — enter into
its dangerous composition ; made still more so by its power
of delusion, by which its projects against government are
covered in most instances, even to the eyes of its victims, by
the specious show of patriotism. Thus constituted, who can
estimate its force ? Where can benevolent and social feel
ings be found sufficiently strong to counteract its progress ?
Is love of country ? Alas ! the attachment to a party be
comes stronger than that to our country. A factious oppo
sition sickens at the sight of the prosperity and success of
the country. Wide-spread adversity is its life ; general
prosperity its death. Nor is it only over our moral senti
ments that this bane of freedom triumphs. Even the selfish
passions of our nature, planted in our bosom for our individual
safety, afford no obstacle to its progress. It is this opposi-

64 SPEECHES.

tion, which gentlemen call harmless, and treat with so much
respect ; it is this moral treason, to use the language of my
friend from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy), which has, in all ages
and countries, ever proved the most deadly foe to freedom.
Nor is it then only dangerous when it breaks forth into open
treason and rebellion. Without resort to violence, it is
able, in a thousand ways, to counteract and deaden all the
motions of government, to render its policy wavering, and
to compel it to submit to schemes of aggrandizement on the
part of other governments ; or, if resistance be determined on,
to render it feeble and ineffectual. Do gentlemen ask for
instances ? Unhappily they are but too numerous. Where
can they not be found ? Admired and lamented republics
of antiquity ! Athens, Carthage, and Kome, you are the
victims and witnesses of the fell spirit of factious opposition !
Fatal fields of Zama and Cherona3a, you can attest its de
structive cruelty ! What is the history of Polybius, and
that of the other historians of the free states of antiquity ?
what the political speeches of Cicero and the orations of
Demosthenes, those models of eloquence arid wisdom, but
volumes of evidence, attesting that an opposition founded
in faction, unrestrained by moderation and a regard to the
general welfare, is the most dangerous of political evils. Nor
does antiquity alone testify. The history of modern times
is pregnant with examples. What, I would ask, has be
come of the free states of modern Italy, which once flourished
in wealth and power — Florence, Genoa, Venice, and many
others ? what of the United Provinces and Switzerland ?
Gone ; perished under the deadly feuds of opposition. Even
England, with her deep-rooted and -powerful executive, has
not been free from its pernicious effect. What arrested the
war of Marlborough, when France was so humbled, that, had
it been continued, Europe might have been free from the
danger winch she has experienced from that power ? What
stayed the conquering hand of Chatham, when before his

SPEECHES. 65

genius and power the throne of the Bourbons trembled to
its centre ? The spirit of factious opposition, that common
cause of calamity, — that, without which, liberty might be
eternal, and free states irresistible.

Our country, as young as she is, has her examples also.
In the war of the Revolution, had she been united to a man
— had there been no apologists of opposition — had no one
opposed his will to the general determination — would the
enemy ever have had a hold in our country ? or would that
contest have lasted for a year ? or would we have been in
debted to foreign aid for the establishment of our indepen
dence ? Even in this war, how much has it debilitated the
energies of our country ? The gentleman from New Hamp
shire, who spoke with ingenuity on this subject, told us, that
if we were united, the Canadas would be reduced in thirty
days ; and that in consequence of the disasters springing
from our divisions, we had been disgraced.

What more can I say on the fatal effects of opposition ?
I appeal to that gentleman to state the cause of our
divisions ; and would ask him whether, with the certain
knowledge of its pernicious effects, every means that could
excite opposition have not been unceasingly applied ? To
obviate the natural conclusion, the gentleman from New
Hampshire was compelled to deny that the party now in
power is a majority in this country; and to contend that
the representation in this body furnishes no evidence of that
fact. He argued, that many who are opposed to the war
were, from party motives, induced to vote for those in favor
of it. Even admitting the argument to be well-founded,
which I cannot think, might it not be retorted ? I would
be glad to know why the rule does not apply to the minority
in an equal degree ? Until he assigns some reason why it
does not, I must continue to consider the majority here, as
representing a great majority of the people ; and the
minority, as opposing the will of that majority.

VOL. II. 5

66 SPEECHES.

The pretensions and declarations of the gentlemen on
the other side of the House, have compelled me to make
these general observations. I know not how else they can
be met, and I consider them as fraught with doctrines so
erroneous and dangerous, that it is my duty to present their
falsity, in the best manner in my power, to this House and
to the country. From the same sense of duty, I feel bound
to offer my sentiments on a subject of greater delicacy ; — I
mean, on the character of the opposition which the govern
ment has experienced, since the commencement of the present
difficulties, in 1806 ; and to inquire under which of the two
species of opposition — the moderate and useful, or factious
and dangerous — it ought to be arranged ? It is with pain I
make this inquiry. I take no pleasure in perceiving the
faults of any part of our citizens, much less in presenting
them to the public. My object is not to expose, but to re
form — to admonish of a danger so incident to free states, into
which all opposition, even of the most virtuous kind, so easily
degenerates, if not incessantly watched ; and to call on them,
while yet possible, to arrest its fatal career. It is important
to know that there is a stage in the progress of opposition,
which gentlemen consider so harmless, which, when once at
tained, no power can arrest — not love of country — not even
the certainty of being involved in the common destruction.
Has it made any progress in this country to so dangerous a
state ? I fear there are appearances which will justify such
a belief. One of its most natural symptoms is, a settled and
fixed character, which, as its object is to embarrass and
weaken government, loses no opportunity to throw impedi
ments in the way of every measure. It has two other con
comitants : the one, a violence and vehemence not warranted
by any considerations of expediency ; and the other, the
urging of measures which, if adopted, must lead to national
ruin. It seems to me that there are reasons to believe that
all of these exist in the present opposition. Is it not set-

SPEECHES. 67

tied and fixed ? In an unexampled state of national diffi
culties, from the first . belligerent decree against our neutral
commerce down to this day, I ask, what one of all the
measures of our government to resist this almost universal
depredation, has not, under one pretext or another, been op
posed, ridiculed, and weakened ? Yes, opposed with a vio
lence that would lead to a belief that the constituted
authorities, instead of opposing the most gross and out
rageous injustice, sought only the destruction of their coun
try. Again ; what have been the measures that opposition
has virtually urged ? What is it at this moment ? To
withhold the laws — to withhold the loans — to withhold the
men who are to fight our battles — or, in other words, to de
stroy public faith, and to deliver the country unarmed to the
mercy of the enemy. Suppose all of these objects accom
plished, and what would be the situation of the country ?
I appeal to the people for a decision. Nor are those morbid
symptoms confined to this body. The contagion has gone
forth into the community, and wherever it has appeared, has
exhibited the same dangerous characteristics. The inquiry
might be pushed much farther ; but I abstain from it, as it
is to me by no means a pleasant task.

But, say the gentlemen on the other side of the House,
what right have we to object ? The constitution justifies
and secures them in an opposition to the measures of govern
ment. They claim to be not only above laws, but beyond
animadversion. It is in their eyes fair and proper that
the majority who act under the undoubted and express
sanction of the constitution, should be subjected to every
species of abuse and impediment ; but, should any one ques
tion the right or the expediency of the opposition, we hear
an immediate cry of oppression. For my part, I think that
a fair and moderate opposition ought at all times to be re
spected ; but, that our constitution authorized that danger
ous and vicious species which I have attempted to describe,

68 SPEECHES.

I utterly deny. I call on those who make the claim to so
extravagant a power, to point out the article of that instru
ment which warrants such a construction. Will they cite
that which establishes the liberty of speech here ? Its ob
ject is far different, and it furnishes not the shadow of such
a power. Will they rely on its general spirit ? It knows
no object but the general good, and must for ever condemn
all factious opposition to measures emanating from its own
authority. It is then not authorized either by the letter or
the spirit of the constitution. If, then, our opponents have
the right, it is because it is not expressly forbidden. In this
sense there is no limitation to their constitutional rights, A
right might be thus derived to violate the whole decalogue.
The constitution forbids almost no crimes ; nor ought it to
be considered in the light of a voluminous penal code, whose
object is the definition and prohibition of all acts injurious to
society. Even were this the case, the argument that what
is not forbidden is justifiable, would be fallacious ; for there
are many acts of the most dangerous tendency (of which an
unprincipled opposition is one), which in their very nature
are not susceptible of that rigid definition necessary to sub
ject them to punishment. How absurd, then, the argument,
as applied to the constitution, whose object is the mere
enumeration, distribution, and organization of the powers
of the body politic.

I have been compelled by the great and dangerous errors
of the gentleman on the other side, to take a view more
general, than is usually proper, of a subject on which it is so
important to think correctly ; and I cannot take my seat
without reiterating my admonition to this body and the
country, to guard against the pernicious effects of a factious
opposition. Universal experience and the history of all ages
furnish ample testimony of its dangerous consequences, par
ticularly in a state of war. Could any certain remedy be
applied to restrain it within the bounds of moderation, then,

SPEECHES. 69

indeed, might our liberty be immortal. I know of none but
the good sense and the virtue of the people. The triumph
of a party can be nothing to them. They can have no
interest but in the general welfare.

SPEECH

On the Loan Bill, delivered in the House of Kepre-
sentatives, February 25th, 1814.

[NOTE. — January 31st, 1814. Mr. Eppes from the Committee of

Ways and Means, reported a Bill to authorize a loan of millions of

dollars, which was read and referred to the Committee of the Whole.
The debate on this Bill, in which almost all the leading men of both par
ties participated, took a wide range ; embracing all the great questions of
the day, which were elaborately discussed. On the character of the dis
cussion, a shrewd contemporary makes the following pertinent remarks :

" The debate (not on the Loan Bill, but suffered while it was be
fore a Committee of the Whole of the House of Representatives) has
had an unlimited range. Every question of politics that has agitated the
United States for fifteen or twenty years past, and every one that
may be expected for twenty years to come, appears to have been
embodied in the speeches of the members : some of whom, it is
said, have spoken three hours, without mentioning the Bill at all."

The principal grounds of the opposition were, the inexpediency of
the war — to carry on which the loan was asked — and the impos
sibility, if granted, of obtaining the money. Mr. Calhoun spoke to
these objections and in favor of the Bill.]

MR. CHAIRMAN : — It is now more than two weeks since
the commencement of this debate ; the greater part of which
time has been consumed by the opposition in attempting to
prove the bad faith, poverty, folly, and injustice of our
government and country : for all of their arguments and de
clamation, however variant and contradictory, are reducible to

70 SPEECHES.

two objections against the passage of this bill. First — That
such is the want of capital, or of public credit, that the loan
cannot be had, or if at all, only at an extravagant interest ; and
secondly — If the amount can be obtained, the bill ought to
be rejected ; because, in their opinion, the war is unjust and
inexpedient. The last of these objections I propose to dis
cuss, To examine both at large would occupy too much
time. Without, therefore, discussing the question whether
the loan can or cannot be had, I will merely offer a few re
flections incidentally connected with it.

It is a little remarkable that not one of the minority has
discussed the material points on this part of the subject;
I mean the question, — is the money proposed to be raised by
this bill, indispensable for the service of the year ? And, if
so, is a loan, the only, or the best mode of obtaining it ? The
chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means has presented
an estimate of the expenditures already ordered, — or which
must be incurred, — by which it appears, that the sum proposed
to be raised by this bill, with other sources of revenue, will
be absolutely necessary to meet them. The silence of the
opposition sanctions the correctness of the estimate ; and as
no other mode has been indicated of obtaining the necessary
supplies, this may be presumed to be the only or the best
one. It ceases, then, to be a question, \vhether the loan can
be had at this or that interest. It is necessary ; it must be
had ; and the rate per centum will depend principally on the
state of the money market — and not on arguments used
here. Again ; on comparing the two objections to the pas
sage of this bill, one of them destroys all confidence in the
other. Our opponents contend, not only that the loan can
not be had, but that it ought not to be granted. To defeat the
passage of the bill in, or to prevent its successful operation out
of this House, is the declared object of their policy. It
is true that all have not made the latter declaration ; but
none, as far as my memory serves, have disavowed it. When,

SPEECHES. 71

then, they argue that the loan must fail, they must be con
sidered either as dupes of their wishes, or, what is more pro
bable, as aiming to destroy the confidence of moneyed men in
the puhlic faith ; for it cannot be presumed that they have
any hope of defeating the passage of the bill.

But to proceed to the objection which I proposed to dis
cuss. The war, say our opponents, is unjust and inexpedient,
and, therefore, this bill ought to be rejected. Tho facts of the
supposed injustice and inexpediency of the war, on which^this
objection rests, have claimed the exclusive attention of the op
position. The inference deduced from them — that they justify
the rejection of this bill, though far from being a self-evident
proposition, has received no part of their arguments or elucida
tions. For my part, I consider it not only false but dangerous ;
and shall, therefore, not only consider the alleged injustice and
inexpediency of the war, but also the inference assumed
from these charges. I trust, with, the attention of the com
mittee, to prove that both are equally unfounded. I must
beg an attentive and deliberate hearing ; for a correct mode
of thinking on this subject, I sincerely believe to be necessary,
to the lasting prosperity of our country. I say an attentive
and deliberate hearing, for it is not sufficient that the mind
be fixed on the discussion ; but it should also be free from
those passions and prejudices unfavorable to the reception of
truth. The fact that discussion here assumes the form of
debate produces a state of things unfavorable to dispassionate
attention. In debate here, as between two individuals, the
opposite sides are much more disposed to find objections to
an argument, be it ever so clear, than to receive it with a
proper degree of assent. In their zeal, the interest of the
country is too often forgotten ; and mere recriminations made
to take the place of earnest endeavors to discover and en
force the claims of truth. I hope what I have to say will
not be viewed as a mere exercise of skill in discussion, in
which those who hear me have little or no interest ; lyit as

72 SPEECHES.

containing principles believed to be essential to the public in
terest. I trust I hold in proper contempt the spirit of idle
debate. Its heat and zeal are momentary. Not so with our
principles and measures. On them must depend our future
prosperity and happiness.

Is the war unjust and inexpedient ? This is the question
which I now propose to discuss. The eagerness and zeal
with which our opponents endeavor to prove this point, seem
to me not at all consistent with sound principles, or due love
of country. In their zeal they often presume that we are
wrong, and our enemy right ; and that the burden lies on
us to prove their charges false — before they have attempted
to prove them true. How contrary this to the maxims of
Koman wisdom ! That wise and virtuous people, so far from
presuming their country to be wrong, considered it as a
crime in a citizen to doubt the justice of the public cause.
In a state of war, how worthy of our imitation ! It was at
the root of Koman greatness. Without it, a free state must
ever lose much of its native and peculiar strength ; the sponta
neous and concurring zeal of its citizens. The charge of in
justice and inexpediency in respect to the war, necessarily
leads me to investigate its cause. It originated, as agreed on
all sides, in certain commercial aggressions on the part of
England, and her practice of impressing American seamen
from American vessels on the high seas. Though I have
named commercial injuries first, it is my intention to give
impressment the preference in the order of discussion ; not
only because the war is continued for it, but because it is of
greater intrinsic importance. The life and liberty of a cit
izen are more important to him and his country than his pro
perty ; and consequently the obligation to protect the for
mer is more sacred than the latter. To the truth of this
position, our political institutions bear testimony. A single
judicial process determines a question of property ; but it re
quires a double investigation, first, before a grand and then a

SPEECHES. 73

petit jury, before the humblest and most suspected citizen
can be deprived of life or liberty. This mode of thinking is
worthy of a free people, and, in fact, essential to the perma
nent existence of their freedom. Yes ; life and liberty,
those precious gifts of Heaven, are, by our laws and constitu
tions, guaranteed to all. They may be abused, and thus be
come forfeited to the country ; but cannot be taken away by
the hand of arbitrary power. Let us bear these sentiments in
our minds, and bring them in our bosoms to this discussion.
It is fortunate that the facts, connected with impress
ment, are few and undoubted. I set aside, for the present,
the pretext and principle on which Great Britain acts in
relation to it. None can deny that a great number of
American sailors have been impressed from on board Amer
ican vessels on the high seas, and, by force, compelled to
serve a sovereign to whom they owe no allegiance, and to
fight battles in which they have no interest. It is equally
certain, that the practice is now of long continuance ; and
that negotiation has often, but in vain, been resorted to for
redress. I say, a great number, without attempting to be
more specific — because I do not conceive the exact number
to be material ; and also, because I do not wish to incorpo
rate any thing the least doubtful in the statement. On this
point, however, the two governments are pretty well agreed.
Ours estimates the entire number taken at something more
than 6,000 ; and the British government acknowledges that,
at the breaking out of the war, they had sixteen hundred,
at least, on board their public vessels. After deducting
from our list the dead by battle and disease, the deserters
and the liberated, it will be found that theirs exceeded our
estimate. To the shame of the minority, they alone have
attempted to throw any doubt on this point, and to dimin
ish the injury of the enemy below their own acknowledg
ment. On this simple statement, there are two inferences so
clear, that I feel it almost an insult to the understanding of

74 SPEECHES.

this committee to state them. I must seek for my apology
in the efforts of our opponents to render that doubtful, which,
in itself, is so manifest ; — I mean the violation of the rights
and liberty of the impressed American seamen, and the cor
respondent duty imposed on their country to protect them.
I know of no illustration of a proposition so perfectly clear.
No head can be so impenetrable as not to perceive its truth ;
no heart so callous as not to feel its obligation. For, who,
in this community of freemen, is willing to renounce the
claim of protection which he has on all, — or withhold the duty
which he is under to all ? It is the essence of civil society.

Such, and so simple is the truth on which the cause of
our country stands. On these essential facts and inferences
we are on all sides agreed. The obligation of the govern
ment is established. How, then, are we to be absolved from
so sacred a duty ? The impressed, the enslaved seamen
have invoked the protection of their country. Shall it be
extended to them, or shall it be withheld ? This is the
question now proposed for our consideration, and which
naturally introduces the various arguments of the minority
on this important subject. They combat against inferences
the most clear and powerful ; and proportionally perspicu
ous and strong must be the reasons to justify their conduct.
I will commence with that which I believe to be most relied
on, because most frequently and zealously urged in justifi
cation of our enemy. It is said that they take American
seamen by mistake, and not on principle ; their object is
to take their own seamen — but, from the impossibility of
distinguishing them, the American seaman is impressed.
The answer is plain and decisive. The argument is founded
in a misconception. The duty which the country owes to
the impressed sailor originates in a single fact, that he is
unjustly deprived, by a foreign nation, of his liberty. The
principle on which this is done, or the manner in which it is
effected, is immaterial. Whether done on principle or by

SPEECHES. 75

mistake, may, it is true, have a bearing on the continuance
of the practice and its future extent ; for what is done by
mistake or accident generally leaves the consolation that it-
will not probably occur again ; but what is done on principle
may be expected to continue. We have not even this hope.
The evil is inveterate. The mistake, if one it is, must for
ever happen, so long as the present practice is continued of
impressing from American vessels. It, therefore, operates,
as it regards us, as if it were the result of principle. I,
however, deny the fact on which this justification rests.
The object of England is not to take her seamen only. By
recurring to official documents on this subject, it will be
found, that she impresses persons on board of our vessels,
who could not be mistaken for British sailors. She takes,
indiscriminately, Dane, Dutch, Spaniard, and seamen of
any nation. To speak another language and to wear a
different complexion are, it seems, no evidence with the
British government that they are not English sailors. What,
then, is the principle of that government on this subject ?
If we are to judge by facts, and not by pretexts (which will
never be wanting, if we are simple enough to believe them),
it is this : they claim, at least as far as we are concerned,
that every seafaring person found on the ocean is presump
tively an Englishman, and bound to serve the crown of
Great Britain. They admit, it is true, that this presump
tion may be rebutted in a single case ; and in this only by the
seaman proving himself to belong to the same country with
the flag under which he sails. If, for instance, the vessel is
American, that he was born in the United States. The
impressing officer, the very person interested against him,
is, however, the judge and jury who presides in this mock
trial of nativity. It is thus the American flag is insulted.
It is thus the American citizen is stripped of his liberty
under its protection ! At home, he holds his liberty under
the protection of the most sacred laws ; abroad — no, I will

76 SPEECHES.

not admit the distinction — for while under our flag he is
still at home — he holds life and liberty at the mercy of every
insignificant, drunken midshipman ! But let us attend, for
a moment longer, to the object of this principle of the
British government, as illustrated by practice. A war in
Europe, in which England is engaged, sooner or later
extends to all the other powers in that part of the globe.
In consequence of her superiority at sea, the navigation
and commerce of other states are destroyed or suspended
in a state of war ; and their seamen, who cannot readily
change their habits, are compelled to seek employment in
foreign service. Until lately, the United States remaining
neutral, and offering high wages, they naturally preferred
ours. To this state of facts, her principle of impressing all
foreign seamen was applied ; and, by its operation, she
forced those, who were by their own consent employed in
our vessels, to serve, by compulsion, in her navy. Thus, by
a single process, under the pretext of taking her own seamen,
the commerce and navigation of the world are converted
into a nursery to support the British navy ; and the practice
of impressment from neutrals, on investigation, is discovered
to be, like all her other encroachments, a system of universal
monopoly. Unless resisted by the steady and persevering
efforts of other nations, she must eventually draw the com
merce of the world into the vortex of her system.

It is next urged that this is an ancient custom on the
part of England and Europe generally — that it is a part of
the law of nations to impress on board of neutral vessels on
the high seas. Those who urge this argument ought to sub
stantiate it by a reference to the facts and to elementary
writers on public law. Till this is done, it cannot be considered
in a stronger light than a mere assertion. I, for my own
part, do not believe that it ever constituted the custom of
Europe, nor that of England, till since the period of the
American war. If it were a general custom, why is it not

SPEECHES. 77

recognized by some of the many writers on the law of nations ?
They minutely state the cases in which a belligerent may
enter a neutral vessel for the purpose of search. Why is not
this also mentioned ? None of the rights of search could be
more important, or better deserve their attention than this,
if any such really existed. Their silence, then, is decisive
against the custom. I know that some English writers
have set up an old claim, founded on the orders of their gov
ernment ; but there is no proof of acquiescence on the part of
other powers ; and if there were, it could not be obligatory
on us. The law of nations is composed, principally, of usages
originating in mutual convenience. Among the nations of
modern Europe, who are distinguishable by their language
and countenances, it is possible that impressment on board
of neutral vessels may not be liable to the mistakes and
abuses of which we complain ; and that it might even be a
mutual convenience. Such a custom, then, would not be
extraordinary. But were those nations related, as are the
United States and England, and the practice thus, from
necessity, attended with incessant abuse, it never could
exist. If our opponents, then, had proved, and not merely
asserted, such a custom among European nations, as between
us and England, our country would have formed an exception.
It is not applicable to our condition ; it is unequal, not
reciprocal, and attended with grievous and constant abuses.
As applied to us, then, the general usage — if such there be —
ought to be modified by treaty, so as to suit the mutual
convenience of both parties ; an object which this country
has ever been anxious to effect, but which has been studiously
avoided by our enemy. If, however, our opponents still
insist that it is a right under the law of nations, and must,
notwithstanding the argument which I have advanced, be
considered as applicable to us, we may meet usage with
usage ; or, rather, a doubtful uncertain usage, and opposed
to reason, by that which is undoubted and founded in the

78 SPEECHES.

very nature of civil society. If to impress in neutral vessels
be an usage of England and the rest of Europe, how much
more general and indisputable is the custom of affording
protection to their subjects against foreign violence ! This
is the usage which is certain and universal — not confined to
any particular nation, nor originating in accidental circum
stances. All States, the most weak and contemptible claim
it ; and it is so interwoven with the very elements of society,
that it cannot be relinquished without certain destruction.
On this custom, which combines both right and duty, we may
oppose any pretext or claim of our enemy.

But, say some of our opponents, we are willing to defend
native-born American seamen, but not the naturalized. I
know not how they who make this distinction can answer
a simple question founded on an admitted fact. American
seamen — sixteen hundred at least — native-born American
seamen — by the acknowledgment of the British government,
are impressed and held in bondage. If, then, you are willing
to defend such, why not support the war, now carried on
solely in defence of right, outraged in the persons of these
unfortunate citizens ? What avail is the declaration, that
you are willing to defend them, when you will not move a
finger in their cause ? But the distinction, between native
and naturalized, is without truth or reason. It constitutes
no part of the controversy between the two countries. We
contend for the defence of American seamen generally. The
enemy has not distinguished between the two classes. He
insists on continuing a custom which makes both equally
liable to his oppression. We have not — we shall not hear
of a distinction, till some security is afforded against the
abuses of which we complain. Till then, I can consider it
only as an equivocation, which acknowledges the duty of the
government to protect, but evades the discharge of it. We
are told that our seamen ask no protection — and that it is
strange those, who are most remote and least interested,

SPEECHES. 79

should discover the greatest anxiety in their behalf. As to
the first part of this statement, I deny its truth. Our sailors
have claimed our protection. They have importuned and
invoked their country. We have had their applications for
protection laid before this House in the form of a document.
It forms a large volume. Considering the cold indifference
with which we have heard their prayer, I wonder that they
have not, long since, ceased to consider us as their guardians.
But we who stand forth to discharge this sacred duty, are
charged with being backwoodsmen, men who never saw a
ship till convened here in our legislative capacity. Admit
the fact ; and what then ? Such generous sympathy for
those who stand connected with us only by the ties of citizen
ship, does honor to our country. I hope it is not strange.
It is usual. Our history abounds with many instances of this
sympathy of the whole with any and every part. When it
ceases to be natural, we shall cease to be one nation. It
constitutes our real union. The rest is form. The wonder
is, in fact, on the other side. Since it cannot be denied,
that American citizens are held in foreign bondage, how
strange that those who boast of being neighbors and relations,
should be dead to all sympathy — should not have the manly
spirit to make a generous effort for their relief. There was
a time when our opponents, to their honor, were not so cold
on this subject. The venerable gentleman from Massachu
setts, and another gentleman high in the ranks of his party,
formerly felt and spoke on it, as we now do — like Americans.
How unhappy the change ! How unaccountable ! Unless,
indeed, we look to the poisonous effects of the spirit of sys
tematic opposition — a spirit which, I lately observed on
another occasion, clings more strongly to the cause of a party,
than to that of the country.

But great frauds, we are told, are committed in the
certificates of protection. I will not spend much time on this
frivolous argument. What right has England to complain

80 SPEECHES.

of frauds, if they really do exist ? Whether they do or not,
I do not think worth the inquiry. The argument, taken at
the best, can have no weight, except with those who think
that the freeborn citizens of this country, under our own flag,
are to be protected like a slave, by a pass in his pocket. To
give weight to it, we must forget our rights and duties as an
independent nation. The framers of the law under which
the protections are taken out, did not design them as safe
guards while navigating the ocean. The object was to iden
tify the seamen, as Americans, in the ports of foreign
countries ; and tins construction has been given to it by our
Government in its negotiations with the British. In this
view, the law is not unworthy of the wisdom and independence
of our country ; but I can scarcely conceive a greater na
tional degradation, than would be involved in the scheme of
affording protection to our seamen on the high seas, and
under our flag, by a pass.

On the subject of impressment, one argument only re
mains to be replied to. The practice of taking seamen from
our vessels is necessary, say our opponents, to the existence
of England. I would be happy to know the reason why it
is necessary. We have pledged ourselves by a law, which
we offer to make the basis of a treaty, not to employ a single
British sailor. The provisions of the bill are ample ; and we
are willing to give her every reasonable security on this
point. When the assertion, then, is made, in the face of
this law, designed to exclude British seamen, that the prac
tice of impressing on board of our vessels is necessary to her
existence, it must be meant — if any thing be meant — in re
lation to American seamen. If so, before we disregard our
duty and surrender our rights to the disposition of a foreign
power, I think it would be prudent to establish two points
connected with this subject. In the first place, it ought to
be clearly proved to be necessary to. the existence of England.
I, for one, will not agree to yield our independence on mere

SPEECHES. 81

assertion, however respectable the authority by which it is
made. In the next place, it ought to be proved to be our
duty to submit. The sense of moral obligation is peculiarly
strong in the bosoms of the American people. However
great the sacrifice, if our opponents can clearly establish it
to be their duty, I dare pledge myself they will make it.
Till both are satisfactorily proved, it would be highly un
reasonable on their part to demand of the country an acqui
escence in a practice so ruinous. Our existence is at stake,
no less than that of England ; or, rather, the danger to her is
imaginary ; to us, real and certain. An undeviating devotion
to its duty is the blood and life of a free state. Habitual depar
ture from it must, sooner or later, prove fatal. It infuses a
poison into the system, which will corrupt and destroy. Take
this very case. It is our duty, — most sacredly our duty, to
protect the lives and liberties of our citizens against foreign
oppression. Instead of doing this, we have, for many years,
quietly beheld them forced into a hateful foreign service.
What has been the reason of this conduct on our part ?
The want of power ? No ; a vigorous and decisive effort, in
the very first instance, — before the enemy had learned to be
arrogant by our submission, — would have strangled the pre
tension in its birth. We yielded because we wished to en
joy the blessings of peace ; its ease, its comforts, above all,
its means of making money. The practical language of the
Government to the people was — it is better to be rich than
to be virtuous. Can we, then, wonder at the alarming
growth of avarice ? It is to be traced back, in part, to this
original sin of our Government. The first American citizen
impressed and not immediately liberated, was good cause,
in my opinion imperious cause, of war. No calculation of
gain should have prevented it. To do our duty is more im
portant than to be rich.

Before I take my leave of this subject I will present to the
committee, what I consider a confession of the justice of our

VOL. II. — 6

82 SPEECHES.

cause, and the correctness of our policy. I allude to the
habitual and obvious misstatements which our opponents
make on this subject. They say, we are continuing the war in
order to compel Great Britain to renounce the right of im
pressing her own subjects. They must know that this is not
the fact ; and that the charge is calculated to mislead the
public mind. Why not state the matter as it really is ?
Why not say, what they must know to be true, that the
war is continued, in order to protect from impressment
American seamen ? Is it not from a fear of the public sen
timent ? And is this not a strong indirect acknowledgment
that the principles we contend for, if understood, would meet
with kind and congenial feelings in the bosom of the Ame
rican people ? When the head is right, there is, among a
free people, but little danger of the heart. When they are
agreed in facts and inferences, they will never disagree in
sentiment.

I will now proceed to consider the next cause of the war,
the injuries done by Great Britain to our commerce. It is
not my intention to speak of them in detail, or to consider
them as particular acts injurious to our trading interests.
This view has been often presented, and is well understood.
I propose to ascend to their origin, and to point out the
spirit and principles of the government from which they have
proceeded. This view has not yet been taken, though it is
of the most interesting nature. The detail of British in
justice may rouse our indignation, but it is only by reflecting
on the principles and character of her government, that we
can justly appreciate the extent of our danger, and the mea
sures best calculated to counteract it. Even the repeal of
the Orders in Council, and the consequent suspension of
commercial injuries, do not strip this view of the subject of
any of its interest. For, it ought ever to be remembered,
that the revocation (June 23d, 1812) of the celebrated
orders of 1807 and 1809, expressly retains their principles.

SPEECHES. 83

They, then, only slumber ; and, as sure as we exist, her tem
per and policy will rouse them into action on the first suit
able occasion, unless prevented by the firm and spirited con
duct of this and other nations interested in a free trade.

The commercial policy of Great Britain, which has vexed
and annihilated the commerce of every other nation, began
distinctly to develop itself in the year 1756 ; from which
time to the present, I assert, without the fear of contradic
tion, she has habitually struggled to enlarge what she terms
her maritime and belligerent rights on the ocean, at the ex
pense of neutrals. The assertion is based on historical facts,
which the general information of most of the members of
this committee will enable them to decide for themselves.
T have neither the inclination nor the time to recite and
examine the whole series in connection. I will content my
self with taking a brief notice of some of the leading and
most characteristic. At their head, in point of time, is the
order which takes its name from the year already mentioned,
and which distinctly marks the commencement of this policy.
The character of this celebrated rule or order is so well
known as to require no comment. In the war of our Ke volu
tion, she still further enlarged her maritime and belligerent
policy, particularly in the shape of blockades, since so enor
mously extended. This, with other encroachments at the
time, produced that association of nations called " THE
ARMED NEUTRALITY." The object of this was, to check
further encroachments, and to remedy those that already
existed. It was acceded to by almost every nation of
Europe. On the breaking out of the French Kevolution,
pursuing the same line of policy, she made further encroach
ments. One of the most considerable, and which was severe
ly felt by this country, was, an enlargement of articles con
traband of war, so as to extend them to the numerous and
important articles of breadstuffs. This was during Washing
ton's administration ; and constituted the principal one of

84 SPEECHES.

that period of our history. Preparations were then made to
appeal to arms for the redress of so serious an injury ; but
this was prevented by England's agreeing to make compen
sation for the injuries which we had sustained. With such
spirit did our Government then act, although the injury then
sustained dwindles into nothing, compared with the present ;
and with so little accuracy has a gentleman from New-York
(Mr. G-rosvenor) spoken, who not only magnified the ag
gressions of that period above those of the present, but
stated that Washington was unwilling to resort to arms for
redress. In the present war with France, her maritime and
commercial policy has hastened to its perfection. In the
year 1805, it assumed an aspect most threatening to our
commerce. It fell on our carrying trade, at that time in a
most flourishing condition. Be it remarked — let it be laid
up in your memory — that the old rule of '56, the parent of
all these aggressions, was then, after many years, revived,
and made the apology for premeditated wrongs. Just so
may we expect the revoked orders to revive. Blockades and
Orders in Council followed the destruction of our carrying
trade. They have been too recent and too severely felt, to
need a particular recital. Negotiation was tried — negotia
tion failed ; and the injuries continuing, have ended in the
present relation between the two countries.

The English maritime and belligerent policy is not only
such as I have stated it to be, but it is a policy peculiar to
her, and is in opposition to the interests of the rest of the
world. It is the interest and wish of all other civilized na
tions to ameliorate, or, if the expression is justifiable, to hu
manize belligerent rights on the ocean. England stands alone.
To establish this position, it would be necessary to consider, a
little more in detail, the series of facts to which I have already
alluded ; but, as I am fearful of being tedious, I must check
my inclination, and confine myself to a few observations only.

A signal proof of the peculiar policy of England may

SPEECHES. 85

be found in the history of the armed neutrality, which
had for its object, as already observed, the restriction of
some of those pretended belligerent rights. Kussia, Swe
den, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, and even France, though
then a belligerent power, acceded to it. England alone re
fused. It may, however, be said, that France, too, has often
committed injuries on neutral trade. The fact is admitted.
But, without wishing to apologize for her, I conceive there
has been a marked distinction (arising out of her situation)
between her conduct and that of England. The latter has
steadily pursued a policy hostile to neutral commerce on es
tablished principles ; the former has been irregular in her
hostilities, indicating more of passion than of system. Be
sides, she has always expressed a regret for her injuries, and
represented them, however unjustifiable, as intended to coun
teract schemes of England.

It remains now to prove what is the tendency of the
British maritime and commercial policy ; and in what, if not
counteracted, it must terminate. Keason and the general
convenience of nations have for centuries established cer
tain usages, by which belligerent powers are, in many in
stances, restrained from doing all the injury they can to
each other, from a regard to the interest of others. These
usages constitute the rights of neutrals, which are, for the
most part, well defined by the many writers on the laws of
nations. Under the cover of, what she calls, her belligerent
and maritime rights, the object and tendency of the British
policy is, to throw off those restraints on the ocean. It is,
in fact, to undo all that has been done in favor of civiliza
tion on that element, and to return to the lawless state of
barbarous ages. It is the interest of every other power to
restrain her within the limits of the ancient barriers ; for if
they are once transcended, there are no limits but what her
power or interest may prescribe. Neutral commerce, as such,
will be annihilated. She will judge and decide, according to

86 SPEECHES.

her pleasure, what is beneficial to her enemy, and what to
herself. The former will be destroyed, the latter spared. Nor
will the evil stop here. The waves of power are incessantly
washing away the mounds that restrain them. The transi
tion is easy from this boundless extension of her belligerent
policy, to a system of universal monopoly, in peace as well as
in war — a system which considers the ocean as her peculiar
domain.

I omitted, in its proper place, an argument which
strongly illustrates this part of the subject ; I allude to the
great changes made in the British courts of admiralty.
Formerly, they held jurisdiction, like all similar tribunals in
other countries, under the laws of nations only. They were
as the creatures of those laws, and intended only to carry
their rules into execution. They were, of course, not under
the municipal laws of the country where they happened to
be located, as far as it regarded the rules of their decisions.
Thus constituted, they were one of the principal ornaments
of the civilization of modern times. The whole of this is
now reversed. The courts of admiralty receive laws as regu
larly from the British Government, as those of Westminster.
The only difference is, that the statutes of Parliament pre
scribe the rules of decision to the one, and the Orders in
Council to the other. It is thus that England legislates for
the ocean, and, consequently, for the world, on that great
highway, and has her proper tribunals, with commensurate
jurisdiction, to carry into effect her laws. But why should
I consume time to prove her maritime policy ? Who is
there so stupid as not to see and feel its effect ? You can
not look towards her shores and not behold it. You may
see it in her parliament, her prints, her theatres, and in her
very songs. It is scarcely disguised. It is her pride and
boast. The nature of her policy is then manifest and ad
mitted ; but it will be asked, how can you counteract it ?
I answer, by the measures now being pursued ; by force, by

SPEECHES. 87

war ; not by remonstrance, not by negotiation, and still less
by leaving it to itself. The nature of its growth indicates
its remedy. It originated in power — has grown in propor
tion as opposing power has been removed — and can only be
restrained by power. Nations are, for the most part, not re
strained by moral principles, but by fear. It is an old max
im, that they have heads, but no hearts. They see their
own interests, but do not sympathize in the wrongs of oth
ers. Such is the fact in relation to England. When neu
trals are numerous and powerful, their rights are, in some
degree, respected by her ; when few and inconsiderable, de
spised. This last has been the unfortunate state of the
world for the last twenty years. That counteracting influ
ence, that repulsive power by which she was bound to her
proper orbit, has been almost wholly removed. This coun
try alone was left to support the rights which belong to neu
trals. Perilous was the condition, and arduous the task.
We were not intimidated. We stood opposed to her usurpa
tion, and, by our spirit and efforts, have done all in our pow
er to save the last vestiges of neutral rights. Embargoes,
non-intercourse, non-importation, and, finally, war, \vere all
manly exertions to preserve the rights of this, and of all
other nations, from the deadly grasp of British maritime
policy.

But, say our opponents, these efforts are vain — and our
condition hopeless. If so, it only remains for us to assume
the habit of our condition. We must submit — humbly sub
mit — crave pardon — and hug our chains. It is not wise to
provoke, where we cannot resist. But let us be well assured
of the hopeless nature of our condition before we sink into
submission. On what do our opponents rest this despondent
and slavish belief ? On the recent events in Europe ? I ad
mit they are great, and well calculated to impose on the
imagination. Our enemy never presented a more imposing
exterior. His fortune is at the flood. But I am admon-

88 SPEECHES.

ished by universal experience, that such prosperity is the
most fickle of human conditions. From the flood the tide
dates its ebb ; from the meridian, the sun commences his
decline. There is more of sound philosophy than fiction in
the fickleness which poets attribute to fortune. Prosper
ity has its weakness — adversity its strength. In many re
spects our enemy has lost by those very changes which seem
to be so much in his favor. He can now no more claim to
be struggling for existence ; no more, to be fighting the bat
tles of the world, in defence of the liberties of mankind. The
magic cry of French influence, is lost. Hence were drawn
those motives which stimulated her efforts into fiercest ac
tion, which united the continent to her cause, and, in some
degree, damped the ardor of her rival in power. Even here,
in this very hall, we are not strangers to its magic tones.—
Even here the cry of French influence, that baseless fiction,
that phantom of faction, though now banished, once often re
sounded. I rejoice that the spell is broken, by which it was
attempted to bind the generous spirit of this country. The
minority can no longer act under cover ; but will be obliged
to defend their opposition on its intrinsic merits.

It is not in this respect only, that our enemy has lost by
the late events. The tremendous and exhausting conflicts
of this, and the preceding campaign, seem, at last, to dispose
the continental powers to peace. If they have a just con
ception of their true interest, and are not prevented by Brit
ish gold and intrigue, a continental peace will ensue. There
certainly is much alarm in England on the probability of
such an event. Should it, fortunately, be the case — should
the allies prove content with their fortune, and France sub
mit to her present limits, all Europe must speedily combine
against the British maritime policy. The great power on
land being crushed, to use the language of our opponents —
but more properly being forced within proper limits, the
great monopolist of the ocean will, I trust, be the next ob-

SPEECHES. 89

ject of fear and resistance. The principle of the armed neu
trality is not; and cannot be forgotten. It exists essentially
in the policy of modern Europe. Ever since the discovery
of the passage round the Cape of Good Hope, and of this
continent, on which we enjoy the proud pre-eminence of be
ing the first great civilized power, a great change has been
gradually working in Europe. For two centuries, the char
acter of that part of the world has been eminently trading
and commercial. The habits of every part are formed more
or less on this state of things. There lives scarcely a human
being, from the ice and snows of Siberia to the sunny plains
of Italy, who has not some habit, the gratification of which
depends on commerce. Hence it has become an object of
primary policy. The wars in Europe, for many years past,
have, with few exceptions, been, more or less, connected with
it. The policy of every court has been to obtain commercial
supplies on the best terms, and, as much as possible, through
the agency of their own subjects. With such habits and
policy, it is impossible they can behold with indifference the
monopoly of Great Britain. They will not quietly suffer
the common highway of nations, intended by a kind Provi
dence for the common intercourse and benefit of all, to be
converted into her exclusive domain. No ; the ocean cannot
become property. Like light and air, it is insusceptible of
the idea of property. Heaven has given it to man equally,
freely, bountifully ; and all empires attempted to be raised
on it, must partake of the fickleness of its waves. A policy
so injurious to the common interests of mankind, must, soon
er or later, unite the world against her. For many years
her encroachments have advanced without exciting much jea
lousy. The attention of all the nations of Europe has been
exclusively directed to the maintenance of their existence,
menaced by the power of France. To preserve life was
more important than to acquire comfort ; so to resist that
power was more imperious than to oppose England. Libe-

90 SPEECHES.

rated now from fear, they will soon have leisure to attend to
their interests. The difference between our policy and that
of other nations, in this respect, is only in appearance, and
not in reality. Each acted in a manner suited to the cir
cumstances in winch it found itself. Attachment to France,
as proclaimed by British partisans, formed no part of our
policy. We were safe from the danger with which her power
menaced other nations. A broad ocean was our immediate
security. We resisted the power which then and now press
es on us, and which will soon cause itself to be felt and re
sisted by all. Should the course of events be such as I have
indicated, then will the wisdom and spirit of our country be
universally applauded. Our situation was trying and respon
sible. We, alone, had to sustain all the rights and duties
which attach to the neutral character. We were not intim
idated by its difficulties. We dared, single-handed as we were,
to make a stand against the favorite and obstinate policy of
our enemy. The present and temporary interests of commerce
were nobly surrendered for its permanent advantages. The
example can scarcely fail to produce its effect. But if, un
fortunately, we should be left alone to maintain the contest ;
and if, in consequence (which may God forbid), necessity
should compel us to yield for the present, yet our generous
efforts will not have been in vain. A mode of thinking, and
a tone of sentiment have been excited, which must stimulate
to future and more successful struggles. What we may not
be able to effect with eight millions of people, will be done
with twenty. The great cause will not be yielded. No ;
never ! never ! We cannot renounce our rights to the ocean
which Providence has spread before our doors \ nor will we
ever hold that, which is the immediate gift of Heaven, under
the license of any nation. We have already had success
worthy of our cause. The future is audibly pronounced by
the splendid victories over the Guerriere, Java, and Macedo
nian. We and all nations, are, in them, taught & lesson

SPEECHES. 91

never to be forgotten. Opinion is power. The charm of
British naval invincibility is broken.

In this, the only just view of our contest, how pitiful
appear the objections of our opponents ! Some pecuniary
difficulties in Massachusetts, and in other places ! And
must we, for them, renounce our lasting prosperity and
greatness ? Have we no fortitude ? — no self-command ?
Must we, like children, yield to the impulse of present
pleasure, however fatal ? If the maritime parts of Massa
chusetts suffer, let them remember, that if the war should
be successful — if our future commerce and navigation should
be secured, they will partake most largely in the advan
tages, common and great, indeed, to all, but peculiarly so to
them.

Suppose that our opponents, who object to every thing,
had been at the helm of government, and that an opposite
line of policy had been pursued : — no embargoes — no non-
intercourse — no non-importation acts — no war — and, in fact,
no resistance to the injuries and aggressions of Great Britain ;
who can be ignorant of what would have been the conse
quence ? They would have multiplied in number and de
gree, till our commerce would have been annihilated. Unre-
sisted, they would have constituted future principles, and
our acquiescence been construed into an acknowledgment of
their truth. Then would we have felt — what the experience
of all ages has taught — that it is far more easy to maintain,
than to wrest back usurped rights. Wrongs, submitted to,
produce contrary effects in the oppressor and the oppressed.
Oppression strengthens and prepares for new oppression ;
submission debases to further submission. The first wrong,
by the universal law of our nature, is most easily re
sisted. It excites the greatest degree of union and indig
nation. Let that be submitted to ; let the consequent
debasement and loss of national honor be felt ; and nothing
but the grinding hand of oppression can force to resistance.

92 SPEECHES.

I know not which to pronounce the most guilty : the nation
that inflicts a wrong, or that which quietly submits to it.
In other respects, the difference is marked. The former
may "be hated, hut is respected — at least feared ; while the
latter is below pity, or any other feeling of the human heart
but sovereign contempt. In submission, then, there is no
remedy : our honor lost ; our commerce under the control of
our oppressor ; — what next ? The hopes and fears (those
universal instruments of government) of the whole mercan
tile section of this country, and all connected interests,
would be turned towards Great Britain ; for the power of
legislation over our commerce would be virtually transferred
from the American Congress to the King in Council. Need
I trace the consequence ? Need I paint the corrupt and
debasing influences ? The beams of the mid-day sun are
scarcely more clear. The very contempt which such base
ness would excite — justly excite — in our enemy, would in
sure our subjugation. It is impossible to allow any right,
much less independence, to that which creeps and licks the
dust. Such is the condition of our nature. We must have
the spirit to resist wrong, or be slaves. Such were the alter
natives presented to our country, and such would have
been the result of the opposite policy, now recommended and
applauded by our opponents.

I have now said ah1 I intended on this most interesting
view of our cause. It has an elevation and clearness which
renders it attractive to my mind. I love to dwell on it, be
cause it imparts a steady and clear conviction of the wisdom
and necessity of that course of measures, to the adoption of
which, it is my pride to have in part contributed. I feel
how little interesting all the common topics of opposition
are, after the view already taken. The descent gives a shock,
which I know the committee will partake with him who is
addressing them. If, however, they will continue their at
tention, I will offer a few observations on a subject which

SPEECHES. 93

has made a principal figure in the speeches of our opponents.
I allude to the character which they give to this war, as
offensive, and not defensive. On this point, I spoke fully
when the Army Bill was under consideration. What was
then said, has been introduced and objected to on this occa
sion. I then stated, that the difference between an offensive
and defensive war consisted in the motive and cause. If, for
instance, a war is forced on the nation waging it, by the op
pression of that against which it is declared, it would be de
fensive, however it might be carried on ; but if, on the con
trary, it originated in ambition, or any other improper
motive, it would be offensive. This distinction is not only
supported by reason, but by the declamation of our oppo
nents. They have, for almost two years, been in the habit
of denouncing offensive war. They, then, acknowledge that
such a war is wicked ; and how can it bear that character
but by its cause ? It seems, now, that they have changed
their grounds. We hear no more of the wickedness of
offensive war ; but, what is most strange, all their efforts are
directed to prove, that it may be an innocent and virtuous
thing. That nation, say they, is engaged in an offensive
war, who first assumes a warlike attitude. However just,
however necessary the cause, the war is still offensive. Be
it so. I care not for words. My answer is decisive. If my
conception be just, that an offensive war is to be tested by
the cause, I then pronounce ours not to be of that character ;
but, if their definition be correct, then an offensive war may
be most just, most virtuous, and necessary ; and all their
declamation against it is idle and unmeaning rant. I tender
an option, and care not which is taken. They who defend
a bad cause, act imprudently in descending to particulars.
Our opponents, by doing so in this case, have furnished the
best reply to their own arguments.

On expatriation and retaliation I will say nothing. The
hour is late, and I feel myself somewhat exhausted. I pass

94 SPEECHES.

them by the more cheerfully, as the gentleman from Louisi
ana (Mr. Kobertson) and my colleague have replied fully
to the objection urged on those subjects. Before I proceed
further, it will be necessary to restate the propositions with
which I commenced, so that the entire chain of the argument
— both that which has already been advanced, and what
remains to be submitted — may be distinctly seen.

It will be remembered that I reduced all the arguments
and objections of our opponents to the passage of this bill,
under two general heads. First, that the loan cannot be
had ; or must be obtained, if at all, at an exorbitant interest.
Second, that if it can be, still it ought not to be granted,
because the war is unjust and inexpedient. I also stated,
that the latter comprehended the assertion of the injustice
and inexpediency of the war, and the assumed inference,
that, if true, the minority would be justified in their oppo
sition both to the bill and to the war. On the alleged in
justice and inexpediency of the war I have presented my
opinions, and, I trust, satisfied the committee that its justice
is demonstrably clear, and its expediency unquestionable ;
or rather, its necessity imperious, if the preservation of the
independence of the country constitutes political necessity.

But is it justifiable to withhold the loan, even admitting
the war to be, as alleged by our opponents, unjust and inex
pedient ? This is the question now proposed to be discussed.
It contains the practical consequence of all that has been
said in opposition. Few propositions involve principles so
deeply connected with the lasting prosperity of our repub
lican institutions : and, in regard to which, consequently, it
is more necessary to think correctly. Error here cannot be
indifferent. A false mode of thinking must endanger the
existence of the republic. I must, then, again entreat the
attentive and deliberate audience of the committee, while
I offer my opinions and reasons on so interesting a subject.

In considering the question, — how far, in a war, thought

SPEECHES. 95

to be unjust or improper by any portion of the people, they
would be warranted in their opposition, after it is constitu
tionally declared, — I shall leave out of view such as involve
extreme or flagrant injustice. A war, impious or sacrilegious,
cannot be governed by the general rules which apply to or
dinary cases. At least, it is not necessary for me to consider
such extreme cases, as none can impute such a character to
the present.

I have already stated that the sum proposed to be raised
by this bill, is indispensably necessary to meet the expenses
of the ensuing year ; and that, if it is withheld, it must
communicate a fatal shock to public credit. In that event,
not only the invasion of Canada would be prevented, which
some gentlemen state to be their object, but the whole oper
ations of the war — even viewed as defensive in the strictest
sense — would be abandoned. Officers and soldiers will no
more serve in our garrisons than in Canada without pay. It
is idle to talk of only preventing the reduction of the enemy's
provinces by withholding the loan. Nor can gentlemen be
serious. They have opposed every attempt to raise supplies,
in whatever shape it has appeared. They appear to be bold
in facing bankruptcy. But have they reflected on the dis
astrous effects of their efforts, should they be successful ?
The old and recent creditors of the Government, the army,
the navy, — which they boast of cherishing, — in a word, every
individual would feel the calamity ; for private, no less than
public credit would partake of the shock. I am wholly at
a loss to perceive on what principle of expediency, policy,
or morality, such conduct can be justified. Surely it is not
a self-evident proposition, that, because the war is simply
unjust and inexpedient, in the opinion of the minority, there
fore, they have a right to involve the country in ruin, and
place it, bound as a suppliant, at the feet of a haughty
enemy. They, then, ought to state some intelligible and
satisfactory principle on which this conduct may be justified.

96 SPEECHES.

I have sought with attention, but have not found, the sem
blance of such an one. On the contrary, all the analogies
of private life, as well as of reason, forbid and condemn the
conduct of our opponents. Suppose a father to do some act,
which, in the opinion of a son, is not strictly just or proper,
by which he becomes involved in a contest with a stranger,
would the son be justified in taking part against him ? How
much less, then, can any party be in opposition to their
country in a war with another nation ? for it stands in the
place of the common parent of all ; and comprehends, to use
the language of a member from North Carolina (Mr. Gaston),
" all the charities of life!'

But what must be thought of the motives and conduct
of the minority, when I state that much the greater part of
the expenses of the war, for which this bill is intended in
part to provide, has been incurred by their votes as much as
by those of the majority ? I hold in my hands the journal
of the first session of the Twelfth Congress ; by which it
appears, that the Keport of the Committee on Foreign Kela-
tions was supported not only by the votes on this side of the
House, but by a decided majority on the other. The report
ended in recommending six resolutions to the adoption of
the House : — To fill up the old establishment ; to raise ten
thousand additional troops ; to increase the navy ; to provide
for calling out the militia ; and to authorize the arming of
private vessels. On the first of these, there was a minority
of eleven votes only : so unanimous was this House at that
time ! On some of the others, it is true, it was more con
siderable ; but all met with the support of gentlemen on the
other side. What ought to be particularly noted is, that
when the Senate and this House disagreed on the second
resolution, — to raise an additional number of regular troops,
the former supporting twenty-five thousand men, and the
latter, at first, ten thousand men, the Senate's proposition,
increasing the number, was passed by the votes of the mi-

SPEECHES. 97

nority. The leading men on the side of the opposition at
that time — among whom was a gentleman from Massachu
setts, well known in this country (Mr. Quincy), and another
from New- York, of great influence (Mr. Emmot), and many
whom I now behold — voted for the report. I have taken the
trouble to turn down the pages where the respective votes
are recorded, for the satisfaction of any member who may
desire to see them. With what countenance can our oppo
nents, then, withhold the supplies for expenses incurred by
their own votes ? Will they say that they knew not the
object of the report ? Miserable the excuse — and such as
it is, not founded on fact. War with Great Britain was un
equivocally announced ; and even the invasion of Canada,
now so hateful to them, was distinctly avowed. Was their
object to embarrass, and, finally, to put the majority out of
power ? Will they dare to make an avowal so disgraceful
to their party ? The truth is, that the necessity of the war
was, at that time, almost universally acknowledged ; and, as
to its justice, no one doubted it. Its injustice was an inven
tion of a period long subsequent. It is thus that consistency,
no less than reason, ought to check the minority in their
opposition, and to induce them to unite with us to carry on
the war to a successful issue.

I would be glad to know what limits our opponents have
prescribed to their opposition. If the supplies may be with
held because the war is unjust and improper in their opinion,
will not the same reason justify every species of resistance,
both in and out of this House ? If the public faith solemnly
plighted — if the happiness of the country, are no checks to
opposition, I see no reason why the laws or the constitution
should be. Let some intelligible limitation be prescribed.
I see none — to me it appears lawless. I know it will be
said, — Is all opposition to be proscribed ? Is none justi
fiable ? We proscribe nothing. We propose no law, — no
restraint on the conduct of the minority. We appeal to the

VOL. II.— 7"

98 SPEECHES.

virtue and the intelligence of the community only. On the
people must finally fall the ruinous effects of erroneous and
dangerous principles. If our liberty be lost, theirs will be
the cost. Our constitution supposes a degree of good sense
and virtue in them adequate to self-government. If the
fact be not so, our system of government is founded in error.
They, only, can arrest the effects of dangerous opposition.
What they permanently condemn will meet with no support
here.

How far the minority in a state of war, may justly
oppose the measures of Government, is a question of the
greatest delicacy. On the one side, an honest man, if he
believe the war to be unjust or unwise, will not disavow his
opinion. But, on the other hand, an upright citizen will do
no act, whatever he may think of the war, to put his country
in the power of the enemy. It is this double aspect of the
subject which indicates the course that reason approves.
Among ourselves, at home, we may contend ; but whatever
may be requisite to give the reputation and arms of the
republic a superiority over its enemy, it is the duty of all,
the minority no less than the majority, to support. Like
the system of our State and General governments, — within,
they are many, — to the world but one, — so it ought to be
with parties : — among ourselves, we may divide, — but in
relation to other nations, there ought to be only the Ameri
can people. In some cases it may possibly be doubtful, even
to the most conscientious, how to act. This is one of the mis
fortunes of differing from the rest of the community on the
subject of war.

I cannot refrain from alluding to an observation made
by a gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Gaston), con
nected with this view of the subject. Speaking of the
reduction of Canada, he observed, that his judgment and
feelings were at variance ; that when he consulted the
former, he believed our efforts would be unsuccessful ; but

SPEECHES. 99

when the latter, his regard to the interest of his country
led him to hope for success. I do not allude to this observa
tion with a view to point out any contradiction between it and
his opposition to the passage of this bill ; though I think it
would be difficult to reconcile them. My object is to make
an open acknowledgment to him, for what I think the
commencement of a more correct mode of thinking in rela
tion to the war. I thank the gentleman for his good wishes ;
and for that expressed in relation to the reduction of Canada.
I know it does not contain an approbation of the attempted
conquest ; but it comports with the conduct of a good
citizen,, — since the attempt is determined on by the consti
tuted authorities, — to wish it well. This seems to me to
be in the true spirit of an honest opposition ; and I hope it
will be so extended as to influence the general conduct of the
minority. It is thus we may divide among ourselves, and
the national strength be left unimpaired. For I do not
agree with those members of the minority, who assert there
is no loss of strength by their opposition. We are asked by
them, " Why have you not effected your object ? You com
mand the purse and the sword of the country, and can order
ivhatever is necessary to be done. I answer : — Because we
have not your good wishes. This only can add heart to
heart. Government, it is true, can command the arm and
hand, the bone and muscle of the nation ; but these are
powerless — nerveless, without the concurring good wishes of
the community. He who, in estimating the strength of a
people, looks only to their numbers and physical force, leaves
out of the reckoning the most material elements of power
— union and zeal. Without these, the former is inert matter.
Without these, a free people is degraded to the miserable
rabble of a despotism ; but with these, they are irresistible.

The same gentleman made an assertion which I am bound
to contradict. He asserted, without attempting to prove,
that this House has degenerated into a mere registering

100 SPEECHES.

body of executive edicts. A sense of decorum prevents me
from speaking of the charge with merited severity. I will
not meet the assertion with arguments, but assertion. It is
easy to assert, but slow and difficult to prove : It were hope
less to oppose the latter to the former ; — the creeping pace
of the one is no match for the winged rapidity of the other.
I then assert, that what the gentleman has said is untrue in
fact.

[Here Mr. G. entered into some explanation, and denied the use
of the word " registering " ; and concluded by wishing to know, in
what sense Mr. C. used the word, untrue.

Mr. C. said, simply as implying, that the fact is not as Mr. G.
stated ; and that lie had too much respect for him to have used it in
any other sense. He then proceeded.]

Some arguments and observations of mine on a former
occasion, in regard to the nature and character of opposition,
have, in this debate, called forth replies from many of the
minority, and particularly from the gentleman just alluded
to. He asserted that a majority might also be a faction, and
citing the Federalist in proof of this position, stated the ad
ditional fact, that, when it is one, it is far more dangerous
than a factious minority. If the gentleman had been more
attentive, he would have found that there was nothing in my
arguments to contradict the position taken in the Federalist.
What I said was in reply ; and was intended to refute the
assertion of our opponents on that occasion — that all the
misfortunes and miseries of free States originated in the
blunders and folly of majorities. The error of this opinion I
then sufficiently exposed, both by experience and reason. It
has found no advocate on this occasion. I will not again
repeat the reasons ; but simply restate — that opposition, in
free States, is strongly inclined to degenerate into a struggle
for power and ascendency, in which attachment to party
becomes stronger than attachment to country. This opinion,
I conceive, is incontrovertibly established ; in fact, its truth

SPEECHES. 101

is but too manifest to all who have looked- into' the character
of man, or are acquainted with his history. ; Ofcr the 'other
hand, I feel no disposition to deny that 'the^ majority may,
possibly, become factious — that is, cease to consult the gen
eral interest. I claimed no peculiar exemption for them — it
made no part of my argument — I stated principles, but left
their application to the good sense of the community. Much
less do I feel disposed to contest the position that, if such a
majority could, and should, by any misfortune, exist in this
country, it would be more dangerous than a factious minority.
I cannot doubt, for instance, that if the present minority
could be swelled into a majority by the addition of one-third
more to their ranks, and that they should, when in power,
retain all the principles which I hear them daily advance in
this House, they would not only be more dangerous than they
now are — when their power is, to divide and distract ; but
that it would be the greatest calamity that could befall our
country.

A very important view of the subject yet remains to be
presented to the committee ; but I fear the hour is too
late, and I am too much exhausted to enter as fully into it
as it deserves. The topic aUuded to is — the effects of this
war ; which has been pronounced so ruinous by our opponents.
On examination, strong reasons will be found for the opinion,
that it is daily producing the most solid and lasting advan
tages to the community.

It has already liberated us from that dread of British
power, which was almost universal before the declaration of
war. If we have done little against our enemy, he has done
still less against us. What the state of public feeling was on
this point, may be, in some degree, inferred from the debates
in this House before the declaration of war. I cannot but
express my surprise at an assertion of a gentlemen from
Virginia (Mr. Sheffey), that all his fears and predictions had
been realized. Has he already forgotten the speeches in

102 SPEECHES.

which he and his friends portrayed the effects of the war in
gloving, aacj. temfi (^colors ? Kebellion, civil war, prostrated
liberty, and conflagrated towns, all mingled in one horrid
group. (Mr. Sheffey here explained.) It seems that the
gentleman has availed himself of the usual privilege of po
litical prophets. If events turn out any thing like their
predictions, they are claimed as fulfilments ; but if entirely
the opposite, they are explained away.

There is no one who hears me, but will acknowledge,
that the dread of England was great tmd general. Her
power over our hopes and our fears was too great for our
complete independence, and but illy comported with the
steady pursuit of our own peculiar interests. From this state
the war has liberated us, I hope for ever.

We have also acquired, in some degree, and are progres
sively acquiring, what to me appears indispensable in the
present state of man and the world — military skill and means,
combined with the tone of thinking and feeling necessary to
their use. Occasional privations are always to be encoun
tered in the defence of national rights, and the habits neces
sary to meet them with fortitude are of the greatest impor
tance. I know how much this country is attached to peace
and quiet industry. I know how delightful repose and safety
are to our nature. But universal experience, and the history
of those nations with whom we are necessarily connected,
forbid me to indulge in the pleasing dream, that any degree
of prudence or justice on our part can render such a state
perpetual. The ambition of a single nation can destroy
the peace of the world. We must, then, submit to the in
scrutable law of our nature, which forbids the hope, in this
world, of uninterrupted peace and enjoyment. We must,
also, as prudent men, rejoice in the acquisition of those na
tional qualities necessary to meet the vicissitudes of war when
unavoidable. Connected with this subject, I rejoice to be
hold the amazing growth of our manufacturing interest. I

SPEECHES. 103

regret that I cannot present my thoughts fully on this im
portant subject. It will more than indemnify the country
for all of its losses. I believe no country, however valuable
its staples, can reach a state of great and permanent wealth,
without the aid of manufactures. Keason and experience,
I conceive, support this position. Our internal strength and
means of defence are, by them, greatly increased. War,
when forced on us hereafter, will find us with ample means ;
and will not be productive of that distressing vicissitude
which follows it, where the industry of the country is founded
on commerce, and agriculture dependent on foreign markets.
Even our commerce, in the end, will partake of the benefits.
Kich means of exchange with all the world will be furnished
to it ; and the country will be in a much better condition to
extend to it efficient protection. I have merely suggested
the topics for argument on this important branch of our
political economy ; and conclude by expressing the hope,
that, on some future occasion, they will receive a suitable
discussion.

SPEECH

On the repeal of the Embargo and Non-Importation
Act, delivered in the House of Representatives,
April 6th, 1814.

[NOTE. — April 4th, 1814. The unfinished business being postpon
ed with that view, Mr. Calhoun, the Chairman of the Committee of
Ways and Means, reported a Bill, " To repeal an Act laying an em
bargo on all ships and vessels in the ports and harbors of the United
States, and so much of any act or acts, as prohibits the importation of
goods, wares and merchandise, of the growth, produce and manufac
ture of Great Britain and Ireland, &c.," which having been twice read,

104 SPEECHES.

was referred to the Committee of the Whole. Mr. Wright of Mary
land objected to this reference, because, the Bill coupled two objects,
which ought to be kept separate ; and moved a recommittal to the
same committee, with instructions to report two separate bills. This
motion was overruled by the Speaker, and the question, on referring
the Bill to the Committee of the Whole, was carried by a large major
ity. On Wednesday, April 6th, the House resolved itself into a Com
mittee of the Whole on this Bill, when Mr. Calhoun made the following
speech in support of it. There were numerous amendments offered
which were negatived, and the Bill was ordered to a third reading and
passed the next day, by a vote of 115 to 37.1

IN order, Mr. Chairman, to judge of the propriety of the
measure embraced by the bill, it will be necessary to go back
to the nature and character of the war in which this coun
try is engaged. It is, as has been emphatically and correctly
stated, a war for Free Trade and Sailors' Rights ; and such
must be the character of every war in which we may engage.
We are so far removed from European contests, that we shall
never enter into the struggles for continental power in that
quarter of the world. Not that we should be indifferent
spectators of the events in Europe — because the changes
there may have a considerable bearing on the affairs and in
terests of this country ; but the interest we feel in them is
not of such a character, as to make us a primary party in
any of their contests. But one circumstance always accom
panying European struggles, will, more or less, involve the
rights of this country. Of such a character is the British
commercial or maritime policy, which, in its effects, tends to
destroy the free trade of this country, and also to infringe
the rights of our seamen. In this point of view, it is a mat
ter of great importance that we should duly reflect on the
character of the present contest, to decide what part this
country ought to act, and what principles should now govern
our conduct.

The policy of Britain, which is to contract and limit neu-

SPEECHES. 105

tral rights, and which if not resisted must annihilate them,
will always have a strong bearing on the United States. But
that policy will not stop here ; it will affect the interests of
every country in Europe, and place them, more or less, on
the side of this country in resistance to it. It then becomes
a matter of policy to unite those countries, interested in the
cause of free trade, in the struggle which we are obliged to
make against the usurpations of the enemy. In this point
of view, the most liberal and generous policy ought to be
pursued by us as to the other countries of Europe, and par
ticularly to the great Northern powers of Sweden and Kus-
sia. But it may be said, our past measures contradict this
leading principle of policy. I think not. The restrictive
system sprang from an unusual state of things : it was a pa
cific policy arising from the extraordinary state of the world,
at the time we embarked in it ; and, of course, was a tempo
rary, rather than, a permanent policy. On looking back to
its origin, gentlemen will find it to be such as I have stated.
It originated at a moment when every power on the conti
nent of Europe was arrayed against Great Britain, and not one
of them was then interested in the support or defence of neu
tral rights. There was scarcely a port in Europe, which, at the
commencement of our restrictive system, was not occluded to
British commerce. In this state of things the United States, in
order to avoid war (not having taken the resolution, at that
time, to declare war), resorted to the restrictive system — resort
ed to it because the extraordinary state of the European world
presented a prospect, that the strong pressure of this system on
Great Britain might save the country from the contest into
which we have since been reluctantly drawn. Such was the
character of the Embargo measure, originating from the posture
of the world at that day, when it was resorted to without the
prospect of its producing an impression on neutral powers — for
there were then no neutrals. Gentlemen may say, that in this
view of the restrictive system, it ought to have terminated

106 SPEECHES.

at the commencement of the war. To be candid, that was
my opinion ; and when a motion was made by a gentleman
from Massachusetts (Mr. Kichardson) to that effect, I advo
cated it on the ground, that the restrictive policy was opposed
to the war. That motion was not successful ; but it was re
jected by a majority of one vote only, — so many members of
the republican party agreeing with me in that opinion, as
almost to have carried the question at that time. But why
was the system not then terminated ? The reasons will be
obvious to all who revert to the circumstances of the period.
The state of the world which originally induced us to adopt
the system — which gave great energy to it, remained un
changed. All Europe was still occluded to British commerce ;
the war between Kussia and France had not then broken out —
Eussia had not then opened her ports to British commerce.

This, then, is the governing motive which prevented the
repeal of that system. Had the state of the world been
then what it now is ; had all the European world, France
excepted, been open to British commerce ; had there existed
neutral nations on the continent of Europe, of power and
influence ; — had this state of things then existed, there is
the strongest reason to believe, from the small majority
against the resolution of the gentleman from Massachusetts,
to which I have alluded, that the restrictive system would
have been terminated by the war. As to my own views of
the system, I thought it ought to have terminated in war
earlier than it did. In this respect I disagreed with gentle
men on the other side of the House, with whom I then voted.
They wished for neither war nor restriction.

But let us now attend to the present state of the world.
What is the condition of England ? As between us and
Great Britain, there are many nations of great power
now in a neutral condition : Russia, Sweden, all Germany,
Denmark, Prussia, Spain (for even she may be considered
neutral), and perhaps Holland. Under the entire change of

SPEECHES. 107"

the circumstances of Europe, ought not the restrictive system
to terminate ? Indubitably — indubitably ; — because all the
reasons which justified and recommended its continuance have
now ceased. It was originally resorted to as a pacific measure.
War having been declared, as a war measure it was continued
— as a measure of force, because all Europe was shut against
our enemy. All Europe being now open to her, that reason
has ceased. Suppose we persist in the measure. Does any
one believe that England will feel its effects as she did when
the continent was shut ? Certainly not. But in addition
to this consideration, the fact is, that we are now contending
for free trade, and ought to propitiate, as much as possible,
every nation which has the same interest as ourselves in its
maintenance : in one word, it is our interest to attach the
friendship of Kussia, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, and of all
nations who have a deep interest in free trade, to our cause.
I have a strong impression, that if we open our ports to
them, and the maritime usurpations of Britain continue,
they will, in time, make common cause with the United
States ; that, in time, their weight will be thrown into the
scale with us to counteract her policy. It will not be deco
rous or wise for the United States, standing up for the freedom
of trade, to pursue a course of policy calculated to irri
tate those nations with whom they may have common cause.
What said the Emperor of Kussia in relation to our war with
Britain, when apprised of it ? He expressed his solicitude
for the trade with America, and regretted that our difference
with Great Britain would interrupt it. This sentiment he
expressed at the moment when France and her allies were
marching against him, and he did not know how soon they
would plant their standard in his capital. That sentiment
must have still greater influence with him now, when his
enemy is repelled. The same feeling which governed the
Emperor of Russia in this respect, must, in a greater or less
degree, govern every nation on the continent of Europe,

108 SPEECHES.

whose interests are the same. In the proposition which has
been made to France on the part of the allies, a solicitude
has been evinced on this subject, which, if this country shows
a disposition to extend the benefits of its commerce to the
European continent, must have weight in the British cabi
net. We ought never to forget the reasons which forced us
into war. Anxious to maintain our neutral position, and
enjoy the benefits of neutral trade, we for years closed our
eyes to the aggressions on the part of the enemy ; sufferance
on our part provoked only further injury, which forced us to
arms in defence of neutral rights and free trade. Under
this view of the subject, I hope this committee will duly ap
preciate the necessity of conciliating those nations, whose
interests are now the same as ours ; with whom we have now
some trade, which, in future, may be expected to be greatly
extended.

But it may be said, England will not permit this trade.
To what a situation will she then be reduced ! to an alter
native the most awkward and perplexing : she must either
keep up her present mere cruising or paper blockade of our
sea-coast to prevent the entrance of those neutrals, or modify
her system in favor of all neutrals. Will not a persistence
in her present unlawful system of blockade and capture at
sea of neutral vessels destined for the United States, irritate
and vex those nations, and detach them from her cause ?
If, on the other hand, she modifies her system of blockade in
their favor, we may carry on a lucrative trade to the conti
nent of Europe, not beneficial to England, but very much so
to the United States. The very option which will thus be
presented, will embarrass the British cabinet, and have a
stronger tendency to produce peace, than ten years' continu
ance of the present system, when the prospect of its produ
cing any pressure has become so very faint. I ask gentlemen
on the same side of the House with myself, whether, if the
restrictive system were now off, there would be ten votes

SPEECHES. 109

in the House in favor of putting it on ? I contend there
would not. If it were to expire on the 10th of the present
month, would there be ten votes in favor of its renewal ? I
believe not. If the House would in neither case embrace it
under present circumstances, there is the strongest reason to
presume that, in its judgment, the restrictive system is not
now operative and wise. What, then, is the objection to its
repeal ? A regard to consistency. I know regard ought
always to be had to this trait, so valuable in governments
and individuals ; but it is not the duty of men to regulate
their conduct without any regard to events. True wisdom
consists in properly adapting our conduct to circumstances.
Two things may change our conduct on any particular point : a
change of our own opinion, or of exterior circumstances, which
entirely change the reason of our former conduct. Men can
not always go straight forward, but must regard the obstacles
which impede their course. Inconsistency consists in a
change of conduct, when there is no change of circumstances
which justify it. Those who adapt their conduct to a change
of circumstances, act, not inconsistently, but otherwise. They
would be inconsistent, if they persisted in a course of mea
sures after the reasons which called for them had so changed,
as to require a course directly the reverse. I respect the
firmness of many friends around me, because it indicates
their determination to persevere in any system, and adhere
to any measure, which they believe the interest of their
country requires. But, according to the view which I have
taken, I do not consider such a persistence in the restrictive
system as the dictate either of wisdom or of sound policy.

There are many other observations which I might make
on this subject, which I shall, at present, forbear to urge.

As to the manufacturing interest, in regard to which
some fears have been expressed, the resolution voted by the
House yesterday is a strong pledge, that it will not suffer the
manufacturers to be unprotected, in case of a repeal of the

110 SPEECHES.

restrictive system. I hope that at all times, and under
every policy, they will be protected with due care. All far
ther remarks I reserve, until I shall hear the objections to
the bill

SPEECH

On the Resolution reported by the Committee of
Ways and Means, to increase the Direct Tax, deliv
ered in the House of Representatives, Oct. 25th,
1814.

[NOTE. — After the capture of Washington by the British army
under the command of Gen. Ross, the President, by Proclamation,
called an extra session of Congress, which met on the 19th of Sept.,
1814. The finances of the Government, as well as the currency of
the country, were in a deplorable state ; and the attention of Congress
was immediately directed to these subjects. The Committee of Ways
and Means recommended, among other measures, an addition of 50
per cent, on the Direct Taxes ; which was subsequently, in conformity
with the views of the Secretary of the Treasury, increased to one
hundred per cent. He also recommended the issue of treasury notes,
and the establishment of a National Bank, with a capital of fifty
millions, as necessary to the support of the public credit.

The first resolution of the committee, recommending the addition
of 100 per cent, on the Direct Taxes, was discussed on the 24th and
25th of October, by Messrs. Rhea, Fisk, and Calhoun in favor, and
by Messrs. Webster and Shipherd in opposition ; and decided in the
affirmative, by a vote of 89 to 38. The following is a sketch of Mr.
Calhoun's remarks.]

MR. CALHOUN said, he did not rise to consider whether
the war was originally just and necessary, or whether the ad
ministration had abandoned the original objects of the con-

SPEECHES. Ill

test ; much less, whether the opposition, according to the very
modest declaration of the member from New Hampshire
(Mr. Webster), possessed all the talent and confidence of the
country. His object was to call the attention of the House
to the necessity of prompt and vigorous measures for the
prosecution of the war. If ever a body of men, said he,
held the destinies of a country in their hands, it was that
which he was now addressing. You have, for an enemy, a
Power the most implacable and formidable ; who, now freed
from any other contest, will, the very next campaign, direct
the whole of his force against you. Besides his deep-rooted
enmity towards this country, which will urge him to exer
tion, he is aware of the necessity, on his part, to bring the
contest to a speedy termination. He dreads its continuance ;
for he well knows that, should it be maintained by us with
vigor for only a few years, there will be other parties to the
struggle, which may again involve him in a war with all
Europe. He, then, will put forth, from spite and policy, the
whole of his strength the next summer to crush us, if pos
sible, by one mighty effort. To meet this state of things,
the whole of our resources will have to be called into action ;
and, what is of equal importance, with such promptitude
as to be ready to act as soon as the season will admit. What,
then, are the duties which devolve on this House, and which
must be performed, in order that we may be in a state of
preparation to meet and maintain the struggle P This is
the question which he proposed to consider, — not indeed in
detail, but generally ; in order that we may be aware of the
urgent necessity for dispatch.

First, then, it will be absolutely necessary to pass these
tax resolutions, or some others of equal vigor, into laws. Our
finances, it is acknowledged, are much deranged ; and it is
also admitted, on all sides, that they can only be restored by
a vigorous system of taxation. Has any member estimated
how much time this will consume ? It is now the 25th of

112 SPEECHES.

October, and we have not passed even the resolutions. At
the same rate of proceeding, to settle all the complex details
of the bills, and pass them into laws, will require months.
In the next place, it will be necessary (he presumed no mem
ber could doubt it) to take the state of the circulating me
dium into consideration, and to devise some measure to ren
der it more safe and better adapted to the purposes of finance.
The single fact, that we have no proper medium commensu
rate in its circulation with the Union ; — that it is all local —
is calculated to produce much embarrassment in the opera
tions of the treasury. But, Sir, after we have passed the taxes
and established an adequate circulating medium, which must
of necessity, with the closest attention, consume much time,
much still will remain to be done. The army, to which the
President had so strongly called our attention, has not yet
claimed a moment of our time. He would not pretend to
anticipate the plan which the Military Committee would
doubtless submit to the House ; but he would state what ap
peared to him indispensable to give to our arms the greatest
effect with the least expenditure. He did not wish to be
understood as the advocate of parsimony, but of economy,
combined with effective action.

The enemy, at present, presses the war both on our sea
board and interior frontier. The nature of the contest on
either will, if properly considered, indicate the mode in which it
ought to be met. On the seaboard it must be strictly de
fensive. The enemy can make no permanent conquest of
any importance there ; but he hopes, by alarming and har
assing the country, and putting us to an enormous expense
in defending it, to break the spirit of the people, and bring
us to his own terms. The only remedy in our hands, with
out a marching force, is to fortify as strongly as possible the
cities and exposed points, and to garrison them with a suffi
cient number of experienced regular troops. In case of an
attack they must be aided by the militia of the cities and

SPEECHES. 113

adjacent country, called out on the occasion en masse; which
can be done without much vexation or expense. By having
respectable garrisons of regular troops, thus aided on emer
gencies, and supported by strong works, we will afford more
security, and save millions of expense. The present militia
force, he supposed, in actual service, could not be much short
of 100,000. Less than hah0 that number of regulars could be
made abundantly adequate to the defence of our seaboard.

On the Canada frontier the war must assume an oppo
site character. If we wish to act with effect, it must there
be wholly offensive. He had earnestly hoped that the
miserably stale and absurd objections against offensive opera
tions in Canada had ceased, till he heard, yesterday, the
member from New Hampshire (Mr. Webster). It was so ob
viously the cheapest and most effectual mode of operating on
our enemy, that thinking men, he believed, with few excep
tions, of all parties, had agreed in its expediency. For, sup
pose we should have, at the opening of the next campaign, a
sufficient force on the Canada frontier for its reduction,
what would be the result ? Our enemy must either call off
the whole of his force to defend himself in that quarter, or
he must permit it to fall into our possession. Either event
would be desirable. If he should adopt the former, as in all
probability he would be compelled to do, our seaboard would
be freed from danger and alarm, and we would have the fur
ther advantage of meeting him on equal terms. He could
no longer avail himself of his maritime superiority. If, how
ever, he should not strengthen himself in Canada, but con
tinue the war on the coast, it would be still more to our
advantage. The reduction of his possessions, besides shed
ding a glory on our arms and producing, both here and in
England, the happiest effects in our favor — would enable us
to maintain the struggle with half the expense in men and
money. After so desirable an event, our efforts might be
almost exclusively directed to the defence of the seaboard,

VOL. II. 8

114 SPEECHES.

and the war would assume a new aspect highly favorable to
this country. To secure so desirable a state of things, a
regular force of, at least, 50,000 men ought to be ready
to act against Canada by the first of May or June, at
furthest. If they could be immediately raised and marched
to their proper depots for training, they could, in a few
months, be well trained for service. He was well assured
that the brilliant battles of Bridgewater and Chippewa were
won by men three-fourths of whom had not been in the
ranks more than four months. With skilful officers, and
with the aptitude of the Americans to acquire the military
art, the finest army in a few months might be formed. He
said, he could not refrain from congratulating this House
and the country on the acquisition we had made, in so short a
time, of military skill. It was wonderful, almost incredible,
that, in a year or two, with very little opportunity, such
generals should be formed as led, during the last summer, our
armies to victory. No country, under all the circumstances,
ever in so short a time, developed so much military talent.
Put under their command, without delay, a sufficient force,
well appointed, and you will find yourself in the road to
honor and secure peace. But can this be done by idle de
bate ? — by discussing the origin of the war, and the relative
talent and virtue of the two great parties in this country ?
Now is our time, not for debate, but action. Much is to be
done ; we have not a moment to lose. Time is to us every
thing — men, money, honor, glory, and peace. Should we
consume it in debate, and let the moments for prepara
tion glide away, our affairs must be irretrievably ruined.
Compare what remains to be done with the time for
action, and it is certain that, to act promptly is as im
portant as to act at all. Under these impressions, he hoped
that the House would pass, this day, on all the resolutions ;
that they would be referred back to the committee, to report
bills immediately ; and that whatever was needful to our

SPEECHES. 115

early and complete preparation, would be promptly dis
patched. The enemy is already arrived, and, as soon as
permitted by the season, will strike with deadly intent.
Let us be ready to receive and return the blow with re
doubled force. We are placed in circumstances the most
urgent and imperious. Our supposed weakness has tempted
him to make his extraordinary demands. Who, that bears
in his bosom the heart of an American, can think of them
without the most just indignation ? Surrender the lakes to
his control ; renounce the fisheries — that nursery for sea
men ; cede a part of Maine, and all beyond the Greenville
line ; and recognize the Indians as their allies, and under
their protection ! Such is his language. He relies not so
much in his own strength, as our divisions and consequent
weakness. Let it be our most serious business, by vigor and
promptitude, to baffle and destroy his vain hopes. If we
fail, it will not be for the want of means, but because we
have not used them. We have generals and troops that have
proved themselves an overmatch for the choicest of the ene
my's battalions, commanded by his most boasted officers.
To this evidence of skill and courage, superadd preparations
on our part equal to our resources. By this means, you will
make him sensible of his presumption, and compel him to
listen to terms of peace, honorable to both nations. He has
it in his power, at all times, to make such a peace. Every
member who hears me knows this to be the fact, not
withstanding the unjust and unfounded insinuations of
the member from New Hampshire (Mr. Webster) to the
contrary.

He observed, again, that England dreaded a continuance
of the contest. The affairs of Europe are far from being
settled. Her relation, in a commercial point of view, is cal
culated to raise up powerful enemies on the continent.
Should she be foiled and disgraced here, which she must be,
if we but do our duty, the opportunity, so favorable, to hum-

116 SPEECHES.

ble her, will be seized. Of these facts she is sensible, and
our very preparation for a vigorous war will make her dread
the contest. But suppose, instead of vigorous and prompt
preparation, we consume our time in debate here, and permit
our affairs to go on in the consequent slow and feeble way—
where is the man so blind as to believe that England will
limit her views by her present demands, extravagant as they
are ? We are already told, that she will proportion her
future demands to the relative situation of the two countries.
She neither expected nor desired peace on the terms which
were offered. Her bosom is repossessed with the ambition
and projects that inspired her in the year seventy-six. It is
the war of the Revolution revived ; we are again struggling
for our liberty and independence. The enemy stands ready,
and eagerly watches to seize any opportunity which our fee
bleness or division may present, to realize his gigantic
schemes of conquest. In this struggle for existence, he must,
he said, entreat the members of the opposition — though they
can reconcile it to their consciences to stand with folded
arms, and coldly look on — not to impede, by idle and frivo
lous debate, the efforts of those who are ready, by every sac
rifice, to maintain the independence of the country. The
subject is weighty ; he felt himself pressed on all sides by
the most interesting topics ; but he would abstain from fur
ther remarks, lest he who deprecated the consumption of the
time of the House in long debate, should set an example of
it in himself. The time is precious, and he felt that he
owed an apology for having consumed so much of it as he
had done.

SPEECHES. 11*7

SPEECH

On the Military Peace Establishment, delivered in
the House of Kepresentatives, February 27th,
1815.

[NOTE. — February 22d, 1815. Mr. Troup, from the Committee
on Military Affairs, reported a Bill to fix the Military Peace Establish
ment. The Bill provided that it should not exceed Ten Thousand
men ; which was read and referred to a Committee of the Whole.
When called up in committee, Mr. Desha moved to substitute Six
Thousand for Ten Thousand, which gave rise to considerable debate,
and the amendment was carried 69 to 50 ; and the Bill, after some
further amendments, was reported to the House, when on the question
of concurrence in the amendments, a debate arose, in which Mr. Cal-
houn took part, against the amendment. The following is only a
sketch of his remarks.]

MR. CALHOUN said, That on the question of fixing the
Military Peace Establishment, it appeared to him the House
was acting rather in the dark, having before them neither
the estimates, nor the facts on which they could be founded.
In determining the amount of the Military Establishment,
he said, the House ought to take into view three objects, and
to graduate the force to be retained accordingly, viz. : a pro
per maintenance and garrison of our military posts and for
tresses ; an establishment large enough to keep alive military
science and serve as a seminary for that purpose ; and the
adaptation of our military force to the policy of the enemy
in regard to this country. As regarded these objects, it
appeared to him, that the House was not in possession of
information to enable it to act understandingly. What
force would be necessary to guard our seaports, to protect
our northwestern and western frontier from Indian hosti-

118 SPEECHES.

lity ? Of this there was no estimate, but every thing was left
to conjecture. As to the second point, practical military
men ought to be consulted, whether it would be proper to
keep up a military force to maintain military science.

The next question, said Mr. 0., was more important.
Have we a sufficient knowledge of the force and policy of the
enemy, to enable us to decide on the reduction of our milita
ry establishment ? He contended we had not. What would be
the feelings of England on receiving intelligence of the late
events, he did not know. Whether the soreness of her recent
defeat would produce a disposition to remain at peace or to re
taliate, no gentleman could say. If there were any doubt on
this subject, we ought to act with caution in reducing our
military establishment. What course the enemy will pursue
we cannot determine : whether he will keep up a small peace
establishment or a large military force, we do not know. It
ought to be recollected, that he has abundance of military
means, and that living is as cheap in Canada as in England.
If the enemy should keep up, on our borders, a force of
30,000 or 40,000 men, instead of reducing it to four or five
thousand, would it be wise in us wholly to disarm ? It
would not. If a large force should be retained in service in
our vicinity, it would be highly impolitic for us to reduce
ours as low as was proposed. The gentleman from Virginia
(Mr. Jackson) had on a former day remarked, that our situa
tion was peculiarly felicitous, in having no enemy imme
diately in our neighborhood. But it ought to be borne in
mind, that the most powerful nation in Europe possessed
provinces adjoining our territory, into which she could
readily pour an armed force. He hoped that she never
would, but she might do so. Suppose with forty thousand
men, she should choose, without notice, to make a hostile
movement against our territory ? Every strong position on
the Niagara frontier would fall at once into her hands, and

SPEECHES. 119

the very expense we wish to avoid, must be quadrupled to
enable us to regain them.

Having neither estimates nor facts, as he had • before
remarked, the House ought to act cautiously. It is easier to
keep soldiers, than to get them ; — to retain officers of skill and
renown in your service, than to make them. Let us wait
a while before we reduce our army to a mere peace estab
lishment.

[Several gentlemen then addressed the House on this question, pro
and con., when Mr. Calhoun again rose and said : — ]

He was more and more convinced of the inexpediency of
breaking up, at once, our whole military establishment.
Had they before them, he asked, or could they have, at this
session, the necessary estimates whereby to fix the peace esta
blishment. If they had, there would probably be little dif
ference of opinion on the subject ; but they had not. Gentle
men had said that to retain so great a force, would imply
a suspicion of the good faith of Great Britain, in regard to
the peace. His reply to that argument was, that if the
largest number, now proposed, be agreed to, we shall reduce
our army to one-sixth of the amount of our war establish
ment ; that is to say, from sixty to ten thousand men, and
ultimately perhaps from ten thousand to six. He rose now,
however, principally to reply to the argument that our ratifi
cation of the treaty amounted to an abandonment to Great
Britain of the right of impressment, &c. — to an abandon
ment of free trade and sailors' rights.

In the first place, he denied the position that this
country had ever set up a claim to the universality of the
flag. We had always been ready to make any arrange
ment, by which our own seamen might be protected.
Although the Government, perhaps, ought to have done so,
it never made it a point that the flag should protect every
thing under it. It had been said, however, that unless the

120 SPEECHES.

flag protected all sailing under it, it would be difficult to rem
edy the abuse of the right of search for persons. We offered
the rule, that the flag should protect the seamen, as one sub
ject to modification. This Government had always been
willing to make such reciprocal regulations as should, in this
respect, secure to each nation its rights. The celebrated
Seamen's Bill, as it was called, was the result of a dispo
sition of this sort. We have denied the right of Great
Britain to take any other than her own seamen, and have we
made any stipulation, express or implied, by which we have
yielded the rights of our citizens to exemption from impress
ment by her authority ? On the contrary, he maintained
that that right was substantially and for ever fixed. We
have exhibited, said Mr. C., during this war, a power and an
energy of character, which will prevent any nation from at
tempting, hereafter, to take our, or any other seamen from
our decks. Mr. C. added, he had no doubt, but that Great
Britain would be willing, in order to guard against any
future collision on this subject, to enter into reciprocal
arrangements, which shall preclude, hereafter, any necessity
or pretence for searching our merchant vessels for her sea
men. There is no abandonment on our part, by the treaty,
of any right. He had seen some assertions to the contrary
in newspapers ; but he had never expected to hear it gravely
said on this floor, that it would be something like a violation
of the treaty, if we should hereafter resist the practice of
impressing our seamen. The war, said Mr. C., had effected
all its great objects. The British claim of impressment,
which we resisted, ended with the European war. It was
a claim resulting from a state of war • that state ceasing,
the operation of • the claim ceased with it, and there was no
necessity for a treaty stipulation against a claim which was
extinct. If war should again break out in Europe, and
that claim be revived (which, he believed, would not be the
case), we shall be in a better condition than ever to assert

SPEECHES. 121

the rights of our citizens ; though he believed we had made
such an impression on the British nation, that it would
never feel the same disposition hereafter, which it had here
tofore evinced, to encroach on our rights. They were now
better secured than by paper or parchment stipulations.
They are secured, said Mr. 0., by the vigor and energy of
the American people, who will again be ready to draw the
sword, if Britain again ventures to encroach ^>n them.

[After some remarks by Mr. Hanson, Mr. Calhoun continued : — ]

Nothing was more easy, than, by taking detached parts
of papers and omitting to take circumstances into view, en
tirely to misrepresent any question. If the gentleman last
up, who had quoted a part of the instructions to our minis
ters, had read a little more of that report, he would have seen
the gross error of the construction he has put upon it — he
would have found, that our ministers were fully authorized
to have made a treaty — containing a stipulation respecting
impressment — to terminate at the conclusion of a general
peace ; the object being, to guard against the possible con
tinuance of the practice of impressment during the war in
Europe. He would have seen further, that, when peace was
concluded, the necessity for such a stipulation ceased. What,
said Mr. C., was the injury we complained of, and what was
the claim of the enemy? The claim was, that he had a right,
in time of war, to enter on board American (neutral) vessels,
and to judge who were American and who were British
seamen, and to take therefrom whomsoever he thought proper.
What was the ground of complaint on our part ? That the
enemy, in the exercise of this pretended right, frequently
took American seamen, to the detriment of the commerce
and the deprivation of the personal liberty of American citi
zens. At the time these instructions were sent to our
ministers, there was a war raging in Europe, which no gen
tleman there pretended to think would come to a speedy ter-

122 SPEECHES.

mination. It appeared to be a contest, which would endure
for a series of years, having already, with little intermission,
lasted twenty. Those statements and those instructions, a
part of which had been quoted, were then given respecting
the question of impressment, as springing out of a state of
war ; and it was at that time, that the report was made to
this House, proclaiming the necessity of unceasing resistance
to so grievous a% injury. This state of war, Mr. C. continued,
having ceased, and, with it, the evil of impressment, there
was no necessity to continue the contest of this ground. And
had we done so, what would have been the language of the
gentleman and his friends ? That statesmen go to war for
practical injuries — that, as Great Britain never impresses in
time of peace in Europe, to continue the war on this account,
would be to fight against a mere speculative claim on the
part of the British Government. To have adopted this
course would have been exceedingly unwise • and would have
met with the severest reprobation of the gentlemen on that
side of the House. Every one who heard him knew, said
Mr. C., that such would have been the clamor rung from
one end of the country to the other. Any one who adverted
to the very document, of which the gentleman had read a
part (viewed in connection with then existing circumstances),
would find his whole argument answered by it as completely
and demonstrably as any proposition in Euclid. The idea
that we had relinquished our rights in this respect, because
the matter was not recited in the treaty, was, in his opinion,
preposterous. It could not be maintained by the semblance
of an argument. They are not at all affected by it. But
they are strongly fortified by the events of the present war,
and the spirit with which it has been waged — a spirit which
will probably make foreign powers more careful of invading
them. The benefit of the claim to Great Britain can never
compensate for the injury she might sustain, by provoking us
to war, in resistance to it, and in defence of the personal

SPEECHES. 123

liberty of our citizens. In the late contest, this country has
acquired a character which will secure respect to its rights.
If ever an American citizen should be forcibly impressed,
said Mr. 0., he would be ready again to draw the sword in
his defence : and no government could prosper, that would
with impunity permit so flagrant an outrage on the rights
of its citizens. Government itself is only protection ; and
they cannot be separated. I feel pleasure and pride, said
Mr. C., in being able to say, that I am of a party which
drew the sword on this question, and succeeded in the con
test ; for, to all practical purposes, we have achieved com
plete success.

SPEECH

On the Bill to regulate the commerce between the
United States and Great Britain, according to the
Convention of the 3d of July, 1815; delivered
in the House of Representatives, January 9th,
1816.

[NOTE. — The Message of the President, of the 26th of December,

1815, communicating to Congress the Commercial Convention with
Great Britain, and recommending such legislative provisions as might
be deemed necessary to carry it into effect, having been referred to
the Committee on Foreign Relations, Mr. Forsyth, its chairman, on
December 29th, reported a Bill for the purpose, which was, on the
same day, referred to the Committee of the Whole, where it was dis
cussed with much animation and ability until the 9th of January,

1816. Involving, as in the case of Jay's Treaty, questions of moment,
as to the constitutional distribution of powers, between the two Houses,
the debate was resumed in the House — all the leading men of both
parties participating in it. On no question, perhaps, during the
period, was there an equal display of eloquence and ability.

124 SPEECHES.

On the 10th January, 1816, the Senate, in anticipation of the
action of the House, passed a Bill " enacting and declaring so much
of any act or acts as is contrary to the provisions " of the Treaty, " to
be of no force or effect." This was received by the House on the
same day ; when it was denounced as an " attempt to evade the ques
tion before the House " — and subsequently laid on the table. On the
13th, the House passed its Bill by a vote of 86 to 71, and sent it to
the Senate, where, on the 19th it was rejected by a vote of 21 to 10.
The House, February 6th, amended the Senate's Bill by striking out all
after the enacting clause, and inserting its own Bill ; on the ground that
it "interfered with the judicial power" and, at the same time, "de
prived the House of its just powers in respect to provisions affecting the
public revenues." Thus amended the Bill was passed and sent to the
Senate ; where, on February 12, it was, after full debate, again rejected.
The two Houses being thus at issue, a Committee of Conference was
subsequently agreed to ; and, by compromise, the Senate's Bill, with
some modifications, was finally (February 24) adopted. Yeas, 100;
Nays, 15.]

MR. SPEAKER : — The votes on this bill have been order-

/ ed to be recorded ; and the House will see, in my peculiar

situation, a sufficient apology for offering my reasons for the

rejection of the bill. I had no disposition to speak on this

bill ; as I was content to let it take that course, which, in

the opinion of the majority, it ought, till the members were

\ called on by the order of the House to record their votes.

The question presented for consideration is perfectly sim
ple, and easily understood : — Is this bill necessary to give valid
ity to the late treaty with Great Britain ? It appears to me
that this question is susceptible of a decision, without con
sidering whether a treaty can in any case set aside a law ;
or, to be more particular, whether the treaty which this bill
proposes to carry into effect, does repeal the discriminating
duties. The House will remember, that a law was passed
at the close of last session, conditionally repealing those
duties. That act proposed to repeal them in relation to any
nation, which would on its part agree to repeal similar duties

SPEECHES. 125

as to this country. On the contingency happening, the law
became positive. It has happened, and it has been an
nounced to the country, that England has agreed to repeal.
The President, in proclaiming the treaty, has notified the
fact to the House and to the country. Why, then, propose
to do that by this bill, which has already been done by a pre
vious act ? I know it has been said in conversation, that
the provisions of the act are not as broad as the treaty. It
does not strike me so. They appear to me to be commen
surate. I also infer from the appearance of this House, that
it is not very deeply impressed with the necessity of this bill.
I have never, on any important occasion, seen it so indiffer
ent. Whence does this arise ? From its want of import
ance ? If, indeed, the existence of the treaty depended on
the passage of this bill, nothing scarcely could be more in
teresting. It would be calculated to excite strong feelings.
We all know how the country was agitated when Jay's
Treaty was before the House. The question then was on an
appropriation to carry it into effect ; a power acknowledged
by all to belong to the House ; and on the exercise of which,
the existence of the treaty was felt to depend. The feelings
manifested corresponded with this conviction. Not so on
this occasion. Further, the treaty has already assumed the
form of law. It is so proclaimed to the community ; the
words of the proclamation are not material ; it speaks of
itself ; and if it means any thing, it announces the treaty as
a rule of public conduct, as a law exacting the obedience of
the people. Were I of the opposite side, if I, indeed, be
lieved this treaty to be a dead letter till it received the
sanction of Congress, I would lay the bill on the table and
move an inquiry into the fact, why the treaty has been pro
claimed as a law before it received the proper sanction. It
is true, the Executive has transmitted a copy of the treaty
to the House ; but has he sent the negotiation ? Has he
given any light to show why it should receive the sanction of

126 SPEECHES.

this body ? Do gentlemen mean to say that information is
not needed ; that though we have the right to pass laws, to
give validity to treaties, yet we are hound by a moral obli
gation to pass such laws ? To talk of the right of this House
to sanction treaties, and at the same time to assert that it is
under a moral obligation not to withhold that sanction, is a
solecism. No sound mind that understands the terms, can
possibly assent to it. I would caution the House, while it is
extending its powers to cases which, I believe, do not belong
to it, to take care lest it lose its substantial and undoubted
power. I would put it on its guard against the dangerous
doctrine, that it can in any case become a mere registering
body. Another fact in regard to this treaty. It does not
stipulate that a law shall pass to repeal the duties proposed
to be repealed by this bill, which would be its proper form,
if in the opinion of the negotiators a law was necessary ; but
it stipulates in positive terms for their repeal without con
sulting or regarding us.

I here conclude this part of the discussion, by stating that
it appears to me from the whole complexion of the case,
that the bill before the House is a mere form, and cannot
be supposed to be necessary to the validity of the treaty.
It will be proper, however, to reply to the arguments which
have been urged on the general nature of the treaty-making
power, and as it is a subject of great importance, I solicit
the attentive hearing of the House.

It is not denied, I believe, that the President, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, has a right to make
commercial .treaties ; it is not asserted that this treaty is
couched in such general terms as to require a law to carry
the details into execution. Why, then, is this bill neces
sary ? Because, say gentlemen, the treaty of itself, without
the aid of this bill, cannot exempt British tonnage, and goods
imported in their bottoms, from the operation of the law lay
ing additional duties on foreign tonnage and goods imported

SPEECHES. 127

in foreign vessels ; or, giving the question a more general
form, because a treaty cannot annul a law.

The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Barbour), who argued
this point very distinctly, though not satisfactorily, took as
his general position, that to repeal a law is a legislative act,
and can only be done by law ; that in the distribution of the
legislative and treaty-making power, the right to repeal a law
fell exclusively under the former. How does this comport
with the admission immediately made by him, that the trea
ty of peace repealed the act declaring war ? If he admits
the fact in a single case, what becomes of his exclusive legis
lative right ? He indeed felt that this rale failed him, and
in explanation assumed a position entirely new ; for he ad
mitted, that when the treaty did that which was not author
ized to be done by law, it did not require the sanction of
Congress, and might in its operation repeal a law inconsis
tent with it. He said, Congress is not authorized to make
peace ; and for this reason, a treaty of peace repeals the act
declaring war. In this position, I understood his colleague
substantially to concur. I hope to make it appear, that in tak
ing this ground, they have both yielded the point in discussion.
I shall establish, I trust, to the satisfaction of the House, that
the treaty-making power, when it is legitimately exercised, al
ways does that which cannot be done by law ; and, that the rea
sons advanced to prove that the treaty of peace repealed the act
declaring war, so far from being peculiar to that case, apply
to all treaties. They do not form an exception, but in fact con
stitute the rule. Why then, I ask, cannot Congress make
peace ? They have the power to declare war. All acknowledge
this power. Peace and war are opposites. They are the
positive and negative terms of the same proposition ; and what
rule of construction more clear than that when a power is
given to do an act, the power is also given to repeal it ? By
what right do you repeal taxes, reduce your army, lay up your
navy, or repeal any law, but by the force of this plain ride of

128 SPEECHES.

construction ? Why cannot Congress then repeal the act de
claring war ? I acknowledge, with the gentleman, that they
cannot, consistently with reason. The solution of this ques
tion explains the whole difficulty. The reason is plain ; one
power may make war ; it requires two to make peace. It is
a state of mutual amity succeeding one of mutual hos
tility ; — a state that cannot be created, but with the con
sent of both parties. It requires a contract or a treaty be
tween the nations at war. Is this peculiar to a treaty of
peace ? No, it is common to all treaties. It arises out of
their nature, and not from any accidental circumstance, at
taching to a particular class. It is no more nor less than
that Congress cannot make a contract with a foreign nation.
Let us apply it to a treaty of commerce, to this very case.
Can Congress do what this treaty has done ? It has repeal
ed the discriminating duties between this country and Eng
land. Either country could by law repeal its own. But, by
law, they could go no farther ; and for the reason, that peace
cannot be made by law. Whenever, then an ordinary sub
ject of legislation can only be regulated by contract, it passes
from the sphere of the ordinary power of making laws, and
attaches itself to that of making treaties, wherever it is lodg
ed. All acknowledge the truth of this conclusion, where
the subject, on which the treaty operates, is not expressly
given to Congress : but in other cases, they consider the two
powers as concurrent ; and conclude from the nature of such
powers, that such treaties must be confirmed by law. Will
they acknowledge the opposite — that laws on such subjects
must be confirmed by treaties ? And if, as they state, a law
can repeal a treaty when concurrent, why not a treaty a law ?
Into such absurdities do false doctrines lead. The truth is,
the legislative and treaty-making powers are never, in the
strict sense, concurrent. They both may have the same sub
ject, as in this case, viz., commerce ; but they discharge
functions entirely different in their nature in relation to it.

SPEECHES. 129

When we speak of concurrent powers, we mean when
both can do the same thing ; but I contend that when the
two powers under discussion are confined to their proper
sphere, not only the law cannot do what could be done by
treaty, but the reverse is true ; that is, they never are nor
can be concurrent powers. It is only when we reason on
this subject that we mistake ; in all other cases the common
sense of the House and country decide correctly. It is pro
posed to establish some regulation of commerce ; — we imme
diately inquire, does it depend on our will ? can we make
the desired regulation without the concurrence of any foreign
power ? If so, it belongs to Congress, and any one would
feel it to be absurd to attempt to effect it by treaty. On the
contrary, does it require the consent of a foreign power ? is
it proposed to grant a favor for a favor — to repeal discriminat
ing duties on both sides ? It is equally felt to belong to the
treaty-making power \ and he would be thought insane who
should propose to abolish the discriminating duties in any
case, by an act of the American Congress. It is calculated,
I feel, almost to insult the good sense of the House, to dwell
on a point evidently so clear. What then do I infer from
what has been advanced ? That, according to the argu
ment of gentlemen, treaties, producing a state of tilings in
consistent with the provisions of an existing law, annul such
provisions. But as I do not agree with them in the view
which they have taken, I will here present my own for con
sideration.

Why, then, has a treaty the force which I attribute to
it ? Because it is an act, in its own nature, paramount to
laws made by the common legislative powers of the country.
It is in fact a law, and something more ; a law established
by contract between independent nations. By analogy to pri
vate life, law has the same relations to treaty, as the resolution
taken by an individual to his contract. An individual may
make the most deliberate promise ; he may swear it in the
VOL. n. — 9

130 SPEECHES.

most solemn form, that he will not sell his house, or any
other property he may have ; yet, if he should afterward sell,
the sale would be valid in law ; he would not be admitted in
a court of justice to plead his oath against his contract. Take
the case of a government in its most simple form, where it
is purely despotic ; that is, where all power is lodged in the
hands of a single individual. Would not his treaties repeal
inconsistent edicts ? Let us now ascend from the instances
cited to illustrate the nature of the two powers, to the prin
ciple on which the paramount character of a treaty rests. A
treaty always affects the interests of two ; a law only that of
a single nation. It is an established principle of politics and
morality, that the interest of the many is paramount to that
of the few. In fact, it is a principle so radical, that without
it no system of morality, no rational scheme of government,
could exist. It is for this reason that contracts, or that
treaties [which are only the contracts of independent na
tions], or, to express both in two words, that plighted faith
has in all ages and nations been considered so solemn. But
it is said, in opposition to this position, that a subsequent
law can repeal a treaty ; and to this proposition, I under
stand that the member from North Carolina (Mr. G-aston)
assents. Strictly speaking, I deny the fact. I know that a
law may assume the appearance of repealing a treaty ; but,
I insist, it is only in appearance, and that, in point of fact,
it is not a repeal. Whenever a law is proposed, declaring a
treaty void, I consider that the House acts not as a legisla
tive body, but judicially. To illustrate my* idea : If the
House is a moral body, — that is, if it is governed by reason
and virtue, which must always be presumed, — the only ques
tion that ever can occupy its attention, whenever a treaty is
to be declared void, is whether, under all the circumstan
ces of the case, the treaty is not already destroyed, by being
violated by the nation with whom it is made, or by the ex-
'stence of some other circumstance, if other there can be.

SPEECHES. 131

The House determines this question : Is the country any
longer bound by the treaty ? Has it not ceased to exist ?
The nation passes judgment on its own contract ; and this
from the necessity of the case, as it admits no supreme
power to which it can refer for decision. If any other con
sideration move the House to repeal a treaty, it can be con
sidered only in the light of a violation of a contract acknow
ledged to be binding on the country. A nation may, it is
true, violate its contract ; it may even do this under the form
of law ; but I am not considering what may be done, but
what may be rightfully done. It is riot a question of power,
but of right. Why are not these positions, in themselves so
clear, universally assented to ? Gentlemen are alarmed at
imaginary consequences. They argue not as if seeking for
the meaning of the constitution, but as if deliberating on
the subject of making one ; not as members of the legisla
ture, and acting under a constitution already established, but
as those of a convention about to frame one. For my part,
I have always regarded the constitution as a work of great
wisdom ; and, being the instrument under which we exist as
a body, it is our duty to bow to its enactments, whatever they
may be, with submission. We ought scarcely to indulge a
wish that its provisions should be different from what they
in fact are. The consequences, however, which appear to
work with so much terror on the minds of the gentlemen, I
consider to be without any just foundation. The treaty-
making power has many and powerful limits ; and it will be
found, when I come to discuss what those limits are, that it
cannot destroy the constitution, or our personal liberty, or
involve us, without the assent of this House, in war, or grant
away our money. The limits I propose to this power are
not the same, it is true ; but they appear to me much more
rational and powerful than those which were supposed to pre
sent effectual guards against its abuse. Let us now consider
what they are

132 SPEECHES.

The grant of the power to make treaties is couched in
the most general terms. The words of, the constitution are,
that the President shall have power, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-
thirds of the Senators present concur. In a subsequent part
of the constitution, treaties are declared to be the supreme
law of the land. Whatever limits are imposed by these
general terms ought to be the result of a sound construc
tion of the instrument. There are, apparently, but two re
strictions on its exercise ; the one derived from the nature
of our government, and the other from that of the power
itself. Most certainly all grants of power under the consti
tution must be construed by that instrument ; for, having
their existence from it, they must of necessity assume that
form which the constitution has imposed. This is acknow
ledged to be true of the legislative power, and it is doubt
less equally so of the power to make treaties. The limits of
the former are exactly marked ; it was necessary, to prevent
collision with similar co-existing State powers. This country
is divided into many distinct sovereignties. Exact enumera
tion on this head is necessary, to prevent the most danger
ous consequences. The enumeration of legislative powers in
the constitution has relation, then, not to the treaty-making
power, but to the powers of the States. In our relation to the
rest of the world the case is reversed. Here the States disap
pear. Divided within, we present the exterior of undivided
sovereignty. The wisdom of the constitution, in this, appears
conspicuous. Where enumeration was needed, there we find
the powers enumerated and exactly defined ; where not, we
do not find what would be only vain and pernicious. What
ever, then, concerns our foreign relations ; whatever requires
the consent of another nation, belongs to the treaty-making
power, and can only be regulated by it ; and it is competent to
regulate all such subjects, provided [and here are its true
limits] such regulations are not inconsistent with the consti-

SPEECHES. 133

tution. If so, they are void. No treaty can alter the fabric
of our government, nor can it do that which the constitution
has expressly forbidden to be done ; nor can it do that differ
ently which is directed to be done in a given mode, — all other
modes being prohibited. For instance, the constitution says,
no money " shall be drawn out of the treasury but by an ap
propriation made by law." Qf course no subsidy can be
granted without an act of law ; and a treaty of alliance
could not involve the country in war without the consent of
this House. With this limitation, it is easy to explain the
case put by my colleague, who said, that according to one
limitation, a treaty might have prohibited the introduction
of a certain description of persons before the year 1808, not
withstanding the clause in the constitution to the contrary.
I will speak plainly on this point : — it was the intention of
the constitution that the slave trade should be tolerated till
the time mentioned. It covers me with confusion to name
it here ; I feel ashamed of such a tolerance, and take a large '
part of the disgrace, as I represent a part of the Union by
whose influence it might be supposed to have been intro
duced. Though Congress alone is prohibited, by the words
of the clause, from suppressing that odious traffic, yet my col
league will admit that it was intended to be a general pro
hibition on the Government of the Union. I perceive my
colleague indicates his dissent. It will be necessary to be
more explicit.

[Here Mr. C. read that part of the constitution, and showed that
the word " Congress " might be left out, in conformity with other parts
of the constitution, without injury to the sense of the clause ; and he
insisted that the plain meaning of the parties to the constitution was,
that the trade should continue till 1808, and that a prohibition by
treaty would be equally against the spirit of the instrument.]

Besides these constitutional limits, the treaty-making pow
er, like all powers, has others derived from its nature and ob-

134 SPEECHES.

jects. It has for its object, contracts with foreign nations ; as
the powers of Congress have for their object, whatever may be
done in relation to the powers delegated to it, without the
consent of foreign nations. Each, in its proper sphere, ope
rates with general influence ; but when they become erratic,
then they are portentous and dangerous. A treaty never
can legitimately do that whicji can be done by law ; and the
converse is also true. Suppose the discriminating duties re
pealed on both sides by law, — still what is effected by this
treaty would not even then be done ; for the plighted faith
of both would be wanting. Either side might repeal its law
without breach of contract. It appears to me, that gentle
men are too much influenced on this subject by the example of
Great Britain. Instead of looking to the nature of our own,
they have been swayed in their opinions by the practice of
that government, to which we are but too much in the habit
of looking for precedents. Much anxiety has recently been
evinced, to be independent of English broadcloths and mus
lins ; I hope it indicates the approach of a period when'we
shall also throw off the thraldom of thought. The truth is,
but little analogy exists between this and any other govern
ment. It is the pride of ours, to be founded in reason and
equity ; all others have originated, more or less, in fraud,
violence, or accident. The right to make treaties, in Eng
land, can only be determined by the practice of the govern
ment ; as she has no written constitution. Her practice
may be wise in regard to her government, when it would be
very imprudent here. Admitting the fact to be, that
the king refers all commercial treaties affecting the munici
pal regulations of the country, to parliament, for its sanction ;
the argument drawn from this would be very feeble to prove
that this, also, was the intention of our constitution. Strong
differences exist between the forms of the two governments.
The king is hereditary ; — he alone, without the participation of
either house of parliament, negotiates and makes treaties.

SPEECHES. 135

England has no constitution emanating from the people, alike
superior to the legislature and the king. Not so here. The
President is elected for a short period ; he is amenable to
the public opinion ; he is liable to be impeached for corrup
tion ; he cannot make treaties without the concurrence of
two-thirds of the Senate — a fact very material to be remem
bered — which body is in like manner responsible to the
people at periods not very remote. Above all, — as the laws
and constitution are here perfectly distinct, and the latter is
alike superior to laws and treaties, — the treaty-making power
cannot change the form of government, or encroach on the
liberties of the country, without encroaching on that instru
ment, which, so long as the people are free, will be watched
with vigilance.

SPEECH

On the motion to Repeal the Direct Tax, delivered
in the House of Representatives, January 3 1st,
1816.

[NOTE. — January 9th, 1816. The Committee of Ways and
Means, to whom was referred that portion of the President's Mes
sage relating to the revenue, reported, among others, the following
resolution :

" Resolved, That it is expedient so to amend an act, entitled, 'An
act to provide additional revenues for defraying the expenses of
Government and maintaining public credit, by laying a direct tax
upon the United States, and to provide for assessing and collecting
the same,' passed on the 9th of January, 1815, as to reduce the tax
to be levied for the year 1816, and succeeding years, to $3,000,000,
with a' similar provision in regard to the direct tax on the District of
Columbia. This resolution being called up in Committee of the

136 SPEECHES.

Whole, caused much debate. Mr. Clay moved to amend it, so as to
limit its operation to one year, with a view to place it under the
annual control of the House. This was carried ; and then Mr. Har
den of Kentucky moved to amend it, by declaring it expedient to
repeal the laws laying a direct tax, altogether. This called forth dis
cussion for several days successively, in which many of the most promi
nent men in the House took part. The motion was finally negatived
by a vote of 81 to 73.]

MR. CHAIRMAN : — There are in the affairs of nations,
not less than in those of individuals, moments, on the proper
use of which depend 'their fame, duration, and prosperity.
Such I conceive to be the present situation of this country.
Recently emerged from a war, we find ourselves in possession
of a physical and moral power of great magnitude ; and im
pressed by the misfortunes which have resulted from want of
forecast heretofore, we are disposed to apply our means to
purposes most valuable to the country. In a situation of
such interest, I hope we shall be guided by the dictates of
truth and wisdom only ; that we shall prefer the lasting hap
piness of our country to present ease ; its security to its
pleasure ; fair honor and reputation to inglorious and in
active repose.

We are now called on to determine what amount of
revenue is necessary for this country in time of peace. This
involves the additional question : what are the measures
which the true interests of this country demand ? The
principal expense of our Government grows out of measures
necessary for its defence ; and in order to decide what those
measures ought to be, it will be proper to inquire, what
ought to be our policy towards other nations ? and what will
probably be theirs towards us ? I intentionally leave out
of consideration the financial questions, which some gentle
men have examined in the debate, and also the question of
retrenchments ; on which I will only remark, that I hope,
whatsoever of economy shall enter into the measures of Con-

SPEECHES. 137

gress, they will at least be divested of the character of par
simony.

Beginning with the policy of the country. This ought
to correspond with the character of its political institutions.
What, then, is their character ? They are founded on
reason and justice. These being the foundations of our
Government, its policy ought to comport with them. It is
the duty of all nations, especially of one whose institutions
recognize no principle of force, but appeal to virtue for
their strength, to act with justice and moderation — with
moderation approaching to forbearance. In all possible con
flicts with foreign powers, our Government should be able to
make it manifest to the world, that it has justice on its side.
We should always forbear, if possible, until all shall be satis
fied, that when we take up arms, it is not for the purpose of
conquest, but for the maintenance of our essential rights.
Our Government, moreover, is also founded on equality ; it
permits none to exercise violence ; it permits no one to trample
on the rights of his fellow-citizens with impunity. These
maxims we should also carry into our intercourse with
foreign nations ; and as wo render justice to all, so we should
be prepared to exact it from all.

Our policy should not only be moderate and just, but as
high-minded as it is moderate and just. This appears to me
to be, for our country, the true line of conduct. In the policy
of nations there are two extremes : one, in which justice and
moderation may sink into feebleness — -another, in which that
lofty spirit which ought to animate all nations, particularly
free states, may mount up to military -violence. These ex
tremes ought to be equally avoided ; — but, of the two, I
consider the first far the most dangerous, far the most fatal.
There are two splendid examples of nations which have ulti
mately sunk by military violence ; the Komans in ancient
times — the French in modern. But how numerous are the
instances of nations that have gradually sunk into insignifi-

138 SPEECHES.

cance through imbecility and apathy. They have not, in
deed, struck the mind so forcibly as the two former ; because
they have sunk ingloriously, without any thing in their de
scent to excite either admiration or respect. I consider this
extreme weakness not only the most dangerous in itself —
but one to which the people of this country are peculiarly
liable. The people, indeed, are high-minded ; and, there
fore, it may be thought that my fears are unfounded. But
they are blessed with much happiness, moral, political, and
physical. These operate on the dispositions and habits of
the people with something like the effects attributed to
southern climates : they dispose them to pleasure and to inac
tivity, except in pursuit of wealth. I need not appeal to
the past history of the country ; to the indisposition of our
people to war, from the commencement of the Government ;
arising from the nature of our habits, and the disposition to
pursue those courses which contribute to swell our private for
tunes. We incline, not only from the causes already men
tioned, but from the nature of our foreign relations, to that
feeble policy, which I consider as more dangerous than
the other extreme. We have, it is true, dangers to appre
hend from abroad — but they are far off, at the distance of
three thousand miles ; which prevents that continued dread
which they would excite, if in our immediate neighborhood.
Besides, we can have no foreign war which we should
dread or fear to meet, save a war with England ; for a
war with her breaks in on the whole industry of the
country, and affects all its private pursuits. On this ac
count wv prefer suffering very great wrongs from her,
rather than to redress them by arms. The gentleman from
Pennsylvania asks, if the country did forbear till it felt dis
grace, whose fault was it ? Not, he said, of the administra
tions of Washington or Adams ; for neither of them had left
it in such condition. A few words on this point. The fault
can be ascribed to neither of our several administrations —

SPEECHES. 139

to neither of the two great parties. It arose from the indis
position of the people to resort to arms, for the reason al
ready assigned. It arose, also, in part, from two incidental
circumstances — the want of preparation, and the untried
character of our Government in war. But there were other
circumstances, too, connected with the party to which the
gentleman belongs, which, doubtless, contributed to prolong
forbearance. That party took advantage of the indisposition
of the people to an English war, and preached up the ad
vantages of peace when it had become ignominious, and un
til we had scarcely the ability to defend ourselves. The gen
tleman from Pennsylvania further said, that, if peace had
not been made when it was, we should not have been here
deliberating at this time. This assertion is a fearful one, if
true. If the nation was on the verge of ruin, the errors
which brought it to that situation ought to be known, probed
and corrected — even if they rose out of the constitution.
But it is an assertion that ought not to be lightly made.
The effects are dangerous ; for what man hereafter, with such
consequences before his eyes, would venture to propose a
war ? If such were the admitted fact, a future enemy would
persist in war, expecting the country to sink before his ef
forts ; his arms would be nerved, his exertions doubly
strengthened against us. In every view, the position is one
of such dangerous bearing on the future relations of the
country, that it ought not to be admitted without the strong
est proof. What was the fact ? What had been the pro
gress of events for a few months preceding the termination
of the war ? At Baltimore, at Plattsburg, at New Orleans,
the invaders had been signally defeated — a new spirit was
diffused through the whole mass of the community. Can it
be believed, then, that the Government was on the verge of
dissolution ? No, Sir, it never stood firmer on its basis than
at that moment. It is true, indeed, that we labored under
great difficulties ; but it is an observation made by a states-

140 SPEECHES.

man of great sagacity, Edmund Burke, when Pitt was an
ticipating the downfall of France, through the failure of her
finances, that an instance is not to be found of a high-minded
nation sinking under financial difficulties; and its truth would
have been exemplified in our country had the war continued.
Men on all sides began to unite in defence of the country ;
parties in this House began to rally on this point ; and if
the gentleman from Pennsylvania had been a member at
that time, he also, from what he has said, would have taken
that ground. The gentleman has taken, on this point, a
position as erroneous as it is dangerous ; and I have thought
proper thus to notice it.

As a proof that the situation of the country naturally
inclines us to too much feebleness rather than violence, I re
fer to the fact, that there are, on this floor, men who are en
tirely opposed to armies, to navies, to every means of defence.
Sir, if their politics prevail, the country will be disarmed
and at the mercy of any foreign power. On the other hand,
there is no excess of military fervor, no party inclining to
military despotism ; for though a charge of such a disposi
tion has been made by a gentleman in debate, it is without
the shadow of foundation. What is the fact in regard to
the army ? Does it bear out his assertion ? Is it even
proportionally larger now than it was in 1801-2, the period
which the gentleman considers as the standard of political
perfection ? It was then about 4,000 men ; it was larger,
in proportion, than an army of 10,000 men would now be.
The charge of a disposition to make this a military govern
ment finds its support only in the imaginations of gentlemen ;
it cannot be sustained by facts ; it is contrary to reason and
to evidence.

Dismissing this part of the subject, I will now proceed to
consider another, in my opinion, equally important, viz. :
what will probably be the policy of other nations. With the
world at large we are now at peace. I know of no nation

SPEECHES. 141

with which we shall probably come in collision, unless it
be with Great Britain and Spain. With both these nations
we have many and important points of collision. I hope we
shall maintain, in regard to both, the strictest justice ; the
more so, as with both there is a possibility, sooner or later,
of our being engaged in war. As to Spain I will say nothing ;
because she is the inferior of the two, and the measures
which apply to the superior power, will include also the
inferior. I shall consider our relations, then, with England
only. Peace now exists between the two countries. As to
its duration, I will give no opinion, except that I believe it
will last the longer in consequence of the war, which has just
ended. Evidences have been furnished during the war, of
the capacity and character of this country, which will make
England indisposed to try her strength with us on slight
grounds. But what will be the probable course of events*rre>
specting the future relations between the two countries ?
England is the most formidable power in the world : she has
the most numerous army and navy at her command. We, on
the other hand, are the most growing nation on earth : mosj;
rapidly improving in those very particulars in which she
excels. This question, then, presents itself : will the greater
power permit the less to attain its destined greatness by
natural growth, or will she take measures to disturb it.
They who know the history of nations, will not believe that
a rival will look unmoved on this prosperity. It has been
said, that nations have heads, but no hearts. Every states
man, every one who loves his country, who wishes to maintain
its dignity, to see it attain the summit of greatness and pros
perity, regards the progress of other nations with a jealous
eye. The English statesmen have always so acted. I find
no fault with them on this account, but rather point to the
example as originating in a principle which ought also to
govern our conduct. Will Great Britain permit us to go On
in an uninterrupted march to the height of national great-

142 SPEECHES.

ness and prosperity ? I fear not. But, admitting the councils
on that side of the water to be governed by a degree of mag
nanimity and justice which the world has never experienced
from them (and, I am warranted in saying, never will), may
not some unforeseen collision involve us in hostilities ? Gen
tlemen on the other side have said, that there are points of
difference with that nation (existing prior to the war) which
are yet unsettled. I grant it. If such, then, be the fact,
does it not show that causes of conflict remain, and that
whenever the same condition of the world that excited them
into action before the war, shall recur, the same collisions
will probably take place again ? If Great Britain sees the
opportunity of enforcing the same doctrines we have already
contested, will she not seize it ? Admitting this country to
maintain that policy which it ought ; that its councils be
governed by the most perfect justice and moderation — yet
we see that, by difference of views on essential points, the
p_eace between the two nations is liable to be jeopardized.
I am sure that future wars with England are not only pos-
slhle, but, I will say more, they are highly probable — nay,
that they will certainly take place. Future wars, I fear
(with the Honorable Speaker) — future wars, long and bloody,
will exist between this country and Great Britain. I lament
it ; but I will not close my eyes on future events ; I will not
betray the high trust reposed in me ; I will speak what I
believe to be true. You will have to encounter British
jealousy and hostility in every shape ; not immediately mani
fested by open force or violence, perhaps, but by indirect
attempts to check your growth and prosperity. As far as
she can, she will disgrace every thing connected with you.
Her reviewers, paragraphists, and travellers, will assail you
and your institutions ; and no means will be left untried to
bring you to contemn yourselves, and be contemned by others.
I thank God, they have not now the means they once possess
ed of effecting their objects. No ; the late war has given

SPEECHES. 143

you a tone of feeling and thinking which forhids the acknow
ledgment of national inferiority — that first of political evils.
Had we not encountered Great Britain, we should not have
had the brilliant points to rest on which we now have. We,
too, have now our heroes and illustrious actions. If Great
Britain has her Wellington, we have our Jackson, Brown
and Scott. If she has her naval heroes, we also have them,
not less renowned — for they have plucked the laurel from
her brows. It is impossible that we can now be degraded by
comparisons : I trust we are equally above corruption and
intrigue ; and that when the contest comes, it will be tried
only by force of arms.

Let us now consider the measures of preparation which
sound policy dictates. First, then, as to the extent, without
reference to the kind. These measures ought to be graduated
by a reference to the character and capacity of both countries.
England excels in means all countries that now exist, or ever
did exist ; and has, besides, great moral resources. She is
intelligent, and renowned for masculine virtues. On our
part, our measures ought to correspond with that lofty policy,
which becomes freemen determined to defend their rights.
Thus circumstanced on both sides, we ought to omit no pre
paration fairly within the compass of our means. Next, as
to the species of preparation — a question which opens subjects
of great extent and importance. The navy, most certainly,
in any point of view, occupies the first place. It is the most
safe, most effectual and cheapest mode of defence. For let
the fact be remembered, our navy costs less per man, includ
ing all the amount of extraordinary expenditures on the lakes,
than our army.

This is an important fact which ought to be fixed in the
memory of the House ; for, if the force be the safest and most
efficient, which is at the same time the cheapest, on that
should be our principal reliance. We have heard much of
the danger of standing armies to our liberties : — the objection

144 SPEECHES.

cannot be made to the navy. Generals, it must be acknow
ledged, have often advanced at the head of armies to imperial
rank and power ; but in what instance has an admiral
usurped the liberties of his country ? Put our strength in
the navy for foreign defence, and we shall certainly escape
the whole catalogue of possible ills painted by gentlemen on
the other side. A naval force attacks that country, from
whose hostilities, alone, we have any thing to dread, where
she is most assailable, and defends its own where it is weak
est. Where is Great Britain most vulnerable? In what
point is she most accessible to attack ? In her commerce —
in her navigation. There she is not only exposed, but the
blow is fatal. There is her strength — there the secret of her
power. There, then, if it ever shall become necessary, we
ought to strike. And where are we most exposed? On
the Atlantic line ; — a line so long and weak, that we are
peculiarly liable to be assailed on it. How is it to be de
fended ? By a navy, and by a navy only, can it be efficiently
defended. Let us look back to the time when the enemy
was in possession of the whole line of the sea-coast, moored
in our rivers, and ready to assault us at every point. The
facts are too recent to require a minute description. I will
only state, generally, that our commerce was cut up — our
specie circulation destroyed — our internal communication
interrupted — our best and cheapest highway being entirely
in possession of the enemy — our ports foreign the one to the
other — our treasury exhausted in merely defensive prepara
tions and militia requisitions — for not knowing where we
would be assailed, we had, at the same moment, to stand
prepared at every point. A recurrence of this state of things,
so oppressive to the country, in the event of another war,
can be prevented only by the establishment and maintenance
of a sufficient naval force. I think it proper to press this
point thus strongly, because, though it is generally assented
to, that the navy ought to be increased, I find that assent too

SPEECHES. 145

cold — the approbation bestowed on it too negative in its char
acter. The navy ought, it is said, to be gradually increased.
If the navy is to be increased at all, let its augmentation be
limited only by your ability to build, officer and man. If it
is the kind of force most safe, and at the same time most
efficient to guard against foreign invasion, or repel foreign
aggression, you ought to put your whole force on the seaside.
It is estimated that we have in our country eighty thousand
sailors. This would enable us to man a considerable fleet,
which, if well-directed, would give us the habitual command
on our own coast — an object, in every point of view, so de
sirable. Not that we ought hastily, without due preparation,
under present circumstances, to build a large number of
vessels ; but we ought to commence preparations — establish
docks, collect timber and naval stores ; and, as soon as the
materials are prepared, to commence building, to the extent
which I have mentioned. If any thing can preserve the
country in its most imminent dangers from abroad, it is this
species of armament. If we desire to be free from future
wars (as I hope we may be), this is the only way to effect
it. We shall have peace then, and, what is of still higher
moment, peace with perfect security.

In regard to our present military establishment, it is
small enough. This the Honorable Speaker has fully demon
strated. It is not, at present, sufficiently large to occupy
all our fortresses. Gentlemen have spoken in favor of the
militia, and against the army. In regard to the militia,
I will go as far as any gentleman, and considerably fur
ther than those who are so violently opposed to our small
army. I desire not only to arm the militia, but to extend
their term of service, and make them efficient. To talk
about the efficiency of militia, called into service for six
months only, is to impose on the people, — to ruin them with
false hopes. I am aware of the danger of large standing
armies, and I know that the militia constitutes the true force

VOL. II. — 10

146 SPEECHES.

of the country ; that no nation can be safe, at home and
abroad, which has not an. efficient militia ; but the term of
service ought to be enlarged, to enable them to acquire a
knowledge of the duties of the camp, and to allow the
habits of civil life to be broken. For although militia,
freshly drawn from their homes, may, in a moment of en
thusiasm, do great service, as at New Orleans ; yet, in
general, they are not calculated for service in the field,
until time is allowed them to acquire habits of discipline
and subordination. On land, your defence ought to depend
on a regular draught from the body of the people. You
will thus, in time of war, dispense with the business of re
cruiting, a mode of defending the country every way uncon
genial with our republican institutions. Uncertain, slow in
its operation and expensive, it draws from society only its
worst materials ; introducing into our army, of necessity, all
the severities which are exercised in that of the most des
potic governments. Thus composed, our armies, in a great
degree, lose that enthusiasm with which citizen soldiers,
conscious of liberty and fighting in defence of their country,
have ever been animated. All the free nations of antiquity
intrusted the defence of the country, not to the dregs of
society, but to the body of its citizens ; and hence that
heroism, which nations, in modern times, may admire but
cannot equal. I know that I utter truths unpleasant to
those who wish to enjoy liberty without making the efforts
necessary to secure it. Her favor is never won by the cow
ardly, the vicious, or indolent. It has been said by some
physicians, that life is a forced state. The same may be
said of freedom. It requires efforts, it presupposes mental
and moral qualities of a high order to be generally diffused
in the society where it exists. It mainly stands on the
faithful discharge of two great duties which every citizen
of proper age owes the republic ; a wise and virtuous exer
cise of the right of suffrage, and a prompt and brave

SPEECHES. 147

defence of the country in the hour of danger. The first
symptom of decay has ever appeared in the backward and
negligent discharge of the latter duty. Those who are
acquainted with the historians and orators of antiquity,
know the truth of this assertion. The least decay of
patriotism, the least verging towards pleasure and luxury, will
there immediately discover itself. Large standing and merce
nary armies then become necessary ; and those who are unwil
ling to render the military service adequate to the defence of
their rights, soon find, as they ought to do, a master. It is
the order of nature, and cannot be reversed. The plan I pro
pose, will at once put an efficient force into your hands, and
render you secure. I cannot agree with those who think we
are free from danger, and need not prepare for it, because
we have no nation to dread in our immediate neighborhood.
Recollect that the nation with whom we have recently termi
nated a severe conflict lives on the bosom of the deep ; that,
although three thousand miles of ocean intervene between us,
she can attack you with as much facility as if she had but
two or three hundred miles overland to march. She is as
near to you as if she occupied Canada instead of the British
Isles. You have the power of assailing, as well as of being
assailed ; her provinces border on your territory, the dread
of losing which, if you are prepared to attack them, will con
tribute to that peace which every honest man is anxious to
maintain as long as possible.

I shall now proceed to a point of less, but still of great
importance, — I mean the establishing of roads and the open
ing of canals through various parts of the country. Your
country has certain points of feebleness and certain points
of strength about it. Your feebleness ought to be removed
— your strength improved. Your population is widely dis
persed. Though this be greatly advantageous in one respect,
— that of preventing the country from being permanently
conquered, — it imposes a great difficulty in defending it

148 SPEECHES.

from invasion, because of the difficulty of transporta
tion from one point to another of your widely extended
frontiers. We ought to contribute as much as possible to
the formation of good military roads, not only on the score
of general political economy, but to enable us, on emergencies,
to collect the whole mass of our military means on the point
menaced. The people are brave, great and spirited, but
they must be brought together in sufficient numbers, and
with a certain promptitude, to enable them to act with
effect. The importance of military roads was well known to
the Komans. The remains of their roads exist to this day,
some of them uninjured by the ravages of time. Let us
make great permanent roads ; not like the Komans with
views of subjecting and ruling provinces, but for the more
honorable purposes of defence, and of connecting more
closely the interests of various sections of this great country.
Let any one look at the vast cost of transportation during
the war, much of which is chargeable to the want of good
roads and canals, and he will not deny the vast importance
of a due attention to this object.

Next, let us consider the proper encouragement to be
afforded to the industry of the country. In regard to the
question, how far manufactures ought to be fostered, it is
the duty of this country, as a means of defence, to encourage
its domestic industry, more especially that part of it which
provides the necessary materials for clothing and defence. Let
us look at the nature of the war most likely to occur. England
is in possession of the ocean ; no man, however sanguine, can
believe that we can soon deprive her of her maritime pre
dominance. That control deprives us of the means of main
taining, cheaply clad, our army and navy. The question re
lating to manufactures must not depend on the abstract prin
ciple, that industry, left to pursue its own course, will find,
in its own interests, all the encouragement that is necessary.
Laying the claims of manufacturers entirely out of view,

SPEECHES. 149

on general principles, without regard to their interests, a cer
tain encouragement should be extended, at least, to our wool
len and cotton manufactures.

There is another point of preparation not to be over
looked — the defence of our coast, by means other than the
navy, on which we ought to rely mainly, but not entirely.
The coast is our weak part, which ought to be rendered
strong, if it be in our power to make It so. There are two
points on our coast particularly weak — the mouths of the
Mississippi and the Chesapeake Bay — which ought to be
cautiously attended to, not, however, neglecting others. The
administration which leaves these two points in another war
without fortifications, ought to receive the execration of the
country. Look at the facility afforded by the Chesapeake
Bay to maritime powers in attacking us. If we estimate
with it the margin of rivers navigable for vessels of war, it
adds fourteen hundred miles, at least, to the line of our sea-
coast, and that of the worst character : for when an enemy
is there, it is without the fear of being driven from it : he
has, besides, the power of assaulting two shores at the same
time, and must be expected on both. Under such circum
stances, no degree of expense would be too great for its de
fence. Besides, the whole margin of the Bay is an extreme
ly sickly one, and fatal to the militia of the upper country.
How it is to be defended, military and naval men will be
best judges ; but I believe that steam frigates ought at least
to constitute a part of the means ; the expense of which,
however great, the people ought and would cheerfully bear.

I might now call the attention of the committee to other
points, but, "for the fear of fatiguing them, I will mention
only my views in regard to our finances, as connected with
preparatory measures. A war with Great Britain will im
mediately distress your finances, so far as your revenue de
pends on imports. It is impossible, during war, to prepare
a system of internal revenue in time to meet the defect thus

150 SPEECHES.

occasioned. Will Congress then leave the nation wholly de
pendent on foreign commerce for its revenue ? This Union
is rapidly changing the character of its industry. When a
country is agricultural , depending for supply on foreign mar
kets, its people may be taxed through its imports almost to
the amount of its capacity. The country, however, is rapid
ly becoming, to a considerable extent, a manufacturing com
munity. We find that exterior commerce (not including the
coasting trade) is every day bearing less and less proportion
to the entire wealth and strength of the nation. Its finan
cial resources will, therefore, daily become weaker and weak
er, instead of growing with its growth, if we do not resort to
other objects than our foreign commerce for taxation. But
gentlemen say, that the moral power of the nation ought not
to be neglected ; and that moral power is inconsistent with
oppressive taxes on the people. With oppressive taxes, moral
power certainly is inconsistent ; but, to make them oppres
sive, they must be both heavy and unnecessary. I agree,
therefore, with gentlemen in their premises, but not in their
conclusion, that, because oppressive taxes destroy the whole
moral power of the country, there ought, therefore, to be no
taxes at all. Such a conclusion is certainly erroneous. Let
us examine the question, whether a tax laid for the defence,
security, and lasting prosperity of a country, is calculated to
destroy its moral power, and more especially of this country.
If such be the fact, indispensable as I believe these taxes to
be, I will relinquish them ; for of all the powers of the Gov
ernment, the power of a moral kind is most to be cherished.
We had better give up all our physical power, than part with
this. But what is moral power ? The zeal of the country,
and the confidence it reposes in the administration of its
Government. Will it be diminished by imposing taxes
wisely and moderately ? If you suppose the people intelli
gent and virtuous, this cannot be admitted. But if a ma
jority of them be ignorant and vicious, then it is probable

SPEECHES. 151

that a tax laid for the most judicious purpose may deprive
you of their confidence. The people, I believe, are intelli
gent and virtuous. The more wisely, then, you act ; the less
you yield to the temptation of ignoble and false security, the
more you attract their confidence. The very existence of
your Government proves their intelligence ; for, let me say
to this House that, if one who knew nothing of this people
were made acquainted with its government, and with the
fact that it had sustained itself for thirty years, he would
know at once that this was a most intelligent and virtuous
people. Convince the people that measures are necessary
and wise, and they will maintain them. Already they go
far, very far before this House, in energy and public spirit.
If ever measures of this description become unpopular, it
will be by speeches here. Are any willing to lull the people
into false security ? Can they withdraw their eyes from
facts menacing the prosperity, if not the existence of the
country ? Are they willing to inspire them with sentiments
injurious to their lasting peace and prosperity ? The sub
ject is grave ; it is connected with the happiness and exist
ence of our institutions. I most sincerely hope that the
members of this House are the real agents of the people.
They are sent here, not to consult their ease and convenience,
but their general defence and common welfare. Such is. the _
language of the constitution. In discharge of the sacred
trust reposed in me by those for whom I act, I have faith
fully pointed out those measures which our situation and re- /
lation to the rest of the world render necessary for our secu^/
rity and prosperity. They involve, no doubt, much expense ;
they require considerable sacrifices on the part of the people ;
but are they on that account to be rejected ? We are called
on to choose. On the one side is ease, it is true ; but, on
the other, the security of the country. We may dispense
with the taxes ; we may neglect every measure of precau
tion, and feel no immediate disaster : but, in such a state

152 SPEECHES.

of things, what virtuous, what wise citizen, but must look
on the future with dread. I know of no situation so responsi
ble, if properly considered, as ours. We are charged by Provi
dence, not only with the happiness of this great and rising
people, but, in a considerable degree, with that of the human
race. We have a government of a new order, perfectly dis
tinct from all others which have preceded it — a government
founded on the rights of man ; resting, not on authority, not
on prejudice, not on superstition, but reason. If it shall
succeed, as fondly hoped by its founders, it will be the com
mencement of a new era in human affairs. All civilized
governments must, in the course of time, conform to its
principles. Thus circumstanced, can you hesitate what
course to choose ? The road that wisdom indicates, leads,
it is true, up the steep, but leads also to security and lasting
glory. No nation that wants the fortitude to tread it, ought
ever to aspire to greatness. Such ought, and will sink into
the list of those that have done nothing to be known or re
membered. It is immutable, — it is in the nature of things.
The love of present ease and pleasure, indifference about the
future, — that fatal weakness of human nature, — has never
failed, in individuals or nations, to sink to disgrace and ruin.
On the contrary, virtue and wisdom, which regard the future,
which spurn the temptations of the moment, however rugged
their path, end in happiness. Such are the universal senti
ments of all wise writers, from the didactics of the philoso
pher to the fictions of the poet. They agree and inculcate,
that pleasure is a flowery path, leading off among groves and
gardens, but ending in a dreary wilderness ; that it is the
siren's voice, that he who listens to is ruined ; that it is the
cup of Circe, of which whosoever drinks, is converted into a
swine. This is the language of fiction. Keason teaches the
same lesson. It is my wish to elevate the national senti
ment to that which animates every just and virtuous mind.
No effort is needed here to impel us the opposite way. That

SPEECHES. 153

also may be but too safely trusted to the frailties of our na
ture. This country is now in a situation similar to that which
one of the most beautiful writers of antiquity ascribes to
Hercules in his youth. He represents the hero as retiring
into the wilderness to deliberate on the course of life which
he ought to choose. Two goddesses approach him ; one
recommending a life of ease and pleasure ; the other of la
bor and virtue. The hero adopts the counsel of the latter,
and his fame and glory are known to the world. May this
country, the youthful Hercules, possessing his form and mus
cles, be animated by similar sentiments, and follow his ex
ample !

SPEECH

On the Bill, to establish a National Bank, delivered
in the House of Representatives, February 26th,
1816.

[NOTE. — A Bill " to incorporate the Subscribers to the Bank of
the United States," was reported by Mr. Calhoun, Chairman of the
Committee on National Currency, on the 8th of January, 1816, and
referred to the Committee of the Whole. It was not, it seems, called
up until the 26th of February following, when, on motion of Mr. Cal
houn, the intervening orders were postponed for that purpose, and the
debate commenced, which continued, with little interruption, until the
14th of March, when it passed the House by a vote of 80 to 71. The
discussion embraced both principle and detail, and the ablest men of
both parties took part in it. The supporters of the Bill were Messrs.
Calhoun, Clay, Cuthbert, Sharp, Condict, Forsythe, Grosvenor, Wilde,
Telfair, Wright, and others ; its opponents, Messrs. Randolph, Webster,
Cady, Pickering, Pitkin, Sergeant, Hanson, Stanford, Hopkinson,
Culpepper, Gaston, Hardin, and others. A large majority of the

154 SPEECHES.

Republican Party voted for the Bill ; — influenced, no doubt, by the
peculiar circumstances of the time.]

ME. CALHOUN rose to explain his views of a subject, so
interesting to the republic, and so necessary to be correctly
understood, as that of the bill now before the committee.
He proposed, at this time, only to discuss general principles,
without reference to details. He was aware, he said, that
principle and detail might be united ; but he should, at
present, keep them distinct. He did not propose to com
prehend, in this discussion, the power of Congress to grant
bank charters ; nor the question whether the general ten
dency of banks was favorable or unfavorable to the liberty
and prosperity of the country ; nor the question whether a
national bank would be favorable to the operations of the
Government. To discuss these questions, he conceived,
would be an useless consumption of time. The constitutional
question had been already so freely and frequently discussed,
that all had made up their minds on it. The question whe
ther banks were favorable to public liberty and prosperity,
was one purely speculative. The fact of the existence of
banks, and their incorporation with the commercial concerns
and industry of the nation, prove that inquiry to come too
late. The only question was, on this hand, under what
modifications were banks most useful ; and whether the
United States ought, or ought not, to exercise the power to
establish a bank. As to the question whether a national
bank would be favorable to the administration of the finances
of the Government, it was one on which there was so little
doubt, that gentlemen would excuse him if he did not enter
into it. Leaving all these questions, then, Mr. C. said, he
proposed to examine the cause and state of the disorders of
the national currency, and the question whether it was in the
power of Congress, by establishing a national bank, to remove
these disorders. This, he observed, was a question of novelty,

SPEECHES. 155

and vital importance ; a question which greatly affected the
character and prosperity of the country.

As to the state of the currency, Mr. C. proceeded to re
mark, that it was extremely depreciated, and, in degrees,
varying according to the different sections of the country.
All would assent, that this state of the currency was a stain
on public and private credit, and injurious to the morals of
the community. This was so clear a position that it required
no proof. There were, however, other considerations, arising
from the state of the currency, not so distinctly felt, nor so
generally assented to. The state of our circulating medium
was, he said, opposed to the principles of the federal consti
tution. The power was given to Congress, by that instru
ment, in express terms, to regulate the currency of the
United States. In point of fact, he said, that power, though
given to Congress, is not in their hands. The power is
exercised by banking institutions, no longer responsible for
the correctness with which they manage it. Gold and silver
have disappeared entirely. There is no money but paper
money ; and that money is beyond the control of Congress.
No one, he said, who referred to the constitution, could
doubt that the money of the United States was intended to
be placed entirely under the control of Congress. The only
object the framers of the constitution could have had in view,
in giving to Congress the power to coin money, regulate the
value thereof, and of foreign coins, must have been to give
a steadiness and fixed value to the currency of the United
States. The state of things, at the time of the adoption of
the constitution, afforded Mr. C. an argument in support of
his construction. There then existed, he said, a depreciated
paper currency, which could only be regulated and made
uniform by giving a power for that purpose to the General
Government. The States could not do it. He argued,
therefore, taking into view the prohibition against the States
issuing bills of credit, that there was a strong presumption

156 SPEECHES.

this power was intended to be given exclusively to Congress.
Mr. C. acknowledged there is no provision in the constitution
by which the States were prohibited from creating banks which
now exercise this power. But, he said, that banks were then
but little known. There was but one, the Bank of North
America, with a capital of only four hundred thousand
dollars, and the universal opinion was that bank-notes repre
sented gold and silver ; and that, under this impression, there
could be no necessity to prohibit banking institutions, be
cause their notes always represented gold and silver ; and
these could not be multiplied beyond the demands of the
country. Mr. 0. drew the distinction between banks of
deposit and banks of discount ; the latter of which were then
but little understood, and their abuse not conceived of until
demonstrated by recent experience. No man, he remarked,
in the convention, as much talent and wisdom as it con
tained, could possibly have foreseen the course of these in
stitutions ; that they would have multiplied from one to two
hundred and sixty ; from a capital of four hundred thousand
dollars to one of eighty millions ; from being consistent with
the provisions of the constitution, and the exclusive right of
Congress to regulate the currency, that they would be directly
opposed to it ; that, so far from their credit depending on
their punctuality in redeeming their bills with specie, they
might go on ad infinitum in violation of their contract, with
out a dollar in their vaults. There had indeed, Mr. C. said,
been an extraordinary revolution in the currency of the
country. By a sort of under-current, the power of Congress
to regulate the money of the country had caved in, and upon
its ruins had sprung up those institutions which now exer
cised the right of making money for and in the United
States ; for gold and silver are not now the only money —
whatever is the medium of purchase and sale must take
their place ; and, as bank paper alone was now employed
for this purpose, it had become the money of the country.

SPEECHES. 157

A change great and wonderful has taken place, said he,
which divests you of your rights, and turns you back to the
condition of the revolutionary war, in which every State
issued hills of credit, which were made a legal tender, and
were of various values.

This then, Mr. C. said, was the evil. We have, in lieu
of gold and silver, a paper medium, unequally but gen
erally depreciated, which affects the trade and industry of
the country ; which paralyzes the national arm ; which
sullies the faith, both public and private, of the United
States ; a medium no longer resting on gold and silver as its
basis. We have, indeed, laws regulating the currency of
foreign coins ; but they are, under present circumstances, a
mockery of legislation, because there is no coin in circulation.
The right of making money, an attribute of sovereign pow
er, a sacred and important right, was exercised by two hun
dred and sixty banks, scattered over every part of the Uni
ted States, not responsible to any power whatever for their
issues of paper. The next and great inquiry was, he said,
how this evil was to be remedied. Kestore, said he, these
institutions to their original use ; cause them to give up
their usurped power ; cause them to return to their legiti
mate office of places of discount and deposit • let them be
no longer mere paper machines ; restore the state of things
which existed anterior to 1813, which was consistent with
the just policy and interests of the country ; cause them to
fulfil their contracts — to respect their broken faith ; resolve
that every where there shall be a uniform value to the nation
al currency ; your constitutional control will then prevail.

How then, he proceeded to examine, was this desirable
end to be attained ? What difficulty stood in the way ?
The reason why the banks could not now comply with their
contracts, was that conduct, which, in private life, frequently
produces the same effect. It was owing to the prodigality
of their engagements, without means to fulfil them ; to their

158 SPEECHES

issuing more paper than they could possibly redeem with
specie. In the United States, according to the best estimate,
there were not in the vaults of all the banks more than fif
teen millions of specie, with a capital amounting to about
eighty-two millions of dollars. Hence the cause of the de
preciation of bank-notes — the excess of paper in circulation
beyond that of specie in their vaults. This excess was visi
ble to the eye, and almost audible to the ear ; so familiar
was the fact, that this paper was emphatically called "trash"
or "rags." According to estimation, also, he said there
were in circulation at the same date, within the United
States, two hundred millions of dollars of bank-notes, credit,
and bank paper in one shape or other. Supposing thirty
millions of these to be in possession of the banks themselves,
there were, perhaps, one hundred and seventy millions actu
ally in circulation, or on which the banks draw interest. The
proportion between demand and supply, which regulates the
price of every thing, regulates also the value of this paper.
In proportion as the issue is excessive, it depreciates in value
— and no wonder, when, since 1810 or 1811, the amount
of paper in circulation had increased from eighty or
ninety, to two hundred millions. Mr. C. here examined the
opinion entertained by some gentlemen, that bank paper
had not depreciated, but that gold and silver had appre
ciated — a position he denied by arguments, founded on the
portability of gold and silver, which would equalize their
value in every part of the United States ; and on the facts
that gold and silver coin had increased in quantity instead of
diminishing, and that exchange on Great Britain (at gold
and silver value) had been, for some time past, in favor of
the United States. Yet, he said, gold and silver were leav
ing our shores. In fact we have degraded the metallic cur
rency ; we have treated it with indignity ; it leaves us and
seeks an asylum on foreign shores. Let it become again the
basis of bank transactions and it will revisit us.

SPEECHES. 159

Having established, as he conceived, in the course of his
remarks, that the excess of paper issue was the true and only
cause of depreciation of our paper currency, Mr. C. turned
his attention to the manner in which that excess had been
produced. It was intimately connected with the suspension
of specie payments. They stood as cause and effect. First,
the excessive issues caused the suspension of specie pay
ments ; and advantage had been taken of that suspension to
issue still greater floods of it. The banks had undertaken to
do a new business, uncongenial with the nature of such insti
tutions. They undertook to make loans to Government,
not as brokers, but as stockholders — a practice wholly incon
sistent with specie payments. After showing the difference
between the ordinary business of a bank, in discounts, and
the making loans for twelve years, Mr. C. said, indisputably
the latter practice was a great and leading cause of the sus
pension of specie payments. Of this species of property
(public stock) the banks in the United States held, on the 30th
day of September last, about eighteen and a half millions,
and a nearly equal amount of treasury notes, besides stock
for long loans made to the State Governments ; amounting,
altogether, to nearly forty millions — being a large proportion
of their actual capital. This, he said, was the great cause
of the suspension of specie payments.

Had the banks (he now discussed the question) the capacity
to resume specie payments ? If they have the disposition,
they may resume specie payments. The banks, he said, were
not insolvent : they never were more solvent. If so, the term
itself implies, that if time be allowed them they may, before
long, be in a condition to resume payments of specie. If the
banks would regularly and consentaneously begin to dispose
of their stock, — to call in their notes for the treasury notes
they have, — and moderately to curtail their private dis
counts ; if they would act in concert in this manner, they
might resume specie payments. If they were to withdraw.

160 SPEECHES.

by the sale of a part only of their stock and treasury notes,
twenty-five millions of their notes from circulation, the rest
would be appreciated to par, or nearly so ; and they would
still have fifteen millions of stock disposable to send to Eu
rope for specie, &c. With $30,000,000 in their vaults, and
so much of their paper withdrawn from circulation, they
would be in a condition to resume payments in specie. The
only difficulty — that of producing concert — was one which
it belonged to Congress to surmount. The indisposition of
the banks, from motives of interest, obviously growing out
of the vast profits most of them have lately realized, by which
the stockholders have received from 12 to 20 per cent, on
their stock, would be, he showed, the greatest obstacle.
What, he asked, was a bank ? An institution, under present
uses, to make money. What was the instinct of such an
institution ? Gain, gain, nothing but gain : and they would
not willingly relinquish their gain, from the present state of
things (which was profitable to them), acting as they did
without restraint and without hazard. Those who believe
that the present state of things would ever cure itself, Mr.
C. said, must believe what is impossible. Banks must change
their nature, lay aside their instinct, before they will volun
tarily aid in doing what it is not their interest to do. By this
process of reasoning he came to the conclusion that it rested
with Congress to make them return to specie payments, by
making it their interest to do so. This introduced the sub
ject of the National Bank.

A national bank, he said, paying specie itself, would have
a tendency to make specie payments general, as well by its
influence as by its example. It will be the interest of the
National Bank to produce this state of things, because, other
wise, its operations will be greatly circumscribed ; as it must
pay out specie or national bank-notes : for he presumed one
of the first rules of such a bank would be, to take the notes
of no bank which did not pay in gold or silver. A national

SPEECHES. 161

bank of thirty-five millions, with the aid of those banks
which are at once ready to pay specie, would produce a
powerful effect all over the Union. Further ; a national
bank would enable the Government to resort to measures
which would make it unprofitable to banks to continue the
violation of their contracts, and advantageous to return to the
observance of them. The leading measures, of this character,
would be to strip the banks, refusing to pay specie, of all the
profits arising from the business of the Government ; to pro
hibit deposits with them ; and to refuse to receive their notes
in payment of dues to the Government. How far such
measures would be efficacious in producing a return to specie
payments, he was unable to say ; but it was as far as he was
willing to go, at the present session. If they persisted in re
fusing to resume payments in specie, Congress must resort to
measures of a deeper tone, which they might rightfully do.

The restoration of specie payments, Mr. C. argued, would
remove the embarrassments under which the industry of the
country labored, and the stains from its public and private
faith. It remained to see, whether this House, without
whose aid it was in vain to expect success in this object,
would have the fortitude to apply the remedy. If this was
not the proper remedy, he hoped such an one would be pro
posed as a substitute, instead of opposing this by vague and
general declamation against banks. The disease, he said,
was deep : it affected public opinion, and whatever affects
public opinion, touches the vitals of the Government. Here
after Congress would never stand in the same relation to this
measure in which they now did. The disease arose in time
of war — the war had subsided, but left the disease, which it
was now in the power of Congress to eradicate : but if they
did not now exercise the power, they would become abettors
of a state of things which was of vital consequence to pub
lic morality, as he showed by various illustrations. He called
upon the House, as guardians of the public weal, of the

VOL. II. — 11

162 SPEECHES.

health of the body politic, which depended on public morals,
to interpose against a state of things which was inconsistent
with both. He appealed to the House, too, as the guardians
of public and private faith. In what manner, he asked,
were the public contracts fulfilled ? In gold and silver, in
which the Government had stipulated to pay ? No. In
paper issued by these institutions ; in paper greatly depre
ciated ; ia paper depreciated from five to twenty per cent,
below the currency in which the Government had contracted
to pay, &c. He added another argument — the inequality
of taxation, in consequence of the state of the circulating
medium ; which, notwithstanding the taxes were laid with
strict regard to the constitutional provision for their equality,
made the people in one section of the Union pay, perhaps,
one-fifth more of the same tax than those in another. The
constitution having given Congress the power to remedy
these evils, they were, he contended, deeply responsible for
their continuance.

The evil he desired to remedy, Mr. C. said, was a deep
one — almost incurable, because connected with public opin
ion, over which banks have a great control. They have, in
a great measure, a control over the press, for proof of which
he referred to the fact that the present wretched state of the
circulating medium had scarcely been denounced by a single
paper within the United States. The derangement of the
circulating medium, he said, was a joint thrown out of its
socket. Let it remain for a short time in that state, and the
sinews will be so knit that it cannot be replaced : apply the
remedy soon, and it is an operation easy, though painful.
The evil grows, while the resistance to it becomes weak, and
unless checked at once will become irresistible. Mr. C. con
cluded the speech, of which the above is a mere outline, by
observing, that he could have said much more on this impor
tant subject, but he knew how difficult it was to gain the
attention of the House to long addresses.

SPEECHES. 163

SPEECH

On the New Tariff Bill, delivered in the House of
Representatives, April 6th, 1816.

[NOTE. — Under a resolution of the House (February 23, 1815), the
Secretary of the Treasury, on the 12th of February, 1816, submitted
an elaborate Report to Congress, on the subject of a general tariff of
duties proper to be imposed on imported goods, wares, and merchan
dise. On this a Bill was subsequently framed, reported, and referred
to the Committee of the Whole. The details were discussed at great
length — and the Bill, after various amendments, 'finally passed the
House, April 8th, 1816, by a vote of 88 to 54. During the debate, an
amendment was moved by Mr. Tucker (not Mr. Randolph, as is
frequently stated), to strike out the minimum price of 25 cents per
square yard on cottons, which was warmly discussed. Mr. Calhoun,
Chairman of the Committee on the National Currency, was, at the
time, very busily engaged in framing his celebrated Report ; when he
was suddenly called from the committee room, by the Chairman of
the Committee on Manufactures, to reply to the arguments of Mr.
Tucker and others. The sketch of his remarks is, of course, imper
fect. The views expressed were uttered on the spur of the occasion,
without study or premeditation ; and were not such (as the Speaker
has since publicly declared) as received the sanction of his more ma
tured experience and reflection. The same remark may be made, gen
erally, of his speeches on the Bank and Internal Improvement.]

THE debate heretofore on this subject has been on the
degree of protection which ought to be afforded to our cot
ton and woollen manufactures : all professing to be friendly
to those infant establishments, and to be willing to extend to
them adequate encouragement. The present motion assumes
a new aspect. It is introduced professedly on the ground
that manufactures ought not to receive any encouragement ;
and willj in its operation, leave our cotton establishments ex-

164 SPEECHES.

posed to the competition of the cotton goods of the East
Indies, which, it is acknowledged on all sides, they are not
capable of meeting with success, without the proviso propos
ed to be stricken out by the motion now under discussion.
Till the debate assumed this new form, he had determined
to be silent ; participating, as he largely did, in that general
'anxiety which is felt, after so long and laborious a session, to
' return to the bosom of our families. But, on a subject of
such vital importance, touching, as it does, the security and
permanent prosperity of our country, he hoped that the
House would indulge him in a few observations. He regret-
ed much his want of preparation ; he meant not a verbal
preparation, for he had ever despised such ; but that due
and mature meditation and arrangement of thought which
the House is entitled to on the part of those who occupy any
portion of their time. But, whatever his arguments might
want on that account in weight, he hoped might be made up
/ ,i lin the disinterestedness of his situation. He was no manu
facturer ; he was not from that portion of our country sup
posed to be peculiarly interested. Coming, as he did, from
fneSouth ; having, in common with his immediate constitu-
/ents, no interest, but in the cultivation of the soil, in selling
; its products high, and buying cheap the wants and conven
iences of life, no motives could be attributed to him but such
as were disinterested.

He had asserted that the subject before them was con
nected with the security of the country. It would, doubt
less, by some be considered a rash assertion ; but he con
ceived it to be susceptible of the clearest proof; and he
hoped, with due attention, to establish it to the satisfac
tion of the House.

The security of a country mainly depends on its spirit
and its means ; and the latter principally on its moneyed
resources. Modified as the industry of this country now is,
combined with our peculiar situation and want of a naval

SPEECHES. 165

ascendency, whenever we have the misfortune to be involved
in a war with a nation dominant on the ocean — and it is
almost only with such we can at present be — the moneyed
resources of the country to a great extent must fail. He
took it for granted that it was the duty of this body to adopt
those measures of prudent foresight which the event of war
made necessary. We cannot, he presumed, be indirferent"1fco~7
dangers from abroad, unless, indeed, the House "is prepared f
to indulge in the phantom of eternal peace, which seems toJ
possess the dream of some of its members. Could such a
state exist, no foresight or fortitude would be necessary to
conduct the affairs of the republic ; but as it is the mere
illusion of the imagination, as every people that ever has
or ever will exist is subjected to the vicissitudes of peace
and war, it must ever be considered as the plain dictate of
wisdom in peace to prepare for war. What, then, let us
consider, constitute the resources of this country, and what
are the effects of war on them ? Commerce and agriculture,
till lately almost the only, still constitute the principal,
sources of our wealth. So long as these remain uninterrupted^
the country prospers ; but war, as we are now circumstanced^
is equally destructive to both. They both depend on foreign
markets ; and our country is placed, as it regards them, inD
situation strictly insular ; a wide ocean rolls between. Our
commerce neither is nor can be protected by the present
means of the country. What, then, are the effects of a war
with a maritime power — with England ? Our commerce
annihilated, spreading individual misery and producing na
tional poverty ; our agriculture cut off from its accustomed
markets, the surplus product of the farmer perishes on his
hands, and he ceases to produce because he cannot sell.
His resources are dried up, while his expenses are greatly
increased ; as all manufactured articles, the necessaries as
well as the conveniences of life, rise to an extravagant price.
The recent war fell with peculiar pressure on the growers of

166 SPEECHES.

cotton and tobacco, and other great staples of the country ;
and the same state of things will recur in the event of
another, unless prevented by the foresight of this body. If
the mere statement of facts did not carry conviction to every
mind, as he conceives it is calculated to do, additional
arguments might be drawn from the general nature of
wealth. -' Neither agriculture, manufactures, nor commerce,
taken separately, is the cause of wealth ; it flows from the
three combined, and cannot exist without each. The
weaRh of any single nation or an individual, it is true, may
not immediately depend on the three, but such wealth
always presupposes their existence. He viewed the words
in the most enlarged sense. Without commerce, industry
would have no stimulus ; without manufactures, it would be
without the means of production ; and without agriculture
neither of the others can subsist. When separated entirely
and permanently, they perish. War in this country pro-
puces, to a great extent, that effect ; and hence the great
:ernTarrassment which follows in its train. The failure of the
wealth and resources of the nation necessarily involved the
ruin of its finances and its currency. It is admitted by the
most strenuous advocates, on the other side, that no country
ought to be dependent on another for its means of defence ;
that, at least, our musket and bayonet, our cannon and ball
ought to be of domestic manufacture. But what, he asked,
is more necessary to the defence of a country than its cur
rency and finance ? Circumstanced as our country is, can
these stand the shock of war ? Behold the effect of the
late war on them. When our manufactures are grown to
a certain perfection, as they soon will under the fostering
care of Government, we will no longer experience these evils.
The farmer will find a ready market for his surplus produce ;
and, what is almost of equal consequence, a certain and
cheap supply of all his wants. His prosperity will diffuse
itself to every class in the community ; and, instead of that

SPEECHES. 167

languor of industry and individual distress now incident to
a state of war and suspended commerce, the wealth and
vigor of the community will not be materially impaired.
The arm of Government will be nerved ; and taxes in the
hour of danger, when essential to the independence of the
nation, may be greatly increased ; loans, so uncertain and
hazardous, may be less relied on ; thus situated, the storm may
beat without, but within all will be quiet and safe. To give
perfection to this state of things, it will be necessary to add,
as soon as possible, a system of internal improvements, and
at least such an extension of our navylnrrrffl^preverrf
cutting off our coasting trade) The advantage of each is so
striking as not to require illustration, especially after the
experience of the recent war. It is thus the resources of Ehlsj
Government and people would be placed beyond the powerj
of a foreign war materially to impair. But it may be said
that the derangement then experienced, resulted, not from
the cause assigned, but from the errors of the weakness of
the Government. He admitted that many financial blun
ders were committed, for the subject was new to us ; that
the taxes were not laid sufficiently early, or to as great an
extent as they ought to have been ; and that the loans were
in some instances injudiciously made ; but he ventured to
affirm that, had the greatest foresight and fortitude been
exerted, the embarrassment would have been still very great ;
and that even under the best management, the total derange
ment which was actually felt would not have been post
poned eighteen months, had the war so long continued.
How could it be otherwise ? A war such as this count
was then involved in, in a great measure dries up the re
sources of individuals, as he had already proved ; and the
resources of the Government are no more than the aggregate j
of the surplus incomes of individuals called into action bya/
system of taxation. It is certainly a great political evil,
incident to the character of the industry of this country,

168 SPEECHES.

that, however prosperous our situation when at peace, with
an uninterrupted commerce — and nothing then could exceed
it — the moment that we were involved in war the whole is
reversed. When resources are most needed, when indispen-
/ sable to maintain the honor, yes, the very existence of the
lunation, then they desert us. Our currency is also sure to
experience the shock, and become so deranged as to prevent
us from calling out fairly whatever of means is left to the
country. The result of a war in the present state of our
naval power, is the blockade of our coast, and consequent
destruction of our trade. The wants and habits of the
country, founded on the use of foreign articles, must be
gratified ; importation to a certain extent continues, through
the policy of the enemy or unlawful traffic ; the exportation
of our bulky articles is prevented, too ; the specie of the
country is drawn to pay the balance perpetually accumulat
ing against us ; and the final result is, a total derangement
of our currency. To this distressing state of things there
were two remedies — and only two ; one in our power imme
diately, the other requiring much time and exertion ; but
both constituting, in his opinion, the essential policy of tins
country : he meant the navy and domestic manufactui
By the former, we could open the way to our markets ; by
the latter, we bring them from beyond the ocean,- and natu
ralize them. Had we the means of attaining an immediate
naval ascendency, he acknowledged that the policy recom
mended by this bill would be very questionable ; but as that
is not the fact — as it is a period remote, with any exertion,
and will be probably more so from that relaxation of exertion
so natural in peace, when necessity is not felt, it becomes
the duty of this House to resort, to a considerable extent, at
least as far as is proposed, to the only remaining remedy.

But to this it has been objected that the country is not
prepared, and that the result of our premature exertion
would be to bring distress on it without effecting the intend-

SPEECHES. 169

ed object. Were it so, however urgent the reasons in its fa
vor, we ought to desist, as it is folly to oppose the laws of
necessity. But he could not for a moment yield to the as
sertion : on the contrary, he firmly believed that the country
is prepared, even to maturity, for the introduction of manu
factures. We have abundance of resources, and things natu
rally tend at this moment in that direction. A prosperous
commerce has poured an immense amount of commercial
capital into this country. This capital has, till lately, found
occupation in commerce ; but that state of the world which
transferred it to this country, and gave it active employment,
has passed away, never to return. Where shall we now find
full employment for our prodigious amount of tonnage —
where markets for the numerous and abundant products of
our country ? This great body of active capital, which for
the moment has found sufficient employment in supplying our
markets, exhausted by the war and measures preceding it,
must find a new direction ; it will not be idle. What Chan
nel can it take but that of manufactures ? This, if things
continue as they are, will be its direction. It will introduce
a new era in our affairs, in many respects highly advanta
geous, and ought to be countenanced by the Government. Be
sides, we have already surmounted the greatest difficulty that
has ever been found in undertakings of this kind. The cot
ton and woollen manufactures are not to be introduced — they
are already introduced to a great extent ; freeing us entirely
from the hazards, and, in a great measure, the sacrifices ex
perienced in giving the capital of the country a new direc
tion. The restrictive measures and the war, though not in
tended for that purpose, have, by the necessary operation of
things, turned a large amount of capital to this new branch
of industry. He had often heard it said, both in and out of
Congress, that this effect alone would indemnify the country
for all of its losses. So high was this tone of feeling when
the want of these establishments was practically felt, that

170 SPEECHES.

he remembered, during the war, when some question was agi
tated respecting the introduction of foreign goods, that many
then opposed it, on the grounds of injuring our manufac
tures. He then said that war alone furnished sufficient stim
ulus, and perhaps too much, as it would make their growth
unnaturally rapid ; but that, on the return of peace, it would
then be time for us to show our affection for them. He at
that time did not expect an apathy and aversion to the ex
tent which is now seen. But it will 110 doubt be said, if they
are so far established, and if the situation of the country is
so favorable to their growth, where is the necessity of afford
ing them protection ? It is to put them beyond the reach
of contingency. Besides, capital is not yet, and cannot for
some time be, adjusted to the new state of things. There is,
in fact, from the operation of temporary causes, a great
pressure on these establishments. They had extended so
rapidly during the late war, that many, he feared, were with
out the requisite surplus capital or skill to meet the present
crisis. Should such prove to be the fact, it would give a
back set, and might, to a great extent, endanger their ulti
mate success. Should the present owners be ruined, and the
workmen dispersed and turned to other pursuits, the country
would sustain a great loss. Such would, no doubt, be the
fact to a considerable extent, if. not protected. Besides, cir
cumstances, if we act with wisdom, are favorable to attract
to our country much skill and industry. The country in
Europe having the most skilful workmen is broken up. It
is to us, if wisely used, more valuable than the repeal of the
Edict of Nantz was to England. She had the prudence to
profit by it : let us not discover less political sagacity. Af
ford to ingenuity and industry immediate and ample protec
tion, and they will not fail to give a preference to this free
and happy country.

It has been objected to this bill, that it will injure our
marine, and consequently impair our naval strength. How

SPEECHES. 171

far it is fairly liable to this charge, he was not prepared to
say. He hoped and believed it would not, at least to any
alarming extent, have that effect immediately ; and he firm
ly believed that its lasting operation would be highly benefi
cial to our commerce. The trade to the East Indies would
certainly be much affected ; but it was stated in debate that
the whole of the trade employed but six hundred sailors.
But, whatever might be the loss in this or other branches of
our foreign commerce, he trusted it would be amply compen
sated in our coasting trade, a branch of navigation wholly
in our own hands. It has at all times employed a. great
amount of tonnage ; something more, he believed, than one-
third of the whole : nor is it liable to the imputation thrown
out by a member from North Carolina (Mr. Gaston), that it
produced inferior sailors. It required long and. dangerous
voyages ; and, if his information was correct, no branch of
trade made better or more skilful seamen. The fact that it
is wholly in our own hands is a very important one, while
every branch of our foreign trade must suffer from com
petition with other nations.

Other objections of a political character were made to the
encouragement of manufactures. It is said they destroy the
moral and physical power of the people. This might former
ly have been true, to a considerable extent, before the perfec
tion of machinery, and when the success of the manufactures
depended on the minute subdivision of labor. At that time
it required a large portion of the population of a country to
be engaged in them ; and every minute subdivision of labor
is undoubtedly unfavorable to the intellect ; but the great
perfection of machinery has in a considerable degree obviated
these objections. In fact, it has been stated that the manu
facturing districts in England furnish the greatest number of
recruits to her army ; and that, as soldiers, they are not ma
terially inferior to the rest of her population. It has been
further asserted that manufactures are the fruitful cause of

172 SPEECHES.

pauperism ; and England has been referred to as furnishing
conclusive evidence of its truth. For his part, he could per
ceive no such tendency in them, but the exact contrary, as
they furnished new stimulus and means of subsistence to the
laboring classes of the community. We ought not to look
to the cotton and woollen establishments of Great Britain
for the prodigious numbers of poor with which her population
was disgraced. Causes much more efficient exist. Her poor
laws, and statutes regulating the price of labor, with heavy
taxes, were the real causes. But, if it must be so — if the
mere fact that England manufactured more than any other
country explained the cause of her having more beggars, it is
just as reasonable to refer to it her courage, spirit, and all her
masculine virtues, in which she excels all other nations, with
a single exception, — he meant our own — in which we might,
without vanity, challenge a pre-eminence,
^""inother objection had been made, which, he must acknow-
I ledge, was better founded : that capital employed in manu-
I facturing produced a greater dependence on the part of the
J employed, than in commerce, navigation, or agriculture. It
is certainly an evil, and to be regretted ; but he did not
think it a decisive objection to the system ; especially when
it had incidental political advantages which, in his opinion,
more than counterpoised it. It produced an interest strictly
'•.American, — as much so as agriculture ; in which it had the
idecictSd advantage of commerce or navigation. The country
will from this derive much advantage. Again, it is calcula-
^j2i-4;o bind together more closely our widely-spread republic.
lit will greatly increase our mutual dependence and inter
course ; and will, as a necessary consequence, excite an in
creased attention to Internal Improvements, a subject every
way so intimately connected with the ultimate attainment
of national strength and the perfection of our political insti
tutions. He regarded the fact that it would make the parts
adhere more closely ; that it would form a new and most

SPEECHES. 173

powerful cement, and outweighing any political objections
that might be urged against the system. In his opin
ion the liberty and the union of this country were insepa
rably united. That, as the destruction of the latter would
most certainly involve the former, so its maintenance will,
with equal certainty, preserve it. He did not speak lightly.
He had often and long revolved it in his mind, and he had crit
ically examined into the causes that destroyed the liberty of
other states. There are none that apply to us, or apply
with a force to alarm. The basis of our republic is too
broad, and its structure too strong, to be shaken by them.
Its extension and organization will be found to afford effec
tual security against their operation ; but let it be deeply im
pressed on the heart of this House and country, that, while
they guarded against the old, they exposed us to a new and
terrible danger, Disunion. This single word comprehended
almost the sum of our political dangers ; and against it we
ought to be perpetually guarded.

SPEECH

On the Compensation Bill, delivered in the House
of Kepresentatives, Jan. 17th, 1817.

[NOTE. — March 4th, 1816. Mr. Johnson of Kentucky moved
the appointment of a Special Committee to inquire into the expe
diency of changing the mode of compensating Members of Congress,
from a per diem to an annual allowance ; and on March 6th, as its
chairman, reported a Bill fixing the amount at 81,500 per session.
The debate, which continued until late on March 8th, when it was
passed by a vote of 81 to 67, was animated and, in some respects,
acrimonious. No question, apparently so trivial, ever produced so
general an excitement through the countiy. The measure was de-

174 SPEECHES.

nounced every where, — from the hustings, in the primary assemblies
of the people, and even by the Legislatures of many of the States. The
storm raged so violently that, early in the ensuing session of Congress,
a Bill on the motion of Mr. Johnson was introduced to repeal the
obnoxious Act, which, after some opposition, passed January 23d,
1817.1

I HOPE the House will not agree to fill the blanks with
six dollars, as reported by the Committee of the Whole.
I have remained silent thus long, not that I agree with
those who think this a trivial question, but because I was
anxious, in ultimately making up my mind, to profit by the
observations of others. I have now, however, finally decided
on the course I intend to pursue. If the blank should be
filled with a sum fully equal to the present pay, I shall vote
for the bill on its passage ; — not that, in itself, I prefer the
daily to the annual pay ; for on this point, my opinion
remains unaltered. I believe the latter, for several reasons
not necessary to repeat, to be in itself preferable. The
daily, however, has one advantage at present over tbe other
mode ; — it has a better prospect of being permanent. If
the pay be left in its present form, it will most certainly be
repealed by the next Congress, whatever may be the feelings
of a majority of that body, as to the mode or amount. They
will not be free agents — most of them being already com
mitted in the canvass for a seat in this House. But should
the mode be changed and the amount retained, the very
men who have turned out the most of us, who have been the
agitators in the late elections will, in all probability, become
the pacificators ; for we may be perfectly assured of one fact,
that the feelings of those gentlemen are very different now
from wbat they were before the elections. If you change the
mode, they will seize tbe opportunity, and assert that you
have now done what ought originally to haye been done.
Should the blank not be filled with an adequate sum, — say
nine or ten dollars a day, — I shall vote against the passage of

SPEECHES. 175

the bill, so as to retain the present law. But if it must
corne to a repeal, I would prefer it to take place after the
4th of March next, so as to leave the subject entirely open
for the next Congress. Such is the course which my judg
ment admonishes me to pursue.

It has more than once been said, that this is not an im
portant subject. If the observation be made in reference to
the members who now compose this body, I readily assent.
To them it is a trivial subject. They are free agents, and
if they find the sacrifice too considerable, they can, at any
moment, return to those private pursuits, so much more pro
fitable, and, in many respects, desirable. We then, as indi
viduals, have no right to complain, should the pay be
reduced to the smallest amount. But there is another aspect
of this subject, of a very different character. The question
of adequate, or inadequate compensation to the members of
Congress, is, if I am not greatly mistaken, intimately con
nected with the very essence of our liberty. This House is
the foundation of the fabric of that liberty. So happy is its
constitution, that, in all instances of a general nature, its
duty and its interest are inseparable. If I understand cor
rectly the structure of our Government, the prevailing prin
ciple is not so much a balance of power as a well connected
chain of responsibility. This responsibility commences here,
and this House is the centre of its operation. The members
are elected for two years only ; and, at the end of that period,
are responsible to their constituents for the faithful discharge
of their public duties. Besides, the very structure of the House
is admirably calculated to unite interest and duty. The
members of Congress have, in their individual capacity, no
power or prerogative. These attach to the entire body
assembled here, and acting under certain set forms. We
then, as individuals, are not less amenable to the laws which
we enact, than the humblest citizen. Such is the responsi
bility — such the structure — such the sure foundation of

176 SPEECHES.

our liberty. If we turn our attention to what are called the
co-ordinate branches of our Government, we find them very
differently constructed. The judiciary is in no degree re
sponsible to the people immediately. To Congress — to this
body is the whole of their responsibility. Such too, in a
great measure, is the theory of our Government, as applied
to the executive branch. It is true the President is elected
for a term of years ; but that term is twice the length of
ours ; and, besides, his election is, in point of fact, removed
in all of the States three degrees from the people. The
electors in many of the States, are chosen by the State Legis
latures ; and where that is not formally the case, it is never
theless in point of fact effected through the agency of those
bodies. But what mainly distinguishes the legislative and
executive branches, as regards their actual responsibility to
the people, is the nature of their operation. It is the duty of
the former to enact laws, of the latter to execute them.
Every citizen of ordinary information, is capable, in a greater
or less degree, of forming an opinion of the propriety of the
law — and, consequently, of judging whether Congress has or
has not done its duty ; but of the execution of the laws,
they are far less competent to judge. How can the com
munity judge, whether the President, in appointing officers
to execute the laws, has in all cases been governed by fair
and honest motives, or by favor and corruption ? How
much less competent is it to judge whether the application
of the public money has been made with economy and fide
lity, or with extravagance and dishonesty ! These are facts
that can be fully investigated, and brought before the public
by Congress, and Congress only. Hence it is that the con
stitution has made the President responsible to Congress.
This, then, is the essence of our liberty : Congress is respon
sible to the people immediately, and the other branches of
the Government are responsible to it. What, then, becomes
of the theory of the Government, if the President holds

SPEECHES. 177

offices in his gift, which, as regards honor or profit, are more
desirable than a seat in this House, the only office imme
diately in the gift of the people —

[Here Mr. C. checked himself.]

I find myself committing an unpardonable error, in pre
senting arguments to this body. The ear of this House, on
this subject, is closed to truth and reason. What has pro
duced this magic spell ? Instructions ! Well, then, has it
come to this ? Have the people of this country snatched
the power of deliberation from this body? Have they
resolved the Government into its original elements, and re
sumed their primitive power of legislation ? Are we, then,
a body of individual agents, and not a deliberative one, with
out the power, but possessing the form of legislation ? If
such be the fact, let gentlemen produce their instructions,
properly authenticated. Let them name the time and place
at which the people assembled and deliberated on this ques
tion. Oh, no ! they have no written, no verbal instructions :
but they have implied instructions. The law is unpopular,
arid they are bound to repeal it, in opposition to their con
sciences and reason. Have gentlemen reflected on the conse
quences of this doctrine ? Are we bound in all cases to do
what is popular ? If this be true, how are political errors,
once prevalent, ever to be corrected ? Suppose a party to
spring up in this country, whose real views should be the de
struction of liberty ; suppose that, by management, by the
patronage of offices, by the corruption of the press, they
should delude the people, and obtain a majority (and surely
such a state of things is not impossible) ; what, then, will
be the effect of this doctrine ? Ought we to sit quiet ?
Ought we to be dumb ? or, rather, ought we to approve,
though we see that liberty is to be ingulfed ? This doctrine
of implied instruction, if I am not mistaken, is a new one,
for the first time broached in this House ; and, if I am not

VOL. II. — 12

178 SPEECHES.

greatly deceived, not more new than dangerous, It is very
different in its character and effects from the old doctrine,
that the constituents have a right to assemble and formally
to instruct the representative ; and though I would not hold
myself bound to obey any such instructions, yet I con
ceive that the doctrine is not of a very dangerous character,
as the good sense of the people has as yet prevented them
from exercising such a right, and will, in all probability, in
future prevent them. But this novel doctrine is of a far
different character. Such instructions may exist any day,
and on any subject. It may be always at hand to justify
any aberration from political duty. I ask its advocates, in
what do they differ in their actions from the mere trimmer —
the political weathercock ? It is true, the one may have in
view his own advancement, in consulting his popularity ;
and the other may be governed by a mistaken but con
scientious regard to duty ; yet, how is the country benefited
by this difference, since they equally abandon the plain road
of truth and reason, to worship at the shrine of this political
idol ? It was said by a member from Massachusetts (Mr.
Conner), that this right of instruction is only denied in
monarchies ; and in proof of it, he cited the opinion of Mr.
Burke, (whom he called a pensioner,) expressed at the Bristol
election. So far is he from being correct, that in none of
the free governments of antiquity can he point out the least
trace of his doctrine. It originated in the modern govern
ments of Europe, particularly in that of Great Britain. The
English parliament had, at its origin, no other power or duty
but to grant money to the crown ; and as the members of
that body were frequently urgently pressed to enlarge their
money-grants, it was a very convenient excuse, to avoid the
squeeze, to say that they were not instructed. The gentle
man was incorrect in calling Burke a pensioner, at the time
he delivered the celebrated speech at the Bristol polls.
Burke, at that time, whatever may have been his subsequent

SPEECHES. 179

character, was a prominent champion in the cause of liberty
and of this country ; and if the gentleman will recur to the
points in which he refused to obey the instructions of his
constituents, it will not greatly increase his affection for
such doctrines. That mind must be greatly different from
mine, which can read that speech, and not embrace its
doctrines.

I, too, am an advocate for instruction. I am instructed.
The constitution is my letter of instruction. Written by
the hand of the people — stamped with their authority — it
admits of no doubt as to its obligations. Your very acts in
opposition to its authority, are null. This is the solemn
voice of the people, to which I bow in perfect submission.
It is here the vox populi is the vox Dei. This is the all-
powerful creative voice which spake our Government into
existence, and made us politically as we are. This body is
the first orb in the political creation, and stands next in au
thority to the original creative voice of the people ; and any
attempt to give a different direction to its movement, from
what the constitution and the deliberate consideration of its
members point out, I consider as an innovation on the prin
ciples of our Government. This is necessary, to make the
people really happy ; and any one invested with public au
thority, ought to be as sensibly alive to the people's happi
ness,- as some gentlemen wish the House to be to mere
popularity. I know that such is the structure of our
Government, that the permanent feeling of the community
will impress itself on this House. I rejoice that such is the
fact, as there would be no security for liberty, were it other
wise. The sense of the people, operating fairly and consti
tutionally through elections, will be felt on this very subject,
at the very next session ; but surely the question by whom
the repeal is to be effected, is one of no slight importance.
It can, by our successors, if they think proper, be at least
consistently done ; by us, it cannot. Should we reduce the

180 SPEECHES.

compensation to the old rates, when it is well known that
the sense of a great majority of this House is wholly averse
to it, besides the great loss of individual character which we
must sustain, it is calculated to bring into suspicion the
political characters of all, to the great injury of the pub
lic. You may rely on it, the public wish and expect us
to act on the convictions of our mind and will, and will not
tolerate the idea, that either on this or any other important
occasion you are acting a part, and that you studiously
shape your conduct to catch the applause of the audience.

I hope I shall not be misunderstood : that, while I com
bat the idea that we are bound to do such acts as will render
us popular (for such I understand to be the doctrine), we
are to overlook the character of those for whom we are to
make laws. This is most studiously to be regarded. The
laws ought, in all cases, to fit the permanent and settled
character of the community. The state of public feeling,
then, is a fact to be reasoned upon, and to receive that
weight on any particular question to which it may fairly be
entitled. But, for my part, I prefer that erectness of mind
which, in all cases, is disposed to embrace what is, in itself,
just and wise. Such a character of mind I think more use
ful, under our form of government, than any other, and more
certain of the applause of after ages. If I be not mistaken,
it constitutes the very essence of the admired characters of
antiquity, such as Cato, Phocion, and Aristides ; and if we
could conceive them divested of this trait, they would cease
to be the objects of our admiration.

Taking it for granted that I have succeeded in proving
that this House is at liberty to decide on this question ac
cording to the dictates of its best judgment, I now resume
the argument where I dropped it. I have proved that this
House is the foundation of our liberty ; that it is responsible
to the people for the faithful discharge of its duties, and
that every other branch of G-overnment is responsible to it, as

SPEECHES. 181

the immediate representative of the people ; and, that it is
essential to the fair operation of the principles of our consti
tution, that this body be not in any degree under the influ
ence of the other branches of the Government. How then
stands the fact ? I beg that no one will attribute to me
factious views. I shall speak with relation to no particular
measure or men. I wish simply to illustrate general princi
ples ; to speak to the constitution and the laws. How then,
I repeat, is the fact ? Are there not in the power of the
President a multitude of offices more profitable, and many
both more profitable and honorable, in public estimation,
than a seat in this House — the only office in the General Gov
ernment in the gift of the people ? Have we not seen, in
many instances, men attracted out of this house to fill subor
dinate Executive offices, whose only temptation was pay ;—
and what is far more dangerous, and in every respect much
more to be dreaded, do we not see the very best talents of
the House, men of the most aspiring character, anxious to
fill the departments or foreign missions ? Let me not be
understood to throw blame on them. The fault is not so
much in them as in the system. Congress, then, is only the
first step in the flight of honorable distinction ; — so high
the people can raise the aspirant ; — to go beyond, to rise to
the highest, the Executive must take him by the hand. On
what side, then, must his inclination be ? on the side of his
constituents, who can do no more than keep him where he
is ? or on that of the Executive power, on whom his future
hopes must depend ? Setting corruption aside, which I be
lieve has made no inroad on us, take human nature as it is,
can you expect in ordinary virtue, that vigilant and bold
oversight over the Executive power which the constitution
supposes, and which is necessary to coerce a power possessed
of so much patronage ? I am aware the evil is difficult to
be cured. It is the opinion of some, that no member of either
House ought to be capable of appointment to any office

182 SPEECHES.

for the term for which the President is elected. It is woi-
thy of reflection. For my part, but one objection occurs to
me; which I cannot surmount : I fear that so long as the
Executive offices which I have mentioned, continue to be
more desirable than a seat in this House, such a regulation
would tend still further to depress the legislature. The best
materials for politics would systematically avoid Congress,
and approach Executive favor through some other avenue.
Whether this or some other plan be adopted in part, I am
confident it is necessary to make a seat in Congress more de
sirable than it is even at the present pay. What sum was
sufficient for that purpose I stated last year in debate, and I
have only to regret, that the country did not see the same
necessity with me on this point. Gentlemen say we ought
to come here for pure patriotism and honor. It sounds well ;
but, if the system be adopted to its full extent, there will
be found neither patriotism nor honor sufficient for continual
privations. We must regard human nature as it is, and par
ticularly that portion for which we legislate. Our country
men, with many admirable qualities, are, in my opinion,
greatly distinguished by the love of acquisition — I will not
call it avarice — and the love of honorable distinction. I
object to neither of these traits. They both grow necessari
ly out of the character of our country and institutions. Our
population advances beyond that of all other countries ;
marriages in all conditions of life take place at an early pe
riod. Hence the duty imposed on almost every one to make
provision for a growing family ; hence our love of gain, which
in most instances, is founded on the purest virtues. The
love of distinction is not less deeply fixed. In a country
where qualities are so mixed, reliance ought not to be had
wholly on honor or on profit. They ought to be blended in
due proportion. The truth is, that no office requiring long-
continued privations will be honored, unless duly rewarded ;
for, if not, it ceases to be an object of pursuit. If these

SPEECHES. 183

views be correct, the effect of an adequate reward is not only
to attract talent to the place where it is most needed — the
legislature — but to make it more stationary there, and, what
is more essential, to place it more beyond Executive control,
and thus to realize the full effects of the theory of your
Government. The additional expense would not be felt ;
and I know of no other objection, which has the least plausi
bility, except, that we cannot plead the example of any other
country ; and that it is calculated to produce too much com
petition for a seat in Congress. I acknowledge the want of
example in other countries, and I think it worth serious in
vestigation, what effect it has had on the permanency of
their liberties. But why should we look for examples either
to the State legislatures or to other countries ? In what
other instance have the duties of legislation involved so great
a sacrifice of time and domestic pursuits ? Compare our
services here with those of a judge, or of Executive officers,
and they will be found not less burdensome. Nor do I fear
that the competition for a seat in Congress will be too ani
mated. I believe that a sharply contested election, if cor
ruption does not enter, is of public advantage. It brings
the proceedings of this body more fully before the people,
and makes them much better acquainted with their interest.
It even makes a seat here more honorable in public estima
tion. Nor am I afraid that competition will produce corrup
tion. Fifteen hundred or two thousand dollars a year will
not be sufficient for this purpose. An election to Congress
is, in this respect, more safe than that to a State legislature,
as it requires so many more to elect to the former than to
the latter. This security grows with the increasing growth
of the country ; as the number of constituents increase rela
tively to the representatives. There are other and im
portant considerations connected with a just compensation to
the members of this body ; but, as they have been fairly,
presented by the report of the committee, I will not fully

184 SPEECHES.

discuss them. By inadequate pay, you close the door of
public honor on some of the most deserving citizens. Tal
ent in this country is principally from the middling and low
er classes. These, in fact, constitute the great body of the
community. A young man of talents spends his property
and time in acquiring sufficient information 'to pursue a pro
fession ; he proves worthy of public confidence ; ought he
not to receive indemnity for the application of his time and
talents to the service of his country ? It would be .economy
with a vengeance, to exclude all such from the halls of legis
lation, or to make them mere political adventurers, who
would enter here only for further promotion. The extent of
our country points out another and powerful reason why the
pay should be respectable. No one is fit for legislation who
does not constantly bear in mind that our republic is dis
tinguished from- all others that have ever existed, by the ex-

o / «/

tent of its territory. While we derive from this distinction
many advantages, we are liable to great and menacing dan
gers. While we behold our growth with pride, it must, at
the same time, impress us with awe. It is our duty to over
come space by every means in our power. We ought to at
tract suitable talents from the most distant part of our re
public by a full and generous allowance. Distance itself
constitutes a great objection with many to perform the
duties of this body. Should the men who, by nature and
study, are endowed with requisite qualities for public service,
be forced by a miserable parsimony either to direct their
talents to private pursuits, or to the affairs of the respective
States, and men of inferior capacity be sent to this body,
who can measure the public misfortune ? What will tend
more powerfully to dissever this Union ? Some have taken
up the idea, as extraordinary as it may seem, that the in
creased pay to the members is, in its nature, aristocratical.
What ! is it aristocratical to compensate the public servant
1 for his services to the public ? Can it be considered as

SPEECHES. 185

favoring the power of a few, to extend the power and influ
ence of the people in the affairs of the General Government ?
It enables them to select the best talents for their own im
mediate service ; it raises them in the scale of influence, by
causing the most shining and aspiring talents to be depend
ent on them for promotion and honor ; it makes their service
more desirable than that of the Executive employments ;
and, by a simple process, enables them, through their imme
diate agents, this House, to hold a controlling power over
any department of the Government. Such is the aristocrat-
ical tendency of this reprobated measure. I might extend
my observations much further on this most important subject ;
but so much has been well said by others, that I will abstain.
I must, however, present to the House a reason, which, I
believe, has not as yet been touched on : I mean the happy
effect which an adequate compensation would have on the
tone of parties in our country. Make a seat in Congress
what it ought to be — the first post in the community next
to the Presidency, and men of the greatest distinction in
every part of the country will seek it. The post, then, of
honor and distinction being in the people, and not in the
President, will be open to all parties, in proportion to their
ascendency in the Union. That entire monopoly of honor
and public profit by the majority will not be experienced,
which must be felt, when the honors of the country are
principally in the hands of the Chief Magistrate. Those
who best understand our nature, can the most fully appreci
ate the consequences. Although it may not abate the heat
of party, it will greatly affect its feelings towards our happy
political institutions.

186 SPEECHES.

SPEECH

On the Bill to set aside the Bank dividends and bo
nus as a permanent fund for the construction of
Roads and Canals, delivered in the House of Repre
sentatives, February 4th, 1817.

[NOTE. — This Bill, pledging the bonus and dividends of United
States stock on the shares held by the Government in the National Bank,
was reported by the special committee, to whom the subject had been
referred, on December 23d, 1816 ; and on the 4th of February fol
lowing, discussed at some length in Committee of the Whole, when
it was amended in several particulars. Cn the 7th of February, the
debate was renewed in the House, on the motion of Mr. King to post
pone it indefinitely, and continued, with much animation, until late
the next day, when it passed by a vote of 86 to 84.]

MK. CHAIRMAN : — It seems to be the fate of some mea
sures to be praised, but not adopted. Such, 1 fear, will be
the fate of this on which we are now deliberating. From
the indisposition manifested by the House to go into commit
tee on the bill, there is not much prospect of its success ; yet
it seems to me, when I reflect how favorable is the present
moment, and how confessedly important a good system of
roads and canals is to our country, I may be reasonably very
sanguine of success. At peace with ah1 the world ; abound
ing in pecuniary means ; and, what is of the most import
ance, and at which I rejoice, as most favorable to the coun
try, party and sectional feelings, merged in a liberal and
enlightened regard to the general concerns of the country.
Such are the favorable circumstances under which we are
now deliberating. Thus situated, to what can we direct our
resources and attention more important than internal im
provements ? What can add more to the wealth, the strength,

SPEECHES. 187

and the political prosperity of our country ? The manner
in which facility and cheapness of intercourse contribute to
the wealth of a nation, has been so often and ably discussed
by writers on political economy, that I presume the House to
be perfectly acquainted with the subject. It is sufficient to
observe, that every branch of national industry — agricultu
ral, manufacturing, and commercial — is greatly stimulated
by it, and rendered more productive. The result is, that it
tends to diffuse universal opulence. It gives to the interior
the advantages possessed by the parts most eligibly situated
for trade. It makes the country price, whether in the sale
of the raw product, or in the purchase of articles for
consumption, approximate to that of the commercial towns.
In fact, if we look into the nature of wealth, we will find
that nothing can be more favorable to its growth than good
roads and canals. An article, to command a price, must not
only be useful, but must be the subject of demand ; and the
better the means of commercial intercourse, the larger is the
sphere of demand. The truth of these positions is obvious,
and has been tested by all countries where the experiment
has been made. It has, particularly, been strikingly exempli
fied in England ; and if the result there, in a country so
limited, and so similar in its products, has been to produce a
most uncommon state of opulence, what may we not expect
from the same cause in our country, abounding, as it does, in
the greatest variety of products, and presenting the greatest
facility for improvement ? Let it not be said that internal
improvements may be wholly left to the enterprise of the
States and of individuals. I know that much may justly
be expected to be done by them ; but, in a country so new
and so extensive as ours, there is room enough for all the
General and State Governments, and individuals, in which to
exert their resources. But many of the improvements con
templated are on too great a scale for the resources of the
States or individuals ; and many of such a nature as the rival

188 SPEECHES.

jealousy of the States, if left alone, would prevent. They
require the resources and the general superintendence of this
Government to effect and complete them.

But there are higher and more powerful considerations
why Congress ought to take charge of this subject. If we
were only to consider the pecuniary advantages of a good
system of roads and canals, it might, indeed, admit of some
doubt whether they ought not to be left wholly to individual
exertions ; but, when we come to consider how intimately
the strength and political prosperity of the republic are con
nected with this subject, we find the most urgent reasons
why we should apply our resources to them. In many re
spects, no country, of equal population and wealth, possesses
equal materials of power with ours. The people, in muscu
lar power, in hardy and enterprising habits, and in lofty and
gallant courage, are surpassed by none. In one respect, and,
in my opinion, in one only, are we materially weak. We oc
cupy a surface prodigiously great in proportion to our numbers.
The common strength is brought to bear with great difficulty
on the point that may be menaced by an enemy. It is our
duty, then, as far as in the nature of things it can be effect
ed, to counteract this weakness. Good roads and canals,
judiciously laid out, are the proper remedy. In the recent
war, how much did we suffer for the want of them ! Be
sides the tardiness and the consequential inefficacy of our
military movements, to what an increased expense was the
country put for the article of transportation alone ! In the
event of another war, the saving, in this particular, would go
far towards indemnifying us for the expense of constructing
the means of transportation.

It is not, however, in this respect only, that roads and
canals add to the strength of the country. Our power of
raising revenue, in war particularly, depends mainly on them.
In peace, our revenue depends principally on the imports :
in war, this source, in a great measure, fails, and internal

SPEECHES. 189

taxes, to a great amount, become necessary. Unless the
means of commercial intercourse are rendered much more
perfect than they now are, we shall never be able, in war,
to raise the necessary supplies. If taxes were collected in
kind ; if, for instance, the farmer and mechanic paid in their
surplus produce, then the difficulty would not exist : as. in
no country on earth is there so great a surplus, in proportion
to its population, as in ours. But such a system of taxes is
impossible. They must be paid in money ; and, by the
constitution, must be laid uniformly. What, then, is the
effect ? The taxes are raised in every part of this extensive
country uniformly ; but the expenditure must, in its nature,
be principally confined to the scene of military operations.
This drains the circulating medium from one part, and accu
mulates it in another, and, perhaps, a very distant one. The
result is obvious. Unless it can return through the opera
tion of trade, the part from which the constant drain takes
place, must ultimately be impoverished. Commercial inter
course is the true remedy for this weakness : and the means
by which this is to be effected, are roads, canals, and the
coasting trade. On these, combined with domestic manu
factures, does the moneyed capacity of this country, in war,
depend. Without them, not only will we be unable to raise
the necessary supplies, but the currency of the country must
necessarily fall into the greatest disorder ; such as we lately
experienced.

But, on this subject of national power, what can be more
important than a perfect unity in every part, in feelings and
sentiments ? And what can tend more powerfully to pro
duce it than overcoming the effects of distance ? No state,
enjoying freedom, ever occupied any tm'ng like as great an
extent of country as this republic. One hundred years ago,
the most profound philosophers did not believe it to be even
possible. They did not suppose it possible that a pure re
public could exist on as great a scale even as the island of

190 SPEECHES,

Great Britain ? What then was considered as chimerical,
we now have the felicity to enjoy ; and, what is more re
markable, such is the happy mould of our Government — so
wisely are the State and General powers arranged — that
much of our political happiness derives its origin from the
extent of our republic. It has exempted us from most of
the causes which distracted the small republics of antiquity.
Let it not, however, be forgotten ; let it be for ever kept in
mind, that it exposes us to the greatest of all calamities —
next to the loss of liberty — and even to that in its conse
quence — disunion. We are great, and rapidly — I was about
to say fearfully — growing. This is our pride and our danger ;
our weakness and our strength. Little does he deserve to
be intrusted with the liberties of this people, who does not
raise his mind to these truths. We are under the most
imperious obligation to counteract every tendency to dis
union. The strongest of all cements is, undoubtedly, the
wisdom, justice, and above all, the moderation of this House ;
yet the great subject on which we are now deliberating, in
this respect deserves the most serious consideration. What
ever impedes the intercourse of the extremes with this, the
centre of the republic, weakens the union. The more en
larged the sphere of commercial circulation — the more ex
tended that of social intercourse — the more strongly are we
bound together — the more inseparable are our destinies.
Those who understand the human heart best know how
powerfully distance tends to break the sympathies of our
nature. Nothing — not even dissimilarity of language — tends
more to estrange man from man. Let us, then, bind the
republic together with a perfect system of roads and canals.
Let us conquer spate. It is thus the most distant parts of
the republic will be brought within a few days' travel of the
centre ; it is thus that a citizen of the West will read the
news of Boston still moist from the press. The mail and
the press are the nerves of the body politic. By them, the

SPEECHES. 191

t_

slightest impression made on the most remote parts, is com
municated to the whole system ; and the more perfect the
means of transportation, the more rapid and true the vibra
tion. To aid us in this great work — to maintain the integ
rity of this republic, we inhabit a country presenting the
most admirable advantages. Belted around, as it is, by
lakes and oceans — intersected in every direction by bays and
rivers, the hand of industry and art is tempted to improve
ment. So situated, blessed with a form of government at
once combining liberty and strength, we may reasonably
raise our eyes to a most splendid future, if we only act in a
manner worthy of our advantages. If, however, neglecting
them, we permit a low, sordid, selfish and sectional spirit to
take possession of this House, this happy scene will vanish.
We will divide ; — and in its consequences will follow, misery
and despotism.

To legislate for our country, requires not only the most \
enlarged views, but a species of self-devotion not exacted in
any other. In a country so extensive, and so various in its
interests, what is necessary for the common good may appa
rently be opposed to the interest of particular sections. It
must be submitted to as the condition of our greatness. But
were we a small republic ; were we confined to the ten miles
square, the selfish instincts of our nature might, in most
cases, be relied on in the management of public affairs. /

Such, then, being the obvious advantages of internal
improvements, why should the House hesitate to commence
the system ? I understand there are, with some members,
constitutional objections. The power of Congress is objected
to : first, that there is none to cut a road or canal through a
State, without its consent ; and next, that the public moneys
can only be appropriated to effect the particular powers
enumerated in the constitution. The first of these objections,
it is plain, does not apply to this bill. No particular road or
canal is proposed to be cut through any State. The bill

192 SPEECHES.

simply appropriates money to the general purpose of im
proving the means of intercommunication. When a bill is
introduced to apply the money to a particular object in any
State, then, and not till then, will the question be fairly
before us. I express no opinion on this point. In fact,
I scarcely think it worth the discussion, since the good sense
of the States may be relied on. They will, in all cases,
readily yield their assent. The fear is in a different direc
tion : in too great a solicitude to obtain an undue share to
be expended within their respective limits. In fact, as I un
derstand it, this is not the objection insisted on. It is mainly
urged, that the Congress can only apply the public money in
execution of the enumerated powers. I am no advocate for
refined arguments on the constitution. The instrument was
not intended as a thesis for the logician to exercise his inge
nuity on. It ought to be construed with plain, good sense ;
and what can be more express than the constitution on this
very point ? The first power delegated to Congress is com
prised in these words : "To lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the
common defence and general welfare of the United States ;
but all duties, imposts, and excises, shall be uniform through
out the United States." First, the power is given to lay
taxes ; next, the objects are enumerated to which the money
accruing from the exercise of this power, may be applied —
viz., to pay the debts, provide for the defence, and promote
the general welfare ; and last, the rule for laying the taxes
is prescribed — to wit, that all duties, imposts, and excises,
shall be uniform. If the framers had intended to limit the
use of the money to the powers afterwards enumerated and
defined, nothing could have been more easy than to have
expressed it plainly. I know it is the opinion of some, that
the words " to pay the debts, and provide for the common
defence and general welfare," which I have just cited, were
not intended to be referred to the power of laying taxes,

SPEECHES. 193

contained in the first part of the section, but that they are
to be understood as distinct and independent powers, granted
in general terms ; and are qualified by a more detailed enu
meration of powers in the subsequent part of the constitu
tion. If such were, in fact, the meaning intended, surely
nothing can be conceived more bungling and awkward than
the manner in which the framers have communicated their
intention. If it were their intention to make a summary of
the powers of Congress in general terms, which were after
wards to be particularly defined and enumerated, they should
have told us so plainly and distinctly f and if the words " to
pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and gen
eral welfare " were intended for this summary, they should
have headed the list of our powers, and it should have been
stated that, to effect these general objects, the following
specific powers were granted. I ask members to read the
section with attention ; and it will, I conceive, plainly appear
that such could not have been the intention. The whole
section seemed to me to be about taxes. It plainly com
mences and ends with it ; and nothing could be more strained
than to suppose the intermediate words " to pay the debts,
and provide for the common defence and general welfare,"
were to be taken as independent and distinct powers. Forced,
however, 'as such a construction was, I might admit it, and
urge that the words do constitute a part of the enumerated
powers. The constitution gives to Congress the power to
establish post-offices and post-roads. I know the interpreta
tion usually given to these words confines our powers to that
of designating only the post-roads ; but it seems to me that
the word "establish." comprehends something more. But
suppose the constitution to be silent, why should we be con
fined in the application of moneys to the enumerated powers ?
There is nothing in the reason of the thing, that I can per
ceive, why it should be so restricted ; and the habitual and
uniform practice of the Government coincides with my opinion.

VOL. II. — 13

194 SPEECHES.

Our laws are full of instances of money appropriated without
any reference to the enumerated powers. We granted, by
an unanimous vote, or nearly so, $50,000 to the distressed
inhabitants of Caraccas, and a very large sum, at two dif
ferent times, to the St. Domingo refugees. If we are re
stricted in the use of our money to the enumerated powers,
on what principle can the purchase of Louisiana be justified ?
To pass over many other instances, the identical power, which
is now the subject of discussion, has, in several instances,
been exercised. To look no further back — at the last session
a considerable sum wdfe granted to complete the Cumberland
Road. In reply to this uniform course of legislation, I expect
it will be said, that our constitution is founded on positive
and written principles, and not on precedents. I do not
deny the position ; but I have introduced these instances to
prove the uniform sense of Congress, and the country (for
they have not been objected to), as to our powers ; and
surely they furnish better evidence of the true interpretation
of the constitution than the most refined and subtle argu
ments.

Let it not be argued, that the construction for which I
contend gives a dangerous extent to the powers of Congress.
In this point of view, I conceive it to be more safe than the
opposite. By giving a reasonable extent to the money power,
it exempts us from the necessity of giving a strained and
forced construction to the other enumerated powers. For
instance, if the public money could be applied to the pur
chase of Louisiana, as I contend it may be, then there was
no constitutional difficulty in that purchase ; but if it could
not, then are we compelled either to deny that we had the
power to purchase, or to strain some of the enumerated
powers, to prove our right. It has, for instance, been said,
that we had the right to purchase, under the power to ad
mit new States ; a construction, I venture to say, far more

SPEECHES. 195

forced than the one for which I contend. Such are my
views as to our power to pass this bill.

I believe that the passage of the bill would not be much
endangered by a doubt of the power ; for I conceive, on that
point, there are not many who were opposed. The mode is
principally objected to. A system, it is contended, ought to
be presented before the money is appropriated. I think dif
ferently. To set apart the fund, appears to me to be,
naturally, the first act ; at least I take it to be the only
practicable course. A bill filled with details would have but
a faint prospect of passing. The enemies to any possible sys
tem in detail, and those who are opposed in principle, would
unite and defeat it. Though I am unwilling to incorporate
details in the bill, yet I am not averse to presenting my
views on that point. The first great object is to perfect the
communication from Maine to Louisiana. This may be
fairly considered as the principal artery of the whole system.
The next is the connection of the Lakes with the Hudson
River. In a political, commercial, and military point of
view, few objects can be more important. The next object
of chief importance is, to connect all the great commercial
points on the Atlantic, — Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washing
ton, Richmond, Charleston, and Savannah, — with the West
ern States ; and finally, to perfect the intercourse between
the West and New Orleans. These seem to me to be the
great objects. There are others, no doubt, of great import
ance, which would receive the aid of Government. The fund
proposed to be set apart in this bill is about $650,000 a year,
which is, doubtless, too small to effect such great objects of
itself ; but it will be a good beginning ; and I have no doubt,
when it is once begun, the great work will be completed. If
the bill succeed, at the next session the details may be arranged
and the system commenced. I cannot regard those who ob
ject merely to the mode, as being very heartily in favor
of the system. Every member must know that, in all

196 SPEECHES.

great measures, it is necessary to concede something ; as it
is impossible to make all think alike on the minutise of the
measure, who are agreed in principle. A deep conviction of
the importance of the thing itself is almost sure to be accom
panied with a liberal spirit of concession. The committee
who introduced this bill gave it the shape, in their opinion,
the most proper in itself, and the most likely to succeed. If
it cannot pass in its present form, and under the present
circumstances, it is certainly very doubtful whether it ever
will. I feel a deep solicitude in relation to it. I am anx
ious that this Congress shall have the reputation of it ; and 1
am the more so, on account of the feelings which have been
created against it. No body of men, in my opinion, ever better
merited, than this Congress, the confidence of the country.
For wisdom, firmness, and industry, it has never been ex
celled. To its acts, I appeal for the truth of my assertions.
The country already begins to experience the benefits of
its foresight and firmness. The diseased state of the cur
rency, which many thought incurable, and most thought
could not be healed in so short a time, begins to exhibit
symptoms of speedy health. Uninfluenced by any other
considerations than love of country and duty, let us add this
to the many useful measures already adopted. The money
cannot be appropriated to a more exalted use. Every por
tion of the community — the farmer, mechanic, and merchant
— will feel its good effects ; and, what is of the greatest im
portance, the strength of the community will be augmented,
and its political prosperity rendered more secure.

SPEECHES 197

SPEECH

On the Revenue Collection Bill (commonly called the
Force Bill), in reference to the Ordinance of the
South Carolina Convention, delivered in the
Senate, February 15th and 16th, 1833.

MR. PRESIDENT : — I know not which is most objection
able, the provisions of the bill, or the temper in which its
adoption has been urged. If the extraordinary powers with
which the bill proposes to clothe the Executive, to the utter
prostration of the constitution and the rights of the States,
be calculated to impress our minds with alarm at the rapid
progress of despotism in our country ; the zeal with which
every circumstance calcuated to misrepresent or exaggerate
the conduct of Carolina in the controversy, is seized on with
a view to excite hostility against her, but too plainly indi
cates the deep decay of that brotherly feeling which once ex
isted between these States, and to which we are indebted for
our beautiful federal system, and by the continuance of
which alone it can be preserved. It is not my intention to
advert to all these misrepresentations ; but there are some so
well calculated to mislead the mind as to the real character
of the controversy, and to hold up the State in a light so
odious, that I do not feel myself justified in permitting them
to pass unnoticed.

Among them, one of the most prominent is, the false
statement that the object of South Carolina is to exempt
herself from her share of the public burdens, while she par
ticipates in the advantages of the Government. If the
charge were true — if the State were capable of being actuated
by such low and unworthy motives, mother as I consider her,
I would not stand up on this floor to vindicate her conduct.

198 SPEECHES.

Among her faults, — and faults I will not deny she has, — no
one has ever yet charged her with that low and most sordid
of vices — avarice. Her conduct, on all occasions, has been
marked with the very opposite quality. From the com
mencement of the Revolution — from its first breaking out at
Boston till this hour, no State has been more profuse of its
blood in the cause of the country ; nor has any contributed
so largely to the common treasury in proportion to wealth
and population. She has, in that proportion, contributed
more to the exports of the Union, — on the exchange of which
with the rest of the world the greater portion of the public
burden has been levied, — than any other State. No : the
controversy is not such as has been stated ; the State does
not seek to participate in the advantages of the Government
without contributing her full share to the public treasury.
Her object is far different. A deep constitutional question
lies at the bottom of the controversy, i The real question at
issue is : Has this Government a right to impose burdens on
the capital and industry of one portion of the country, not
with a view to revenue, but to benefit another ? And I must
be permitted to say that, after the long and deep agitation
of this controversy, it is with surprise that I perceive so
strong a disposition to misrepresent its real character. To
correct the impression which those misrepresentations are cal
culated to make, I will dwell on the point under consider
ation for a few moments longer.

The Federal Government has, by an express provision of
the constitution, the right to lay on imports. The State
has never denied or resisted this right, nor even thought of so
doing. The Government has, however, not been contented
with exercising this power as she had a right to do, but has
gone a step beyond it, by laying imposts, not for revenue, but
protection. This the State considers as an unconstitutional
exercise of power — highly injurious and oppressive to her and
the other staple States, and has, accordingly, met it with the

SPEECHES. 199

most determined resistance. I do not intend to enter, at
this time, into the argument as to the unconstitutionality of
the protective system. It is not necessary. It is sufficient
that the power is nowhere granted ; and that, from the
journals of the Convention which formed the constitution, it
would seem that it was refused. In support of the journals,
I might cite the statement of Luther Martin, which has al
ready been referred to, to show that the Convention, so far
from conferring the power on the Federal Government, left
to the State the right to impose duties on imports, with the
express view of enabling the several States to protect their
own manufactures. Notwithstanding this, Congress has as
sumed, without any warrant from the constitution, the right
of exercising this most important power ; and has so exer
cised it as to impose a ruinous, burden on the labor and capi
tal of the State, by which her resources are exhausted — the
enjoyments of her citizens curtailed — the means of education
contracted — and all her interests essentially and injuriously
affected. We have been sneeringly told that she is a small
State ; that her population does not much exceed half a
million of souls ; and that more than one-half are not of
the European race. The facts are so. I know she never can
be a great State, and that the only distinction to which she
can aspire must be based on the moral and intellectual ac
quirements of her sons. To the development of these much
of her attention has been directed ; but this restrictive sys
tem, which has so unjustly exacted the proceeds of her labor,
to be bestowed on other sections, has so impaired her re
sources, that, if not speedily arrested, it will dry up the
means of education, and with it, deprive her of the only
source through which she can aspire to distinction.

There is another misstatement, as to the nature of the
controversy, so frequently made in debate, and so well calcu
lated to mislead, that I feel bound to notice it. It has been
said that South Carolina claims the right to annul the con-

200 SPEECHES.

stitution and laws of the United States ; and to rebut this
supposed claim, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Hives)
has gravely quoted the constitution, to prove that the con
stitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, are the
supreme laws of the land — as if the State claimed the right
to act contrary to this provision of the constitution. No
thing can he more erroneous : her object is not to resist
laws made in pursuance of the constitution, but those made
without its authority, and which encroached on her reserved
powers. She claims not even the right of judging of the de
legated powers, but of those that are reserved ; and to resist
the former, when they encroach upon the latter. I will
pause to illustrate this important point.

All must admit that there are delegated and reserved
powers, and that the powers reserved are reserved to the
States respectively. The powers, then, of the system are
divided between the General and the State Governments ;
and the point immediately under consideration is, whether
a State has any right to judge as to the extent of its reserved
powers, and to defend them against the encroachments of
the General Government. Without going deeply into this
point at this stage of the argument, or looking into the
nature and origin of the Government, there is a simple view
of the subject which I consider as conclusive. The very idea
of a divided power implies the right on the part of the State
for which I contend. The expression is metaphorical when
applied to power. Every one readily understands that the
division of matter consists in the separation of the parts.
But in this sense it is not applicable to power. What, then,
is meant by a division of power ? I cannot conceive of a
division, without giving an equal right to each to judge of
the extent of the power allotted to each. Such right I hold
to be essential to the existence of a division ; and that, to
give to either party the conclusive right of judging, not only
of the share allotted to it, but of that allotted to the other,

SPEECHES. 201

is to annul the division, and to confer the whole power on the
party vested with such right.

But it is contended that the constitution has conferred
on the Supreme Court the right of judging "between the
States and the General Government. Those who make this
objection, overlook, I conceive, an important provision of the
constitution. By turning to the 10th amended article, it
will be seen that the reservation of power to the States is not
only against the powers, delegated to Congress, but against
the United States themselves ; and extends, of course, as
well to the judiciary as to the other departments of the
Government. The article provides, that all powers not de
legated to the United States, or prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo
ple. This presents the inquiry, What powers are delegated
to the United States ? They may be classed under four
divisions : first, those that are delegated by the States to
each other, by virtue of which the constitution may be alter
ed or amended by three-fourths of the States, when, without
which, it would have required the unanimous vote of all ;
next, the powers conferred on Congress ; then those on the
President ; and finally, those on the judicial department —
all of which are particularly enumerated in the parts of the
constitution which organize the respective departments.
The reservation of powers to the States is, as I have said,
against the whole ; and is as full against the judicial as it
is against the executive and legislative departments of. the
Government. It cannot be claimed for the one without
claiming it for the whole, and without, in fact, annulling this
important provision of the constitution.

Against this, as it appears to me, conclusive view of the
subject, it has been urged that this power is expressly con
ferred on the Supreme Court by that portion of the constitu
tion which provides that the judicial power shall extend to all
cases in law and equity arising under the constitution, the

202 SPEECHES.

laws of the United States, and treaties made under their au
thority. I believe the assertion to be utterly destitute of any
foundation. It obviously is the intention of the constitution
simply to make the judicial power commensurate with the
law-making and treaty-making powers ; and to vest it with
the right of applying the constitution, the laws, and the
treaties, to the cases which might arise under them ; and not
to make it the judge of the constitution, the laws, and the
treaties themselves. In fact, the power of applying the laws
to the facts of the case, and deciding upon such application,
constitutes, in truth, the judicial power. The distinction
between such power, and that of judging of the laws, will
be perfectly apparent when we advert to what is the acknow
ledged power of the court in reference to treaties or compacts
between sovereigns. It is perfectly established, that the
courts have no right to judge of the violation of treaties ;
and that, in reference to them, their power is limited to the
right of judging simply of the violation of rights under them ;
and that the right of judging of infractions belongs exclu
sively to the parties themselves, and not to the courts : of
which we have an example in the French treaty, which was
declared by Congress null and void, in consequence of its vi
olation by the Government of France. Without such de
claration, had a French citizen sued a citizen of this country
under the treaty, the court could have taken no cognizance
of its infraction ; nor, after such a declaration, would it have
heard any argument or proof going to show that the treat}'
had not been violated.

The declaration, of itself, is conclusive on the court. Bu t
it will be asked how the court obtained the power to pro
nounce a law or treaty unconstitutional, when it comes in
Conflict with that instrument. I do not deny that it pos
sesses the right ; but I can by no means concede that it was
derived from the constitution. It had its origin in the ne
cessity of the case. Where there are two or more rules es-

SPEECHES. 203

tablished, one from a higher, the other from a lower author
ity, which may come into conflict in applying them to a par
ticular case, the judge cannot avoid pronouncing in favor of
the superior against the inferior. It is from this necessity,
and this alone, that the power which is now set up to over
rule the rights of the States against an express provision of
the constitution was derived. It had no other origin. That
I have traced it to its true source, will be manifest from the
fact that it is a power which, so far from being conferred ex
clusively on the Supreme Court, as is insisted, belongs to
every court — inferior and superior — State and General — and
even to foreign courts.

But the senator from Delaware (Mr. Clayton) relies on
the journals of the Convention to prove that it was the in
tention of that body to confer on the Supreme Court the
right of deciding, in the last resort, between a State and the
General Government. I will not follow him through the
journals, as I do not deem that to be necessary to refute his
argument. It is sufficient for this purpose to state, that Mr.
Kutledge reported a resolution, providing expressly that the
United States and the States might be parties before the
Supreme Court. If this proposition had been adopted, I
would ask the senator whether this very controversy between
the United States and South Carolina might not have been
brought before the court ? I would also ask him whether it
can be brought before the court as the constitution now
stands ? If he answers the former in the affirmative, and
the latter in the negative, as he must, then it is clear, his
elaborate argument to the contrary notwithstanding, that the
report of Mr. Rutledge was not, in substance, adopted as he
contended ; and that the journals, so far from supporting,
are in direct opposition to the position which he attempts to
maintain. I might push the argument much farther against
the power of the court, but I do not deem it necessary, at
least in this stage of the discussion. If the views which

204 SPEECHES.

have already been presented be correct, and I do not see how
they can be resisted, the conclusion is inevitable, that the
reserved powers were reserved equally against every depart
ment of the Government, and as strongly against the judicial
as against the other departments, and, of course, were left
under the exclusive will of the States.

There still remains another misrepresentation of the con
duct of the State, which has been made with the view of excit
ing odium. I allude to the charge, that South Carolina sup
ported the tariff of 1816, and is, therefore, responsible for
the protective 7 system. To determine the truth of this
charge, it becomes necessary to ascertain the real character
of that law — whether it was a tariff for revenue or for pro
tection — and, as involved in this, to inquire, What was the
condition of the country at the period ? The late war with
Great Britain had just terminated, which, with the restric
tive system that preceded it, had diverted a large amount
of capital and industry from commerce to manufacturers,
particularly to the cotton and woollen branches. There was
a debt, at the same time, of one hundred and thirty millions
of dollars hanging over the country, and the heavy war duties
were still in existence. Under these circumstances, the ques
tion was presented, as to what point the duties ought to be
reduced ? This question involved another — at what time
the debt ought to be paid ? which was a question of policy,
involving in its consideration all the circumstances connected
with the then condition of the country. Among the most
prominent arguments in favor of an early discharge of the
debt was, that the high duties which it would require to ef
fect it would have, at the same time, the effect of sustaining
the infant manufactures, which had been forced up under the
circumstances to which I have adverted. This view of the
subject had a decided influence in determining in favor of an
early payment of the debt. The sinking fund was, accord
ingly, raised from seven to ten millions of dollars, with the

SPEECHES. 205

provision to apply the surplus which might remain in the
treasury as a contingent appropriation to that fund • and the
duties were graduated to meet this increased expenditure.
It was thus that the policy and justice of protecting the
large amount of capital and industry which had been diverted
by the measures of the Government into new channels, as I
have stated, was combined with the fiscal action of the Gov
ernment, and which, while it secured a prompt payment of
the debt, prevented the immense losses to the manufacturers
which would have followed a sudden and great reduction.
Still, revenue was the main object, and protection but the
incidental. The bill to reduce the duties was reported by the
Committee of Ways and Means, and not of Manufactures,
and it proposed a heavy reduction on the then existing rate
of duties. But what of itself, without other evidence, is de
cisive as to the character of the bill, is the fact that it fixed
a much higher rate of duties on the unprotected than on the
protected articles. I will enumerate a few leading articles
only. Woollen and cotton above the value of 25 cents on
the square yard, though they were the leading objects of pro
tection, were subject to a permanent duty of only 20 per cent.
Iron, another leading article among the protected, had a pro
tection of not more than 9 per cent, as fixed by the act, and
of but fifteen as reported in the bill. These rates were all
below the average duties as fixed in the act, including
the protected, the unprotected, and even the free articles. I
have entered into some calculation, in order to ascertain the
average rate of duties under the act. There is some uncer
tainty in the data, but I feel assured that it is not less than
thirty per cent, ad valorem : showing an excess of the ave
rage duties above that imposed on the protected articles
enumerated of more than 10 per cent., and thus clearly es
tablishing the character of the measure — that it was for
revenue, and not protection.

Looking back, even at this distant period, with all our

206 SPEECHES.

experience, I perceive but two errors in the act : the one in
reference to iron, and the other the minimum duty on coarse
cottons. As to the former, I conceive that the bill, as re
ported, proposed a duty relatively too low, which was still
farther reduced in its passage through Congress. The duty,
at first, was fixed at seventy-five cents the hundredweight ;
but, in the last stage of its passage, it was reduced, by a sort
of caprice, occasioned by an unfortunate motion, to forty-five
cents. This injustice was severely felt in Pennsylvania, the
State, above all others, most productive of iron ; and was the
principal cause of that great reaction which has since thrown
her so decidedly on the side of the protective policy. The
other error was that as to coarse cottons, on which the duty
was as much too high as that on iron was too low. It intro
duced, besides, the obnoxious minimum principle, which has
since been so mischievously extended ; and to that extent, I
am constrained in candor to acknowledge, as I wish to dis
guise nothing, the protective principle was recognized by the
act of 1816. How this was overlooked at the time, it is not
in my power to say. It escaped my observation, which I can
account for only on the ground that the principle was then
new, and that my attention was engaged by another impor
tant subject — the question of the currency, then so urgent,
and with which, as chairmam of the committee, I was par
ticularly charged. With these exceptions, I again repeat, I
see nothing in the bill to condemn ; yet it is on the ground
that the members from the State voted for the bill, that the
attempt is now made to hold up Carolina as responsible for
the whole system of protection which has since followed,
though she has resisted its progress in every stage. Was
there ever greater injustice ? And how is it to be accounted
for, but as forming a part of that systematic misrepresenta
tion and calumny which has been directed for so many years,
without interruption, against that gallant and generous
State ? And why has she thus been assailed ? Merely be-

SPEECHES. 207

cause she abstained from taking any part in the Presidential
canvass — believing that it had degenerated into a mere sys
tem of imposition on the people — controlled, almost exclu
sively, by those whose object it is to obtain the patronage of
the Government, and that without regard to principle or
policy. Standing apart from what she considered a contest
in which the public had no interest, she has been assailed by
both parties with a fury altogether unparalleled ; but which,
pursuing the course which she believed liberty and duty re
quired, she has met with a firmness equal to the fierceness
of the assault. In the midst of this attack, I have not escaped.
With a view of inflicting a wound on the State through me,
I have been held up as the author of the protective system,
and one of its most strenuous advocates. It is with pain
that I allude to myself on so deep and grave a subject as that
now under discussion, and which, I sincerely believe, involves
the liberty of the country. I now regret that, under the
sense of injustice which the remarks of a senator from Penn
sylvania (Mr. Wilkins) excited for the moment, I hastily
gave my pledge to defend myself against the charge which
has been made in reference to my course in 1816 : not that
there will be any difficulty in repelling the charge, but be
cause I feel a deep reluctance in turning the discussion, in
any degree, from a subject of so much magnitude to one of
so little importance as the consistency or inconsistency of my
self, or any other individual, particularly in connection with
an event so long since passed. But for this hasty pledge,
I would have remained silent as to my own course on this
occasion, and would have borne with patience and calm
ness this, with the many other misrepresentations with which
I have been so incessantly assailed for so many years.

The charge that I was the author of the protective sys
tem has no other foundation but that I, in common with the
almost entire South, gave my support to the tariff of 1816.
It is true that I advocated that measure, for which I may

208 SPEECHES.

rest my defence, without taking any other, on the ground
that it was a tariff for revenue, and not for protection, which
I have established beyond the power of controversy. But
my speech on the occasion has been brought in judgment
against me by the senator from Pennsylvania. I have since
cast my eyes over the speech ; and I will surprise, I have no
doubt, the senator, by telling him that, with the exception
of some hasty and unguarded expressions, I retract nothing
I uttered on that occasion. I only ask that I may be judged,
in reference to it, in that spirit of fairness and justice which
is due to the occasion : taking into consideration the circum
stances under which it was delivered, and bearing in mind
that the subject was a tariff for revenue, and not for protec
tion ; for reducing, and not raising the duties. But, before
I explain the then condition of the country, from which my
main arguments in favor of the measure were drawn, it is
nothing but an act of justice to myself that I should state a
fact in connection with my speech, that is necessary to ex
plain what I have called hasty and unguarded expressions.
My speech was an impromptu ; and, as such, I apologized to
the House, as appears from the speech as printed, for offering
my sentiments on the question without having duly reflected
on the subject. It was delivered at the request of a friend,
when I had not previously the least intention of addressing
the House. I allude to Samuel D. Ingham, then and now,
as I am proud to say, a personal and political friend — a man
of talents and integrity — with a clear head, and firm and
patriotic heart ; then among the leading members of the
House ; in the palmy state of his political glory, though now
for a moment depressed ; — depressed, did I say ? no ! it is
his State which is depressed — Pennsylvania, and not Samuel
D. Ingham ! Pennsylvania, which has deserted him under
circumstances which, instead of depressing, ought to have
elevated him in her estimation. He came to me, when sit
ting at my desk writing, and said that the House was falling

SPEECHES. 209

into some confusion, accompanying it with a remark, that I
knew how difficult it was to rally so large a body when once
broken on a tax bill, as had been experienced during the late
war. Having a higher opinion of my influence than it de
served, he requested me to say something to prevent the
confusion. I replied that I was at a loss what to say ; that
I had been busily engaged on the currency, which was then
in great confusion, and which, as I have stated, had been
placed particularly under my charge, as the chairman of the
committee on that subject. He repeated his request, and
the speech which the senator from Pennsylvania has compli
mented so highly was the result.

I will ask whether the facts stated ought not, in justice,
to be borne in mind by those who would hold me accounta
ble, not only for the general scope of the speech, but for
every word and sentence which it contains ? But, in asking
this question, it is not my intention to repudiate the speech.
All I ask is, that I may be judged by the rules which, in
justice, belong to the case. Let it be recollected that the
bill was a revenue bill, and, of course, that it was constitu
tional. I need not remind the Senate that, when the meas
ure is constitutional, all arguments calculated to show its
beneficial operation may be legitimately pressed into service,
without taking into consideration whether the subject to
which the arguments refer be within the sphere of the con
stitution or not. If, for instance, a question were before this
body to lay a duty on Bibles, and a motion were made to re
duce the duty, or admit Bibles duty free, who could doubt
that the argument in favor of the motion — that the increased
circulation of the Bible would be in favor of the morality
and religion of the country, would be strictly proper ? But
who would suppose that he who adduced it had committed
himself on the constitutionality of taking the religion or
morals of the country under the charge of the Federal Gov
ernment ? Again : suppose the question to be, to raise the
VOL. n. — 14

210 SPEECHES.

duty on silk, or any other article of luxury ; and that it should
be supported on the ground that it was an article mainly con
sumed by the rich and extravagant — could it be fairly inferred
that in the opinion of the speaker, Congress had a right 'to pass
sumptuary laws ? I only ask that these plain rules may be
applied to my argument on the tariff of 1816. They turn
almost entirely on the benefits which manufactures conferred
on the country in time of war, and which no one could doubt.
The country had recently passed through such a state. The
world was at that time deeply agitated by the effects of the
great conflict which had so long raged in Europe, and which
no one could tell how soon again might return. Bonaparte
had but recently been overthrown ; the whole southern part
of this continent was in a state of revolution, and threat
ened with the interference of the Holy Alliance, which, had it
occurred, must almost necessarily have involved this country in
a most dangerous conflict. It was under these circumstances
that I delivered the speech, in which I urged the House that,
in the adjustment of the tariff, reference ought to be had to a
state of war as well as peace, and that its provisions ought to
be fixed on the compound views of the two periods — making
some sacrifice in peace, in order that less might be made in
war. Was this principle false ? and, in urging it, did I com
mit myself to that system of oppression since grown up, and
which has for its object the enriching of one portion of the
country at the expense of the other ?

The plain rule in all such cases is, that when a measure
is proposed, the first thing is to ascertain its constitutionality;
and, that being ascertained, the next is its expediency ;
which last opens the whole field of argument for and against.
Every topic may be urged calculated to prove it wise or
unwise : so in a bill to raise imposts. It must first be ascer
tained that the bill is based on the principles of revenue,
and that the money raised is necessary for the wants of the
country. These being ascertained, every argument, direct

SPEECHES. 211

and indirect, may be fairly offered, which may go to show
that, under all the circumstances, the provisions of the bill
are proper or improper. Had this plain and simple rule been
adhered to, we should never have heard of the complaint of
Carolina. Her objection is not against the improper modi
fication of a bill acknowledged to be for revenue, but that,
under the name of imposts, a power essentially different from
the taxing power is exercised — partaking much more of the
character of a penalty than a tax. Nothing is more common
than that things closely resembling in appearance should
widely and essentially differ in their character. Arsenic, for
instance, resembles flour, yet one is a deadly poison, and the
other that which constitutes the staff of life. So duties im
posed, whether for revenue or protection, may be called
imposts ; though nominally and apparently the same, yet
they differ essentially in their real character.

I shall now return to my speech on the tariff of 1816.
To determine what my opinions really were on the subject of
protection at that time, it will be proper to advert to my
sentiments before and after that period. My sentiments pre
ceding 1816, on this subject, are a matter of record. I came
into Congress in 1812, a devoted friend and supporter of
the then administration ; yet one of my first efforts was to
brave the administration, by opposing its favorite measure,
the restrictive system — embargo, non-intercourse, and all —
and that upon the principle of free trade. The system re
mained in fashion for a time ; but, after the overthrow of
Bonaparte, I reported a bill from the Committee on Foreign
Relations, to repeal the whole system of restrictive measures.
While the bill was under consideration, a worthy man, then
a member of the House (Mr. M'Kim of Baltimore), moved
to except the Non-Importation Act, which he supported on
the ground of encouragement to manufactures. I resisted
the motion on the very grounds on which Mr. M'Kim sup
ported it. I maintained that the manufacturers were then

212 SPEECHES.

receiving too much, protection, and warned its friends that
the withdrawal of the protection which the war and the high
duties then afforded would cause great embarrassment ; and
that the true policy, in the mean time, was to admit foreign
goods as freely as possible, in order to diminish the antici
pated embarrassment on the return of peace ; intimating, at
the same time, my desire to see the tariff revised, with a
view of affording a moderate and permanent protection.

Such was my conduct before 1816. Shortly after that
period I left Congress, and had no opportunity of making
known my sentiments in reference to the protective system,
which shortly after began to be agitated. But I have the
most conclusive evidence that I considered the arrangement
of the revenue, in 1816, as growing out of the necessity of
the case, and due to the consideration of justice. But, even
at that early period, I was not without my fears that even
that arrangement would lead to abuse and future difficulties.
I regret that I have been compelled to dwell so long on my
self; but trust that, whatever censure may be incurred, will
not be directed against me, but against those who have
drawn my conduct into the controversy ; and who may hope,
by assailing my motives, to wound the cause with which I am
proud to be identified.

I may add, that all the Southern States voted with South
Carolina in support of the bill : not that they had any in
terest in manufactures, but on the ground that they had
supported the war, and, of course, felt a corresponding ob
ligation to sustain those establishments which had grown up
under the encouragement it had incidentally afforded ; whilst
most of* the New England members were opposed to the
measure principally, as I believe, on opposite principles.

I have now, I trust, satisfactorily repelled the charge
against the State, and myself personally, in reference to the
tariff of 1816. Whatever support the State has given the
bill, originated in the most disinterested motives. There was

SPEECHES. 213

not within the limits of the State, so far as my memory serves
me, a single cotton or woollen establishment. Her whole
dependence was on agriculture, and the cultivation of two
great staples, rice and cotton. Her obvious policy was to
keep open the market of the world unchecked and unrestrict
ed ; — to buy cheap, and to sell high : bui from a feeling of
kindness, combined with a sense of justice, she added her
support to the bill. We had been told by the agents of the
manufacturers that the protection which the measure afforded
would be sufficient ; to which we the more readily conceded,
as it was considered a final adjustment of the question.

Let us now turn our eyes forward, and see what has been
the conduct of the parties to this arrangement. Have Caro
lina and the South disturbed this adjustment ? No ; they
have never raised their voice in a single instance against it,
even though this measure, moderate, comparatively, as it is,
was felt with no inconsiderable pressure on their interests.
Was this example imitated on the opposite side ? Far
otherwise. Scarcely had the President signed his name,
before application was made for an increase of duties, which
was repeated, with demands continually growing, till the
passage of the act of 1828. What course now, I would ask,
did it become Carolina to pursue in reference to these de
mands ? Instead of acquiescing in them, because she had
acted generously in adjusting the tariff of 1816, she saw, in
her generosity on that occasion, additional motives for that
firm and decided resistance which she has since made against
the system of protection. She accordingly commenced a
systematic opposition to all further encroachments, which con
tinued from 1818 till 1828 ; by discussions and by resolu
tions, by remonstrances and by protests through her legis
lature. These all proved insufficient to stem the current of
encroachment : but, notwithstanding the heavy pressure on
her industry, she never despaired of relief till the passage of
the act of 1828 — that bill of abominations — engendered by

214 SPEECHES.

avarice and political intrigue. Its adoption opened the eyes
of the State, and gave a new character to the controversy.
Till then, the question had been, whether the protective
system was constitutional and expedient ; but, after that,
she no longer considered the question whether the right of
regulating the industry of the States was a reserved or dele
gated power, but what right a State possesses to defend hej-
reserved powers against the encroachments of the Federal
Government : a question on the decision of which the value
of all the reserved powers depends. The passage of the act
of 1828, with all its objectionable features, and under the
circumstances connected with it, almost, if not entirely,
closed the door of hope through the General Government.
It afforded conclusive evidence that no reasonable prospect
of relief from Congress could be entertained ; yet, the near
approach of the period of the payment of the public debt, and
the elevation of General Jackson to the Presidency, still
afforded a ray of hope — not so strong, however, as to prevent
the State from turning her eyes for final relief to her reserved
powers.

Under these circumstances commenced that inquiry into
the nature and extent of the reserved powers of a State, and
the means which they afford of resistance against the en
croachments of the General Government, which has been
pursued with so much zeal and energy, and, I may add, in
telligence. Never was there a political discussion carried on
with greater activity, and which appealed more directly to
the intelligence of a community. Throughout the whole, no
address has been made to the low and vulgar passions ; but,
on the contrary, the discussion has turned upon the higher
principles of political economy, connected with the operations
of the tariff system, calculated to show its real bearing on
the interests of the State, and on the structure of our polit
ical system ; and to show the true character of the relations
between the State and the General Government, and the

SPEECHES. 215

means which the States possess of defending those powers
which they reserved in forming the Federal Government.

In this great canvass, men of the most commanding
talents and acquirements have engaged with the greatest
ardor ; and the people have been addressed through every
channel — by essays in the public press, and by speeches in
their public assemblies — until they have become thoroughly
instructed on the nature of the oppression, and on the rights
which they possess, under the constitution, to throw it off.

If gentlemen suppose that the stand taken by the people
of Carolina rests on passion and delusion, they are wholly
mistaken. The case is far otherwise. No community, from
the legislator to the ploughman, were ever better instructed
in their rights ; and the resistance on which the State has
resolved, is the result of mature reflection, accompanied with
a deep conviction that their rights have been violated, and
that the means of redress which they have adopted are con
sistent with the principles of the constitution.

But while this active canvass was carried on, which looked
to the reserved powers as the final means of redress if all
others failed, the State at the same time cherished a hope, as
I have already stated, that the election of General Jackson
to the presidency would prevent the necessity of a resort to
extremities. He was identified with the interests of the
staple States ; and, having the same interest, it was believed
that his great popularity — a popularity of the strongest
character, as it rested on military services — would enable him,
as they hoped, gradually to bring down the system of pro
tection, without shock or injury to any interest. Under these
views, the canvass in favor of General Jackson's election to
the Presidency was carried on with great zeal, in conjunction
with that active inquiry into the reserved powers of the States
on which final reliance was placed. But little did the people
of Carolina dream that the man whom they were thus striv
ing to elevate to the highest seat of power would prove so

216 SPEECHES.

utterly false to all their hopes. Man is, indeed, ignorant of
the future ; nor was there ever a stronger illustration of the
observation than is afforded by the result of that election !
The very event on which they had built their hopes has been
turned against them ; and the very individual to whom they
looked as a deliverer, and whom, under that impression, they
strove for so many years to elevate to power, is now the most
powerful instrument in the hands of his and their bitterest
opponents to put down them and their cause !

Scarcely had he been elected, when it became apparent,
from the organization of his cabinet and other indications,
that all their hopes of relief through him were blasted. The
admission of a single individual into the cabinet, under the
circumstances which accompanied that admission, threw all
into confusion. The mischievous influence over the Presi
dent, through which this individual was admitted into the
cabinet, soon became apparent. Instead of turning his eyes
forward to the period of the payment of the public debt,
which was then near at hand, and to the present dangerous
political crisis, which was inevitable unless averted by a
timely and wise system of measures, the attention of the
President was absorbed by mere party arrangements, and
circumstances too disreputable to be mentioned here, except
by the most distant allusion.

Here I must pause for a moment to repel a charge which
has been so often made, and which even the President has
reiterated in his proclamation — the charge that I have been
actuated, in the part which I have taken, by feelings of dis
appointed ambition. I again repeat, that I deeply regret
the necessity of noticing myself in so important a discussion ;
and that nothing can induce me to advert to my own course
but the conviction that it is due to the cause, at which a blow
is aimed through me. It is only in this view that I no
tice it.

It illy became the chief magistrate to make this charge.

SPEECHES. 217

The course which the State took, and which led to the
present controversy between her and the General Government,
was taken as far back as 1828 — in the very midst of that
severe canvass which placed him in power — and in that very
canvass Carolina openly avowed and zealously maintained
those very principles which he, the chief magistrate, now
officially pronounces to be treason and rebellion. That was
the period at which he ought to have spoken. Having
remained silent then, and having, under his approval, im
plied by that silence, received the support and the vote of
the State, I, if a sense of decorum did not prevent it, might
recriminate with the double charge of deception and ingrati
tude. My object, however, is not to assail the President, but
to defend myself against a most unfounded charge. The
time alone when that course was taken, on which this charge
of disappointed ambition is founded, will of itself repel it, in
the eye of every unprejudiced and honest man. | The doc
trine which I now sustain, under the present difficulties, I
openly avowed and maintained immediately after the act of
1828, that "bill of abominations," as it has been so often
and properly termed. Was I, at that period, disappointed
in any views of ambition which I might be supposed to enter
tain ? I was Vice-President of the United States, elected by
an overwhelming majority. I was a candidate for re-election
on the ticket with General Jackson himself, with a certain
prospect of the triumphant success of that ticket, and with
a fair prospect of the highest office to which an American
citizen can aspire. What was my course under these pros
pects ? Did I look to my own advancement, or to an honest
and faithful discharge of my duty ? Let facts speak for
themselves. When the bill to which I have referred came
from the other House to the Senate, the almost universal
impression was, that its fate would depend upon my casting
vote. It was known that, as the bill then stood, the Senate
was nearly equally divided ; and as it was a combined

218 SPEECHES.

measure, originating with the politicians and manufacturers,
and intended as much to bear upon the Presidential election
as to protect manufactures, it was believed that, as a stroke
of political policy, its fate would be made to depend on my
vote, in order to defeat General Jackson's election, as well as
my own. The friends of General Jackson were alarmed, and
I was earnestly entreated to leave the chair in order to avoid
the responsibility, under the plausible argument that, if the
Senate should be equally divided, the bill would be -lost
without the aid of my casting vote. The reply to this en
treaty was, that no consideration personal to myself could
induce me to take such a course ; that I considered the
measure as of the most dangerous character, and calculated
to produce the most fearful crisis ; that the payment of the
public debt was just at hand ; and that the great increase
of revenue which it would pour into the treasury would ac
celerate the approach of that period, and that the country
would be placed in the most trying of situations — with an
immense revenue without the means of absorption upon any
legitimate or constitutional object of appropriation, and com
pelled to submit to all the corrupting consequences of a large
surplus, or to make a sudden reduction of the rates of duties,
which would prove ruinous to the very interests which were
then forcing the passage of the bill. Under these views I
determined to remain in the chair, and if the bill came to me,
to give my casting vote against it, and in doing so, to give my
reasons at large ; but at the same time I informed my friends
that I would retire from the ticket, so that the election of
General Jackson might not be embarrassed by any act of
mine. Sir, I was amazed at the folly and infatuation of that
period. So completely absorbed was Congress in the game of
ambition and avarice — from the double impulse of the manu
facturers and politicians — that none but a few appeared to
anticipate the present crisis, at wliich all are now alarmed,
but which is the inevitable result of what % was then done.

SPEECHES. 219

As to myself, I clearly foresaw what has since followed. The
road of ambition lay open before me — I had but to follow the
corrupt tendency of the times — but I chose to tread the
rugged path of duty.

It was thus that the reasonable hope of relief through the
election of General Jackson was blasted ; but still one other
nope remained, that the final discharge of the public debt —
an event near at hand — would remove our burden. That
event would leave in the treasury a large surplus : a surplus
that could not be expended under the most extravagant
schemes of appropriation, having the least color of decency
or constitutionality. That event at last arrived. At the
last session of Congress, it was avowed on all sides that the
public debt, as to all practical purposes, was in fact paid, the
small surplus remaining being nearly covered by the money
in the treasury and the bonds for duties which had already
accrued ; but with the arrival of this event our ]ast hope was
doomed to be disappointed. After a long session of many
months, and the most earnest effort on the part of South
Carolina and the other Southern States to obtain relief, all
that could be effected was a small reduction in the amount
of the duties ; but a reduction of such a character, that,
while it diminished the amount of burden, distributed that
burden more unequally than even the obnoxious act of 1828 :
reversing the principle adopted by the bill of 1816, of laying
higher duties on tlie unprotected than the protected Articles,
by repealing almost entirely the duties laid upon the former,
and imposing the burden almost entirely on the latter. It
was thus that, instead of relief — instead of an equal distri
bution of the burdens and benefits of the Government, on the
payment of the debt, as had been fondly anticipated — the
duties were so arranged as to be, in fact, bounties on one side
and taxation on the other ; thus placing the two great sec
tions of the country in direct conflict in reference to its
fiscal action, and thereby letting in that flood of political

220 SPEECHES.

corruption which threatens to sweep away our constitution
and our liberty.

This unequal and unjust arrangement was pronounced,
both by the administration, through its proper organ, the
Secretary of the Treasury, and by the opposition, to be a per
manent adjustment ; and it was thus that all hope of relief
through the action of the General Government terminated ;
and the crisis so long apprehended at length arrived, at which
the State was compelled to choose between absolute acquies
cence in a ruinous system of oppression, or a resort to her re
served powers — powers of which she alone was the rightful
judge, and which only, in this momentous juncture, could
save her. She determined on the latter.

The consent of two-thirds of her legislature was necessa
ry for the call of a convention, which was considered the
only legitimate organ through which the people, in their sov
ereignty, could speak. After an arduous struggle the State
Eights party succeeded : more than two-thirds of both branch
es of the legislature favorable to a convention were elected ;
a convention was called — the ordinance adopted. The con
vention was succeeded by a meeting of the legislature, when
the laws to carry the ordinance into execution were enacted :
all of which have been communicated by the President, have
been referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and this
bill is the result of their labor.

Having now corrected some of the prominent misrepre
sentations as to the nature of this controversy, and given a
rapid sketch of the movement of the State in reference to it,
I will next proceed to notice some objections connected with
the ordinance and the proceedings under it.

The first and most prominent of these is directed against
what is called the test oath, which an effort has been made
to render odious. So far from deserving the denunciation
which has been levelled against it, I view this provision of
the ordinance as but the natural result of the doctrines en-

SPEECHES. 221

tertained by the State, and the position which she occupies.
The people of Carolina believe that the Union is a union of
States, and not of individuals ; that it was formed by the
States, and that the citizens of the several States were bound
to it through the acts of their several States ; that each
State ratified the constitution for itself, and that it was only
by such ratification of a State that any obligation was im
posed upon its citizens. Thus believing, it is the opinion of
the people of Carolina that it belongs to the State which has
imposed the obligation to declare, in the last resort, the ex
tent of this obligation, as far as her citizens are concerned ;
and this upon the plain principles which exist in all analo
gous cases of compact between sovereign bodies. On this
principle, the people of the State, acting in their sovereign
capacity in convention, precisely as they did in the adoption
of their own and the federal constitution, have declared, by
the ordinance, that the acts of Congress which imposed du
ties under the authority to lay imposts, are acts, not for rev
enue, as intended by the constitution, but for protection, and
therefore null and void. The ordinance thus enacted by the
people of the State themselves, acting as a sovereign commu
nity, is as obligatory on the citizens of the State as any por
tion of the constitution. In prescribing, then, the oath to
obey the ordinance, no more was done than to prescribe an
oath to obey the constitution. It is, in fact, but a particular
oath of allegiance, and in every respect similar to that which
is prescribed, under the constitution of the United States, to
be administered to all the officers of the State and Federal
Governments ; and is no more deserving the harsh and bitter
epithets which have been heaped upon it, than that, or any
similar oath. It ought to be borne in mind, that, according
to the opinion which prevails in Carolina, the right of resist
ance to the unconstitutional acts of Congress belongs to the1
State, and not to her individual citizens ; and that, though^
the latter may, in a mere question of meum and tuum, resist,

222 SPEECHES.

through the courts, an unconstitutional encroachment upon
their rights, yet the final stand against usurpation rests not
with them, but with the State of which they are members ;
and such act of resistance by a State binds the conscience
and allegiance of the citizen. But there appears to be a
general misapprehension as to the extent to which the State
has acted under this part of the ordinance. Instead of sweep
ing every officer by a general proscription of the minority, as
has been represented in debate, as far as my knowledge ex
tends, not a single individual has been removed. The State
has, in fact, acted with the greatest tenderness, all circum
stances considered, towards citizens who differed from the
majority ; and, in that spirit, has directed the oath to be
administered only in case of some official act directed to be
performed, in which obedience to the ordinance is involved.

It has been further objected, that the State has acted
precipitately. What ! precipitately ! after making a strenu
ous resistance for twelve years — by discussion here and in
the other House of Congress — by essays in all forms — by
resolutions, remonstrances, and protests on the part of her
legislature — and, finally, by attempting an appeal to the
judicial power of the United States ? I say attempting, for
they have been prevented from bringing the question fairly
before the court, and that by an act of that very majority in
Congress who now upbraid them for not making that ap
peal ; of that majority who, on a motion of one of the mem
bers in the other House from South Carolina, refused to give
to the act of 1828 its true title — that it was a protective,
and not a revenue act. The State has never, it is true, re
lied upon that tribunal, the Supreme Court, to vindicate its
reserved rights ; yet they have always considered it as an
auxiliary means of defence, of which they would gladly have
availed themselves to test the constitutionality of protection,
had they not been deprived of the means of doing so by the
act of the majority.

SPEECHES. 223

Notwithstanding this long delay of more than ten years,
under this continued encroachment of the Government, we
now hear it on all sides, by friends and foes, gravely pro
nounced that the State has acted precipitately — that her
conduct has been rash ! That such should be the language
of an interested majority, who, by means of this unconstitu
tional and oppressive system, are annually extorting millions
from the South, to be bestowed upon other sections, is not
at all surprising. Whatever impedes the course of avarice
and ambition, will ever be denounced as rash and precipi
tate ; and had South Carolina delayed her resistance fifty
instead of twelve years, she would have heard from the same
quarter the same language j but it is really surprising, that
those who are suffering in common with herself, and who
have complained equally loud of their grievances ; who have
pronounced the very acts which she has asserted within her
limits to be oppressive, unconstitutional, and ruinous, after
so long a struggle — a struggle longer than that which pre
ceded the separation of these States from the mother-coun
try — longer than the period of the Trojan war — should now
complain of precipitancy ! No, it is not Carolina which has
acted precipitately ; but her sister States, who have suffered
in common with her, have acted tardily. Had they acted as
she has done ; had they performed their duty with equal en
ergy and promptness, our situation this day would be very
different from what we now find it. Delays are said to be
dangerous ; and never was the maxim more true than in the
present case, a case of monopoly. It is the very nature of
monopolies to grow. If we take from one side a large por
tion of the proceeds of its labor, and give it to the other,
the side from which we take must constantly decay, and that
to which we give must prosper and increase. Such is the
action of the protective system. It exacts from the South
a large portion of the proceeds of its industry, which it be
stows upon the other sections, in the shape of bounties to

224 SPEECHES.

manufactures, and appropriations in a thousand forms' ; pen
sions, improvement of rivers and harbors, roads and canals,
and in every shape that wit or ingenuity can devise. Can
we, then, be surprised that the. principle of monopoly grows,
when it is so amply remunerated at the expense of those who
support it ? And this is the real reason of the fact which
we witness, that all acts for protection pass with small mi
norities, but soon come to be sustained by great and over
whelming majorities. Those who seek the monopoly en
deavor to obtain it in the most exclusive shape ; and they
take care, accordingly, to associate only a sufficient number
of interests barely to pass it through the two Houses of Con
gress, on the plain principle, that the greater the number
from whom the monopoly takes, and the fewer on whom it
bestows, the greater is the advantage to the monopolists.
Acting in this spirit, we have often seen with what exact
precision they count : adding wool to woollens, associating
lead and iron, feeling their way, until a bare majority is ob
tained, when the bill passes, connecting just as many inter
ests as are sufficient to ensure its success, and no more. In
a short time, however, we have invariably found that this
lean becomes a decided majority, under the certain operation
which compels individuals to desert the pursuits which the
monopoly has rendered unprofitable, that they may partici
pate in those which it has rendered profitable. It is against
this dangerous and growing disease that South Carolina has
acted — a disease, whose cancerous action would soon have
spread to every part of the system, if not arrested.

There is another powerful reason why the action of the
State could not have been safely delayed. The public debt,
as I have already stated, for all practical purposes, has already
been paid ; and, under the existing duties, a large annual
surplus of many millions must come into the treasury. It is
impossible to look at this state of things without seeing the
most mischievous consequences ; and, among others, if not

SPEECHES. 225

speedily corrected, it would interpose powerful and almost in
superable obstacles to throwing off the burden under which
the South has been so long laboring. The disposition of the
surplus would become a subject of violent and corrupt strug
gle, and could not fail to rear up new and powerful interests
in support of the existing system, not only in those sections
which have been heretofore benefited by it, but even in the
South itself. I cannot but trace to the anticipation of this
state of the treasury the sudden and extraordinary move
ments which took place at the last session in the Virginia
Legislature, in which the whole South is vitally interested.*
It is impossible for any rational man to believe that that
State could seriously have thought of effecting the scheme to
which I allude by her own resources, without powerful aid
from the General Government.

It is next objected, that the enforcing acts have legislated
the United States out of South Carolina. I have already
replied to this objection on another occasion, and will now
but repeat what I then said : that they have been legislated
out only to the extent that they had no right to enter. The
constitution has admitted the jurisdiction of the United
States within the limits of the several States only so far as
the delegated powers authorize ; beyond that they are in
truders, and may rightfully be expelled ; and that they have
been efficiently expelled by the legislation of the State
through her civil process, as has been acknowledged on all
sides in the debate, is only a confirmation of the truth of
the doctrine for which the majority in Carolina have con
tended.

The very point at issue between the two parties there is,
whether nullification is a peaceable and an efficient remedy
against an unconstitutional act of the General Government,
and may be asserted, as such, through the State tribunals.

* Having for their object the emancipation and colonization of slaves.

VOL. II. — 15

226 SPEECHES.

Both parties agree that the acts against which it is directed
are unconstitutional and oppressive. The controversy is only
as to the means by which our citizens may be protected
against the acknowledged encroachments on their rights.
This being the point at issue between the parties, and the
very object of the majority being an efficient protection of
the citizens through the State tribunals, the measures adopt
ed to enforce the ordinance, of course received the most deci
sive character. We were not children, to act by halves.
Yet for acting thus efficiently the State is denounced, and
this bill reported, to overrule, by military force, the civil tri
bunals and civil process of the State ! Sir, I consider this
bill, and the arguments which have been urged on this floor
in its support, as the most triumphant acknowledgment
that nullification is peaceful and efficient, and so deeply in
trenched in the principles of our system, that it cannot be
assailed but by prostrating the constitution, and substituting
the supremacy of military force in lieu of the supremacy of
the laws. In fact, the advocates of this bill refute their own
argument. They tell us that the ordinance is unconstitu
tional ; that it. infracts the constitution of South Carolina,
although, to me, the objection appears absurd, as it was
adopted by the very authority which adopted the constitu
tion itself. They also tell us that the Supreme Court is the
appointed arbiter of all controversies between a State and
the General Government. Why, then, do they not leave
this controversy to that tribunal ? Why do they not confide
to them the abrogation of the ordinance, and the laws made
in pursuance of it, and the assertion of that supremacy which
they claim for the laws of Congress ? The State stands
pledged to resist no process of the court. Why, then, confer
on the President the extensive and unlimited powers provided
in this bill ? W^hy authorize him to use military force to
arrest the civil process of the State ? But one answer can
be given : That, in a contest between the State and the Gen-

SPEECHES. 227

eral Government, if the resistance be limited on both sides
to the civil process, the State, by its inherent sovereignty,
standing upon its reserved powers, wiU prove too powerful in
such a controversy, and must triumph over the Federal Gov
ernment, sustained by its delegated and limited authority ;
and in this answer we have an acknowledgment of the truth
of those great principles for which the State has so firmly
and nobly contended.

Having made these remarks, the great question is now
presented, Has Congress the right to pass this bill ? which
I will next proceed to consider. The decision of this ques
tion involves an inquiry into the provisions of the bill.
What are they ? It puts at the disposal of the President
the army and navy, and the entire militia of the country ; it
enables him, at his pleasure, to subject every man in the
United States, not exempt from militia duty, to martial law ;
to call him from his ordinary occupation to the field, and un
der the penalty of fine and imprisonment, inflicted by a
court martial, to imbrue his hand in his brother's blood.
There is no limitation on the power of the sword ; — and that
over the purse is equally without restraint ; for among the
extraordinary features of the bill, it contains no appropria
tion, which, under existing circumstances, is tantamount to
an unlimited appropriation. The President may, under its
authority, incur any expenditure, and pledge the national
faith to meet it. He may create a new national debt, at the
very moment of the termination of the former — a debt of
millions, to be paid out of the proceeds of the labor of that
section of the country whose dearest constitutional rights
this bill prostrates ! Thus exhibiting the extraordinary spec
tacle, that the very section of the country which is urging
this measure, and carrying the sword of devastation against
us, is, at the same time, incurring a new debt, to be paid
by those whose rights are violated ; while those who violate

228 SPEECHES.

them are to receive the benefits, in the shape of bounties and
expenditures.

And for what purpose is the unlimited control of the
purse and of the sword thus placed at the disposition of the
Executive ? To make war against one of the free and sov
ereign members of this confederation, which the bill proposes
to deal with, not as a State, but as a collection of banditti or
outlaws. Thus exhibiting the impious spectacle of this Gov
ernment, the creature of the States, making war against the
power to which it owes its existence.

The bill violates the constitution, plainly and palpably,
in many of its provisions, by authorizing the President at
his pleasure, to place the different ports of this Union on an
unequal footing, contrary to that provision of the constitu
tion which declares that no preference shall be given to one
port over another. It also violates the constitution by au
thorizing him, at his discretion, to impose cash duties on one
port, while credit is allowed in others ; by enabling the Pres
ident to regulate commerce, a power vested in Congress
alone ; and by drawing within the jurisdiction of the United
States Courts, powers never intended to be conferred on them.
As great as these objections are, they become insignificant in
the provisions of a bill which, by a single blow — by treating
the States as a mere lawless mass of individuals — prostrates
all the barriers of the constitution. I will pass over the mi
nor considerations, and proceed directly to the great point.
This bill proceeds on the ground that the entire sovereignty
of this country belongs to the American people, as forming
one great community, and regards the States as mere frac
tions or counties, and not as integral parts of the Union ;
having no more right to resist the encroachments of the Gov
ernment than a county has to resist the authority of a State ;
and treating such resistance as the lawless acts of so many
individuals, without possessing sovereignty or political rights.
It has been said that the bill declares war against South Car-

SPEECHES. 22$

olina. No. It decrees a massacre of her citizens ! War
has something ennobling about it, and, with all its horrors,
brings into action the highest qualities, intellectual and
moral. It was, perhaps, in the order of Providence that it
should be permitted for that very purpose. But this bill de
clares no war, except, indeed, it be that which savages wage
— a war, not against the community, but the citizens of
whom that community is composed. But I regard it as
worse than savage warfare — as an attempt to take away life
under the color of law, without the trial by jury, or any other
safeguard which the constitution has thrown around the life
of the citizen ! It authorizes the President, or even his de
puties, when they may suppose the law to be violated, with
out the intervention of a court or jury, to kill without mercy
or discrimination !

It has been said by the senator from Tennessee (Mr.
Grundy) to be a measure of peace ! Yes, such peace as the
wolf gives to the lamb — the kite to the dove ! Such peace
as Russia gives to Poland, or death to its victim ! A peace,
by extinguishing the political existence of the State, by aw
ing her into an abandonment of the exercise of every power
which constitutes her a sovereign community. It is to South
Carolina a question of self-preservation ; and I proclaim it,
that, should this bill pass, and an attempt be made to en
force it, it will be resisted, at every hazard — even that of
death itself. Death is not the greatest calamity : there, are
others still more terrible to the free and brave, and among
them may be placed the loss of liberty and honor. There are
thousands of her brave sons who, if need be, are prepared
cheerfully to lay down their lives in defence of the State, and
the great principles of constitutional liberty for which she is
contending. God forbid that this should become necessary !
It never can be, unless this Government is resolved to bring
the question to extremity, when her gallant sons will stand
prepared to perform the last duty — to die nobly.

230 SPEECHES.

I go on the ground that this constitution was made by
the States ; that it is a federal union of the States, in which
the several States still retain their sovereignty. If these views
be correct, I have not characterized the bill too strongly ;
and the question is, whether they be or be not. I will
not enter into the discussion of this question now. I will
rest it, for the present, on what I have said on the intro
duction of the resolutions now on the table, under a hope
that another opportunity will be afforded for more ample dis
cussion. I will, for the present, confine my remarks to the
objections which have been raised to the views which I pre
sented when I introduced them. The authority of Luther
Martin has been adduced by the Senator from Delaware, to
prove that the citizens of a State, acting under the author
ity of a State, are liable to be punished as traitors by this
government. Eminent as Mr. Martin was as a lawyer, and
high as his authority may be considered on a legal point,
I cannot accept it in determining the point at issue. The
attitude which he occupied, if taken into view, would lessen,
if not destroy, the weight of his authority. He had been
violently opposed in convention to the constitution, and the
very letter from which the Senator has quoted was intended
to dissuade Maryland from its adoption. With this view, it
was to be expected that every consideration calculated to ef
fect that object should be urged ; that real objections should
be exaggerated ; and that those having no foundation, ex
cept mere plausible deductions, should be presented. It is
to this spirit that I attribute the opinion of Mr. Martin in
reference to the point under consideration. But if his au
thority be good on one point, it must be admitted to be
equally so on another. If his opinion be sufficient to prove
that a citizen of a State may be punished as a traitor when
acting under allegiance to the State, it is also sufficient to
show that no authority was intended to be given in the con
stitution for the protection of manufactures by the General

SPEECHES. 231

•

Government, and that the provision in the constitution per
mitting a State to lay an impost duty, with the consent of
Congress, was intended to reserve the right of protection to
the States themselves, and that each State should protect its
own industry. Assuming his opinion to be of equal author
ity on both points, how embarrassing would be the attitude
in which it would place the Senator from Delaware, and those
with whom he is acting — that of using the sword and bayo
net to enforce the execution of an unconstitutional act of
Congress. I must express my surprise that the slightest au
thority in favor of power should be received as the most
conclusive evidence, while that which is, at least, equally
strong in favor of right and liberty, is wholly overlooked or
rejected.

Notwithstanding all that has been said, I may say that
neither the Senator from Delaware (Mr. Clayton), nor any
other who has spoken on the same side, has directly and
fairly met the great question at issue : Is this a federal
union ? a union of States, as distinct from that of indivi
duals ? Is the sovereignty in the several States, or in the
American people in the aggregate ? The very language
which we are compelled to use when speaking of our poli
tical institutions, affords proof conclusive as to its real cha
racter. The terms union, federal, united, all imply a
combination of sovereignties, a confederation of States. They
are never applied to an association of individuals. Who
ever heard of the United State of New- York, of Massachu
setts, or of Virginia ? Who ever heard the term federal or
union applied to the aggregation of individuals into one
community ? Nor is the other point less clear — that the
sovereignty is in the several States, and that our system is
a union of twenty-four sovereign powers, under a constitu
tional compact, and riot of a divided sovereignty between
the States severally and the United States. In spite of all
that has been said, I maintain that sovereignty is in its

232 SPEECHES.

nature indivisible. It is the supreme power in a State, and
we might just as well speak of half a square, or half of
a triangle, as of half a sovereignty. It is a gross error to
confound the exercise of sovereign powers with sovereignty
itself, or the delegation of such powers with the surrender of
them. A sovereign may delegate his powers to be exercised
by as many agents as he may think proper, under such con
ditions and with such limitations as he may impose ; but to
surrender any portion of his sovereignty to another is to
annihilate the whole. The Senator from Delaware (Mr. Clay
ton) calls this metaphysical reasoning, which he says he
cannot comprehend. If by metaphysics he means that
scholastic refinement which makes distinctions without dif
ference, no one can hold it in more utter contempt than I
do ; but if, on the contrary, he means the power of analysis
and combination — that power which reduces the most com
plex idea into its elements, which traces causes to their first
principle, and, by the power of generalization and com
bination, unites the whole in one harmonious system — then, so
far from deserving contempt, it is the highest attribute of
the human mind. It is the power which raises man above
the brute — which distinguishes his faculties from mere saga
city, which he holds in common with inferior animals. It
is this power which has raised the astronomer from being a
mere gazer at the stars to the high intellectual eminence of
a Newton or a Laplace, and astronomy itself from a mere
observation of insulated facts into that noble science which
displays to our admiration the system of the universe.
And shall this high power of the mind, which has effected
such wonders when directed to the laws which control the
material world, be for ever prohibited, under a senseless cry
of metaphysics, from being applied to the high purpose of
political science and legislation ? I hold them to be subject
to laws as fixed as matter itself, and to be as fit a subject
for the application of the highest intellectual power. Denun-

SPEECHES. 23S

elation may, indeed, fall upon the philosophical inquirer
into these first principles, as it did upon Galileo and Bacon
when they first Enfolded the great discoveries which have
immortalized their names ; but the time will come when
truth will prevail in spite of prejudice and denunciation, and
when politics and legislation will be considered as much a
science as astronomy and chemistry.

In connection with this part of the subject, I understood
the Senator from Virginia (Mr. Kives) to say that sove
reignty was divided, and that a portion remained with the
States severally, and that the residue was vested in the
Union. By Union, I suppose the Senator meant the United
States. If such be his meaning — if he intended to affirm
that the sovereignty was in the twenty-four States, in what
ever light he may view them, our opinions will not disagree ;
but according to my conception, the whole sovereignty is in
the several States, while the exercise of sovereign powers is
divided — a part being exercised under compact, through this
General Government, and the residue through the separate
State Governments?/ But if the Senator from Virginia (Mr.
Rives) means to assert that the twenty-four States form but
one community, with a single sovereign power as to the
objects of the Union, it will be but the revival of the old
question, of whether the Union is a union between States,
as distinct communities, or a mere aggregate of the Ameri
can people, as a mass of individuals ; and in this light his
opinions would lead directly to consolidation.

But to return to the bill. It is said that the bill ought
to pass, because the law must be enforced. The law must
be enforced ! The imperial edict must be executed ! It is
under such sophistry, couched in general terms, without
looking to the limitations which must ever exist in the prac
tical exercise of power, that the most cruel and despotic
acts ever have been covered. It was such sophistry as this
that cast Daniel into the lion's den, and the three Innocents

234 SPEECHES.

into the fiery furnace. Under the same sophistry the bloody
edicts of Nero and Caligula were executed. The law must
be enforced. Yes, the act imposing the " tea-tax must be
executed." This was the very argument which impelled
Lord North and his administration to that mad career which
for ever separated us from the British crown. Under a
similar sophistry, " that religion must be protected," how
many massacres have been perpetrated ? and how many
martyrs have been tied to the stake ? What ! acting on
this vague abstraction, are you prepared to enforce a law
without considering whether it be just or unjust, constitu
tional or unconstitutional ? Will you collect money when
it is acknowledged that it is not wanted ? He who earns
the money, who digs it from the earth with the sweat of his
brow, has a just title to it against the universe. No one has
a right to touch it without -his consent except his govern
ment, and this only to the extent of its legitimate wants ;
to take more is robbery, and you propose by this bill to
enforce robbery by murder. Yes : to this result you must
come, by this miserable sophistry, this vague abstraction of
enforcing the law, without a regard to the fact whether the
law be just or unjust, constitutional or unconstitutional.

In the same spirit, we are told that the Union must be
preserved, without regard to the means. And how is it pro
posed to preserve the Union ? By force ! Does any man
in his senses believe that this beautiful structure — this har
monious aggregate of States, produced by the joint consent
of all — can be preserved by force ? Its very introduction
will be certain destruction to this Federal Union. No, no.
You cannot keep the States united in their constitutional
and federal bonds by force. Force may, indeed, hold the
parts together, but such union would be the bond between
master and slave — a union of exaction on one side and of
unqualified obedience on the other. That obedience which,
we are told by the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Wilkins),

SPEECHES. 235

is the Union ! Yes, exaction on the side of the master ;
for this very bill is intended to collect what can be no longer
called taxes — the voluntary contribution of a free people —
but tribute — tribute to be collected under the mouths of the
cannon ! Your custom-house is already transferred to a
garrison, and that garrison with its batteries turned, not
against the enemy of your country, but on subjects (I will
not say citizens), on whom you propose to levy contributions.
Has reason fled from our borders ? Have we ceased to
reflect ? It is madness to suppose that the Union can be
preserved by force. I tell you plainly, that the bill, should
it pass, cannot be enforced. It will prove only a blot upon
your statute-book, a reproach to the year, and a disgrace to
the American Senate. I repeat, it will not be executed ; it
will rouse the dormant spirit of the people, and open their eyes
to the approach of despotism. The country has sunk into
avarice and political corruption, from which nothing can
arouse it but some measure, on the part of the Government,
of folly and madness, such as that now under consideration.

Disguise it as you may, the controversy is one between
power and liberty ; and I tell the gentlemen who are opposed
to me, that, as strong as may be the love of power on their
side, the love of liberty is still stronger en ours. History
furnishes many Instances of similar struggles, where the love
of liberty has prevailed against power under every disadvan
tage, and among them few more striking than that of our
own Revolution ; where, as strong as was the parent country,
and feeble as were the colonies, yet, under the impulse of
liberty, and the blessing of God, they gloriously triumphed
in the contest. There are, indeed, many and striking analo
gies between that and the present controversy. They both
originated substantially in the same cause — with this dif
ference — in the present case, the power of taxation is con
verted into that of regulating industry ; in the other, the
power of regulating industry, by the regulation of commerce,

236 SPEECHES.

was attempted to be converted into the power of taxation.
Were I to trace the analogy further, we should find that the
perversion of the taxing power, in the one case, has given
precisely the same control to the Northern section over the
industry of the Southern section of the Union, .which the
power to regulate commerce gave to Great Britain over the
industry of the colonies in the other ; and that the very
articles in which the colonies were permitted to have a free
trade, and those in which the mother-country had a monop
oly, are almost identically the same as those in which the
Southern States are permitted to have a free trade by the
act of 1832, and in which the Northern States have, by the
same act, secured a monopoly. The only difference is in the
means. In the former, the colonies were permitted to have
a free trade with all countries south of Cape Finisterre, a
cape in the northern part of Spain ; while north of that,
the trade of the colonies was prohibited, except through the
mother-country, by means of her commercial regulations.
If we compare the products of the country north and south
of Cape Finisterre, we shall find them almost identical with
the list of the protected and unprotected articles contained
in the act of last year. Nor does the analogy terminate
here. The very arguments resorted to at the commence
ment of the American Kevolution, and the measures adopted,
and the motives assigned to bring on that contest (to enforce
the law), are almost identically the same.

But to return from this digression to the consideration
of the bill. Whatever difference of opinion may exist upon
other points, there is one on which I should suppose there
can be none : that this bill rests on principles which, if car
ried out, will ride over State sovereignties, and that it will
be idle for any of its advocates hereafter to talk of State
rights. The Senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives) says that
he is the advocate of State rights ; but he must permit me
to tell him that, although ne may differ in premises from

SPEECHES. 237

the other gentlemen with whom he acts on this occasion, yet,
in supporting this bill, he obliterates every vestige of dis
tinction between him and them, saving only that, professing
the principles of '98, his example will be more pernicious
than that of the most open and bitter opponents of the rights
of the States. I will also add, what I am compelled to say,
that I must consider him (Mr. Kives) as less consistent than
our old opponents, whose conclusions were fairly drawn from
their premises, while his premises ought to have led him to
opposite conclusions. The gentleman has told us that the
new-fangled doctrines, as he chooses to call them, have
brought State rights into disrepute. I must tell him, in
reply, that what he calls new-fangled are but the doctrines
of '98 ; and that it is he (Mr. Rives), and others with him,
who, professing these doctrines, have degraded them by ex
plaining away their meaning and efficacy. He (Mr. E.) has
disclaimed, in behalf of Virginia, the authorship of nullifi
cation. I will not dispute that point. If Virginia chooses
to throw away one of her brightest ornaments, she must not
hereafter complain that it has become the property of
another. But while I have, as a representative of Carolina,
no right to complain of the disavowal of the Senator from
Virginia, I must believe that he (Mr. E.) has done his native
State great injustice by declaring on this floor, that when
she gravely resolved, in '98, that "in cases of deliberate and
dangerous infractions of the constitution, the States, as par
ties to the compact, have the right, and are in duty bound,
to interpose to arrest the progress of the evil, and to main
tain within their respective limits the authorities, rights, and
liberties, appertaining to them/' she meant no more than to
proclaim the right to protest and to remonstrate. To sup
pose that, in putting forth so solemn a declaration, which
she afterwards sustained by so able and elaborate an argu
ment, she meant no more than to assert what no one had
ever denied, would be to suppose that the State had been

238 SPEECHES.

guilty of the most egregious trifling that ever was exhibited
on so solemn an occasion.

In reviewing the ground over which I have passed, it
will be apparent that the question in controversy involves
that most deeply important of all political questions, whether
ours is a federal or a consolidated government ; — a question,
on the decision of which depend, as I solemnly believe, the
liberty of the people, their happiness, and the place which
we are destined to hold in the moral and intellectual scale
of nations. Never was there a controversy in which more
important consequences were involved ; not excepting that
between Persia and Greece, decided by the battles of Mara
thon, Platea, and Salamis — which gave ascendency to the
genius of Europe over that of Asia — and which, in its con
sequences, has continued to affect the destiny of so large a
portion of the world even to this day. There are often close
analogies between events apparently very remote, which are
strikingly illustrated in this case. In the great contest be
tween Greece and Persia, between European and Asiatic
polity and civilization, the very question between the federal
and consolidated form of government was involved. The
Asiatic governments, from the remotest time, with some
exceptions on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, have
been based on the principle of consolidation, which considers
the whole community as but a unit, and consolidates its powers
in a central point. The opposite principle has prevailed in
Europe — Greece, throughout all her states, was based on a
federal system. All were united in one common but loose bond,
and the governments of the several States partook, for the
most part, of a complex organization, which distributed
political power among different members of the community.
The same principles prevailed in ancient Italy ; and, if we
turn to the Teutonic race, our great ancestors — the race
which occupies the first place in power, civilization, and
science, and which possesses the largest and the fairest part

SPEECHES. 239

of Europe — we shall find that their governments were based
on federal organization, as has been clearly illustrated by a
recent and able writer on the British Constitution (Mr. Pal-
grave), from whose works I take the following extract :

" In this manner the first establishment of the Teutonic States was
effected. They were assemblages of septs, clans, and tribes ; they were
confederated hosts and armies, led on by princes, magistrates, and chief
tains ; each of whom was originally independent, and each of whom lost
a portion of his pristine independence in proportion as he and his compeers
became united under the supremacy of a sovereign, who was superinduced
upon the state, first as a military commander and afterward as a king.
Yet, notwithstanding this political connection, each member of the state
continued to retain a considerable portion of the rights of sovereignty.
Every ancient Teutonic monarchy must be considered as a federation ; it
is not a unit, of which the smaller bodies politic therein contained are the
fractions, but they are the integers, and the state is the multiple which
results from them. Dukedoms and counties, burghs and baronies, towns
and townships, and shires, form the kingdom ; all, in a certain degree,
strangers to each other, and separate in jurisdiction, though all obedient
to the supreme executive authority. This general description, though not
always strictly applicable in terms, is always so substantially and in
effect ; and hence it becomes necessary to discard the language which has
been very generally employed in treating on the English Constitution. It
has been supposed that the kingdom was reduced into a regular and
gradual subordination of government, and that the various legal districts
of which it is composed, arose from the divisions and subdivisions of the
county. But this hypothesis, which tends greatly to perplex our history,
cannot be supported by fact ; and, instead of viewing the constitution as a
whole, and then proceeding to its parts, we must examine it synthetically,
and assume that the supreme authorities of the state were created by the
concentration of the powers originally belonging to the members and cor
porations of which it is composed."

[Here Mr. C. gave way for a motion to adjourn.]

On the next day Mr. Calhoun said : I have omitted at
the proper place, in the course of my observations yesterday,
two or three points, to which I will now advert, before I re
sume the discussion where I left off. I have stated that the
ordinance and acts of South Carolina were directed, not

240 SPEECHES.

against the revenue, but against the system of protection.
But it may be asked, if such was her object, how happens it
that she has declared the whole system void — revenue as
well as protection, without discrimination ? It is this ques
tion which I propose to answer. Her justification will be
found in the necessity of the case ; and if there be any
blame, it cannot attach to her. The two are so blended,
throughout the whole, as to make the entire revenue system
subordinate to the protective, so as to constitute a complete
system of protection, in which it is impossible to discrimi
nate the two elements of which it is composed. South
Carolina, at least, could not make the discrimination ; and
she was reduced to the alternative of acquiescing in a system
which she believed to be unconstitutional, and which she
felt to be oppressive and ruinous, or to consider the whole
as one, equally contaminated through all its parts, by the
unconstitutionality of the protective portion, and as such, to
be resisted by the act of the State. I maintain that the
State has a right to regard it in the latter character, and that,
if a loss of revenue follow, the fault is not hers, but of this
Government, which has improperly blended together, in a
manner not to be separated by the State, two systems
wholly dissimilar. If the sincerity of the State be doubted ;
if it be supposed that her action is against revenue as well
as protection, let the two be separated — let so much of the
duties as are intended for revenue be put in one bill, and the
residue intended for protection be put in another, and I
pledge myself that the ordinance and the acts of the State
will cease as to the former, and be directed exclusively against
the latter.

I also stated, in the course of my remarks yesterday, and
I trust that I have conclusively shown, that the act of 1816,
with the exception of a single item, to which I have alluded,
was, in reality, a revenue measure ; and that Carolina and
the other States, in supporting it, have not incurred the

SPEECHES. 241

slightest responsibility in relation to the system of protection
wliich has since grown up, and which now so deeply distracts
the country. Sir, I am willing, as one of the representatives
of Carolina, and I believe I speak the sentiment of the State,
to take that act as the basis of a permanent adjustment of the
tariff, simply reducing the duties, in an average proportion,
on all the items to the revenue point. I make that offer
now to the advocates of the protective system ; but I must,
in candor, inform them that such an adjustment would dis
tribute the revenue between the protected and unprotected
articles more favorably to the State, and to the South, and
less to the manufacturing interest, than an average uniform
ad valorem, and, accordingly, more so than that now proposed
by Carolina through her convention. After such an offer, no
man who values his candor will dare accuse the State, or
those who have represented her here, with inconsistency in
reference to the point under consideration.

I omitted, also, on yesterday, to notice a remark of the
Senator from Virginia (Mr. Kives), that the only difficulty
in adjusting the tariff grew out of the ordinance and the
acts of South Carolina. I must attribute an assertion, so in
consistent with the facts, to an ignorance of the occurrences
of the last few years in reference to this subject, occasioned
by the absence of the gentleman from the United States, to
which he himself has alluded in his remarks. If the Senator
will take pains to inform himself, he will find that this pro
tective system advanced with a continued and rapid step, in
spite of petitions, remonstrances, and protests, of not only
Carolina, but also of Virginia and of all the Southern States,
until 1828, when Carolina, for the first time, changed the
character of her resistance, by holding up her reserved rights
as the shield of her defence against further encroachment.
This attitude alone, unaided by a single State, arrested the
further progress of the systerft, so that the question from
that period to this, on the part of the manufacturers, has
VOL. n.— 16

242 SPEECHES.

been, not how to acquire more, but to retain that which they
have acquired. I will inform the gentleman that, if this at
titude had not been taken on the part of the State, the ques
tion would not now be how duties ought to be repealed, but
a question, as to the protected articles, between prohibition
on one side and the duties established by the act of 1828 on
the other. But a single remark will be sufficient in reply to,
what I must consider, the invidious remark of the Senator
from Virginia (Mr. Eives). The act of 1832, which has not
yet gone into operation, and which was passed but a few
months since, was declared by the supporters of the system
to be a permanent adjustment, and the bill proposed by the
Treasury Department, not essentially different from the act
itself, was in like manner declared to be intended by the ad
ministration as a permanent arrangement. What has oc
curred since, except this ordinance, and these abused acts of
the calumniated State, to produce this mighty revolution in
reference to this odious system ? Unless the Senator from
Virginia can assign some other cause, he is bound, upon
every principle of fairness, to retract this unjust aspersion
upon the acts of South Carolina.

The Senator from Delaware (Mr. Clayton), as well as
others, has relied with great emphasis on the fact that we
are citizens of the United States. I do not object to the ex
pression, nor shall I detract from the proud and elevated
feelings with which it is associated ; but I trust that I may
be permitted to raise the inquiry, In what manner are we
citizens of the United States ? without weakening the pa
triotic feeling with which, I trust, it will ever be uttered.
If by citizen of the United States he means a citizen at
large, one whose citizenship extends to the entire geo
graphical limits of the country, without having a local citi
zenship in some State or territory, a sort of citizen of the
world, all I have to say is, that such a citizen would be a
perfect nondescript ; that not a single individual of this de-

SPEECHES. 243

scription can be found in the entire mass of our population.
Notwithstanding all the pomp and display of eloquence on
the occasion; every citizen is a citizen of some State or terri
tory, and, as such, under an express provision of the consti
tution, is entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several States ; and it is in this, and in no other sense,
that we are citizens of the United States. The Senator from
Pennsylvania (Mr. Dallas), indeed, relies upon that provision
in the constitution which gives Congress the power to estab
lish an uniform rule of naturalization ; and the operation of
the rule actually established under this authority, to prove
that naturalized citizens are citizens at large, without being
citizens of any of the States. I do not deem it necessary to
examine the law of Congress upon this subject, or to reply to
the argument of the Senator, though I cannot doubt that he
(Mr. D.) has taken an entirely erroneous view of the subject.
It is sufficient that the power of Congress extends simply to
the establishment of a uniform rule by which foreigners may
be naturalized in the several States or territories, without in
fringing, in any other respect, in reference to naturalization,
the rights of the States as they existed before the adoption
of the constitution.

Having supplied the omissions of yesterday, I now re
sume the subject at the point where my remarks then termi
nated. The Senate will remember that I stated, at their
close, that the great question at issue is, whether ours is a
federal or a consolidated system of government ; a system in
which the parts, to use the emphatic language of Mr. Pal-
grave, are the integers, and the whole the multiple, or in
which the whole is an unit and the parts the fractions. I
stated, that on the decision of this question, I believed, de
pended not only the liberty and prosperity of this country,
but the place which we are destined to hold in the intellectual
and moral scale of nations. I stated, also, in my remarks on
this point, that there is a striking analogy between this

244 SPEECHES.

and the great struggle between Persia and Greece, which
was decided by the battles of Marathon, Platea, and Salamis,
and which immortalized the names of Miltiades and Themis-
tocles. I illustrated this analogy by showing that centralism
or consolidation, with the exception of a few nations along
the eastern borders of the Mediterranean, has been the per
vading principle in the Asiatic governments, while the fede
ral system, or, what is the same in principle, that system
which organizes a community in reference to its parts, has
prevailed in Europe.

Among the few exceptions in the Asiatic nations, the
government of the twelve tribes of Israel, in its early period,
is the most striking. Their government, at first, was a mere
confederation without any central power, till a military chief
tain, with the title of king, was placed at its head, without,
however, merging the original organization of the twelve dis
tinct tribes. This was the commencement of that central
action among that peculiar people which, in three genera
tions, terminated in a permanent division of their tribes. It
is impossible even for a careless reader to peruse the history
of that event without being forcibly struck with the analogy
in the causes which led to their separation, and those which
now threaten us with a similar calamity. With the estab
lishment of the central power in the king commenced a sys
tem of taxation, which, under King Solomon, was greatly
increased, to defray the expenses of rearing the temple, of
enlarging and embellishing Jerusalem, the seat of the central
government, and the other profuse expenditures of his magnifi
cent reign. Increased taxation was followed by its natural
consequences — discontent and complaint, which, before his
death, began to excite resistance. On the succession of his
son, Rehoboam, the ten tribes, headed by Jeroboam, demand
ed a reduction of the taxes ; the temple being finished, and
the embellishment of Jerusalem completed, and the money
which had been raised for that purpose being no longer re-

SPEECHES. 245

quired, or, in other words, the debt being paid, they de
manded a reduction of the duties — a repeal of the tariff.
The demand was taken under consideration, and after consult
ing the old men, the counsellors of "98, who advised a reduc
tion, he then took the opinion of the younger politicians, who
had since grown up, and knew not the doctrines of their
fathers ; he hearkened unto their counsel, and refused to
make the reduction, and the secession of the ten tribes under
Jeroboam followed. The tribes of Judah and Benjamin,
which had received the disbursements, alone remained to the
house of David.

But to return to the point immediately under considera
tion. I know that it is not only the opinion of a large
majority of our country, but it may be said to be the opinion
of the age, that the very beau ideal of a perfect government
is the government of a majority, acting through a representa
tive body, without check or limitation on its power ; yet, if
we may test this theory by experience and reason, we shall
find that, so far from being perfect, the necessary tendency
of all governments, based upon the will of an absolute ma
jority, without constitutional check or limitation of power, is
to faction, corruption, anarchy, and despotism ; and this,
whether the will of the majority be expressed directly
through an assembly of the people themselves, or by their
representatives. I know that, in venturing this assertion, I
utter what is unpopular both within and without these walls ;
but where truth* and liberty are concerned, such considera
tions should not be regarded. I will place the decision of
this point on the fact that no government of the kind, among
the many attempts which have been made, has ever endured
for a single generation, but, on the contrary has invariably
experienced the fate which I have assigned to it* Let a
single instance be pointed out, and I will surrender my
opinion. But, if we had not the aid of experience to direct
our judgment, reason itself would be a certain guide. The

246 SPEECHES.

view which considers the community as an unit, and all its
parts as having a similar interest, is radically erroneous.
However small the community may be, and however homo
geneous its interests, the moment that government is put
into operation — as soon as it begins to collect taxes and to
make appropriations, the different portions of the community
must, of necessity, bear different and opposing relations in
reference to the action of the government. There must
inevitably spring up two interests — a direction and a stock
holder interest — an interest profiting by the action of the
government, and interested in increasing its powers and
action ; and another, at whose expense the political machine
is kept in motion. I know how difficult it is to communi
cate distinct ideas on such a subject, through the medium
of general propositions, without particular illustration ; and
in order that I may be distinctly understood, though at the
hazard of being tedious, I will illustrate the important prin
ciple which I have ventured to advance, by examples.

Let us, then, suppose a small community of five persons,
separated from the rest of the world ; and, to make the ex
ample strong, let us suppose them all to be engaged in the
same pursuit, and to be of equal wealth. Let us further sup
pose that they determine to govern the community by the
will of a majority ; and, to make the case as strong as pos
sible, let us suppose that the majority, in order to meet the
expenses of the government, lay an equal tax, say of one
hundred dollars on each individual of this Httle community.
Their treasury would contain five hundred dollars. Three
are a majority ; and they, by supposition, have contributed
three hundred as their portion, and the other two (the mi
nority), two hundred. The three have the right to make the
appropriations as they may think proper. The question is,
How would the principle of the absolute and unchecked ma
jority operate, under these circumstances, in this little com
munity ? If the three be governed by a sense of justice — if

SPEECHES. 247

they should appropriate the money to the objects for which
it was raised, the common and equal benefit of the five, then
the object of the association would be fairly and honestly
effected, and each would have a common interest in the
government. But, should the majority pursue an opposite
course — should they appropriate the money in a manner to
benefit their own particular interest, without regard to the
interest of the two (and that they will so act, unless there be
some efficient check, he who best knows human nature will
least doubt), who does not see that the three and the two
would have directly opposite interests in reference to the action
of the government ? The three who contribute to the common
treasury but three hundred dollars, could, in fact, by appro
priating the five hundred to their own use, convert the action
of the government into the means of making money, and, of
consequence, would have a direct interest in increasing the
taxes. They put in three hundred and take out five ; that
is, they take back to themselves all that they put in, and, in
addition, that which was put in by their associates ; w, in
other words, taking taxation and appropriation together,
they have gained, and their associates have lost, two hundred
dollars by the fiscal action of the government. Opposite
interests, in reference to the action of the government, are
thus created between them : the one having an interest in
favor, and the other against the taxes ; the one to increase,
and the other to decrease the taxes ; the one to retain the
taxes when the money is no longer wanted, and the other to
repeal them when the objects for which they were levied
have been secured.

Let us now suppose this community of five to be raised
to twenty-four individuals, to be governed, in like manner,
by the will of a majority : it is obvious that the same prin
ciple would divide them into two interests — into a majority and
a minority, thirteen against eleven, or in some other propor
tion ; and that all the consequences which I have shown to

248 SPEECHES.

be applicable to the small community of five would be ap
plicable to the greater, the cause not depending upon the
number, but resulting necessarily from the action of the
government itself. Let us now suppose that, instead of gov
erning themselves directly in an assembly of the whole, with
out the intervention of agents, they should adopt the repre
sentative principle ; and that, instead of being governed by a
majority of themselves, they should be governed by a major
ity of their representatives. It is obvious that the operation
of the system would not be affected by the change : the re
presentatives being responsible to those who chose them,
would conform to the will of their constituents, and would
act as they would do were they present and acting for them
selves ; and the same conflict of interest, which we have
shown would exist in one case, would equally exist in the
other. In either case, the inevitable result would be a system
of hostile legislation on the part of the majority, or the
stronger interest, against the minority, or the weaker inter
est ; the object of which, on the part of the former, would
be to exact as much as possible from the latter, which would
necessarily be resisted by all the means in their power. War
fare, by legislation, would thus be commenced between the
parties, with the same object, and not less hostile than that
which is carried on between distinct and rival nations — the
only distinction would be in the instruments and the mode.
Enactments, in the one case, would supply what could only
be effected by arms in the other ; and the inevitable opera
tion would be to engender the most hostile feelings between
the parties, which would merge every feeling of patriotism —
that feeling which embraces the whole — and substitute in its
place the most violent party attachment ; and instead of
having one common centre of attachment, around which the
affections of the community might rally, there would in fact
be two — the interests of the majority, to which those who
constitute that majority would be more attached than they

SPEECHES. 249

would be to the whole, — and that of the minority, to which
they, in like manner, would also be more attached than to
the interests of the whole. Faction would thus take the place
of patriotism ; and, with the loss of patriotism, corruption
must necessarily follow, and in its train, anarchy, and, finally,
despotism, or the establishment of absolute power in a single
individual, as a means of arresting the conflict of hostile in
terests ; on the principle that it is better to submit to the
will of a single individual, who by being made lord and mas
ter of the whole community, would have an equal interest in
the protection of all the parts.

\ Let us next suppose that, in order to avert the calami
tous train of consequences, this little community should adopt
a written constitution, with limitations restricting the will of
the majority, in order to protect the minority against the
oppression which I have shown would necessarily result with
out such restrictions. It is obvious that the case would not
be in the slightest degree varied, if the majority be left in
possession of the right of judging exclusively of the extent
of its powers, without any right on the part of the minority
to enforce the restrictions imposed by the constitution on
the will of the majority. The point is almost too clear for
illustration. Nothing can be more certain than that, when a
constitution grants power, and imposes limitations on the ex
ercise of that power, whatever interests may obtain posses
sion of the government, will be in favor of extending the
power at the expense of the limitation ; and that, unless
those in whose behalf the limitations were imposed have,
in some form or mode, the right of enforcing them, the
power will ultimately supersede the limitation, and the gov
ernment must operate precisely in the same manner as if the
will of the majority governed without constitution or limita
tion of power.

I have thus presented all possible modes in which a gov
ernment founded upon the will of an absolute majority will

250 SPEECHES.

be modified ; and have demonstrated that, in all its forms,
whether in a majority of the people, as in a mere Democra
cy, or in a majority of their representatives, without a con
stitution or with a constitution, to be interpreted as the will
of the majority, the result will be the same : two hostile in
terests will inevitably be created by the action of the govern
ment, to be followed by hostile legislation, and that by fac
tion, corruption, anarchy, and despotism.

The great and solemn question here presents itself, Is
there any remedy for these evils ? on the decision of which
depends the question, whether the people can govern them
selves, which has been so often asked with so much skepti
cism and doubt. There is a remedy, and but one, — the effect
of which, whatever may be the form, isljo organize society
in reference to this conflict of interests, which springs out of
the action of government ; and which can only be done by
giving to each part the right of self-protection ; which, in a
word, instead of considering the community of twenty-four
a single community, having a common interest, and to be
governed by the single will of an entire majority, shall upon
all questions tending to bring the parts into conflict, the
thirteen against the eleven, take the will, not of the twenty-
four as a unit, but of the thirteen and of the eleven sepa
rately, — the majority of each governing the parts, and where
they concur, governing the whole, — and where they disagree,
arresting the action of the government. This I will call the
concurring, as distinct from the absolute majority. In either
way the number would be the same, whether taken as the
absolute or as the concurring majority. Thus, the majority
of the thirteen is s.even, and of the eleven six ; and the two
together make thirteen, which is the majority of twenty-four.
But, though the number is the same, the mode of counting
is essentially different : the one representing the strongest
interest, and the other, the entire interests of the community.
The first mistake is, in supposing that the government of

SPEECHES. 251

the absolute majority is the government of the people — that
beau ideal of a perfect government which has been so enthu
siastically entertained in every age by the generous and pa-
trotic, where civilization and liberty have made the smallest
progress. There can be no greater error : the government
of the people is the government of the whole community —
of the twenty-four — the self-government of all the parts —
too perfect to be reduced to practice in the present, or any
past stage of human society. The government of the abso
lute majority, instead of being the government of the peo
ple, is but the government of the strongest interests, and,
when not efficiently checked, is the most tyrannical and op-
pressive that can be devised. Between this ideal perfection
on the one side, and despotism on the other, no other system
can be devised but that which considers society in reference to
its parts, as differently affected by the action of the government,
and which takes the sense of each part separately, and there
by the sense of the whole, in the manner already illustrated.
These principles, as I have already stated, are not affect
ed by the number of which the community may be com
posed, but are just as applicable to one of thirteen millions —
the number which composes ours — as of the small communi
ty of twenty-four, which I have supposed for the purpose of
illustration ; and are not less applicable to the twenty-four
States united in one community, than to the case of the
twenty-four individuals. There is, indeed, a distinction be
tween a large and a small community, not affecting the prin
ciple, but the violence of the action. In the former, the
similarity of the interests of all the parts will limit the op
pression from the hostile action of the parts, in a great de
gree, to the fiscal action of the government merely ; but in
the large community, spreading over a country of great ex
tent, and having a great diversity of interests, with different
kinds of labor, capital, and production, the conflict and op
pression will extend, not only to a monopoly of the appropri-

252 SPEECHES.

ations on the part of the stronger interests, but will end in
unequal taxes, and a general conflict between the entire in
terests of conflicting sections, which, if not arrested by the
most powerful checks, will terminate in the most oppressive
tyranny that can be conceived, or in the destruction of the
community itself.

If we turn our attention from these supposed cases, and
direct it to our government and its actual operation, we shall
find a practical confirmation of the truth of what has been
stated, not only of the oppressive operation of the system of
an absolute majority, but also a striking and beautiful illus
tration, in the formation of our system, of the principle of
the concurring majority, as distinct from the absolute, which
I have asserted to be the only means of efficiently checking
the abuse of power, and, of course, the only solid foundation
of constitutional liberty. That our government, for many
years, has been gradually verging to consolidation ; that the
constitution has gradually become a dead letter ; and that
all restrictions upon the power of government have been vir
tually removed, so as practically to convert the General Gov
ernment into a government of an absolute majority, without
check or limitation, cannot be denied by any one who has im
partially observed its operation.

It is not necessary to trace the commencement and grad
ual progress of the causes which have produced this change
in our system ; it is sufficient to state that the change has
taken place within the last few years. What has been the
result ? Precisely that which might have been anticipated :
the growth of faction, corruption, anarchy, and, if not des
potism itself, its near approach, as witnessed in the provi
sions of this bill. And from what have these consequences
sprung ? We have been involved in no war. We have
been at peace with all the world. We have been visited
with no national calamity. Our people have been advancing
in general intelligence, and, I will add, as great and alarm-

SPEECHES. 253

ing as has been the advance of political corruption among
the mercenary corps who look to Government for support, the
morals and virtue of the community at large have been ad
vancing in improvement. What, I again repeat, is the
cause ? No other can be assigned but a departure from the
fundamental principles of the constitution, which has con
verted the Government into the will of an absolute and irre
sponsible majority, and which, by the laws that must inevi
tably govern in all such majorities, has placed in conflict the
great interests of the country, by a system of hostile legis
lation, by an oppressive and unequal imposition of taxes, by
unequal and profuse appropriations, and by rendering the
entire labor and capital of the weaker interest subordinate to
the stronger.

This is the cause, and these the fruits, which have con
verted the Government into a mere instrument of taking
money from one portion of the community, to be given to
another ; and which has rallied around it a great, a powerful,
and mercenary corps of office-holders, office-seekers, and ex
pectants, destitute of principle and patriotism, and who have
no standard of morals or politics but the will of the Execu
tive — the will of him who has the distribution of the loaves
and the fishes. I hold it impossible for any one to look at
the theoretical illustration of the principle of the absolute
majority in the cases which I have supposed, and not be
struck with the practical illustration in the actual operation
of our Government. Under every circumstance, the absolute
majority will ever have its American system (I mean nothing
offensive to any Senator) ; but the real meaning of the
American system is, that system of plunder which the
strongest interest has ever waged, and will ever wage, against
the weaker, where the latter is not armed with some efficient
and constitutional check to arrest its action. Nothing but
such check on the part of the weaker interest can arrest it :
mere constitutional limitations are wholly insufficient. .What-

254 SPEECHES.

ever interest obtains possession of the Government, will, from
the nature of things, be in favor of the powers, and against
the limitations imposed by the constitution, and will resort
to every device that can be imagined to remove those re
straints. On the contraiy, the opposite interest, that which
I have designated as the stockholding interest, the tax-pay
ers, those on whom the system operates, will resist the abuse
of powers, and contend for the limitations. And it is on this
point, then, that the contest between the delegated and the
reserved powers will be waged ; but in this contest, as the
interests in possession of the Government are organized and
armed by all its powers and patronage, the opposite interest,
if not in like manner organized and possessed of a power to
protect themselves under the provisions of the constitution,
will be as inevitably crushed as would be a band of unorgan
ized militia when opposed by a veteran and trained corps of
regulars. Let it never be forgotten, that power can only be
opposed by power, organization by organization ; and on this
theory stands our beautiful federal system of Government.
No free system was ever further removed from the principle
that the absolute majority, without check or limitation, ought
to govern. To understand what our Government is, we must
look to the constitution, which is the basis of the system. I
do not intend to enter into any minute examination of the
origin and the source of its powers : it is sufficient for my
purpose to state, what I do fearlessly, that it derived its
power from the people of the separate States, each ratifying
by itself, each binding itself by its own separate majority,
through its separate convention,. — the concurrence of the ma
jorities of the several States forming the constitution ; — thus
taking the sense of the whole by that of the several parts,
representing the various interests of the entire community.
It was this concurring and perfect majority which formed the
constitution, and not that majority which would consider the
American people as a single community, and which, instead

SPEECHES. 255

of representing fairly and fully the interests of the whole,
would but represent, as has been stated, the interests of the
stronger section. No candid man can dispute that I have
given a correct description of the constitution-making power :
that power which created and organized the Government,
which delegated to it, as a common agent, certain powers, in
trust for the common good of all the States, and which im
posed strict limitations and checks against abuses and usurpa
tions. In administering the delegated powers, the constitu
tion provides, very properly, in order to give promptitude
and efficiency, that the Government shall be organized upon
the principle of the absolute majority, or, rather, of two ab
solute majorities combined : a majority of the States consid
ered as bodies politic, which prevails in this body ; and a ma
jority of the people of the States, estimated in federal num
bers, in the other House of Congress. A combination of the
two prevails in the choice of the President, and, of course,
in the appointment of Judges, they being nominated by the
President and confirmed by the Senate. It is thus that the
concurring and the absolute majorities are combined in one
complex system : the one in forming the constitution, and
the other in making and executing the laws : thus beauti
fully blending the moderation, justice, and equity of the
former, and more perfect majority, with the promptness and
energy of the latter, but less perfect.

To maintain the ascendency of the constitution over the
law-making majority is the great and essential point, on
which the success of the system must depend. Unless that
ascendency can be preserved, the necessary consequence
must be, that the laws will supersede the constitution ; and,
finally, the will of the Executive, by the influence of his
patronage, will supersede the laws — indications of which are
already perceptible. This ascendency can only be preserved
through the action of the States as organized bodies, having
their own separate governments, and possessed of the right,

256 SPEECHES.

under the structure of our system, of judging of the extent
of their separate powers, and of interposing their authority
to arrest the unauthorized enactments of the General Gov
ernment within their respective limits. I will not enter, at
this time, into the discussion of this important point, as it
has been ably and fully presented by the Senator from Ken
tucky (Mr. Bibb), and others who preceded him in this
debate on the same side, whose arguments not only remain
unanswered, but are unanswerable. It is only by this power
of interposition that the reserved rights of the States can be
peacefully and efficiently protected against the encroach
ments of the General Government — that the limitations
imposed upon its authority can be enforced, and its move
ments confined to the orbit allotted to it by the con
stitution.

It has, indeed, been said in debate, that this can be
effected by the organization of the General Government
itself, particularly by the action of this body, which repre
sents the States — and that the States themselves must look
to the General Government for the perservation of many of
the most important of their reserved rights. I do not
underrate the value to be attached to the organic arrange
ment of the General Government, and the wise distribution
of its powers between the several departments, and, in par
ticular, the structure and the important functions of this
body ; but to suppose that the Senate, or any department
of this Government, was intended to be the only guardian of
the reserved rights, is a great and fundamental mistake.
The Government, through all its departments, represents the
delegated, and not the reserved powers ; and it is a viola
tion of the fundamental principle of free institutions to sup
pose that any but the responsible representative of any
interest can be its guardian. The distribution of the powers
of the General Government, and its organization, were
arranged to prevent the abuse of power in fulfilling the

SPEECHES. 257

important trusts confided to it, and not, as preposterously
supposed, to protect the reserved powers, which are confided
wholly to the guardianship of the several States.

Against the view of our system which I have presented,
and the right of the States to interpose, it is objected that
it would lead to anarchy and dissolution. I consider the
objection as without the slightest foundation ; -and that, so
far from tending to weakness or disunion, it is the source
of the highest power and of the strongest cement. Nor is
its tendency in this respect difficult of explanation. The
government of an absolute majority, imchecked by efficient
constitutional restraints, though apparently strong, is, in
reality, an exceedingly feeble government. That tendency
to conflict between the parts, which I have shown to be
inevitable in such governments, wastes the powers of the
state in the .hostile action of contending factions, which
leaves very little more power than the excess of the strength
of the majority over the minority. But a government based
upon the principle of the concurring majority, where each great
interest possesses within itself the means of self-protection,
which ultimately requires the mutual consent of all the
parts, necessarily causes that unanimity in council, and
ardent attachment of all the parts to the whole, which give
an irresistible energy to a government so constituted. I
might appeal to history for the truth of these remarks, of
which the Koman furnishes the most familiar and striking
proofs. It is a well-known fact, that, from the expulsion of
the Tarquins to the time of the establishment of the tri-
bunitian power, the government fell into a state of the
greatest disorder and distraction, and, I may add, corrup
tion. How did this happen ? The explanation will throw
important light on the subject under consideration. The
community was divided into two parts — the Patricians and
the Plebeians ; with the power of the state principally in
the hands of the former, without adequate checks to protect

YOL. II. — 17

258 SPEECHES.

the rights of the latter. The result was as might be ex
pected. The patricians converted the powers of the govern
ment into the means of making money, to enrich themselves
and their dependants. They, in a word, had their Ameri
can system, growing out of the peculiar character of the
government and condition of the country. This requires
explanation. At that period, according to the laws of
nations, when one nation conquered another, the lands of the
vanquished belonged to the victor j and, according to the
Koman law, the lands thus acquired were divided into two
parts — one allotted to the poorer class of the people, and the
other assigned to the use of the treasury, — of which the patri
cians had the distribution and administration. The patri
cians abused their power by withholding from the plebeians
that which ought to have been allotted to them, and by
converting to their own use that which ough^t to have gone
to the treasury. In a word, they took to themselves the
entire spoils of victory, — and had thus the most powerful
motive to keep the state perpetually involved in war, to the
utter impoverishment and oppression of the plebeians. After
resisting the abuse of power by all peaceable means, and
the oppression becoming intolerable, the plebeians, at last,
withdrew from the city — they, in a word, seceded ; and
to induce them to reunite, the patricians conceded to them,
as the means of protecting their separate interests, the very
power, which I contend is necessary to protect the rights
of the States, but which is now represented as necessarily
leading to disunion. They granted to them the right of
choosing three tribunes from among themselves, whose
persons should be sacred, and who should have the right of
interposing their veto, not only against the passage of laws,
but even against their execution — a power which those, who
take a shallow insight into human nature, would pronounce
inconsistent with the strength and unity of the state, if not
utterly impracticable ; yet so far from this being the effect,

SPEECHES. 259

from that day the genius of Eome became ascendant, and
victory followed her steps till she had established an almost
universal dominion. How can a result so contrary to all
anticipation be explained ? The explanation appears to me
to be simple. No measure or movement could be adopted
without the concurring assent of both the patricians and
plebeians, and each thus became dependent on the other ;
and, of consequence, the desire and objects of neither could
be effected without the concurrence of the other. To obtain
this concurrence, each was compelled to consult the good
will of the other, and to elevate to office, not those only who
might have the confidence of the order to which they be
longed, but also that of the other. The result was, that
men possessing those qualities which would naturally com
mand confidence — moderation, wisdom, justice, and patriot
ism — were elevated to office ; and the weight of their
authority and the prudence of their counsel, combined with
that spirit of unanimity necessarily resulting from the con
curring assent of the two orders, furnish the real explana
tion of the power of the Koman State, and of that extraordi
nary wisdom, moderation, and firmness which in so remarkable
a degre<? characterized her public men. I might illustrate
the truth of the position which I have laid down by a refe
rence to the history of all free states ancient and modern,
distinguished for their power and patriotism, and conclu
sively show, not only that there was not one which had not
some contrivance, under some form, by which the concurring
assent of the different portions of the community was made
necessary in the action of government, but also that the
virtue, patriotism, and strength of the state were in direct
proportion to the perfection of the means of securing such
assent.

In estimating the operation of this principle in our
system, which depends, as I have stated, on the right of
interposition on the part of a State, we must not omit to

260 SPEECHES.

take into consideration the amending powor^ by which new
powers may be granted, or any derangement of the system
corrected, by the concurring assent of three-fourths of the
States ; and thus, in the same degree, strengthening the
power of repairing any derangement occasioned by the eccen
tric action of a State. In fact, the power of interposition,
fairly understood, may be considered in the light of an appeal
against the usurpations of the General Government, the joint
agent of all the States, to the States themselves, — to be
decided under the amending power, by the voice of three-
fourths of the States, as the highest power known under the
system. I know the difficulty, in our country, of establish
ing the truth of the principle for which I contend, though
resting upon the clearest reason, and tested by the universal
experience of free nations. I know that the governments of
the several States, which, for the most part, are constructed
on the principle of the absolute majority, will be cited
as an argument against the conclusion to which I have
arrived ; but, in my opinion, the satisfactory answer can be
given, — that the objects of expenditure which fall within the
sphere of a State Government are few and inconsiderable, so
that be their action ever so irregular, it can occasion but
little derangement. If, instead of being members of this
great confederacy, they formed distinct communities, and
were compelled to raise armies, and incur other expenses
necessary to their defence, the laws which I have laid down
as necessarily controlling the action of a State where the
will of an absolute and unchecked majority prevailed, would
speedily disclose themselves in faction, anarchy, and corrup
tion. Even as the case is, the operation of the causes to
which I have referred is perceptible in some of the larger
and more populous members of the Union, whose govern
ments have a powerful central action, and which already show
a strong moneyed tendency, the invariable forerunner of cor
ruption and convulsion.

SPEECHES. 261

But, to return to the General Government. We have
now sufficient experience to ascertain that the tendency to
conflict in its action is between the southern and other sec
tions. The latter having a decided majority, must habitually
be possessed of the powers of the Government, both in this
and in the other House ; and, being governed by that in
stinctive love of power so natural to the human breast, they
must become the advocates of the power of Government, and
in the same degree opposed to the limitations ; while the
other and weaker section is as necessarily thrown on the side
of the limitations. One section is the natural guardian of
the delegated powers, and the other of the reserved ; and the
struggle on the side of the former will be to enlarge the
powers, while that on the opposite side will be to restrain
them within their constitutional limits. The contest will, in
fact, be a contest between power and liberty, and such I
consider the present — -a contest in which the weaker section,
with its peculiar labor, productions, and institutions, has at
stake all that can be dear to freemen. Should we be able to
maintain in their full vigor our reserved rights, liberty and
prosperity will be our portion ; but if we yield, and permit
the stronger interest to concentrate within itself all the pow
ers of the Government, then will our fate be more wretched
than that of the aborigines whom we have expelled. In this
great struggle between the delegated and reserved powers,
so far from repining that my lot, and that of those whom I
represent, is cast on the side of the latter, I rejoice that such
is the fact ; for, though we participate in but few of the
advantages of the Government, we are compensated, and
more than compensated, in not being so much exposed to its
corruptions. Nor do I repine that the duty, so difficult to be
discharged, of defending the reserved powers against appa
rently such fearful odds, has been assigned to us. To
discharge it successfully requires the highest qualities,
moral and intellectual ; and should we perform it with a

262 SPEECHES.

zeal and ability proportioned to its magnitude, instead of
mere planters, our section will become distinguished for
its patriots and statesmen. But, on the other hand, if
we prove unworthy of the trust — if we yield to the steady
encroachments of power, the severest calamity and most
debasing corruption will overspread the land. Every Southern
man. true to the interests of his section, and faithful to the
duties which Providence has allotted him, will be for ever
excluded from the honors and emoluments of this Government,
which will be reserved for those only who have qualified
themselves, by political prostitution, for admission into the
Magdalen Asylum.

SPEECH

In reply to Mr. Webster, on the Resolutions respect
ing the Eights of the States, delivered in the Sen
ate, Feb. 26th, 1833.

[THE following resolutions, submitted by Mr. Calhoun, came up for
consideration, viz. :

" Resolved, That the people of the several States composing thefee
United States are united as parties to a constitutional compact, to
which the people of each State acceded as a separate and sovereign
community, each binding itself by its own particular ratification ; and
that the Union, of which the said compact is the bond, is a union
letween theStates ratifying the same.

" Resolved, That the people of the several States thus united by
the constitutional compact, in forming that instrument, and in creating
a General Government to carry into effect the objects for which it was
formed, delegated to that Government, for that purpose, certain definite
powers, to be exercised jointly, reserving, at the same time, each State
to itself, the residuary mass of powers, to be exercised by its own sep-

SPEECHES. 263

arate government; and that, whenever the General Government
assumes the exercise of powers not delegated by .he compact, its acts
are unauthorized, void, and of no effect ; and that the said Government
is not made the final judge of the powers delegated to it, since that
would make its discretion, and not the constitution, the measure of
its powers ; but that, as in all other cases of compact among sovereign
parties, without any common judge, each has an equal right to judge
for itself, as well of the infraction, as of the mode and measure of
redress.

"Resolved, That the assertions that the people of these United
States, taken collectively as individuals, are now, or ever have been,
united on the principle of the social compact, and, as such, are now
formed into one nation or people, or that they have ever been so
united, in any one stage of their political existence ; that the people
of the several States composing the Union have not, as members
thereof, retained their sovereignty ; that the allegiance of their citizens
has been transferred to the General Government; that they have
parted with the right of punishing treason through their respective
State Governments ; and that they have not the right of judging, in
the last resort, as to the extent of powers reserved, and, of consequence,
of those delegated,|are__not only without foundation in truth, but are
contrary to the most certain and plain historical facts, and the clearest
deductions of reason ; and that all exercise of power on the part of the
General Government, or any of its departments, deriving authority
from such erroneous assumptions, must of necessity be unconstitu
tional — must tend directly and inevitably to subvert the sovereignty of
the States — to destroy the federal character of the Union, and to rear
on its ruins a consolidated government, without constitutional check
or limitation, which must necessarily terminate in the loss of lib
erty itself."

Which being read, Mr. Calhoun said :]

WHEN the bill with which the resolutions are connected
was under discussion, the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr
Webster) thought proper to give his remarks a personal
bearing in reference to myself. I had said nothing to justify
this course on the part of that gentleman. I had, it is true,
denounced the bill in strong language, but not stronger than

264 SPEECHES.

the rules which govern parliamentary proceedings permit ;
nor stronger than the character of the bill, and its bearing on
the State which it is my honor to represent, justified. I am
at a loss to understand what motive governed the Senator in
giving a personal character to his remarks. If he intended
any thing unkind — (here Mr. Webster said, audibly, Certainly
not ; and Mr. C. replied, I will not, then, say what I in
tended, if such had been his motive) — but still I must be
permitted to ask, If he intended nothing unkind, what was
the object of the Senator? Did he design to strengthen a
cause which he feels to be weak, by giving the discussion a
personal direction ? If such was his motive, his experience
as a debater ought to have taught him that it was one of
those weak devices which seldom fail to react on those who
resort to them. If his motive was to acquire popularity by
attacking one who had voluntarily, and from a sense of duty
— from a deep conviction that liberty and the constitution
were at stake — had identified himself with an unpopular
question, I would say to him that a true sense of dignity
would have impelled him in an opposite direction. Among
the possible motives which might have influenced him, there
is another, to the imputation of which he is exposed, but
which, certainly, I will not attribute to him— a desire to
propitiate in a certain high quarter — a quarter in which he
must know that no offering could be more acceptable than
the immolation of the character of him who now addresses
you. But whatever may have been the motive of the Sen
ator, I can assure him that I will not follow his example. I
never had any inclination to gladiatorial exhibitions in the
halls of legislation, and if I now had, I certainly would not
indulge them on so solemn a question — a question which, in
the opinion of the Senator from Massachusetts, as expressed
in debate, involves the union of these States — and in mine, the
liberty and the constitution of the country. Before, how
ever, I conclude these prefatory observations, I must allude

SPEECHES. 265

to the remark which the Senator made at the termination of
the argument of my friend from Mississippi (Mr. Poindexter).
I understood the Senator to say that, if I chose to put at
issue his character for consistency, he stood prepared to vin
dicate his course. I assure the Senator that I have no idea
of calling in question his consistency, or that of any other
member of this body. It is a subject in which I feel no
concern. But if I am to understand the remark of the Sen
ator as intended, indirectly, as a chaUenge to put in issue the
consistency of my course as compared with his own, I have to
say that, though I do not accept it, yet, if he should think
proper to make a trial of character on that or any other point
connected with our public conduct, and will select a suitable
occasion, I stand prepared to vindicate my course, as com
pared with his, or that of any other member of this body, for
consistency of conduct, purity of motive, and devoted at
tachment to the country and its institutions.

Having made these remarks, which have been forced upon
me, I shall now proceed directly to the subject before the
Senate ; and, in order that it may, with all its bearings, be
fully understood, I must go back to the period at which I
introduced the resolutions. They were introduced in con
nection with the bill which has passed this House, and is
now pending before the other. That bill was couched in
general terms, without naming South Carolina, or any other
State, though it was understood, and avowed by the com
mittee, as intended to act directly on her.

Believing that the Government had no right to use force
in the controversy, and that the attempt to introduce it
rested upon principles utterly subversive of the constitution
and the sovereignty of the States, I drew up the resolutions,
and introduced them expressly with the view to test those
principles, with a desire that they should be discussed and
voted on before the bill came up for consideration. The
majority ordered otherwise. The resolutions were laid on

266 SPEECHES.

the table, and the bill taken up for discussion. Under this
arrangement, which, it was understood, originated with the
committee that reported the bill, I, of course, concluded that
its members would proceed in the discussion, and explain
the principles and the necessity for the bill, before the
other Senators would enter into the discussion, and par
ticularly those from South Carolina. Understanding, how
ever, that, by the arrangement of the committee, it was
allotted to the Senator from Tennessee to close the discus*i«a
on the bill, I waited to the last moment, in expectation of
hearing from the Senator from Massachusetts. He is a
member of the committee. But, not hearing from him, I
rose to speak to the bill, and, as soon as I had concluded,
the Senator from Massachusetts arose — I will not say to
reply to me — and certainly not to discuss the bill, but the
resolutions, which had been laid on the table, as I have
stated. I do not state these facts in the way of complaint,
but in order to explain my own course. The Senator having
directed his argument against my resolutions, I felt myself
compelled to seize the first opportunity to call them up from
the table, and to assign a day for their discussion, in the hope
not only that the Senate would hear me in their vindication,
but would also afford me an opportunity of taking the sense
of this body on the great principles on which they are based.
The Senator from Massachusetts, in his argument against
the resolutions, directed his attack almost exclusively against
the first ; on the ground, I suppose, that it was the basis of
the other two, and that, unless the first could be demolished,
the others would follow of course. In this he was right.
As plain and as simple as the facts contained in the first are,
they cannot be admitted to be true without admitting the
doctrines for which I, and the State I represent, contend.
He (Mr. W.) commenced his attack with a verbal criticism
on the resolution, in the course of which he objected strongly
to two words, "constitutional" and "accede.'' To the former,

SPEECHES. 267

on the ground that the word, as used (constitutional compact),
was obscure — that it conveyed no definite meaning — and that
the constitution was a noun-substantive, and not an adjec
tive. I regret that I have exposed myself to the criticism
of the Senator. I certainly did not intend to use any ex
pression of doubtful sense, and if I have done so, the Senator
must attribute it to the poverty of my language, and not to
design. I trust, however, that the Senator will excuse me,
when he comes to hear my apology. In matters of criticism,
authority is of the highest importance, and I have an au
thority of so high a character, in this case, for using the
expression which he considers so obscure and so unconstitu
tional, as will justify me even in his eyes. It is no less than
the authority of the Senator himself — given on a solemn
occasion (the discussion on Mr. Foote's resolution), and
doubtless with great deliberation, after having duly weighed
the force of the expression.

[Here Mr. C. read from Mr. Webster's speech, in reply to Mr. Hayne,
in the Senate of the United States, delivered January 26, 1830, as
follows : ]

" The domestic slavery of the South I leave where I find it— in
hands of their own governments. It is their affair, not mine. Nor do
I complain of the peculiar effect which the magnitude of that population
has had in the distribution of power under the Federal Government. "We
know, Sir, that the representation of the States in the other House is not
equal. We know that great advantage, in that respect, is enjoyed by the
slaveholding States ; and we know, too, that the intended equivalent for
that advantage, that is to say, the imposition of direct taxes in the same
ratio, has become merely nominal : the habit of the Government being
almost invariably to collect its revenues from other sources and in other
modes. Nevertheless, I do not complain, nor would I countenance any
movement to alter this arrangement of representation. It is the original
bargain — the compact — let it stand ; let the advantage of it be fully en
joyed. The Union itself is too full of benefits to be hazarded in propo
sitions for changing its original basis. I go for the constitution as it is.
and for the Union as it is. But I am resolved not to submit in silence to
accusations, either against myself individually, or against the North.

268 SPEECHES.

wholly unfounded and unjust — accusations which impute to us a dispo
sition to evade the CONSTITUTIONAL COMPACT, and to extend the power of
the Government over the internal laws and domestic condition of the
States."

It will be seen, by this extract, that the Senator not only
used the phrase " constitutional compact," which he now so
much condemns, but, what is still more important, he calls
the constitution itself a compact — a bargain ; which con
tains important admissions, having a direct and powerful
bearing on the main issue involved in the discussion, as will
appear in the sequel. But, strong as his objection is to the
word " constitutional," it is still stronger to the word " ac
cede," which, he thinks, has been introduced into the resolu
tion with some deep design, as I suppose, to entrap the Sen
ate into an admission of the doctrine of State Eights.
Here, again, I must shelter myself under authority. But I
suspect the Senator, by a sort of instinct (for our instincts
often strangely run before our knowledge), had a prescience,
which would account for his aversion for the word, that this/
authority ovas no less than Thomas Jefferson himself, thp
great apostle of the doctrines of State Eights. The word
was borrowed from him. It was taken from the Kentucky
Eesolution, as well as the substance of the resolution itself.
But I trust I may neutralize whatever aversion the author
ship of this word may have excited in the mind of the Sen
ator, by the introduction of another authority — that of
Washington himself, who, in his speech to Congress, speak
ing of the admission of North Carolina into the Union, uses
this very term, which was repeated by the Senate in their
reply. Yet, in order to narrow the ground between the Sen
ator and myself as much as possible, I will accommodate my
self to his strange antipathy against the two unfortunate
words, by striking them out of the resolution, and substitut
ing in their place those very words which the Senator him
self has designated as constitutional phrases. In the place

SPEECHES. 269

of that abhorred adjective " constitutional," I will insert the
very noun-substantive " constitution ; " and in the place of
the word " accede," I will insert the word " ratify," which
he designates as the proper term to be used.

Let us now see how the resolution stands, and how it will
read after these amendments. Here Mr. C. said the resolu
tion, as introduced, reads :

Resolved, That the people of the several States compos
ing these United States are united as parties to a constitu
tional compact, to which the people of each State acceded
as a separate and sovereign community, each binding itself
by its own particular ratification ; and that the Union, of
which the said compact is a bond, is a union between the States
ratifying the same.

As proposed to be amended :

Resolved, That the people of the several States compos
ing these United States are united as parties to a compact,
under the title of the Constitution of the United States, which
the people of each State ratified as a separate and sovereign
community, each binding itself by its own particular ratifica
tion ; and that the Union of which the said compact is the
bond, is a union between the States ratifying the same.

Where, Sir, I ask, is that plain case of revolution ?
Where that hiatus, as wide as the globe, between the prem
ises and conclusion, which the Senator proclaimed would be
apparent if the resolution was reduced into constitutional
language ? For my part, with my poor powers of concep
tion, I cannot perceive the slightest difference between the
resolution as first introduced, and as it is proposed to be
amended in conformity to the views of the Senator. And,
instead of that hiatus between the premises and conclusion,
which seems to startle the imagination of the Senator, I can
perceive nothing but a continuous and solid surface, sufficient
to sustain the magnificent superstructure of State Eights.
Indeed, it seems to me that the Senator's vision is distorted

270 SPEECHES.

by the medium through which he views every thing connected
with the subject ; and that the same distortion which has
presented to his imagination this hiatus, as wide as the globe,
where not even a fissure exists, also presented that beautiful
and classical image of a strong man struggling in a bog with
out the power of extricating himself, and incapable of being
aided by any friendly hand, while, instead of struggling in a
bog, he stands on the everlasting rock of truth.

Having now noticed the criticism of the Senator, I AiXL
proceed to meet and repel the main assault on the resolution.
He directed his attack against the strong point, the very
horn of the citadel of State Eights. The Senator clearly
perceived that, if the constitution be a compact, it was im
possible to deny the assertions contained in the resolutions, or
to resist the consequences which I had drawn from them,
and, accordingly, directed his whole fire against that point ;
but, after so vast an expenditure of ammunition, not the
slightest impression, so far as I can perceive, has been made.
But, to drop the simile, after a careful examination of the
notes which I took of what the Senator said, I am now at a
loss to know whether, in the opinion of the Senator, our con
stitution is a compact or not, though the almost entire argu
ment of the Senator was directed to that point. At one
time he would seem to deny directly and positively that it
was a compact, while at another he would appear, in lan
guage not less strong, to admit that it was.

I have collated all that the Senator has said upon this
point ; and, that what I have stated may not appear exagge
rated, I will read his remarks in juxtaposition. He said that

" The constitution means a government, not a compact. Not a consti
tutional compact, but a government. If compact, it rests on plighted faith, ( ) ,
and the mode of redress would be to declare the whole void. States may
secede if a league or compact."

I thank the Senator for these admissions, which I intend

SPEECHES. 271

to use hereafter. (Here Mr. C. proceeded to read from his
notes.)

'; The States agreed that each should participate in the sovereignty of
the other."

Certainly, a very correct conception of the constitution ;
but when did they make that agreement but by the consti
tution, and how could they agree but by compact ?

'•' The system, not a compact between States in their sovereign capa
city, but a government proper, founded on the adoption of the people, and
creating individual relations between itself and the citizens."

This, the Senator lays down as a leading, fundamental prin
ciple to sustain his doctrine, and, I must say, with strange
confusion and uncertainty of language ; not, certainly, to be
explained by any want of command of the most appropriate
words on his part.

"It does not call itself a compact, but a constitution. The constitu
tion rests on compact, but it is no longer a compact."

I would ask, To what compact does the Senator refer, as
that on which the constitution rests ? Before the adoption
of the present constitution, the States had formed but one
compact, a*nd that was the old confederation ; and, certainly,
the gentleman does not intend to assert that the present
constitution rests upon that. What, then, is his meaning ?
What can it be, but that the constitution itself is a com
pact ? And how will his language read, when fairly inter
preted, but that the constitution was a compact, but is no
longer a compact ? It had, by some means or another,
changed its nature, or become defunct.

He nexts states that

{: A man is almost untrue to his country who calls the constitution a
compact."

I fear the Senator, in calling it " a compact, a bargain/'

2Y2 SPEECHES.

has called down this heavy denunciation on his own head.
He finally states that

"It is founded on compact, but not a compact results from it."

To what are we to attribute this strange confusion of
words ? The Senator has a mind of high order, and per
fectly trained to the most exact use of language. No man
knows better the precise import of the words he uses. The
difficulty is not in him, but in his subject. He who under
takes to prove that this constitution is not a compact, un
dertakes a task which, be his strength ever so great, must
oppress him by its weight. Taking the whole of the argu
ment of the Senator together, I would say that it is his im
pression that the constitution is not a compact, and will now
proceed to consider the reason which he has assigned for this
opinion.

He thinks there is an incompatibility between constitu-t
tion and compact. To prove this, he adduces the words
" ordain and establish," contained in the preamble of the
constitution. I confess I am not capable of perceiving in
what manner these words are incompatible with the idea
that the constitution is a compact. The Senator will admit
that a single State may ordain a constitution ; and where is
the difficulty, where the incompatibility, of two States con
curring in ordaining and establishing a constitution ? As
between the States themselves, the instrument would be a
compact ; but in reference to the Government, and those on
whom it operates, it would be ordained and established —
ordained and established by the joint authority of two, instead
of the single authority of one.

The next argument which the Senator advances to show
that the language of the constitution is irreconcilable with
the idea of its being a compact, is taken from that portion
of the instrument which imposes prohibitions on the author
ity of the States. He said that the language used in im-

SPEECHES. 273

posing the prohibitions is the language of a superior to an
inferior ; and that, therefore, it was not the language of a
compact, which implies the equality of the parties. As a
proof, the Senator cited several clauses of the constitution
which provide that no State shall enter into treaties of
alliance and confederation, lay imposts, &c., without the as
sent of Congress. If he had turned to the articles of the
old confederation, which he acknowledges to have been a
compact, he would have found that those very prohibitory
articles of the constitution were borrowed from that instru
ment ; that the language which he now considers as imply
ing superiority was taken verbatim from it. If he had ex
tended his researches still further, he would have found that
it is the habitual language used in treaties, whenever a
stipulation is made against the performance of any act.
Among many instances which I could cite if it were neces
sary, I refer the Senator to the celebrated treaty negotiated,
by Mr. Jay with Great Britain in 1793, in which the very
language used in the constitution is employed.

To prove that the constitution is not a compact, the
Senator next observes that it stipulates nothing, and asks,
with an air of triumph, Where are the evidences of the
stipulations between the States ? I must express my sur
prise at this interrogatory, coming from so intelligent a
source. Has the Senator never seen the ratifications of the
constitution by the several States ? Did he not cite them
on this very occasion ? Do they contain no evidence of
stipulations on the part of the States ? Nor is the assertion
less strange that the constitution contains no stipulations.
So far from regarding it in the light in which the Senator
regards it, I consider the whole instrument but a mass of
stipulations. What is that but a stipulation to which the
Senator refers when he states, in the course of his argument,
that each State had agreed to participate in the sovereignty
of the others.

VOL. II.— 18

274 SPEECHES.

But the principal argument on which the Senator relied to
show that the constitution is not a compact, rests on the
provision in that instrument which declares that "this con
stitution, and laws made in pursuance thereof, and treaties
made under their authority, are the supreme laws of the
land." He asked, with marked emphasis, Can a compact be
the supreme law of the land ? I ask, in return, whether
treaties are not compacts, and whether treaties, as well as
the constitution, are not declared to be the supreme law of
the land ? His argument, in fact, as conclusively proves
that treaties are not compacts as that the constitution is not
a compact. I might rest the issue on this decisive answer ;
but, as I desire to leave not a shadow of doubt on this im
portant point, I shall follow the gentleman in the course of
his reasoning.

He defines a constitution to be a fundamental law, which
organizes the government, and points out the mode of its
action. I will not object to the definition, though, in my
opinion, a more appropriate one, or, at least, one better
adapted to American ideas, could be given. My objection is
not to the definition, but to the attempt to prove that the
fundamental laws of a State cannot be a compact, as the
Senator seems to suppose. I hold the very reverse to be the
case ; and that, according to the most approved writers on
the subject of government, these very fundamental laws which
are now stated not only not to be compacts, but inconsistent
with the very idea of compacts, are held invariably to be com
pacts ; and, in that character, are distinguished from the
ordinary laws of the country. I will cite a single authority,
which is full and explicit on this point, from a writer of the
highest repute.

Burlamaqui says, vol. ii., part 1, chap i., sees. 35, 36,
37, 38 :

"It entirely depends upon a free people to invest the sovereigns
whom they place over their heads with an authority either absolute or

SPEECHES. 275

limited by certain laws. These regulations, by which the supreme au
thority is kept within bounds, are called the fundamental laws of the
state."

" The fundamental laws of a state, taken in their full extent, are not
only the decrees by which the entire body of the nation determine the form
of government, and the manner of succeeding to the crown, but are like
wise covenants between the people and the person on whom they confer
the sovereignty, which regulate the manner of governing, and by which
the supreme authority is limited."

" These regulations are called fundamental laws, because they are the
basis, as it were, and foundation of the state on which the structure of the
government is raised, and because the people look upon these regulations
as their principal strength and support."

"The name of laws, however, has been given to these regulations in an
improper and figurative sense, for, properly speaking, they are real cove
nants. But as those covenants are obligatory between the contracting
parties, they have the force of laws themselves."

The same, vol. ii., part 2, ch. i., sees. 19 and 22, in part.

" The whole body of the nation, in whom the supreme power originally
resides, may regulate the government by a fundamental law in such man
ner as to commit the exercise of the different parts of the supreme power
to different persons or bodies, who may act independently of each other in
regard to the rights committed to them, but still subordinate to the laws
from which those rights are derived."

" And these fundamental laws are real covenants, or what the civilians
call pacta conventa, between the different orders of the republic, by
which they stipulate that each shall have a particular part of the sover
eignty, and that this shall establish the form of government. It is evi
dent that, by these means, each of the contracting parties acquires a right
not only of exercising the power granted to it, but also of preserving that
original right."

A reference to the constitution of Great Britain, with
which we are hetter acquainted than with that of any other
European government, will show that that is a compact.
Magna Charta may certainly be reckoned among the funda
mental laws of that kingdom. Now, although it did not as
sume, originally, the form of a compact, yet, hefore the
breaking up of the meeting of the barons which imposed it

276 SPEECHES.

on King John; it was reduced into the form of a covenant
and duly signed by Kobert Fitzwalter and others, on the one
part, and the king on the other.

But we have a more decisive proof that the constitution
of England is a compact in the resolution of the Lords and
Commons in 1688, which declared that : —

" King James the Second having endeavored to subvert the constitu
tion of the kingdom, by breaking the original contract between the king
and people, and having, by the advice of Jesuits and other wicked per
sons, violated the fundamental law, and withdrawn himself out of the
kingdom, hath abdicated the government, and that the throne is thereby
become vacant."

But why should I refer to writers upon the subject of
government, or inquire into the constitution of foreign states,
when there are such decisive proofs that our constitution is
a compact ? On this point the Senator is estopped. I
borrow from the gentleman, and thank him for the word.
His adopted State, which he so ably represents on this floor,
and his native State, the States of Massachusetts and New
Hampshire, both declared, in their ratification of the consti
tution, that it was a compact. The ratification of Massa
chusetts is in the following words :

[Here Mr. 0. read :]

" In Convention of the Delegates of the People of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, February 6, 1788.

"The Convention having impartially discussed and fully considered
the Constitution of the United States of America, reported to Congress
by the Convention of Delegates from the United States of America, and
submitted to us by a resolution of the General Court of said Common
wealth, passed the 25th day of October last past, and acknowledging, with
grateful hearts, the goodness of the Supreme Kuler of the Universe, in
affording the people of the United States, in the course of his providence,
an opportunity deliberately and peaceably, without fraud or surprise, of
entering into an explicit and SOLEMN COMPACT with each other, by assent
ing to and ratifying a new Constitution, in order to form a more perfect
union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the com-

SPEECHES. 277

mon defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of
liberty to themselves and of Massachusetts, assent to and ratify the said
Constitution for the United States of America."

The ratificatioD of New Hampshire is taken from that of
Massachusetts, and almost in the same words. But proof,
if possible, still more decisive, may be found in the celebra
ted resolutions of Virginia on the alien and sedition law, in
1798, and the responses of Massachusetts and the other
States. Those resolutions expressly assert that the consti
tution is a compact between the States, in the following
language :

[Here Mr. C. read from the resolutions of Virginia as follows :]
" That this Assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare, that it

VIEWS THE POWERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, AS RESULTING FROM
THE COMPACT, TO WHICH THE STATES ARE PARTIES, AS LIMITED BY THE
PLAIN SENSE AND INTENTION OF THE INSTRUMENT CONSTITUTING THAT
COMPACT, AS NO FARTHER VALID THAN THEY ARE AUTHORIZED BY THE
GRANTS ENUMERATED IN THAT COMPACT; AND THAT, IN CASE OF A DE
LIBERATE, PALPABLE, AND DANGEROUS EXERCISE OF OTHER POWERS NOT
GRANTED BY THE SAID COMPACT, THE STATES WHO ARE PARTIES THERETO
HAVE THE RIGHT, AND ARE IN DUTY BOUND, TO INTERPOSE FOR ARREST
ING THE PROGRESS OF THE EVIL, AND FOR MAINTAINING WITHIN THEIR
RESPECTIVE LIMITS THE AUTHORITIES, RIGHTS, AND LIBERTIES APPERTAIN
ING TO THEM.

" That the General Assembly doth also express its deep regret that a
spirit has, in sundry instances, been manifested by the Federal Govern
ment to enlarge its powers by forced constructions of the constitutional
charter, which defines them ; and that indications have appeared of a de
sign to expound certain general phrases (which, having been copied from
the very limited grant of powers in the former articles of confederation,
were the less liable to be misconstrued), so as to destroy the meaning and
effect of the particular enumeration which necessarily explains, and limits
the general phrases, and so as to CONSOLIDATE THE STATES, BY DEGREES,

INTO ONE SOVEREIGNTY, THE OBVIOUS TENDENCY AND INEVITABLE RESULT
OF WHICH WOULD BE, TO TRANSFORM THE PRESENT REPUBLICAN SYSTEM

OF THE UNITED STATES INTO AN ABSOLUTE, OR, AT BEST, A MIXED
MONARCHY."

They were sent to the several States. We have the re-

278 SPEECHES.

ply of Delaware, New- York, Connecticut, New Hampshire.
Vermont, and Massachusetts, not one of which contradicts
this important assertion on the part of Virginia ; and, by
their silence, they all acquiesce in its truth. The case is
still stronger against Massachusetts, which expressly recog
nizes the fact that the constitution is a compact.
In her answer she says :

[Here Mr. C. read from the answer of Massachusetts as follows :]

" But they deem it their duty solemnly to declare that, while they
hold sacred the principle, that consent of the people is the only pure
source of just and legitimate power, they cannot admit the right of the
State Legislatures to denounce the administration of that Government, to
which the people themselves, by a solemn compact, have exclusively com
mitted their national concerns. That, although a liberal and enlightened
vigilance among the people is always to be cherished, yet an unreasonable
jealousy of the men of their choice, and a recurrence to measures of ex
tremity upon groundless or trivial pretexts, have a strong tendency to
destroy all rational liberty at home, and to deprive the United States of
the most essential advantages in their relations abroad. That this Legis
lature are persuaded that the decision of all cases in law or equity, arising
under the Constitution of the United States, and the' construction of all
laws made in pursuance thereof, are exclusively vested by the people in
the judicial courts of the United States."

" That the people, in that solemn compact, which is declared to be
the supreme law of the land, have not constituted the State Legislatures
the judges of the acts or measures of the Federal Government, but have
confided to them the power of proposing such amendments of the consti
tution as shall appear to them necessary to the interests, or conformable
to the wishes, of the people whom they represent."

Now I ask the Senator himself — I put it to his candor to
say, if South Carolina be estopped on the subject of the
protective system, because Mr. Burke and Mr. Smith pro
posed a moderate duty on hemp, or some other article, I
know not what, nor do I care, with a view of encouraging its
production (of which motion, I venture to say, not one indi
vidual in a hundred in the State ever heard), whether he
and Massachusetts, after this clear, full, and solemn recog-

SPEECHES. 279

nition that the constitution is a compact (both on his part
and that of his State), be not for ever estopped on this im
portant point ?

There remains one more of the Senator's arguments, to
prove that the constitution is not a compact, to be con
sidered. He says it is not a compact, because it is a govern
ment ; which he defines to be an organized body, possessed
of the will and power to execute its purposes by its own
proper authority ; and which, he says, bears not the slightest
resemblance to a compact. But I would ask the Senator,
Who ever considered a government, when spoken of as the
agent to execute the powers of the constitution, and distinct
from the constitution itself, as a compact ? In that light it
would be a perfect absurdity. It is true that, in general
and loose language, it is often said that the Government is a
compact, meaning the constitution which created it, and
vested it with authority to execute the powers contained in
the instrument ; but when the distinction is drawn between
the constitution and the Government, as the Senator has
done, it would be as ridiculous to call the Government a
compact, as to call an individual, appointed to execute the
provisions of a contract, a contract ; and not less so to sup
pose that there could be the slightest resemblance between
them. In connection with this point, the Senator, to prove
that the constitution is not a compact, asserts that it is
wholly independent of the State, and pointedly declares that
the States have not a right to touch a hair of its head ; and
this, with that provision in the constitution that three-
fourths of the States have a right to alter, change, amend,
or even to abolish it, staring him in the face. f

I have examined all of the arguments of the Senator
intended to prove that the constitution is not a compact ;
and I trust I have shown, by the clearest demonstration,
that his arguments are perfectly inconclusive, and that his
assertion is against the clearest and most solemn evidence —

280 SPEECHES.

evidence of record, and of such a character that it ought to
close his lips for ever.

I turn now to consider the other, and, apparently, contra
dictory aspect in which the Senator presented this part of
the subject : I mean that in which he states that the Gov
ernment is founded in compact, but is no longer a compact.
I have already remarked, that no other interpretation could
be given to this assertion, except that the constitution was
once a compact, but is no longer so. There was a vagueness
and indistinctness in this part of the Senator's argument,
which left me altogether uncertain as to its real meaning.
If he meant, as I presume he did, that the compact is an
executed, and not an executory one — that its object was to
create a government, and to invest it with proper authority
— and that, having executed this office, it had performed its
functions, and, with it, had ceased to exist, then we have the
extraordinary avowal that the constitution is a dead letter —
that it has ceased to have any binding effect, or any practical
influence or operation.

It has, indeed, often been charged that the constitution
has become a dead letter ; that it is continually violated, and
has lost all its control over the Government ; but no one has
ever before been bold enough to advance a theory on the
avowed basis that it was an executed, and, therefore, an
extinct instrument. I will not seriously attempt to refute
an argument, which, to me, appears so extravagant. I
had thought that the constitution was to endure for ever ;
and that, so far from its being an executed contract, it con
tained great trust powers for the benefit of those who created
it, and of all future generations, — which never could be
finally executed during the existence of the world, if our
Government should so long endure.

I will now return to the first resolution, to see how the
issue stands between the Senator from Massachusetts and
myself. It contains three propositions. First, that the

SPEECHES. 281

constitution is a compact ; second, that it was formed by
the States, constituting distinct communities ; and, lastly,
that it is a subsisting and binding compact between the
States. How do these three propositions now stand ? The
first, I trust, has been satisfactorily established ; the second,
the Senator has admitted, faintly, indeed, but still he has
admitted it to be true. This admission is something. It is
so much gained by discussion. Three years ago even this
was a contested point. But I cannot say that I thank him
for the admission : we owe it to the force of truth. The fact
that these States were declared to be free and independent
States at the time of their independence ; that they were
acknowledged to be so by Great Britain in the treaty which
terminated the war of the Kevolution, and secured their in
dependence ; that they were recognized in the same character
in the old articles of the confederation ; and, finally, that
the present constitution was formed by a convention of the
several States — afterwards submitted to them for their re
spective ratifications, and was ratified by them separately,
each for itself, and each, by its own act, binding its citizens,
— formed a body of facts too clear to be denied, and too
strong to be resisted.

It now remains to consider the third and last proposition
contained in the resolution — that it is a binding and a sub
sisting compact between the States. The Senator was not
explicit on this point. I understood him, however, as assert
ing that, though formed by the States, the constitution was
not binding between the States as distinct communities, but '
between the American people in the aggregate ; who, in
consequence of the adoption of the constitution, according
to the opinion of the Senator, became one people, at least
to the extent of the delegated powers. This would, indeed,
be a great change. All acknowledge that, previous to the
adoption of the constitution, the States constituted distinct
and independent communities, in full possession of their

282 SPEECHES.

sovereignty ; and, surely, if the adoption of the constitu
tion was intended to effect the great and important change
in their condition which the theory of the Senator supposes,
some evidence of it ought to be found in the instrument
itself. It professes to be a careful and full enumeration of
all the powers which the States delegated, and of every
modification of their political condition. The Senator said
that he looked to the constitution in order to ascertain its
real character ; and, surely, he ought to look to the same
instrument in order to ascertain what changes were, in fact,
made in the political condition of the States and the country.
But, with the exception of " we, the people of the United
States/' in the preamble, he has not pointed out a single
indication in the constitution, of the great change which, as
he conceives, has been effected in this respect.

Now, Sir, I intend to prove, that the only argument on
which the gentleman relies on this point, must utterly fail
him. I do not intend to go into a critical examination of
the expression of the preamble to which I have referred. I
do not deem it necessary. But if it were, it might be easily
shown that it is at least as applicable to my view of the
constitution as to that of the Senator ; and that the whole
of his argument on this point rests on the ambiguity of the
term thirteen United States ; which may mean certain ter
ritorial limits, comprehending within them the whole of the
States and Territories of the Union. In this sense, the
people of the United States may mean all the people living
within these limits, without reference to the States or Terri
tories in which they may reside, or of which they may be
citizens ; and it is in this sense only that the expression
gives the least countenance to the argument of the Senator.

But it may also mean, the States united, which inversion
alone, without further explanation, removes the ambiguity
to which I have referred. The expression, in this sense,
obviously means no more than to speak of the people of the

SPEECHES. 283

several States in their united and confederated capacity ;
and, if it were requisite, it might be shown that it is only in
this sense that the expression is used in the constitution.
But it is not necessary. A single argument will for ever
settle this point. Whatever may be the true meaning of
the expression, it is not applicable to the condition of the
States as they exist 'under the constitution, but as it was
under the old confederation, before its adoption. The consti
tution had not yet been adopted, and the States, in ordaining
it, could only speak of themselves in the condition in which
they then existed, and not in that in which they would exist
under the constitution. So that, if the argument of the
Senator proves any thing, it proves, not (as he supposes) that
the constitution forms the American people into an aggregate
mass of individuals, but that such was their political con
dition before its adoption, under the old confederation, di
rectly contrary to his argument in the previous part of this
discussion.

But I intend not to leave this important point, the last
refuge of those who advocate consolidation, even on this con
clusive argument. I have shown that the constitution
affords not the least evidence of the mighty change of the
political condition of the States and the country, which the
Senator supposed it effected ; and I intend now, by the most
decisive proof, drawn from the Instrument itself, to show
that no such change was intended, and that the people of
the States are united under it as States and not as individ
uals. On this point there is a very important part of the
constitution entirely and strangely overlooked by the Senator
in this debate, as it is expressed in the first resolution, which
furnishes conclusive evidence not only that the constitution
is a compact, but a subsisting compact, binding between the
States. I allude to the seventh article, which provides that
" the ratification of the conventions of nine States shall be
sufficient for the establishment of this constitution between

284 SPEECHES.

the States so ratifying the same." Yes, "between the States/'
These little words mean a volume — compacts, not laws, bind
/between States ; and it here binds, not as between individuals,
but between the States : the States ratifying ; implying, as
strong as language can make it, that the constitution is
what I have asserted it to be — a compact, ratified by the
States, and a subsisting compact, binding the States ratify
ing it.

But, Sir, I will not leave this point, all-important in es
tablishing the true theory of our Government, on this argu
ment alone, as demonstrative and conclusive as I hold it to
be. Another, not much less powerful, but of a different
character, may be drawn from the tenth amended article,
which provides that " the powers not delegated to the United
States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively or to the people."
The article of ratification, which I have just cited, informs
us that the constitution, which delegates powers, was ratified
by the States, and is binding between them. This informs
us to whom the powers are delegated, — a most important
fact in determining the point immediately at issue between
the Senator and myself. According to his views, the consti
tution created a union between individuals, if the solecism
may be allowed, and that it formed, at least to the extent of
the powers delegated, one people, and not a Federal Union
of the States, as I contend ; or, to express the same idea
differently, that the delegation of powers was to the Ameri
can people in the aggregate (for it is only by such delega
tion that they could be constituted one people), and not to
the United States, — directly contrary to the article just cited,
which declares that the powers are delegated to the United
States. And here it is worthy of notice, that the Senator
cannot shelter himself under the ambiguous phrase, " to the
people of the United States," under which he would certain
ly have taken refuge, had the constitution so expressed it ;

SPEECHES. 285

but, fortunately for the cause of truth and the great princi
ples of constitutional liberty for which I am contending,
"people" is omitted : thus making the delegation of power
clear and unequivocal to the United States, as distinct politi
cal communities, and conclusively proving that all the pow
ers delegated are reciprocally delegated by the States to each
other, as distinct political communities.

So much for the delegated powers. Now, as all admit,
and as it is expressly provided for in the constitution, the re
served powers are reserved " to the States respectively, or to
the people." None will pretend that, as far as they are con
cerned, we are one people, though the argument to prove it,
however absurd, would be far more plausible than that which
goes to show that we are one people to the extent of the
delegated powers. This reservation "to the people" might,
in the hands of subtle and trained logicians, be a peg to
hang a doubt upon ; and had the expression " to the people "
been connected, as fortunately it is not, with the delegated
instead of the reserved powers, we should not have heard of
this in the present discussion.

I have now established, I hope, beyond the power of
controversy, every allegation contained in the first resolu
tion — that the constitution is a compact formed by the peo
ple of the several States, as distinct political communities,
and subsisting and binding between the States in the same
character; which brings me to the consideration of the
consequences which may be fairly deduced, in reference to
the character of our political system, from these established
facts.

The first, and most important is, they conclusively estab
lish that ours is a federal system — a system of States ar
ranged in a Federal Union, each retaining its distinct exist
ence and sovereignty. Ours has every attribute which be
longs to a federative system. It is founded on compact ; it
is formed by sovereign communities, and is binding between

286 SPEECHES.

them in their sovereign capacity. I might appeal, in con
firmation of this assertion, to all elementary writers on the
subject of government, but will content myself with citing
one only : Burlamaqui, quoted with approbation by Judge
Tucker, in his Commentary on Blackstone, himself a high
authority, says :

[Here Mr. C. read from Tucker's Blackstone as follows) :

" Political bodies, whether great or small, if they are constituted by a
people formerly independent, and under no civil subjection, or by those
who justly claim independence from any civil power they were formerly
subject to, have the civil supremacy in themselves, and are in a state of
equal right and liberty with respect to all other States, whether great or
small. No regard is to be had in this matter to names, whether the body
politic be called a kingdom, an empire, a principality, a dukedom, a coun
try, a republic, or free town. If it can exercise justly all the essential
parts of civil power within itself, independently of any other person or
body politic, — and no other hath any right to rescind or annul its acts, — it
has the civil supremacy, how small soever its territory may be, or the
number of its people, and has all the rights of an Independent State.

" This independence of States, and their being distinct political bodies
from each other, is not obstructed by any alliance or confederacies what
soever, about exercising jointly any parts of the supreme powers, such as
those of peace and war, in league offensive and defensive. Two States,
notwithstanding such treaties, are separate bodies, and independent.

;' These are, then, only deemed politically united when some one per
son or council is constituted with a right to exercise some essential powers
for both, and to hinder either from exercising them separately. If any
person or council is empowered to exercise all these essential powers for
both, they are then one State : such is the State of England and Scotland,
since the act of union made at the beginning of the eighteenth century,
whereby the two kingdoms were incorporated into one, all parts of the
supreme power of both kingdoms being thenceforward united, and vested
in the three estates of the realm of Great Britain ; by which entire
coalition, though both kingdoms retain their ancient laws and usages
in many respects, they are as effectually united and incorporated as the
several petty kingdoms which composed the heptarchy were before that
period.

" But when only a portion of the supreme civil power is vested in one
person or council for both, such as that of peace and war, or of deciding
controversies between different States, or their subjects, while each within

SPEECHES. 287

itself exercises other parts of the supreme power, independently of all the
others — in this case they are called Systems of States , which Burlamaqui
defines to be an assemblage of perfect governments, strictly united by
some common bond, so that they seem to make but a single body with
respect to those affairs which interest them in common, though each pre
serves its sovereignty, full and entire, independently of all others. And
in this case, he adds, the confederate States engage to each other only to
exercise with common consent certain parts of the sovereignty, especially
that which relates to their mutual defence against foreign enemies. But
each of the confederates retains an entire liberty of exercising as it thinks
proper those parts of the sovereignty which are not mentioned in the
treaty of union, as parts that ought to be exercised in common. And of
this nature is the American confederacy, in which each State has resigned
the exercise of certain parts of the supreme civil power which they possessed
before (except in common with the other States included in the confedera
cy), reserving to themselves all their former powers, which are not dele
gated to the United States by the common bond of union.

" A visible distinction, and not less important, than obvious, occurs to
our observation in comparing these different kinds of union. The king
doms of England and Scotland are united into one kingdom ; and the two
contracting States, by such an incorporate union, are, in the opinion of
Judge Blackstone, totally annihilated, without any power of revival ; and
a third arises from their conjunction, in which all the rights of sovereign
ty, and particularly that of legislation, are vested. From whence he ex
presses a doubt whether any infringements of the fundamental and essen
tial conditions of the union would of itself dissolve the union of those
kingdoms ; though he readily admits that, in the case of a federate alli
ance, such an infringement would certainly rescind the compact between
the confederated States. In the United States of America, on the contra
ry, each State retains its own antecedent form of government ; its own
laws, subject to the alteration and control of its own legislature only ; its
own executive officers and council of State ; its own courts of judicature,
its own judges, its own magistrates, civil officers, and officers of the mi
litia ; and, in short, its own civil state, or body politic, in every respect
whatsoever. And by the express declaration of the 12th article of the
amendments to the constitution, the powers not delegated to the United
States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people. In Great Britain, a new civil
state is created by the annihilation of two antecedent civil states ; in the
American States, a general federal council and administration is provided
for the joint exercise of such of their several powers as can be more con
veniently exercised in that mode than any other, leaving their civil state

288 SPEECHES.

unaltered ; and all the other powers, which the States antecedently pos
sessed, to be exercised by them respectively, as if no union or connection
were established between them.

" The ancient Achaia seems to have been a confederacy founded upon a
similar plan ; each of those little States had its distinct possessions, terri
tories, and boundaries ; each had its Senate or Assembly, its magistrates
and judges ; and every State sent deputies to the general convention, and
had equal weight in all determinations. And most of the neighboring
States which, moved by fear of danger, acceded to this confederacy, had
reason to felicitate themselves.

" These confederacies, by which several States are united together by
a perpetual league of alliance, are chiefly founded upon this circumstance,
that each particular people choose to remain their own masters, and yet
are not strong enough to make head against a common enemy. The pur
port of such an agreement usually is, that they shall not exercise some
part of the sovereignty there specified without the general consent of each
other. For the leagues, to which these systems of States owe their rise,
seem distinguished from others (so frequent among different States) chiefly
by this consideration, that, in the latter, each confederate people deter
mine themselves, by their own judgment, to certain mutual performances,
yet so that in all other respects they design not in the least to make the
exercise of that part of the sovereignty, whence these performances pro
ceed, dependent on the consent of their allies, or to retrench any thing
from then* full and unlimited power of governing their own States. Thus
we see that ordinary treaties propose, for the most part, as their aim, only
some particular advantage of the States thus transacting — their interests
happening at present to fall in with each other — but do not produce any
lasting union as to the chief management of affairs. Such was the treaty
of alliance between America and France in the year 1778, by which,
among other articles, it was agreed that neither of the two parties should
conclude either truce or peace with Great Britain without the formal con
sent of the other first obtained, and whereby they mutually engaged not
to lay down their arms until the independence of the United States should
be formally or tacitly assured by the treaty or treaties which should ter
minate the war. Whereas, in these confederacies, of which we are now
speaking, the contrary is observable, they being established with this de
sign, that the several States shall for ever link their safety one with an
other, and, in order to their mutual defence, shall engage themselves not
to exercise certain parts of their sovereign power, otherwise than by a
common agreement and approbation. Such were the stipulations, among
others, contained in the articles of confederation and perpetual union be
tween American States, by which it was agreed that no State should.

SPEECHES. 289

without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, send any
embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into any conference,
agreement, alliance, or treaty with, any King, Prince, or State ; nor keep
up any vessels of war, or body of forces, in time of peace ; nor engage in
any war, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled,
unless actually invaded ; nor grant commissions to any ships of war, or
letters of marque and reprisal, except after a declaration of war by the
United States in Congress assembled, with several others ; yet each State
respectively retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every
power, jurisdiction, and right which is not expressly delegated to the
United States in Congress assembled. The promises made in these two
cases here compared run very differently ; in the former, thus : ' I will
join you in this particular war as a confederate, and the manner of our
attacking the enemy shall be concerted by our common advice ; nor will
we desist from war till the particular end thereof, the establishment of
the independence of the United States, be obtained.' In the latter, thus :
' None of us who have entered into this alliance will make use of our
right as to the affairs of war and peace, except by the general consent of
the whole confederacy.' We observed before that these unions submit
only some certain parts of the sovereignty to mutual direction; for it
seems hardly possible that the affairs of different States should have so
close a connection, as that all and each of them should look on it as
their interest to have no part of the chief government exercised with
out the general concurrence. The most convenient method, therefore,
seems to be, that the particular States reserve to themselves all those
branches of the supreme authority, the management of which can have
little or no influence in the affairs of the rest."

[Mr. Calhoun proceeded :]

If we compare our present system with the old confede
ration, which all acknowledge to have been federal in its
character, we shall find that it possesses all the attributes
which belong to that form of government as fully and com
pletely as that did. In fact, in this particular, there is but
a single difference, and that not essential, as regards the
point immediately under consideration, though very impor
tant in other respects. The confederation was the act of the
State governments, and formed a union of governments.
The present constitution is the act of the States themselves,
or, which is the same thing, of the people of the several
YOL. n.— 19

290 SPEECHES.

States, and forms a union of them as sovereign communities,
The States, previous to the adoption of the constitution,
were as separate and distinct political bodies as the govern
ments which represent them, and there is nothing in the na
ture of things to prevent them from uniting under a compact,
in a federal union, without being blended in one mass, any
more than uniting the governments themselves, in like man
ner, without merging them in a single government. To il
lustrate what I have stated by reference to ordinary trans
actions, the confederation was a contract between agents —
the present constitution a contract between the principals
themselves ; or, to take a more analogous case, one is a
league made by ambassadors ; the other, a league made by
sovereigns — the latter no more tending to unite the parties
into a single sovereignty than the former. The only difference
is in the solemnity of the act and the force of the obligation.

There, indeed, results a most important difference, un
der our theory of government, as to the nature and character
of the act itself, whether executed by the States themselves,
or by their governments : but a result, as I have already
stated, not at all affecting the question under consideration,
but which will throw much light on a subject, in relation to
which, I must think the Senator from Massachusetts has
formed very confused conceptions.

The Senator dwelt much on the point that the present
system is a constitution and a government, in contradistinc
tion to the old confederation, with a view of proving that the
constitution was not a compact. Now, I concede to the Sen
ator that our present system is a constitution and a govern
ment ; and that the former, the old confederation, was not
a constitution or government : not, however, for the reason
which he assigned, that the former was a compact, and the
latter not, but from the difference of the origin from which
the two compacts are derived. According to our American
conception, the people alone can form constitutions or gov-

SPEECHES. 291

ermnents, and not their agents. It is this difference, and
this alone, which makes the distinction. Had the old con
federation been the act of the people of the several States,
and not of their governments, that instrument, imperfect as
it was, would have been a constitution, and the agency
which it created to execute its powers, a government. This is
the true cause of the difference between the two acts, and not
that, in regard to which the Senator seems to be bewildered.

There is another point on which this difference throws
important light, and which has been frequently referred to
in debate on this and former occasions. I refer to the ex
pression in the preamble of the constitution, which speaks
of "forming a more perfect union/' and in the letter of
General Washington, laying the draught of the Convention
before the old Congress, in which he speaks of " consolidating
the Union ; " both of which I conceive to refer simply to the
fact that the present Union, as already stated, is a union
between the States themselves, and not a union like that
which had existed between the governments of the States.

We will now proceed to consider some of the conclusions
which necessarily follow from the facts and positions already
established. They enable us to decide a question of vital
importance under our system : Where does sovereignty re
side ? If I have succeeded in establishing the fact that ours
is a federal system, as I conceive I conclusively have, that
fact of itself determines the question which I have proposed.
It is of the very essence of such a system, that the sovereignty
is in the parts, and not in the whole • or, to use the language
of Mr. Palgrave, the parts are the units in such a system,
and the whole the multiple ; and not the whole the unit
and the parts the fractions. Ours, then, is a government of
twenty-four sovereignties, united by a constitutional compact,
for the purpose of exercising certain powers through a com
mon government as their joint agent, and not a union of the
twenty-four sovereignties into one, which, according to the

292 SPEECHES.

language of the Virginia Kesolutions, already cited, would
form a consolidation. And here I must express my surprise
that the Senator from Virginia should avow himself the ad
vocate of these very resolutions, when he distinctly maintains
the idea of a union of the States in one sovereignty, which
is expressly condemned by those resolutions as the essence of
a consolidated government.

Another consequence is equally clear, that^/whatever mod
ifications were made in the condition of the States under the
present constitution, they extended only to the exercise of
their powers by compact, and not to the sovereignty itself,
and are such as sovereigns are competent to make : it being
a conceded point, that it is competent to them to" stipulate to
exercise their powers in a particular manner, or to abstain
altogether from their exercise, or to delegate them to agents,
without in any degree impairing sovereignty itself. The
plain state of the facts, as regards our Government, is, that
these States have agreed by compact to exercise their sover
eign powers jointly, as already stated ; and that, for this
purpose, they have ratified the compact in their sovereign
capacity, thereby making it the constitution of each State,
in nowise distinguished from their own separate constitutions,
but in the superadded obligation of compact — of faith mu
tually pledged to each other. In this compact, they have
stipulated, among other things, that it may be amended by
three-fourths of the States : that is, they have conceded to
each other by compact the right to add new powers or to
subtract old, by the consent of that proportion of the States,
without requiring, as otherwise would have been the case,
the consent of all : a modification no more inconsistent, as
has been supposed, with their sovereignty, than any other
contained in the compact. In fact, the provision to which I
allude furnishes strong evidence that the sovereignty is, as I
contend, in the States severally, as the amendments are
effected, not by any one three-fourths, but by any three-

SPEECHES. 293

fourths of the States, indicating that the sovereignty is in
each of the States.

If these views be correct, it follows, as a matter of course,
that the allegiance of the people is to their several States, \
and that treason consists in resistance to the joint authority
of the States united, not, as has heen absurdly contended, in \
resistance to the Government of the United States/^hich, by
the provision of the constitution, has only the right of pun
ishing.

These conclusions have all a most important bearing on
that monstrous and despotic bill which, to the disgrace of
the Senate and the age, has passed this body. I have still a
right thus to speak .without violating the rules of order, as it
is not yet a law. (These conclusions show that the States can
violate no law ; that they neither are, nor, in the nature of
things can be under the dominion of the law ; that the worst
that can be imputed to them is a violation of compact, for
which they, and not their citizens, are responsible 5 and that,
to undertake to punish a State by law, or to hold the citizens
responsible for the acts of the State, which they are on their
allegiance bound to obey, and liable to be punished as traitors
for disobeying, is a cruelty unheard of among civilized na
tions, and destructive of every principle upon which our
Government is founded. It is, in short, a ruthless and com
plete revolution of our entire system.

I was desirous to present these views fully before the
passage of this long-to-be-lamented bill, but as I was pre
vented by the majority, as I have stated at the commence
ment of my remarks, I trust that it is not yet too late.

Having now said what I intended in relation to my first
resolution, both in reply to the Senator from Massachusetts,
and in vindication of its correctness, I will now proceed to
consider the conclusions drawn from it in the second resolu
tion — that the General Government is not the exclusive and
final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to it, but

294 SPEECHES.

that the States, as parties to the compact, have a right to
judge, in the last resort, of the infractions of the compact,
and of the mode and measure of redress.

It can scarcely be necessary, before so enlightened a body,
to premise that our system comprehends two distinct govern
ments — the General and State Governments, which, prop
erly considered, form but one. The former representing the
joint authority of the States in their confederate capacity,
and the latter that of each State separately. I have pre
mised this fact simply with a view of presenting distinctly
the answer to the argument offered by the Senator from
Massachusetts to prove that the General Government has a
final and exclusive right to judge, not only of its delegated
powers, but also of those reserved to the States. That gen
tleman relies for his main argument on the assertion that a
government, which he defines to be an organized body,
endowed with both will, and power, and authority in proprio
vigore to execute its purpose, has a right inherently to judge
of its powers. 'It is not my intention to comment upon the
definition of the Senator, though it would not be difficult to
show that his ideas of government are not very American.
My object is to deal with the conclusion, and not the defi
nition. Admit, then, that the Government has the right of
judging of its powers, for which he contends. How, then,
will he withhold, upon his own principle, the right of judging
from the State Governments, which he has attributed to the
General Government ? If it belongs to one, on his principle
it belongs to both ; and if to both, when they differ, the veto,
so abhorred by the Senator, is the necessary result : as neither,
if the right be possessed by both, can control the other.

The Senator felt the force of this argument, and, in order
to sustain his main position, he fell back on that clause of
the constitution which provides that " this constitution, and
the laws made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme
law of the land."

SPEECHES. 295

This is admitted — no one has ever denied that the con
stitution, and the laws made in pursuance of it, are of para
mount authority. But it is equally undeniable that laws not
made in pursuance are not only not of paramount authority,
but are of no authority whatever, being of themselves null
and void ; which presents the question. Who are to judge
whether the laws be or be not pursuant to the constitution ?
and thus the difficulty, instead of being taken away, is re
moved but one step further back. This the Senator also felt,
and has attempted to overcome, by setting up, on the part of
Congress and the judiciary, the final and exclusive right of
judging, both for the Federal Government and the States, as
to the extent of their respective powers. That I may do full
justice to the gentleman, I will give his doctrine in his own
words. He states,

': That there is a supreme law, composed of the constitution, the laws
passed in pursuance of it, and the treaties ; but in cases coming before
Congress, not assuming the shape of cases in law and equity, so as to be
subjects of judicial discussion, Congress must interpret the constitution so
often as it has occasion to pass laws ; and in cases capable of assuming a
judicial shape, the Supreme Court must be the final interpreter."

Now, passing over this vague and loose phraseology, I
would ask the Senator upon what principle can he concede
this extensive power to the legislative and judicial depart
ments, and withhold it entirely from the Executive ? If one
has the right it cannot be withheld from the other. I would
also ask him on what principle — if the departments of the
General Government are to possess the right of judging,
finally and conclusively, of their respective powers — on what
principle can the same right be withheld from the State
Governments, which, as well as the General Government,
properly considered, are but departments of the same general
system, and form together, properly speaking, but one gov
ernment ? This was a favorite idea of Mr. Macon, for whose
wisdom I have a respect increasing with my experience,

296 SPEECHES.

and who I have frequently heard say, that most of the mis
conceptions and errors in relation to our system originated
in forgetting that they were but parts of the same system.
I would further tell the Senator, that, if this right be with
held from the State Governments ; if this restraining influ
ence, by which the General Government is confined to its
proper sphere, be withdrawn, then that department of the
Government from which he has withheld the right of judg
ing of its own powers (the Executive) will, so far from being
excluded, become the sole interpreter of the powers of the
Government. It is the armed interpreter, with powers to
execute its own construction, and without the aid of which
the construction of the other departments will be impo
tent.

But I contend that the States have a far clearer right
to the sole construction of their powers than any of the
departments of the Federal Government can have. This
power is expressly reserved, as I have stated on another
occasion, not only against the several departments of the
General Government, but against the United States them
selves. I will not repeat the arguments which I then offered
on this point, and which remain unanswered, but I must be
permitted to offer strong additional proof of the views then
taken, and which, if I ana not mistaken, are conclusive on
this point. It is drawn from the ratification of the consti
tution by Virginia, and is in the following words.

[Mr. C. then read as follows :]

" We, the delegates of the people of Virginia, duty elected in pursuance
of a recommendation from the General Assembly, and now met in Con
vention, having fully and freely investigated and discussed the proceed
ings of the Federal Convention, and being prepared, as well as the most
mature deliberation hath enabled us, to decide thereon, do, in the name
and in behalf of the people of Virginia, declare and make known that the
powers granted under the constitution, being derived from the people of
the United States, may be resumed by them whensoever the same shall
be perverted to their injury or oppression, and that every power not

SPEECHES. 297

granted thereby remains with them, and at their will ; that, therefore, no
right of any denomination can be cancelled, abridged, restrained, or mod
ified by the Congress, by the Senate or House of Representatives, acting
in any capacity, by the President or any department or officer of the
United States, except in those instances in which power is given by the
constitution for those purposes ; and that, among other essential rights,
the liberty of conscience and of the press cannot be cancelled, abridged,
restrained, or modified by any authority of the United States. With
these impressions, with a solemn appeal to the Searcher of all hearts for
the purity of our intentions, and under the conviction that whatsoever
imperfections may exist in the constitution ought rather to be examined
in the mode prescribed therein, than to bring the Union in danger by a
delay, with the hope of obtaining amendments previous to the ratification
— we, the said delegates, in the name and in the behalf of the people of
Virginia, do, by these presents, assent to and ratify the constitution recom
mended on the 17th day of September, 1787, by the Federal Convention,
for the government of the United States, hereby announcing to all those
whom it may concern, that the said constitution is binding upon the said
people, according to an authentic copy hereto annexed, in the words fol
lowing," &c.

It thus appears that this sagacious State (I fear, how
ever, that her sagacity is not so sharpsighted now as for
merly) ratified the constitution, with an explanation as to
her reserved powers ; that they were powers subject to her
own will, and reserved against every department of the
General Government — legislative, executive and judicial —
as if she had a prophetic knowledge of the attempts now
made to impair and destroy them : which explanation can
be considered in no other light than as containing a condition
on which she ratified, and, in fact, making part of the con
stitution of the United States — extending as well to the
other States as herself. I am no lawyer, and it may appear
to be presumption in me to lay down the rule of law which
governs in such cases, in a controversy with so distinguished
an advocate as the Senator from Massachusetts. But I
shall venture to lay it down as a rule in such cases, which
I have no fear that the gentleman will contradict, that, in
case of a contract between several partners, if the entrance

298 SPEECHES.

of one on condition be admitted, the condition enures to
the benefit of all the partners. But I do not rest the argu
ment simply upon this view : Virginia proposed the tenth
amended article, the one in question, and her ratification
must be at least received as the highest evidence of its true
meaning and interpretation.

If these views be correct — and I do not see how they can
be resisted — the rights of the States to judge of the extent
of their reserved powers stands on the most solid foundation,
and is good against every department of the General Gov
ernment ; and the judiciary is as much excluded from an
interference with the reserved powers as the legislative or
executive departments. To establish the opposite, the Sen
ator relies upon the authority of Mr. Madison, in the Federal
ist, to prove that it was intended to invest the court with
the power in question. In reply, I will meet Mr. Madison
with his own opinion, given on a most solemn occasion, and
backed by the sagacious commonwealth of Virginia. The
opinion to which I allude will be found in the celebrated
report of 1799, of which Mr. Madison was the author. It

" But it is objected, that the JUDICIAL AUTHORITY is to be regarded as
the sole expositor of the constitution in the last resort j and it may be
asked for what reason, the declaration by the General Assembly, suppos
ing it to be theoretically true, could be required at the present day, and
in so solemn a manner.

" On this objection it might be observed, first, that there may be in
stances of usurped power, which the forms of the constitution would
never draw within the control of the judicial department; secondly, that,
if the decision of the judiciary be raised above the authority of the sove
reign parties to the constitution, the decisions of the other departments,
not carried by the forms of the constitution before the judiciary, must be
equally authoritative and final as the decisions of this department. But
the proper answer to this objection is, that the resolution of the General As
sembly relates to those great and extraordinary cases in which all the forms
of the Constitution may prove ineffectual against infractions dangerous to
the essential rights of the parties to it. The resolution supposes that

SPEECHES. 299

dangerous powers, not delegated, may not only be usurped and executed
by the other departments, but that the judicial department, also, may ex
ercise or sanction dangerous powers beyond the grant of the constitu
tion ; and, consequently, that the ultimate right of the parties to the con
stitution to judge whether the compact was dangerously violated, must ex
tend to violations by one delegated authority as well as by another ; by
the judiciary as well as by the executive or the legislative."

The Senator also relies upon the authority of Luther
Martin to the same point, to which I have already replied so
fully on another occasion (in answer to the Senator from Del
aware, Mr. Clayton), that I do not deem it necessary to add
any further remarks on the present occasion.

But why should I waste words in reply to these or any
other authorities, when it has been so clearly established that
the rights of the States are reserved against each and every
department of the Government, and no authority in oppo
sition can possibly shake a position so well established ? Nor
do I think it necessary to repeat the argument which I of-
ferred when the bill was under discussion, to show that the
clause in the constitution which provides that the judicial
power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under
this constitution, and to the laws and treaties made under
its authority, has no bearing on the point in controversy ;
and that even the boasted power of the Supreme Court to
decide a law to be unconstitutional, so far from being derived
from this or any other portion of the constitution, results
from the necessity of the case — where two rules of unequal
authority come in conflict — and is a power belonging to all
courts, superior and inferior, State and General, Domestic
and Foreign.

I have now, I trust, shown satisfactorily, that there is no
provision in the constitution to authorize the General Gov
ernment, through any of its departments, to control the ac
tion of a State within the sphere of its reserved powers ; and
that, of course, according to the principle laid down by the
Senator from Massachusetts himself, the government of tho

300 SPEECHES.

States, as well as the General Government, has the right to
determine the extent of their respective powers, without the
right on the part of either to control the other. The neces
sary result is the veto, to which he so much objects ; and to
get clear of which, he informs us, was the object for which
the present constitution was formed. I know not whence he
has derived his information, but my impression is very differ
ent as to the immediate motives which led to the formation
of that instrument. I have always understood that the prin
cipal was, to give to Congress the power to regulate commerce,
to lay impost duties, and to raise a revenue for the payment
of the public debt and the expenses of the Government ; and
to subject the action of the citizens individually to the ope
ration of the laws, as a substitute for force. If the object
had been to get clear of the veto of the States, as the Sena
tor states, the Convention certainly performed their work in
a most bungling manner. There was unquestionably a large
party in that body, headed by men of distinguished talents
and influence, who commenced early and worked earnestly to
the last, to deprive the States — not directly, for that would
have been too bold an attempt, but indirectly — of the veto.
The good sense of the Convention, however, put down every
effort, however disguised and perseveringly made. I do not
deem it necessary to give, from the journals, the history of
these various and unsuccessful attempts — though it would af
ford a very instructive lesson. It is sufficient to say that it
was attempted by proposing to give Congress power to annul
the acts of the States which they might deem inconsistent
with the constitution ; to give to the President the power of
appointing the governors of the States, with a view of veto
ing State laws through his authority ; and, finally, to give to
the judiciary the power to decide controversies between the
States and the General Government : all of which failed —
fortunately for the liberty of the country — utterly and en
tirely failed ; and in their failure we have the strongest evi-

SPEECHES. 301

dence that it was not the intention of the Convention to de
prive the States of the veto power. Had the attempt to
deprive them of this power been directly made, and failed,
every one would have seen and felt that it would furnish con
clusive evidence in favor of its existence. Now, I would ask,
What possible difference can it make in what form this at
tempt was made ? whether by attempting to confer on the
General Government a power incompatible with the exercise
of the veto on the part of the States, or by attempting directly
to deprive them of the right to exercise it ? We have thus di
rect and strong proof that, in the opinion of the Convention,
the States, unless deprived of it, possess the veto power —
or, what is another name for the same thing, the right of
nullification. I know that there is a diversity of opinion
among the friends of State Eights in regard to this power,
which I regret, as I cannot but consider it as a power essen
tial to the protection of the minor and local interests of the
community, and the liberty and the union of the country.
It is the very shield of State Rights, and the only power
by which that system of injustice against which we have con
tended for more than thirteen years can be arrested : a sys
tem of hostile legislation — of plundering by law, which must
necessarily lead to a conflict of arms if not prevented.

But I rest the right of a State to judge of the extent of
its reserved powers, in the last resort, on higher grounds —
that the constitution is a compact, to which the States are
parties in their sovereign capacity ; and that, as in all other
cases of compact between parties having no common umpire,
each has a right to judge for itself. To the truth of this
proposition the Senator from Massachusetts has himself as
sented, if the constitution itself be a compact — and that it
is, I have shown, I trust, beyond the possibility of a doubt.
Having established this point, I now claim, as I stated I
would do in the course of the discussion, the admissions of the
Senator, and, among them, the right of secession and nulli-

302 SPEECHES.

fication, which he conceded would necessarily follow if the
constitution be indeed a compact.

I have now replied to the arguments of the Senator from
Massachusetts so far as they directly apply to the resolutions,
and will, in conclusion, notice some of his general and de
tached remarks. To prove that ours is a consolidated gov
ernment, and that there is an immediate connection between
the Government and the citizen, he relies on the fact that
the laws act directly on individuals. That such is the case
I will not deny ; but I am very far from conceding the point
that it affords the decisive proof, or even any proof at all, of
the position which the Senator wishes to maintain. I hold it to
be perfectly within the competency of two or more States to
subject their citizens, in certain cases, to the direct action of
each other, without surrendering or impairing their sover
eignty. I recollect, while I was a member of Mr. Monroe's
cabinet, a proposition was submitted by the British Govern
ment to permit a mutual right of search and seizure, on the
part of each government, of the citizens of the other, oti
board of vessels engaged in the slave-trade, and to establish
a joint tribunal for their trial and punishment. The propo
sition was declined, not because it would impair the sover
eignty of either, but on the ground of general expediency,
and because it would be incompatible with the provisions of
the constitution which establish the judicial power, and which
provisions require the judges to be appointed by the President
and Senate. If I am not mistaken, propositions of the
same kind were made and acceded to by some of the Conti
nental powers.

With the same view, the Senator cited the suability of
the States as evidence of their want of sovereignty ; at which
I must express my surprise, coming from the quarter it
does. No one knows better than the Senator that it is per
fectly within the competency of a sovereign State to permit
itself to be sued. We have on the statute-book a standing

SPEECHES. 303

law, under which the United States may be sued in certain
land cases. If the provision in the constitution on this point
proves any thing, it proves, by the extreme jealousy with
which the right of suing a State is permitted, the very re
verse of that for which the Senator contends.

Among other objections to the views of the constitution
for which I contend, it is said that they are novel. I hold
this to be a great mistake. The novelty is not on my side,
but on that of the Senator from Massachusetts. The doc
trine of consolidation which he maintains is of recent growth.
It is not the doctrine of Hamilton, Ames, or any of the dis
tinguished federalists of the period, all of whom strenuously
maintained the federative character of the constitution,
though they were accused of supporting a system of policy
which would necessarily lead to consolidation. The first dis
closure of that doctrine was in the case of M'Culloch ; in
which the Supreme Court held the doctrine, though wrapped
up in language somewhat indistinct and ambiguous. The
next, and more open avowal, was by the Senator of Massa
chusetts himself, about three years ago, in the debate on
Footers resolution. The first official annunciation of the doc
trine was in the recent proclamation of the President, of
which the bill that has recently passed this body is the
bitter fruit.

It is further objected by the Senator from Massachusetts,
and others, against the doctrine of State Eights, as main
tained in this debate, that, if it should prevail the peace of
the country would be destroyed. But what if it should not
prevail ? Would there be peace ? Yes, the peace of des
potism : that peace which is enforced by the bayonet and
the sword ; the peace of death, where all the vital functions
of liberty have ceased. It is this peace which the doctrine
of State sovereignty may disturb by that conflict, which in
every free State, if properly organized, necessarily exists be
tween liberty and power ; but which, if restrained within

304 SPEECHES.

proper limits, gives a salutary exercise to our moral and in
tellectual faculties. In the case of Carolina, which has
caused all this discussion, who does not see, if the effusion
of blood be prevented, that the excitement, the agitation,
and the inquiry which it has caused, will be followed by
the most beneficial consequences ? The country had sunk
into avarice, intrigue, and electioneering — from winch nothing
but some such event could rouse it, or restore those honest
and patriotic feelings which had almost disappeared under
their baneful influence. What government has ever attained
power and distinction without such conflicts ? Look at the
degraded state of all those nations where they have been put
down by the iron arm of the government.

I, for my part, have no fear of any dangerous conflict,
under the fullest acknowledgment of State sovereignty : the
very fact that the States may interpose will produce modera
tion and justice. The General Government will abstain
from the exercise of any power in which they may suppose
three-fourths of the States will not sustain them ; while, on
the other hand, the States will not interpose but on the con
viction that they will be supported by one-fourth of their co-
States. Moderation and justice will produce confidence, at
tachment, and patriotism ; and these, in turn, will offer
most powerful barriers against the excess of conflicts between
the States and the General Government.

But we are told that, should the doctrine prevail, the
present system would be as bad, if not worse, than the old
confederation. I regard the assertion only as evidence of
that extravagance of declaration in which, from excitement
of feeling, we so often indulge. Admit the power, and still
the present system would be as far removed from the weak
ness of the old confederation as it would be from the lawless
and despotic violence of consolidation. So far from being the
same, the difference between the confederation and the present
constitution would still be most strongly marked. If there

SPEECHES. 305

were no other distinction, the fact that the former required
the concurrence of the States to execute its acts, and the
latter, the act of a State to arrest them, would make a dis
tinction as broad as the ocean. In the former, the vis inertice
of our nature is in opposition to the action of the system.
Not to act was to defeat. In the latter, the same principle
is on the opposite side — action is required to defeat. He
who understands human nature will see in this fact alone, the 0
difference between a feeble and ilj^-contrived confederation, v
and the restrained energy of a federal system. Of the same
character is the objection that the doctrine will be the source
of weakness. If we look to mere organization and physical
power as the only source of strength, without taking into the
estimate the operation of moral causes, such would appear
to be the fact ; but if we take into the estimate the latter,
we shall find that those governments have the greatest
strength in which power has been most efficiently checked. ^
The government of Borne furnishes a memorable example.
There, two independent and distinct powers existed — the peo
ple acting by tribes, in which the Plebeians prevailed, and
by centuries, in which the Patricians ruled. The Tribunes
were the appointed representatives of the one power, and the
Senate of the other ; each possessed of the authority of
checking and overruling one another, not as departments of
the government, as supposed by the Senator from Massachu
setts, but as independent powers — as much so as the State
and General Governments. A shallow observer would per
ceive, in such an organization, nothing but the perpetual
source of anarchy, discord, and weakness ; and yet, experi
ence has proved that it was the most powerful government
that ever existed ; and reason teaches that this power was
derived from the very circumstance which hasty reflection
would consider the cause of weakness. I will venture an as
sertion, which may be considered extravagant, but in which
history will fully bear me out, that we have no knowledge
VOL. n.— 20

306 SPEECHES.

of any people where the power of arresting the improper
acts of the government, or what may be called the negative
power of government, was too strong, — except Poland, where
every freeman possessed a veto. But even there, although
it existed in so extravagant a form, it was the source of the
highest and most lofty attachment to liberty, and the most
heroic courage : qualities that more than once saved Europe
from the domination of the crescent and cimeter. It is
worthy of remark, that the fate of Poland is not to be attri
buted so much to the excess of this negative power of itself,
as to the facility which it afforded to foreign influence in con
trolling its political movements.

I am not surprised that, with the idea of a perfect
government which the Senator from Massachusetts has form
ed — a government of an absolute majority, unchecked and
unrestrained, operating through a representative body-
he should be so much shocked with what, he is pleased to
call, the absurdity of the State veto. But let me tell him
that his scheme of a perfect government, as beautiful as he
conceives it to be, though often tried, has invariably failed,
— has always run, whenever tried, through the same uni
form process of faction, corruption, anarchy, and despotism.
He considers the representative principle as the great modern
improvement in legislation, and of itself sufficient to secure
liberty. I cannot regard it in the light in which he does.
Instead of modern, it is of remote origin, and has existed, in
greater or less perfection, in every free State, from the re.-
motest antiquity. Nor do I consider it as of itself sufficient
to secure liberty, though I regard it as one of the indis
pensable means — the means of securing the people against
the tyranny and oppression of their rulers. To secure
liberty, another means is still necessary — the means of secur
ing the different portions of society against the injustice and
oppression of each other, which can only be effected by
veto, interposition, or nullification, or by whatever name

SPEECHES. 307

the restraining or negative power of government may be
called.

The Senator appears to be enamored with his conception
of a consolidated government, and avows himself to be pre
pared, seeking no lead, to rush, in its defence, to the front
rank, where the blows fall heaviest and thickest. I admire
Ins gallantry and courage, but I will tell him that he will
find in the opposite ranks, under the flag of liberty, spirits
as gallant as his own ; and that experience will teach him
it is infinitely easier to carry on the war of legislative ex
actions by bills and enactments, than to extort by sword and
bayonet from the brave and the free.

The bill which has passed this body is intended to decide
this great controversy between the view of our Government
entertained by the Senator and those who act with him, and
that supported on our side. It has merged the tariff, and
all other questions connected with it, in the higher and di
rect issue which it presents between the federal and national
system of governments. I consider the bill as far worse, and
more dangerous to liberty, than the tariff. It has been most
wantonly passed, when its avowed object no longer justified
it. I consider it as chains forged and fitted to the limbs of
the States, and hung up to be used when occasion may re
quire. We are told, in order to justify the passage of this
fatal measure, that it was necessary to present the olive-
branch with one hand and the sword with the other. We
scorn the alternative. You have no right to present the
sword. The constitution never put the instrument in your
hands to be employed against a State ; and as to the olive-
branch, whether we receive it or not will not depend on your
menace, but on our own estimate of what is due to ourselves
and the rest of the community in reference to the difficult
subject on which we have taken issue.

The Senator from Massachusetts has struggled hard to
sustain his cause, but the load was too heavy for him to bear.

308 SPEECHES.

I am not surprised at the ardor and zeal with, which he has
entered into the controversy. It is ,a great struggle between
power and liberty — power on the side of the North, and lib
erty on the side of the South. But, while I am not sur
prised at the part which the Senator from Massachusetts has
taken, I must express my amazement at the principles ad
vanced by the Senator from Georgia, nearest me (Mr. For-
syth). I had supposed it was impossible that one of hie ex
perience and sagacity should not perceive the new and dan
gerous direction which this controversy is about to take. For
the first time, we have heard an ominous reference to a pro
vision in the constitution which I have never known to be
before alluded to in discussion, or in connection with any of
our measures. I refer to that provision in the constitution
in which the General Government guarantees a republican
form of government to the States — a power which hereafter,
if not rigidly restricted to the objects intended by the con
stitution, is destined to be a pretext to interfere with our po
litical affairs and domestic institutions in a manner infinitely
more dangerous than any other power which has ever been
exercised on the part of the General Government. I had
supposed that every Southern Senator, at least, would have
been awake to the danger which menaces us from this new
quarter ; and that no sentiment would be uttered, on their
part, calculated to countenance the exercise of this danger
ous power. With these impressions, I heard the Senator,
with amazement, alluding to Carolina as furnishing a case
which called for the enforcement of this guarantee. Does he
not see the hazard of the indefinite extension of so fatal a
power ? There exists in every Southern State a domestic
institution, which would require a far less bold construction
to consider the government of every State in that quarter,
not to be republican, and, of course, to demand, on the part
of this Government, the suppression of the institution to
which I allude, in fulfilment of the guarantee. I believe

SPEECHES. 309

there are now no hostile feelings combined with political con
sideration s, in any section, connected with this delicate sub
ject. But it requires no stretch of the imagination to see
the danger which must one day come, if not vigilantly
watched. With the rapid strides with which this Govern
ment is advancing to power, a time will come, and that not
far distant, when petitions will be received from the quar
ter to which I allude for protection — when the faith of the
guarantee will be, at least, as applicable to that case as the
Senator from Georgia now thinks it is to Carolina. Unless
his doctrine be opposed by united and firm resistance, its
ultimate effect will be to drive the white population from the
Southern Atlantic States.

SPEECH

On the Removal of the Public Deposits from the Bank
of the United States, delivered in the Senate, Jan
uary 13th, 1834.

[THE Special Order now came up, the question being on Mr. Clay's
resolutions in regard to the removal of the Public Deposits.]

MR. CALHOUN said, that the statement of this case might
be given in a very few words. The 16th section of the act
incorporating the Bank, provides that, wherever there is a
bank or branch of the United States Bank, the public moneys
should be deposited therein, unless otherwise ordered by the
Secretary of the Treasury ; and that, in such case, he should
report to Congress, if in session, immediately ; and if not, at
the commencement of the next session. The Secretary, act
ing under the provisions of this section, has ordered the de-

310 SPEECHES

posits to be withheld from the Bank, and has reported his
reasons, in conformity with the provisions of the section.
The Senate is now called upon to consider his reasons, in or
der to determine whether the Secretary is justified or not.
I have examined them with care and deliberation, without
the slightest bias, as far as I am conscious, personal or polit
ical. I have but a slight acquaintance with the Secretary,
and that little is not unfavorable to him. I stand wholly
disconnected with the two great parties now contending for
ascendency. My political connections are with that small and
denounced party which has voluntarily retired from the party
strifes of the day, with a view of saving, if possible, the lib
erty and the constitution of the country, in this great crisis
of our affairs.

Having maturely considered, with these impartial feel
ings, the reasons of the Secretary, I am constrained to say
that he has entirely failed to make out his justification. At
the very commencement, he has placed his right to remove
the deposits on an assumption resting on a misconception of
the case. In the progress of his argument he has entirely
abandoned the first, and assumed a new and greatly enlarged
ground, utterly inconsistent with the first, and equally un
tenable ; and yet, as broad as his assumptions are, there is
an important part of the transaction which he does not at
tempt to vindicate, and to which he has not even alluded. I
shall, said Mr. Calhoun, now proceed, without further re
mark, to make good these assertions.

The Secretary, at the commencement of his argument,
assumes the position that, in the absence of all legal provi
sion, he, as the head of the financial department, had the
right, in virtue of his office, to designate the agent and place
for the safe-keeping of the public deposits. He then con
tends that the 16th section does not restrict his power, which
stands, he says, on the same ground as before the passing of
the act incorporating the Bank. It is not necessary to inquire

SPEECHES. 311

into the correctness of the position assumed by the Secreta
ry ; but, if it were, it would not be difficult to show, that
when an agent, with general powers, assumes, in the execu
tion of his agency, a power not delegated, the assumption
rests on the necessity of the case ; and that no power, in
such case, can be lawfully exercised, which was not necessary
to effect the object intended. Nor would it be difficult to
show that, in this case, the power assumed by the Secretary
would belong, not to him, but to the Treasurer ; who, under the
act organizing the Treasury Department, is expressly charged
with the safe-keeping of the public funds, for which he is re
sponsible under bond, in heavy penalties. But as strongly and
directly as these considerations bear on the question of the
power of the Secretary, I do not think it necessary to pursue
them, for the plain reason that the Secretary has entirely
mistaken the case. It is not a case, as he supposes, where
there is no legal provision in relation to the safe-keeping of
the public funds, but one of precisely the opposite character.
The 16th section expressly provides that the deposits shall
be made in the Bank and its branches ; and, of course, it is
perfectly clear that all powers which the Secretary has de
rived from the general and inherent powers of his office, in
the absence of such provision, are wholly inapplicable to this
case. Nor is it less clear that, if the section had terminated
with the provision directing the deposits to be made in the
Bank, the Secretary would have had no more control over
the subject than myself, or any other Senator ; and it fol
lows, of course, that he must derive his power, not from any
general reasons connected with the nature of his office, but
from some express provisions contained in the section, or
some other part of the act. It has not been attempted to
be shown that there is any such provision in any other sec
tion or part of the act. The only control, then, which the
Secretary can rightfully claim over the deposits is contained
in the provision which directs that the deposits shall be made

312 SPEECHES.

in the Bank, unless otherwise ordered by the Secretary of
the Treasury ; which brings the whole question in reference
to the deposits, to the extent of the power which Congress
intended to confer upon the Secretary, in these few words,
"unless otherwise ordered/'

In ascertaining the intention of Congress, I lay it down
as a rule, which I suppose will not be controverted, that all
political powers, under our free institutions, are trust powers,
and not rights, liberties, or immunities, belonging personally
to the officer. I also lay it down as a rule not less incontro
vertible, that trust powers are necessarily limited (unless
there be some express provision to the contrary) to the sub
ject-matter and object of the trust. This brings us to the
question, What is the subject and object of the trust in this
case ? The whole section relates to deposits — to the safe
and faithful keeping of the public funds. With this view
they are directed to be made in the Bank. With the same
view, and in order to increase the security, power was
conferred on the Secretary to withhold the deposits ; and
with the same view, he is directed to report his reasons for
the removal, to Congress. All have one common object, the
security of the public funds. To this point the whole sec
tion converges. The language of Congress, fairly understood,
is, We have selected the Bank because we confide in it as a
safe and faithful agent to keep the public money ; but, to
prevent the abuse of so important a trust, we invest the Sec
retary with power to remove the deposits, with a view to
their increased security. And lest the Secretary, on his
part, should abuse so important a trust, and in order still
further to increase that security, we direct, in case of re
moval, that he shall report his reasons. It is obvious, under
this view of the subject, that the Secretary has no right
to act in relation to the deposits, but with a view to
their increased security ; and that he has no right to or
der them to be withheld from the Bank so long as the

SPEECHES. 313

funds are safe, and the Bank has faithfully performed the du
ties imposed in relation to them ; and not even then, unless
the deposits can be placed in safer and more faithful hands.
That such was the opinion of the Executive in the first in
stance, we have demonstrative proof in the message of the
President to Congress at the close of the last session, which
placed the subject of the removal of the deposits exclusive
ly on the question of their safety ; and that such was also
the opinion of the House of Representatives then, we have
equally conclusive proof from the vote of that body that the
public funds in the Bank were safe, which was understood, at
that time, on all sides, by friends and foes, as deciding the
question of the removal of the deposits.

The extent of the power intended to be conferred being
established, the question now arises, Has the Secretary tran
scended its limit ? It can scarcely be necessary to argue
this point. It is not even pretended that the public depos
its were in danger, nor that the Bank had not faithfully per
formed all the duties imposed on it in relation to them, nor
that the Secretary had placed the money in safer or more
faithful hands. So far otherwise, there is not a man who
hears me who will not admit that the public moneys are now
less safe than they were in the Bank of the United States.
And I will venture to assert that not a capitalist can be found
who would not ask a considerably higher percentage to in
sure them in their present, than in the place of deposit de
signated by law. If these views are correct, and I hold them
to be unquestionable, the question is decided. The Secretary
has no right to withhold the deposits from the Bank. There
has been, and can be but one argument advanced in favor of
his right which has even the appearance of being tenable —
that the power to withhold is given in general terms, and
without qualification, " unless the Secretary otherwise direct"
They who resort to this argument must assume the position,
that the letter ought to prevail over the clear and manifest

314 SPEECHES.

intention of the act. They must regard the power of the
Secretary, not as a trust power, limited by the subject and
the object of the trust, but as a chartered right, to be used
according to his discretion and pleasure. There is a radical
defect in our mode of construing political powers, of which
this and many other instances afford striking examples. But
I will give the Secretary his choice ; either the intention or
the letter must prevail — he may select either, but cannot be
permitted to take one or the other as may suit his purpose.
If he chooses the former, he has transcended his powers, as I
have clearly demonstrated. If he selects the latter, he is
equally condemned, as he has clearly exercised powers not
comprehended in the letter of his authority. He has not
confined himself simply to withholding the public moneys
from the Bank of the United States, but he has ordered
them to be deposited in other banks, though there is not a
word in the section to justify it. I do not intend to argue
the question, whether he had a right to order the funds with
held from the United States Bank to be placed in the State
banks, which he has selected ; but I ask, How has he ac
quired that right ? It rests wholly on construction — on the
supposed intention of the legislature, which, when it gives
a power, intends to give all the means necessary to render it
available. But, as clear as this principle of construction is,
it is not more clear than that which would limit the right of
the Secretary to the question of the safe and faithful keeping
of the public funds ; and I cannot admit that he shall be
permitted to resort to the letter or to construction, as may
best be calculated to enlarge his power, when the right con
struction is denied to those who would limit his power by
the clear and obvious intention of Congress.

I might here, said Mr. Calhoun, rest the question of the
power of the Secretary over the deposits, without adding
another word. I have placed it on grounds from which no
ingenuity, however great, or subtlety, however refined, can

SPEECHES. 315

remove it ; but such is the magnitude of the case, and such
my desire to give the reasons of the Secretary the fullest
consideration, that I shall follow him through the remainder
of them.

That the Secretary was conscious the first position
which he assumed, and which I have considered, was unten
able, we have ample proof in the precipitancy with which he
retreated from it. He had scarcely laid it down, when, with
out illustration or argument, he passed with a rapid tran
sition, and, I must say, a transition as obscure as rapid, to
another position wholly inconsistent with the first, and in as
suming which, he expressly repudiates the idea that the safe
and faithful keeping of the public funds had any necessary
connection with his removal of the deposits ; his power to
do which, he places on the broad and unlimited ground that
he had a right to make such disposition of them as the pub
lic interest or the convenience of the people might require.
I have said that the transition was as obscure as it was
rapid ; but, obscure as it is, he has said enough to enable us
to perceive the process by which he has reached so extraordi
nary a position ; and we may safely affirm that his arguments
are not less extraordinary than the conclusion at which he
arrives. His first proposition, which, however, he has not
ventured to lay down expressly, is, that Congress has an un
limited control over the deposits, and that it may dispose of
them in whatever manner it may please, in order to promote
the general welfare and convenience of the people. He next
asserts that Congress has parted with this power under the
sixteenth section, which directs the deposits to be made in
the Bank of the United States, and then concludes with af
firming that it has invested the Secretary of the Treasury
with it, for reasons which I am unable to understand.

It cannot be necessary, before so enlightened a body, that
I should undertake to refute an argument so utterly untrue in
premises and conclusion — to show that Congress never pos-

316 SPEECHES.

sessed the power which the Secretary claims for it — that
it is a power, from its very nature, incapable of such en
largement, being limited solely to the safe keeping of the
public funds ; that if it existed, it would be susceptible of
the most dangerous abuses ; that Congress might make the
wildest and most dangerous association the depository of the
public funds ; might place them in the hands of the fanatics
and madmen of the North, who are waging war against the
domestic institutions of the South, under the plea of promoting
the general welfare. But admitting that Congress possessed
the power which the Secretary attributes to it, by what process
of reasoning can he show that it has parted with this un
limited power, simply by directing the public moneys to be
deposited in the Bank of the United States ? or, if it has
parted with the power, by what extraordinary process has it
been transferred to the Secretary of the Treasury by those
few and simple words, " unless he shall otherwise direct ? "
In support of this extraordinary argument, the Secretary has
offered not a single illustration, nor a single remark bearing
the semblance of reason, but one, which I shall now proceed
to notice.

He asserts, and asserts truly, that the Bank charter is a
contract between the Government, or, rather, the people of
the United States and the Bank, and then assumes that it
constitutes him a common agent or trustee, to superintend
the execution of the stipulations contained in that portion
of the contract comprehended in the sixteenth section. Let
us now, taking these assumptions to be true, ascertain what
those stipulations are, the superintendence of the execution
of which, as he affirms, are jointly confided by the parties to
him. The Government stipulated, on its part, that the
public money should be deposited in the Bank of the United
States — a great and valuable privilege, on which the suc
cessful operation of the institution mainly depends. The
Bank, on its part, stipulated that the funds should be safely

SPEECHES. 317

kept, that the duties imposed in relation to them should be
faithfully discharged, and that for this with other privileges,
it would pay to the Government the sum of one million five
hundred thousand dollars. These are the stipulations, the
execution of which, according to the Secretary's assumption,
he has been appointed, as joint agent or trustee, to super
intend, and from which he would assume the extraordinary
power which he claims over the deposits, to dispose of them
in such manner as he may think the public 'nteres? or the
convenience of the people may require.

Is it not obvious that the whole extent of power con
ferred upon him, admitting his assumption to be true, is
to withhold the deposits in case that the Bank should violate
its stipulations in relation to them, on one side ; — and, on
the other, to prevent the Government from withholding the
deposits, so long as the Bank faithfully performed its part of
the contract ? This is the full extent of his power. Ac
cording to his own showing, not a particle more can be
added. But there is another aspect in which the position
the Secretary has assumed may be viewed. It offers for
consideration not only a question of the extent of his power,
but a question as to the nature and extent of duty which
has been imposed upon him. If the position be such as he
has described, there has been confided to him a trust of the
most sacred character, accompanied by duties of the most
solemn obligation. He stands, by the mutual confidence of
the parties, vested with the high judicial power to determine
on the infraction or observance of a contract in which Gov
ernment and a large and respectable portion of the citizens
are deeply interested ; and, in the execution of this high
power, he is bound, by honor and conscience, so to act as
to protect each of the parties in the full enjoyment of their
respective portion of benefit in the contract, so long as they
faithfully observe it. How has the Secretary performed
these solemn duties, which, according to his representation,

318 SPEECHES.

have been imposed upon him ? Has he protected the Bank
against the aggressions of the Government, or the Govern
ment against the unfaithful conduct of the Bank, in relation
to the deposits ? Or has he, forgetting his sacred obliga
tions, disregarded the interests of both : on one side, divest
ing the Bank of the deposits — and on the other, defeating
the Government in the intended security of the public funds,
by seizing on them as the property of the Executive, to be
disposed of, at pleasure, to favorite and partisan banks ?

But I shall relieve the Secretary from this awkward
and disreputable position in which his own arguments have
placed him. He is not the mutual trustee, as he has repre
sented, of the Government and the Bank, but simply the
agent of the former, vested, under the contract, with power
to withhold the deposits, — with a view, as has been stated
to their additional security — to their safe-keeping ; and if
he had but for a moment reflected on the fact that he was
directed to report his reasons to Congress only, and not also
to the Bank, for withholding the deposits, he could scarcely
have failed to perceive that he was simply the agent of one
of the parties, and not, as he supposes, a joint agent of
both.

The Secretary having established, as he supposes, his
right to dispose of the deposits as, in his opinion, the general
interest and convenience of the people might require, pro
ceeds to claim and exercise power with a boldness com
mensurate with the extravagance of the right which he has
assumed. He commences with a claim to determine, in his
official character, that the Bank of the United States is
unconstitutional ; a monopoly, baneful to the welfare of the
community. Having determined this point, he comes to
the conclusion that the charter of the Bank ought not to
be renewed, and then assumes that it will not be renewed.
Having reached this point, he then determines that it is his
duty to remove the deposits. No one can object that Mr.

SPEECHES. 319

Taney, as a citizen in his individual character, should enter
tain an opinion as to the unconstitutionality of the Bank ;
but that he, acting in his official character, and performing
official acts under the charter of the Bank, should undertake
to determine that the institution was unconstitutional, and
that those who granted the charter, and bestowed on him his
power to act under it, had violated the constitution, is an
assumption of power of a nature which I will not undertake
to characterize, as I wish not to be personal.

But he is not content with the power simply to deter
mine on the unconstitutionality of the Bank. He goes far
beyond : he claims to be the organ of the voice of the
people. In this high character, he pronounces that the
question of the renewal of the Bank charter was put at
issue in the last Presidential election, and that the peo
ple had determined that it should not be renewed. I
do not, said. Mr. Calhoun, intend to enter into the argu
ment, whether, in point of fact, the renewal of the charter
was put in issue at the last election. That point was
ably and fully discussed by the honorable Senators from
Kentucky (Mr. Clay) and New Jersey (Mr. Southard), who
conclusively proved that no such question was involved in
the election ; and if it were, the issue comprehended sc
many others, that it was impossible to conjecture on which
the election turned. I look to higher objections. I would
inquire by what authority the Secretary of the Treasury con
stitutes himself the organ of the people of the United States ?
He has the reputation of being an able lawyer, and can he
be ignorant that, so long as the constitution of the United
States exists, the only organs of the people of these States, as
far as the action of the General Government is concerned,
are the several departments, legislative, executive, and judi
cial, which, acting within the respective limits assigned by
the constitution, have a right to pronounce authoritatively
the voice of the people ? A claim on the part of the Exe-

320 SPEECHES.

cutive to interpret, as the Secretary has done, the voice of
the people through any other channel, is to shake the foun
dations of our system. Has the Secretary forgotten that
the last step to absolute power is this very assumption which
he has claimed for that department ? I am thus brought,
said Mr. C., to allude to the extraordinary manifesto read
by the President to the Cabinet, and which is so intimately
connected with the point immediately under consideration.
That document, though apparently addressed to the Cabinet,
was clearly and manifestly intended as an appeal to the
people of the United States, and opens a new and direct
organ of communication between the President and them
unknown to the constitution and the laws. There are but
two channels known to either, through which the President
can communicate with the people — by messages to the two
Houses of Congress, as expressly provided for in the constitu
tion, or by proclamation, setting forth the interpretations
which he places upon a law it has become his official duty to
execute. Going beyond, is one among the alarming signs of
the times which portend the overthrow of the constitution
and the approach of despotic power.

The Secretary, having determined that the Bank was
unconstitutional, and that the people had pronounced against
the recharter, concludes that Congress had nothing to do
with the subject. With a provident foresight, he perceives
the difficulty and embarrassment into which the currency
of the country would be thrown on the termination of
the Bank charter ; to prevent which, he proceeds deliber
ately, with a parental care, to supply a new currency, " equal
to or better" than that which Congress had supplied. With
this view, he determines on an immediate removal of the
deposits ; he puts them in certain State institutions, intend
ing to organize them, after the fashion of the Empire State,
into a great safety-fund system, but which, unfortunately for
the projectors, if not for the country, the limited power of

SPEECHES. 321

the State banks did not permit him to effect. But a sub
stitute was found by associating them in certain articles of
agreement, and appointing an inspector-general of all this
league of banks ! And all this without law or appropria
tion ! Is it not amazing that it never occurred to the Secre
tary that the subject of currency belonged exclusively to
Congress, and that to assume to regulate it was a plain
usurpation of the powers of this department of the Govern
ment ?

Having thus assumed the power officially to determine
on the constitutionality of the Bank ; having erected himself
into an organ of the people's voice, and settled the question
of the regulation of the currency, he next proceeds to assume
judicial powers over the Bank. He declares that the Bank
has transcended its powers, and has, therefore, forfeited its
charter ; for which he inflicts on the institution the severe
and exemplary punishment of withholding the deposits ;
and all this in the face of an express provision investing the
Court with power touching the infraction of the charter,
directing in what manner the trial should be commenced and
conducted, and securing expressly to the Bank the sacred
right of trial by jury in finding the facts. All this passed
for nothing in the eyes of the Secretary, who was too deeply
engrossed in providing for the common welfare to regard
either Congress, the Court, or the constitution.

The Secretary next proceeds to supervise the general
operations of the Bank, pronouncing, with authority, that at
one time it has discounted too freely, and at another too
sparingly — without reflecting that all the control which the
Government can rightfully exercise over the operations of
the institution is through the five directors who represent it
in the Board. Directors ! Mr. Calhoun exclaimed, did I say ?
(alluding to the present). No ! spies is their proper desig
nation.

I cannot, said Mr. C., proceed with the remarks which
VOL. n. — 21

322 SPEECHES.

I intended on the remainder of the Secretary's reasons ; 1
have not patience to dwell on assumptions of power so bold,
so lawless, and so unconstitutional ; they deserve not the
name of arguments, and I cannot waste time in treating them
as such. There are, however, two which I cannot pass over,
not because they are more extraordinary or audacious than
the others, but for another quality, which I choose not to
designate.

The Secretary alleges that the Bank has interfered with
the politics of the country. If this be true, it certainly is a
most heinous offence. The Bank is a great public trust,
possessing, for the purpose of discharging the trust, great
power and influence, which it could not pervert from the
object intended to that of influencing the politics of the
country without being guilty of a great political crime. In
making these remarks, I do not intend to give any coun
tenance to the truth of the charge alleged by the Secretary,
nor to deny to the officers of the Bank the right which belongs
to them, in common with every citizen, freely to form polit
ical principles, and act on them in their private capacity,
without permitting them to influence their official conduct.
But it is strange it did not occur to the Secretary, while he
was accusing and punishing the Bank on the charge of inter
fering in the politics of the country, that the Government
also was a great trust, vested with powers still more exten
sive, and influence immeasurably greater than that of the
Bank, given to enable it to discharge the object for which it
was created ; and that it has no more right to pervert its
power and influence into the means of controlling the politics
of the country than the Bank itself. Can it be unknown to
him that the fourth auditor of the treasury (an officer in his
own department), the man who has made so prominent a
figure in this transaction, was daily and hourly meddling in
politics, and that he is one of the principal political managers
of the administration ? Can he be ignorant that the whole

SPEECHES. 323

power of the Government has been perverted into a great
political machine, with a view of corrupting and controlling
the country ? Can he he ignorant that the avowed and
open policy of the Government is to reward political friends
and punish political enemies ? and that, acting on this prin
ciple, it has driven from office hundreds of honest and com
petent officers for opinion's sake only, and filled their places
with devoted partisans ? Can he he ignorant that the real
offence of the Bank is not that it has intermeddled in
politics, hut because it would not intermeddle on the side of
power ? There is nothing more dignified than reproof from
the lips of innocence, or punishment from the hands of jus
tice ; hut change the picture — let the guilty reprove and the
criminal punish, and what more odious, more hateful, can
be presented to the imagination ?

The Secretary next tells us, in the same spirit, that the
Bank had been wasteful of the public funds. That it has
spent some thirty, forty, or fifty thousand dollars — I do not
remember the exact amount (trifles have no weight in the
determination of so great a question) — in circulating essays
and speeches in defence of the institution, of which sum one-
fifth part — some seven thousand dollars — belonged to the
Government. Well, Sir, if the Bank has really wasted this
amount of the public money, it is a grave charge. It has
not a right to waste a single cent ; but I must say, in defence
of the Bank, that, assailed as it was by the Executive, it
would have been unfaithful to its trust, both to the stock
holders and to the public, had it not resorted to every proper
means in its power to defend its conduct, and, among others,
the free circulation of able and judicious publications.

But admit that the Bank has been guilty of wasting the
public funds to the full extent charged by the Secretary,
I would ask if he, the head of the financial department of
the Government, is not under as high and solemn obligation
to take care of the moneyed interest of the0 public as the

324 SPEECHES.

Bank itself. I would ask him to answer me a few simple
questions : — How has he performed this duty in relation to
the interest which the public holds in the Bank ? Has he
been less wasteful than he has charged the bank to have
been ? Has he not wasted thousands, where the Bank, even
according to his own statement, has hundreds ? Has he not,
by withdrawing the deposits, and placing them in the State
banks, where the public receives not a cent of interest, greatly
affected the dividends of the Bank of the United States, in
which the Government, as a stockholder, is a loser to the
amount of one-fifth of the diminution ? a sum which, I will
venture to predict, will many fold exceed the entire amount
which the Bank has expended in its defence. But this is a
small, a very small proportion of the public loss in conse
quence of the course which the Executive has pursued in
relation to the Bank, and which has reduced the value of the
shares from 130 to 108 (a Senator near me says much more.
— It may be ; I am not particular in such things), and on
which the public sustains a corresponding loss on its share
of the stock, amounting to seven millions of dollars — a sum
more than two hundred fold greater than the waste which
he has charged upon the Bank. Other administrations may
exceed this in talents, patriotism, and honesty ; but, cer
tainly, in audacity, in effrontery, it stands without a par
allel !

The Secretary has brought forward many and grievous
charges against the Bank. I will not condescend to notice
them — it is the conduct of the Secretary, and not that of the
Bank, which is immediately under examination ; and he has
no right to drag the conduct of the Bank into the issue, be
yond its operations in regard to the deposits. To that extent
I am prepared to examine his allegations against it, but be
yond that he has no right — no, not the least — to arraign
the conduct of the Bank ; and I, for one, will not, by
noticing his charges beyond that point, sanction his authority

SPEECHES. 325

to call its conduct in question. But let the point in issue
be determined, and I, as far as my voice extends, will give
to those who desire it, the means of the freest and most un
limited inquiry into its conduct. I am no partisan of the
Bank — I am connected with it in no way, by moneyed or
political ties. I might say, with truth, that the Bank owes
as much to me as any other individual in the country ; and
I might even add, that had it not been for my efforts, it
would not have been chartered. Standing in this relation to
the institution, a high sense of delicacy — a regard to inde
pendence and character — has restrained me from any con
nection with the institution whatever, except some trifling
accommodations in the way of ordinary business, which
were not of the slightest importance either to the Bank or
myself.

But while I shall not condescend to notice the charges of
the Secretary against the Bank, beyond the extent which I
have stated, a sense of duty to the institution, and regard to
the part which I took in its creation, compels me to notice
two allegations against it which have fallen from another
quarter. It is said that the Bank had no agency, or at least
efficient agency, in the restoration of specie payments in 1817,
and that it had failed to furnish the country with a uniform
and sound currency, as had been promised at its creation.
Both of these allegations I pronounce to be without just
foundation. To entor into a minute examination of them
would carry me too far from the subject, and I must content
myself with saying that, having been on the political stage,
without interruption, from that day to this — having been an
attentive observer of the question of the currency throughout
the whole period — the Bank has been an indispensable agent
in the restoration of specie payments ; that, without it, the
restoration could not have been effected short of the utter
prostration of all the moneyed institutions of the country,
and an entire depreciation of bank paper ; and that it has

326 SPEECHES.

not only restored specie payments, but has given a currency
far more uniform between the extremes of the country than
was anticipated, or even dreamed of, at the time of its crea
tion. I will say for myself, that I did not believe at the
time, that the exchange between the Atlantic and the West
would be brought lower than two and a half per cent. — the
estimated expense then, including insurance and loss of time,
of transporting specie between the two points. How much
it was below the anticipated point I need not state : the
whole commercial world knows that it was not a fourth part
at the time of the removal of the deposits.

But to return from this digression. Though I will not
notice the charges of the Secretary, for the reasons already
stated, I will take the liberty of propounding to those who sup
port them on this floor a few plain questions. If there be in
banking institutions an inherent tendency so strong to abuse
and corruption as they contend — if, in consequence of this
tendency, the Bank of the United States be guilty of the
enormous charges and corruptions alleged, notwithstanding
its responsibility to the Government and our control over it,
what is to be expected from an irresponsible league of
banks, as called by the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay),
over which we have no legal control ? If our power of re
newing the charter of the Bank of the United States — if our
right to vacate the charter by scire facias, in case of miscon
duct — if the influence which the appointment of five Govern
ment directors gives us — and, finally, if the power which we
have of appointing committees to examine into its condition,
are not sufficient to hold the institution in check ; if, in
spite of all these, it has, from the innate corruption of such
institutions, been guilty of the enormous abuses and crimes
charged against it, what may we not expect from the asso
ciated banks, the favorites of the treasury, over the renewal
of whose charters the Government has no power, — against
which it can issue no scire facias, — in whose direction it has

SPEECHES. 327

not a single individual, — and into whose conduct Congress
can appoint no committee to look ? With these checks
all withdrawn, what will be the condition of the public
funds ?

I stated, said Mr. Calhoun, in the outset of my re
marks, that, broad as was the power which the Secretary
had assumed in relation to the deposits, there was a portion
of the transaction of a highly important character, to which
he has not alluded, and in relation to which he has not even
attempted a justification. I will now proceed to make good
this assertion to the letter.

There is a material difference between ivitliholding money
from going into the Bank, and withdraiuing it after it has
been placed there. The former is authorized in the manner
which I have stated, under the sixteenth section, which
directs, as has been frequently said, that the public money
shall be deposited in the Bank, unless otherwise ordered by
the Secretary of the Treasury. But neither that section, nor
any portion of the act incorporating the Bank, nor, in truth,
any other act, gives the Secretary any authority of himself
to withdraw public money deposited in the Bank. There is,
I repeat, a material difference between ivithliolding public
money from deposit and withdrawing it. When paid into
the place designated by law as the deposit of the public
money, it passes to the credit of the Treasurer, and then is
in the treasury of the United States, where it is placed under
the protection of the constitution itself, and from which, by
an express provision of the constitution, it can only be with
drawn by an appropriation made by law. So careful were
the framers of the act of 1816 to leave nothing to implica
tion, that express authority is given to the Secretary cf the
Treasury, in the fifteenth section, to transfer the deposits
from one place to another, for the convenience of disb Trse-
rnents ; but which, by a strange perversion, is no^ at
tempted to be so construed as to confer on the Secretan Hie

328 SPEECHES.

power to withdraw the money from the deposit, and loan it
to favorite State banks — I express myself too favorably, I
should say give (they pay no interest) — with a view to sus
tain their credits or enlarge their profits — a power not only
far beyond the Secretary, but which Congress itself could not
exercise without a flagrant breach of the constitution. But
it is said, in answer to these views, that money paid in de
posit into the Bank, as directed by law, is not in the
treasury. I will not stop, said Mr. C., to reply to such an
objection. If it be not in the treasury, where is the
treasury ? If it be not money in the treasury, where is the
money annually reported to be in the treasury ? where the
eight or nine millions which, by the annual report of the
Secretary, are said to be now in the treasury ? Are we to
understand that none of this money is, in truth, in the
treasury ? that it is floating about at large, subject to be
disposed of, to be given away, at the will of the Executive,
to favorites and partisans ? So it would seem ; for it ap
pears, by a correspondence between the Treasurer and the
Cashier of the Bank, derived through the Bank (the Secre
tary not deeming it worth while to give the slightest in
formation of the transaction, as if a matter of course), that
he has drawn out two millions and a quarter of the public
money without appropriation, and distributed it at pleasure
among his favorites !

But it is attempted to vindicate the conduct of the Se
cretary on the ground of precedent. I will not stop to notice
whether the cases cited are in point, nor will I avail my self of
the great and striking advantage that I might have on the
question of precedent. This case stands alone and distinct
from all others. There is none similar to it in magnitude
and importance. I waive all this : I place myself on higher
grounds — I stand on the immovable principle that, on a ques
tion of law and constitution, in a deliberative assembly, there
is no room — no place for precedents. To admit them would

SPEECHES. 329

be to make the violation of to-day the law and constitution of
to-morrow ; and to substitute in the place of the turitten and
sacred will of the people and the legislature, the infractions of
those charged with the execution of the laivs. Such, in my
opinion, is the relative force of law and constitution on one
side, as compared with precedents on the other. Viewed in a
different light, not in reference to the law or constitution,
but to the conduct of the officer, I am disposed to give rather
more weight to precedents, when the question relates to an
excuse or apology for the officer, in case of infraction. If the
infraction be a trivial one, in a case not calculated to excite
attention, an officer might fairly excuse himself on the ground
of precedent ; but in one like this, of the utmost magnitude,
involving the highest interests and most important principles
— where the attention of the officer must be aroused to a
most careful examination, he cannot avail himself of the plea
of precedent to excuse his conduct. It is a case where false
precedents are to be corrected, and not followed. An officer
ought to be ashamed, in such a case, to attempt to vindicate
his conduct on a charge of violating law or constitution by
pleading precedents. The principle in such case is obvious.
If the Secretary's right to withdraw public money from the
treasury be clear, he has no need of precedents to vindicate
him. If not, he ought not, in a case of so much magnitude,
to have acted.

I have not, said Mr. Calhoun, touched a question, which
has had so prominent a part in the debate — whether the
withholding of the deposits was the act of the Secretary or
the President. Under my view of the subject, the question
is not of the slightest importance. It is equally unauthor
ized and illegal, whether done by President or Secretary ;
but, as the question has been agitated, and as my views do
not entirely correspond on this point with those advocating
the side which I do, I deem it due to frankness to express
my sentiments.

330 SPEECHES.

I have no doubt that the President removed the former
Secretary, and placed the present in his place, expressly with
a view to the removal of the deposits. I am equally clear,
under all the circumstances of the case, that the President's
conduct is wholly indefensible ; and, among other objections,
I fear he had in view, in the removal, an object eminently
dangerous and unconstitutional — to give an advantage to his
veto never intended by the constitution — a power intended
as a shield to protect the Executive against the encroachment
of the legislative department — to maintain the present state
of things against dangerous or hasty innovation — but which,
I fear, is, in this case, intended as a sword to defend the
usurpation of the Executive. I say I fear ; for, although
the circumstances of this case lead to a just apprehension
that such is the intention, I will not permit myself to assert
that such is the fact — that so lawless and unconstitutional
an object is contemplated by the President, till his act shall
compel me to believe to the contrary. But while I thus
severely condemn the conduct of the President in removing
the. former Secretary and appointing the present, I must say
that, in my opinion, it is a case of the abuse, and not of the
usurpation of power. The President has the right of removal
from office. The power of removal, wherever it exists, does,
from necessity, involve the power of general supervision ;
nor can I doubt that it might be constitutionally exercised
in reference to the deposits. Keverse the present case :
suppose the late Secretary, instead of being against, had been
in favor of the removal, and that the President, instead of
for, had been against it, deeming the removal not only inex
pedient, but, under the circumstances, illegal ; would any
man doubt that, under such circumstances, he had a right to
remove his Secretary, if it were the only means of preventing
the removal of the deposits ? Nay, would it not be his indis
pensable duty to have removed him ? and had he not, would
he not have been universally, and justly, held responsible ?

SPEECHES. 331

I have now, said Mr. C., offered all the remarks I in
tended in reference to the deposit question : an$, on review
ing the whole ground, I must say, that the Secretary, in
removing the deposits, has clearly transcended his power ;
that he has violated the contract between the Bank and the
United States ; that, in so doing, he has deeply injured that
large and respectable portion of our citizens who have been
invited, on the faith of the Government, to invest their prop
erty in the institution ; while, at the same time, he has
deeply injured the public in its character of stockholder ;
and, finally, that he has inflicted a deep wound on the public
faith. To this last I attribute the present embarrassment
in the currency, which has so injuriously affected all the
great interests of the country. The credit of the country is
an important portion of the currency of the country — credit
in every shape, public and private — credit, not only in the
shape of paper, but that of faith and confidence between
man and man — through the agency of which, in all its forms,
the great and mighty exchanges of this commercial country,
at home and abroad, are, in a great measure, effected. To
inflict a wound any where, particularly on the public faith, is
to embarrass all the channels of currency and exchange ; and
it is to this, and not to the withdrawing the few millions of
dollars from circulation, that I attribute the present money
ed embarrassment. Did I believe the contrary — if I thought
that any great and permanent distress would, of itself, result
from winding up, in a regular and legal manner, the present
or any other Bank of the United States, I would deem it an
evidence of the dangerous power of the institution, and, to
that extent, an argument against its existence. But, as it
is, I regard the present embarrassment, not as an argument
against the Bank, but an argument against the lawless and
wanton exercise of power on the part of the Executive — an
embarrassment which is likely to continue if the deposits be
not restored. The banks which have received them, at the

332 SPEECHES.

expense of the public faith, and in violation of law, will never
be permitted to enjoy their spoils in quiet. No one who
regards the subject in the light in which I do, can ever give
his sanction to any law intended to protect or carry through
the present illegal arrangement ; on the contrary, all such
must feel bound to wage perpetual war against an usurpation
of power so flagrant as that which controls the present de
posits of the public money. If I stand alone, said Mr.
Calhoun, I, at least, will continue to maintain the contest
so long as I remain in public life.

As important, said Mr. Calhoun, as I consider the ques
tion of the deposits, in all its bearings, public and private, it
is one on the surface — a mere pretext to another, and one
greatly more important, which lies beneath, and which must
be taken into consideration, to understand correctly all the
circumstances attending this extraordinary transaction. It
is felt and acknowledged on all sides that there is another
and a deeper question, which has excited the profound sen
sation and alarm which pervade the country.

If we are to believe what we hear from the advocates of
the administration, we would suppose at one time that the
real question was, Bank or no Bank ; at another, that the
question was between the United States Bank and the State
banks ; and, finally, that it was a struggle on the part of the
administration to guard and defend the rights of the States
against the encroachments of the General Government. The
administration the guardians and defenders of the rights of
the States ! What shall I call it ? audacity or hypocrisy ?
The authors of the Proclamation the guardians and defend
ers of the rights of the States ! The authors of the war
message against a member of this confederacy — the authors
of the "bloody bill" the guardians and defenders of the
rights of the States ! This a struggle for State Eights ! No,
Sir : State Eights are no more. The struggle is over for the
present. The bill of the last session, which vested in the

SPEECHES. 333

•

Government the right of judging of the extent of its pow
ers, finally and conclusively, and gave it the power of enforc
ing its judgments by the sword, destroyed all distinction be
tween delegated and reserved rights — concentrated in the
Government the entire powers of the system, and prostrated
the States, as poor and helpless corporations, at the foot of
this sovereignty.

Nor is it more true that the real question is, Bank or no
Bank. Taking the deposit question ia the broadest sense, —
suppose, as is contended by the friends of the administra
tion, that it involves the question of the renewal of the char
ter, and, consequently, the existence of the Bank itself, —
still the banking system would stand almost untouched and
unimpaired. Four hundred banks would still remain scat
tered over this wide republic, and on the ruins of the Uni
ted States Bank many would rise to be added to the present
list. Under this aspect of the subject, the only possible
question that could be presented for consideration would be,
whether the banking system was more safe, more beneficial,
or more constitutional, with or without the United States
Bank.

If, said Mr. Calhoun, this was a question of Bank or no
Bank ; if it involved the existence of the banking system,
it would, indeed, be a great question — one of the first magni
tude ; and, with my present impressions, long entertained and
daily deepening, I would hesitate — long hesitate — before I
would be found under the banner of the system. I have
great doubts, if doubts they may be called, as to the sound
ness and tendency of the whole system, in all its modifica
tions : I have great fears that it will be found hostile to lib
erty and the advance of civilization — fatally hostile to liberty
in our country, where the system exists in its worst and most
dangerous form. Of all institutions affecting the great ques
tion of the distribution of wealth — a question least explored
and the most important of any in the whole range of politi-

334 SPEECHES.

cal economy — the banking institution has, if not the great
est, one of the greatest, and, I fear, most pernicious influ
ences. Were the question really before us, I would not shun
the responsibility, as great as it might be, of freely and fully
offering my sentiments on these deeply important points ;
but, as it is, I must content myself with the few remarks
which I have thrown out.

What, then, is the real question which now agitates the
country ? I answer, it is a struggle between the executive
and legislative departments of the Government — a struggle,
not in relation to the existence of the Bank, but whether
Congress or the President should have the power to create a
Bank, and the consequent control over the currency of the
country. This is the real question. Let us not deceive our
selves : this league, this association of banks, created by the
Executive, bound together by its influence, united in com
mon articles of association, vivified and sustained by receiv
ing the deposits of the public money, and having their notes
converted, by being received every where by the treasury,
into the common currency of the country, is, to all intents
and purposes, a Bank of the United States — the Executive
Bank of the United States, as distinguished from that estab
lished by Congress. However it might fail to perform satis
factorily the useful functions of the Bank of the United
States as incorporated by law, it would outstrip it — far out
strip it — in all its dangerous qualities, in extending the pow
er, the influence, and the corruption of the Government. It
is impossible to conceive any institution more admirably cal
culated to advance these objects. Not only the selected
banks, but the whole banking institutions of the country,
and with them the entire money power, for the purpose of
speculation, peculation, and corruption, would be placed un
der the control of the Executive. A system of menaces and
promises will be established : of menace to the banks in pos
session of the deposits, but which might not be entirely sub-

SPEECHES. 335

servient to Executive views ; and of promise of future fa
vors to those who may not as yet enjoy its favors. Between
the two, the banks would be left without influence, honor, or
honesty, and a system of speculation and stock-jobbing would
commence, unequalled in the annals of our countiy. I fear
they have already commenced ; I fear the means which have
been put in the hands of the minions of power by the re
moval of the deposits, and placing them in the vaults of de
pendent banks, have extended their cupidity to the public
lands, particularly in the Southwest, and that to this we
must attribute the recent phenomena in that quarter — im
mense and valuable tracts of land sold at short notice ; sales
fraudulently postponed to aid the speculators, with which, if
I am not misinformed, a name not unknown to this body has
performed a prominent part. But I leave this to my vigi
lant and able friend from Mississippi (Mr. Poindexter), at
the head of the Committee on Public Lands, who, I doubt
not, will see justice done to the public. As to stock-jobbing,
this new arrangement will open a field which Rothschild him
self may envy. It has been found hard work — very hard,
no doubt — by the jobbers in stock, who have been engaged
in attempts to raise or depress the price of United States
Bank stock ; but no work will be more easy than to raise or
depress the price of the stock of the selected banks, at the
pleasure of the Executive. Nothing more will be required
than to give or withhold deposits ; to draw, or abstain from
drawing warrants ; to pamper them at one time, and starve
them at another. Those who would be in the secret, and
who would know when to buy and when to sell, would have
the means of realizing, by dealing in the stocks, whatever
fortune they might please.

So long as the question is one between a Bank of the
United States incorporated by Congress, and that system of
banks which has been created by the will of the Executive,
it is an insult to the understanding to discourse on the per-

336 SPEECHES.

nicious tendency and unconstitutionality of the Bank of the
United States. To bring up that question fairly and legiti
mately, you must go one step further ; you must divorce the
Government and the banking system. You must refuse all
connection with banks. You must neither receive nor pay
away bank-notes ; you must go back to the old system of
the strong box, and of gold and silver. If you have a right
to receive bank-notes at all — to treat them as money by re
ceiving them in your dues, or paying them away to credit
ors — you have a right to create a bank. Whatever the Gov
ernment receives and treats as money, is money in effect ;
and if it be money, then they have the right, under the con
stitution, to regulate it. Nay, they are bound by a high ob
ligation to adopt the most efficient means, according to the
nature of that which they have recognized as money, to give
it the utmost stability and uniformity of value. And if
it be in the shape of bank-notes, the most efficient means of
giving those qualities is a Bank of the United States, incor
porated by Congress. Unless you give the highest practical
uniformity to the value of bank-notes, so long as you receive
them in your dues, and treat them as money, you violate
that provision of the constitution which provides that taxa
tion shall be uniform throughout the United States. There is
no other alternative : I repeat, you must divorce the Gov
ernment entirely from the banking system, or, if not, you are
bound to incorporate a bank as the only safe and efficient
means of giving stability and uniformity to the currency.
And should the deposits not be restored, and the present
illegal and unconstitutional connection between the Execu
tive and the league of banks continue, I shall feel it my duty,
if no one else moves, to introduce a measure to prohibit
Government from receiving or touching bank-notes in any
shape whatever, as the only means left of giving safety and
stability to the currency, and saving the country from cor
ruption and ruin.

SPEECHES. 337

Viewing the question, in its true light, as a struggle on
the part of the Executive to seize on the power of Congress,
and to unite in the President the power of the sword and the
purse, the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay) said, truly,
and, let me add, philosophically, that we are in the midst of
a revolution. Yes, the very existence of free governments
rests on the proper distribution and organization of power ;
and to destroy this distribution, and thereby concentrate
power in any one of the departments, is to effect a revolution.
But, while I agree with the Senator that we are in the midst
of a revolution, I cannot agree with him as to the time at
which it commenced, or the point to which it has progressed.
Looking to the distribution of the powers of the General
Government into the legislative, executive, and judicial depart
ments — and confining his views to the encroachments of the
executive upon the legislative, he dates the commencement
of the revolution but sixty days previous to the meeting of the
present Congress. I, said Mr. Calhoun, take a wider range,
and date it from an earlier period. Besides the distribution
among the departments of the General Government, there
belongs to our system another, and a far more important
division or distribution of power — that between the States
and the General Government, the reserved and delegated
rights, the maintenance of which is still more essential to the
preservation of our institutions. Taking this wide view of
our political system, the revolution in the midst of which we
are, began, not, as supposed by the Senator from Kentucky,
shortly before the commencement of the present session, but
many years ago, with the commencement of the restrictive
system ; and terminated its first stage with the passage of
the force bill of the last session, which absorbed all the rights
and sovereignty of the States, and consolidated them in this
Government. While this process was going on, of absorbing
the reserved powers of the States on the part of the General
Government, another commenced, of concentrating in the
VOL. ii. — 22

338 SPEECHES.

Executive the powers of the other two, the legislative and
judicial departments of the Government, which constitutes
the second stage of the revolution, in which we have ad
vanced almost to the termination.

The Senator from Kentucky, in connection with this pail
of his argument, read a striking passage from one of the
most pleasing and instructive writers in any language (Plu
tarch), giving the description of Csesar forcing himself, sword
in hand, into the treasury of the Koman Commonwealth.
We are at the same stage of our political revolution, and the
analogy hetween the two cases is complete, varied only by
the character of the actors and the circumstances of the
times. That was a case of an intrepid and bold warrior,
as an open plunderer, seizing forcibly the treasury of the
country, which, in that republic, as well as ours, was confid
ed to the custody of the legislative department of the gov
ernment. The actors in our case are of a different charac
ter : artful and cunning politicians, and not fearless war
riors. They have entered the treasury, not sword in hand,
as public plunderers, but with the false keys of sophistry, under
the silence of midnight. The motive and object are the same,
varied only by character and circumstances. " With money
I will get men, and with men money," was the maxim of the
Roman plunderer. With money we will get partisans, with
partisans votes, and with votes money, is the maxim of
our public pilferers. With men and money, Caesar struck
down Roman liberty at the fatal battle of Pharsalia, never
to rise again ; from which disastrous hour, all the powers of
the Roman Republic were consolidated in the person of
Ceesar, and perpetuated in his line. With money and cor
rupt partisans, a great effort is now making to choke and stifle
the voice of American liberty, through all its constitutional
and legal organs ; by pensioning the press ; by overawing the
other departments ; and, finally, by setting up a new organ,
composed of office-holders and partisans, under the name

SPEECHES. 339

of a National Convention, which, counterfeiting the voice of
the people, will, if not resisted, in their name dictate the
succession; when the deed will have been done — the revolu
tion completed — and all the powers of our republic, in like
manner, consolidated in the Executive, and perpetuated by
his dictation.

The Senator from Kentucky (Mr. C.) anticipates with
confidence that the small party who were denounced at the
last session as traitors and disunionists will be found, on this
occasion, standing in the front rank, and manfully resisting
the advance of despotic power. I, said Mr. Calhoun, heard
the anticipation with pleasure, not on account of the com
pliment which it implied, but the evidence which it affords
that the cloud which has been so industriously thrown over
the character and motives of that small, but patriotic party,
begins to be dissipated. The Senator hazarded nothing in the
prediction. That party is the determined, the fixed, and
sworn enemy to usurpation, come from what quarter and
under what form it may — whether from the Executive upon
the other departments of this Government, or from this Gov
ernment on the sovereignty and rights of the States. The
resolution and fortitude with which it maintained its position
at the last session, under so many difficulties and dangers, in
defence of the States against the encroachments of the
General Government, furnished evidence not to be mistaken,
that that party, in the present momentous struggle, will
be found arrayed in defence of the rights of Congress against
the encroachments of the President. And let me tell the
Senator from Kentucky, said Mr. C., that, if the present
struggle against Executive usurpation be successful, it will
be owing to the success with which we, the nullifiers — I
am not afraid of the word — maintained the rights of the
States against the encroachments of the General Govern
ment at the last session.

A very few words will place this beyond controversy.

340 SPEECHES.

To the interposition of the State of South Carolina we are
indebted for the adjustment of the tariff question ; without
it, all the influence of the* Senator from Kentucky over the
manufacturing interest, great as it deservedly is, would have
been wholly incompetent, if he had even thought proper to
exert it, to adjust the question. The attempt would have
prostrated him, and those who acted with him, and not the
system. It was the separate action of the State that gave
him the place to stand upon, created the necessity for the
adjustment, and disposed the minds of all to compromise.
Now, I put the solemn question to all who hear me, If the
tariff had not been adjusted — if it was now an open question
— what hope of successful resistance against the usurpations
of the Executive, on the part of this or any other branch of
the Government, could be entertained ? Let it not be said
that this is the result of accident — of an unforeseen contin
gency. It was clearly perceived, and openly stated, that no
successful resistance could be made to the corruption and en
croachments of the Executive while the tariff question re
mained open — while it separated the North from the South,
and wasted the energies of the honest and patriotic portions
of the community against each other, the joint effort of
which is indispensably necessary to expel those from authority
who are converting the entire powers of Government into a
corrupt electioneering machine ; and that, without separate
State interposition, the adjustment was impossible. The
truth of this position rests not upon the accidental state of
things, but on a profound principle growing out of the nature
of government and party struggles in a free state. History
and reflection teach us that, when great interests come into
conflict, and the passions and the prejudices of men are
roused, such struggles can never be composed by the influ
ence of any individual, however great ; and if there be not
somewhere in the system some high constitutional power to
arrest their progress, and compel the parties to adjust the

SPEECHES. 341

difference, they go on till the state falls by corruption or
violence.

I will, said Mr. C., venture to add to these remarks an
other, in connection with the point under consideration, not
less true. We are not only indebted to the cause which I have
stated for our present strength in this body against the pre
sent usurpation of the Executive, but if the adjustment of
the tariff had stood alone, as it ought to have done, without
the odious bill which accompanied it — if those who led in the
compromise had joined the State Eights party in their resist
ance to that unconstitutional measure, and thrown the re
sponsibility on its real authors, the administration, their
party would have been so prostrated throughout the entire
South, and their power, in consequence, so reduced, that they
would not have dared to attempt the present measure ; or, if
they had, they would have been broken and defeated.

Were I, said Mr. C., to select the case best calculated to
illustrate the necessity of resisting usurpation at the very
commencement, and to prove how difficult it is to resist it
in any subsequent stage if not met at first, I would select
this very case. What, he asked, is the cause of the present
usurpation of power on the part of the Executive ? What
the motive, the temptation, which has induced him to
seize on the deposits ? What but the large surplus reve
nue ? the eight or ten millions in the public treasury beyond
the wants of the Government ? And what has put so large an
amount of money in the treasury, when not needed ? I answer,
the protective system — that system which graduated duties,
not in reference to the wants of the Government, but in refer
ence to the importunities and demands of the manufacturers, —
and which poured millions of dollars into the treasury beyond
the most profuse demands, and even the extravagance of the
Government — taken — unlawfully taken, from the pockets of
those who honestly made it. I hold that those who make
are entitled to what they make against all the world, except

342 SPEECHES.

the Government ; and against it, except to the extent of its
legitimate and constitutional wants ; and that for the Gov
ernment to take one cent more is robbery. In violation of
this sacred principle, Congress first removed the deposits
into the public treasury from the pockets of those who made
it, and where they were rightfully placed by all laws, human
and divine. The Executive, in his turn, following the example,
has taken them from that deposit, and distributed them
among favorite and partisan banks. The means used have
been the same in both cases. The constitution gives to Con
gress the power to lay duties with a view to revenue. This
power, without regarding the object for which it was intend
ed, forgetting that it was a great trust power, necessarily
limited, by the very nature of such powers, to the subject
and the object of the trust, was perverted to a use never in
tended — that of protecting the industry of one portion of
the country at the expense of another ; and, under this false
interpretation, the money was transferred from its natural
and just deposit — the pockets of those who made it — into
the public treasury, as I have stated. In this, too, the Ex
ecutive followed the example of Congress.

By the magic construction of a few simple words — •" un
less otherwise ordered " — intended to confer on the Secretary
of the Treasury a limited power — to give additional security
to the public deposits, he has, in like manner, perverted this
power, and made it the instrument, by similar sophistry, of
drawing the moTiey from the treasury, and bestowing it, as
I have stated, on favorite and partisan banks. Would to
God, said Mr. C. — would to God I could reverse the whole of
this nefarious operation, and terminate the controversy by
returning the money to the pockets of the honest and in
dustrious citizens, by the sweat of whose brows it was made,
and to whom only it rightfully belongs. But, as this can
not be done, I must content myself by giving a vote to re-

SPEECHES. 343

turn it to the public treasury, where it was ordered to be
deposited by an act of the legislature.

There is another aspect, said Mr. C., in which this sub
ject may be viewed. We all remember how early the ques
tion of the surplus revenue began to agitate the country.
At a very early period, a Senator from New Jersey (Mr. Dick-
erson) presented his scheme for disposing of it by distributing
it among the States. The first message of the President
recommended a similar project, which was followed up by a
movement on the part of the Legislature of New- York, and,
I believe, some of the other States. The public attention
was aroused — the scheme scrutinized — its gross unconstitu
tionally and injustice, and its dangerous tendency — its ten
dency to absorb the power and existence of the States, were
clearly perceived and denounced. The denunciation was too
deep to be resisted, and the scheme was abandoned. What
have we now in lieu of it ? What is the present scheme
but a distribution of the surplus revenue ? A distribution at
the sole will and pleasure of the Executive. — a distribution
to favorite banks, and through them, in the shape of dis
counts and loans, to corrupt partisans, as the means of in
creasing political influence.

We have, said Mr. C., arrived at a fearful crisis. Things
cannot long remain as they are. It behooves all who love
their country — who have affection for their offspring, or who
have any stake in our institutions, to pause and reflect. Con
fidence is daily withdrawing from the General Government.
Alienation is hourly going on. These will necessarily create
a state of things inimical to the existence of our institutions,
and, if not arrested, convulsions must follow ; and then
comes dissolution or despotism, when a thick cloud will be
thrown over the cause of liberty and the future prospects of
our country.

344 SPEECHES.

SPEECH

On the proposition of Mr. Webster to recharter the
Bank of the United States, delivered in the Senate,
March 21st, 1834.

[NOTE. — The question being upon granting leave to Mr. Webster
to introduce into the Senate a bill to recharter, for the term of six years,
the Bank of the United States, with, modifications :]

I RISE, said Mr. Calhoun, in order to avail myself of an
early opportunity to express my opinion on the measure pro
posed by the Senator from Massachusetts, and the questions
immediately connected with it ; under the impression that,
on a subject so intimately connected with the interests of
every class in the community, there should be an early de
claration of their sentiments by the members of this body,
so that all may know what to expect, and on what to cal
culate.

I shall vote for the motion of the Senator, not because I
approve of the measure he proposes, but because I consider
it due in courtesy to grant leave, unless there be strong rea
sons to the contrary, which is not the case in this instance ;
but while I am prepared to vote for his motion, and, let me
add, to do ample justice to his motives for introducing the
bill, I cannot approve of the measure he proposes. In every
view which I have been able to take, it is objectionable.
Among the objections, I place the uncertainty as to its object.
It is left entirely open to conjecture whether a renewal of
the charter is intended, or a mere continuance, with the view
of affording the Bank time to wind up its affairs ; and what
increases the uncertainty is, if we apply the provisions of the
proposed bill to the one or the other of these objects, it is
equally unsuited to either. If a renewal of the charter be

SPEECHES. 345

intended, six years is too short ; if a continuance, too long.
I, however, state this as a minor objection. There is an
other of far more decisive character : it settles nothing ; it-
leaves every thing unfixed ; it perpetuates the present strug
gle, which so injuriously agitates the country — a struggle of
bank against bank — of one set of opinions against another ;
and prolongs the whole, without even an intervening armis
tice, to the year 1842 : a period that covers two presidential
terms, and by inevitable consequence, running, for two suc
cessive presidential elections, the politics of the country in
to the bank question, and the bank question into politics,
with the mutual corruption which must be engendered ;
keeping, during the whole period, the currency of the coun
try, which the public interest requires should have the ut
most stability, in a state of uncertainty and fluctuation.

But why should I pursue the objections to the plan
proposed by the Senator ? He, himself, acknowledged the
measure to be defective, and that he would prefer one of a
more permanent character. He has not proposed this as the
best measure, but has brought it forward under a supposed
necessity — under the impression that something must be
done — something prompt and immediate, to relieve the ex
isting distress which overspreads the land. I concur with
him in relation to the distress, that it is deep and extensive ;
that it fell upon us suddenly, and in the midst of prosperity
almost unexampled ; that it is daily consigning hundreds to
poverty and misery ; blasting the hopes of the enterprising ;
taking employment and bread from the laborer ; and working
a fearful change in the relative condition of the money deal
ers on one side, and the man of business on the other — rais
ing the former rapidly to the top of the wheel, while it is
whirling the latter, with equal rapidity, to the bottom.
While I thus agree with the Senator as to the distress, I am
also sensible that there are great public emergencies in which
no permanent relief can be afforded, and when the wisest

346 SPEECHES.

are obliged to resort to expedients ; to palliate and to tempo
rize, in order to gain time with a view to apply a more effec
tual remedy. But there are also emergencies of precisely the
opposite character ; when the best and most permanent is the
only practicable measure, and when mere expedients tend but
to distract, to divide, and confound, and thereby to delay or
defeat all relief; and such, viewed in all its relations and
bearing, I consider the present ; and that the Senator from
Massachusetts also has not so considered it, I attribute to
the fact that, of the two questions blended in the subject
under consideration, he has given an undue prominence to
that which has by far the least relative importance — I mean
those of the Bank and of the currency. As a mere bank ques
tion, as viewed by the Senator, it would be a matter of but little
importance whether the renewal should be for six years or for
a longer period ; and a preference might very properly be
given to one or the other, as it might be supposed most likely
to succeed ; but I must say, that, in my opinion, in selecting
the period of six years, he has taken that which will be much
less likely to succeed than one of a reasonable and proper
duration. But had he turned his view to the other and more
prominent question involved ; had he regarded the question
as a question of currency, and that the great point was to
give it uniformity, permanency, and safety ; that, in effecting
these essential objects, the Bank is a mere subordinate agent,
to be used or not to be used, and to be modified, as to its
duration and other provisions, wholly in reference to the
higher question of the currency, I cannot think he would
ever have proposed the measure which he has brought for
ward, which leaves, as I have already said, every thing con
nected with the subject in a state of uncertainty and fluctu
ation.

All feel that the currency is a delicate subject, requiring
to be touched with the utmost caution ; but in order that it
may be seen as well as felt why it is so delicate — why slight

SPEECHES. 347

touches, either in depressing or elevating it, agitate and con
vulse the whole community, I will pause to explain the cause.
If we take the aggregate property of a community, that
which forms the currency constitutes, in value, a very small
proportion of the whole. What this proportion is in our coun
try and other commercial and trading communities, is some
what uncertain. I speak conjecturally in fixing it as one to
twenty-five or thirty, though I presume this is not far from
the truth ; and yet this small proportion of the property of
the community regulates the value of all the rest, and forms
the medium of circulation by which all its exchanges are ef
fected ; bearing, in this respect, a striking similarity, con
sidering the diversity of the subjects, to the blood in the
human or animal system.

If we turn our attention to the laws which govern the
circulation, we shall find one of the most important to be,
that, as the circulation is decreased or increased, the rest of
the property will, all other circumstances remaining the same,
be decreased or increased in value exactly in the same pro
portion. To illustrate : If a community should have an ag
gregate amount of property of thirty-one millions of dollars,
of which one million constitutes its currency ; and that one
million should be reduced one-tenth part, that is to say, one
hundred thousand dollars, the value of the rest will be re
duced in like manner one-tenth part, that is, three millions
of dollars. And here a very important fact discloses itself,
which explains why the currency should be touched with such
delicacy, and why stability and uniformity are such essential
qualities ; I mean that a small absolute reduction of the
currency makes a great absolute reduction of the value of
the entire property of the community, as we see in the case
supposed ; where a reduction of one hundred thousand dol
lars in the currency reduces the aggregate value of property
three millions of dollars — a sum thirty times greater than the
reduction of the currency. From this results an important

348

SPEECHES.

consideration. If we suppose the entire currency to be in
the hands of one portion of the community, and the property
in the hands of the other portion, the former, by having the
currency under their exclusive control, might control the
value of all the property in the community, and possess
themselves of it at their pleasure. Take the case already
selected, and suppose that those who hold the currency
diminish it one-half by abstracting that amount from circu
lation — the effect of which would be to reduce the circulation
to five hundred thousand dollars ; the value of property would
also be reduced one-half, that is, fifteen millions of dollars.
Let the process be reversed, and the money abstracted grad
ually restored to circulation, and the value of the property
would again be increased to thirty millions. It must be ob
vious that, by alternating these processes, and purchasing at
the point of the greatest depression, when the circulation is
the least, and selling at the point of the greatest elevation,
when it is the fullest, the supposed moneyed class, who could
at pleasure increase or diminish the circulation, by abstract
ing or restoring it, might also at pleasure control the entire
property of the country. Let it ever be borne in mind, that
the exchangeable value of the circulating medium, compared
with the property and the business of the community, re
mains fixed, and can never be diminished or increased by in
creasing or diminishing its quantity ; while, on the contrary,
the exchangeable value of the property, compared to the
currency, must increase or decrease with every addition or
diminution of the latter. It results, from this, that there is
a dangerous antagonist relation between those who hold or
command the currency and the rest of the community ; but,
fortunately for the country, the holders of property and of
the currency are so blended as not to constitute separate
classes. Yet it is worthy of remark — it deserves strongly to
attract the attention of those who have charge of the pub
lic affairs — that under the operation of the banking system,

SPEECHES. 349

and that peculiar description of property existing in the
shape of credit or stock, public or private, which so strikingly
distinguishes modern society from all that has preceded it,
there is a strong tendency to create a separate moneyed in
terest, accompanied with all the dangers which must neces
sarily result from such interest, and which deserves to be
most carefully watched and restricted.

I do not stand here the partisan of any particular class
in society — the rich or the poor, the property holder or the
money holder ; and, in making these remarks, I am not ac
tuated by the slightest feeling of opposition to the latter.
My object is simply to point out important relations that
exist between them, resulting from the laws which govern the
currency, in order that the necessity of an uniform, stable, and
safe currency, to guard against the dangerous control of one
class over another, may be clearly seen. I stand in my place
simply as a Senator from South Carolina, to represent her on
this floor, and to advance the common interest of these States
as far as we have the constitutional power, and as far as it
can be done consistently with equity and justice to the parts.
I am the partisan, I have said, of no class, nor, let me add,
of any political party. I am neither of the opposition nor of
the administration. If I act with the former in any in
stance, it is because I approve of its course on the particular
occasion ; and I shall always be happy to act with them
when I do approve. If I oppose the administration — if I
desire to see power change hands — it is because I disapprove
of the general course of those in authority — because they
have departed from the principles on which they came into
office— because, instead of using the immense power and
patronage put in their hands to secure the liberty of the
country and advance the public good, they have perverted
them into party instruments for personal objects. But mine
has not been, nor will it be, a systematic opposition. What
ever measure of theirs I may deem right, I shall cheerfully

350 SPEECHES.

support ; and I only desire that they shall afford me more
frequent occasions for support, and fewer for opposition, than
they have heretofore done.

With these impressions, and entertaining a deep convic
tion that an unfixed, unstable, and fluctuating currency is
to be ranked among the most fruitful sources of evil, whether
viewed politically or in reference to the business transactions
of the country, I cannot give my consent to any measure
that does not place the currency on a solid foundation. If
I thought this determination would delay the relief so neces
sary to mitigate the present calamity, it would be to me a
subject of the deepest regret. I feel that sympathy which
I trust I ought for the sufferings of so many of my fellow-
citizens, who see their hopes daily withered. I, however,
console myself with the reflection that delay will not be the
result of, but, on the contrary, relief will be hastened by, the
view which I take of the subject. I hold it impossible that
any thing can be effected, regarding the subject as a mere
bank question. Viewed in that light, the opinion of this
House, and of the other branch of Congress, is probably de
finitively made up. In the Senate, it is known that we have
three parties, whose views, considering it as a bank question,
appear to be irreconcilable. All hope, then, of relief must
centre in some more elevated view — in considering it, in its
true light, as a subject of currency. Thus regarded, I shall
be surprised, if, on full investigation, there will not appear a
remarkable coincidence of opinion, even between those whose
views, on a slight inspection, would seem to be contradictory.
Let us, then, proceed to the investigation of the subject
under the aspect which I have proposed.

What, then, is the currency of the United States ? What
its present state and condition ? These are the questions
which I propose now to consider, with a view of ascertaining
what is the disease, what the remedy, and what the means of
applying it, so as to restore our currency to a sound condition.

SPEECHES. 351

The legal currency of this country — that in which alone
debts can be discharged according to law — are certain gold,
silver, and copper coins, authorized by Congress, under an
express provision of the constitution. Such is the law.
What, now, are the facts ? That the currency consists
almost exclusively of bank-notes (gold having entirely dis
appeared, and silver, in a great measure, expelled by banks
instituted by twenty-five distinct and independent powers),
issued under the authority of the direction of those institu
tions. They are, in point of fact, the mint of the United
States. They coin the actual money (for such we must call
bank-notes), and regulate its issue, and, consequently, its
value. If we inquire as to their number, the amount of
their issue, and other circumstances calculated to show their
actual condition, we shall find, that so rapid has been their
increase, and so various their changes, that no accurate infor
mation can be had. According to the latest and best that
I have been able to obtain, they number at least four hundred
and fifty, with a capital of not less than one hundred and
forty-five millions of dollars, with an issue exceeding seventy
millions ; and the whole of this immense fabric standing on
a metallic currency of less than fifteen millions of dollars, of
which the greater part is held by the Bank of the United
States. If we compare the notes in circulation with the
metallic currency in their vaults, we shall find the proportion
about six to one ; and if we compare the latter with the
demands that may be made upon the banks, we shall find
that the proportion is about one to eleven. If we examine
the tendency of the system at this moment, we shall find
that it is on the increase — rapidly on the increase. There
is now pending a project of a ten million bank before the
Legislature of New- York ; but recently one of five millions
was established in Kentucky ; within a short period one of
a large capital was established in Tennessee, besides others
in agitation in several of the other States.

352 SPEECHES.

[Here Mr. Porter, of Louisiana, said that one of eleven millions
had just been established in that State.]

This increase is not accidental. It may be laid down as
a law, that where two currencies are permitted to circulate
in any country, one of a cheap and the other of a dear ma
terial, the former necessarily tends to grow upon the latter,
and will ultimately expel it from circulation, unless its ten
dency to increase be restrained by a powerful and efficient
check. Experience tests the truth of this remark, as the
liistory of the banking system clearly illustrates. The
Senator from Massachusetts truly said that the Bank of
England was derived from that of Amsterdam, as ours, in
turn, from that of England. Throughout its progress, the
truth of what I have stated to be a law of the system is
strongly evinced. The Bank of Amsterdam was merely a
bank of deposit — a storehouse for the safe-keeping of the
bullion and precious metals brought into that commercial
metropolis, through aU the channels of its widely-extended
trade. It was placed under the custody of the city authori
ties ; and, on the deposit, a certificate was issued as evidence
of the fact, which was transferable, so as to entitle the holder
to demand the return. An important fact was soon disclosed
— that a large portion of the deposits might be withdrawn,
and that the residue would be sufficient to meet the return
ing certificates ; or, what is the same in effect, that cer
tificates might be issued without making a deposit. This
suggested the idea of a bank of discount as well as deposit.
The fact thus disclosed fell in too much with the genius of
the system to be lost, and, accordingly, when transplanted
to England, it suggested the idea of a bank of discount and
of deposit ; the very essence of which form of banking, that
on which their profit depends, consisting in issuing a greater
amount of notes than it has specie in its vaults. But the
system is regularly progressing, under the impulse of the
laws that govern it, from its present form to a mere paper

SPEECHES. 353

machine — a machine for fabricating and issuing notes not
convertible into specie. Already has it once reached this
condition, both in England and the United States, and from
which it has been forced back, in both, to a redemption of
its notes, with great difficulty.

The natural tendency of the system is accelerated in our
country by peculiar causes, which have greatly increased its
progress. There are two powerful causes in operation. The
one resulting from that rivalry which must ever take place
in States situated, as ours are, under one General Govern
ment, and having a free and open commercial intercourse.
The introduction of the banking system in one State, neces
sarily, on this principle, introduces it into all the others, of
which we have seen a striking illustration on the part of
Virginia and some of the other Southern States, which en
tertained, on principle, strong aversion to the system ; yet
were compeUed, after a long and stubborn resistance, to yield
their objections, or permit their circulation to be furnished
by the surrounding States, at the expense of their own
capital and commerce. The same cause which thus compels
one State to imitate the example of another, in introducing
the system from self-defence, will compel the other States,
in like manner, and from the same cause, to enlarge and
give increased activity to the banking operation, whenever
any one of the States sets the example of so doing on its
part ; and thus, by mutual action and reaction, the whole
system is rapidly accelerated to the final destiny which I have
assigned.

This is strikingly exemplified in the rapid progress of
the system since its first introduction into our country. At
the adoption of our constitution, forty-five years ago, there
were but three banks of the United States, the amount of
whose capital I do not now recollect, but it was very small.
In this short space, they have increased to four hundred and
fifty, with a capital of one hundred and forty-five millions,
VOL. ii.— 23

354 SPEECHES.

as has already been stated : an increase exceeding nearly a
hundred fold the increase of our wealth and population, as
great as they have been.

But it is not in numbers only that they have increased :
there has, in the same time, been a rapid advance in the
proportion which their notes in circulation bear to the specie
in their vaults. Some twenty or thirty years ago, it was not
considered safe for the issues to exceed the specie by more
than two and a half or three for one ; but now, taking the
whole, and including the Bank of the United States with
the State banks, the proportion is about six to one ; and
excluding that Bank, it would very greatly exceed that pro
portion. This increase of paper, in proportion to metal,
results from a cause which deserves much more notice than
it has heretofore attracted. It originates mainly in the
number of the banks. I will proceed to illustrate it.

The Senator from New- York (Mr. Wright), in assigning
his reasons for believing the Bank of the United States to be
more dangerous than those of the States, said that one bank
was more dangerous than many. This in some respects
may be true ; but in one, and that a most important one,
it is strikingly the opposite — I mean in the tendency of the
system to increase. Where there is but one bank, the ten
dency to increase is not near so strong as where there are
many, as illustrated in England, where the system has ad
vanced much less rapidly, in proportion to the wealth and
population of the kingdom, than in the United States. But
where there is no limitation as to their number, the increase
will be inevitable, so long as banking continues to be among
the most certain, eligible, and profitable employments of
capital, as now is the case. With these inducements, there
must be constant application for new banks, whenever there
is the least prospect of profitable employment — banks to be
founded mainly on nominal and fictitious capital, and add
ing but little additional capital to that already in existence

SPEECHES. 355

— and with our just and natural aversion to monopoly, it is
difficult, on principles of equality and justice, to resist such
application. The admission of a new hank tends to diminish
the profits of the old, and, "between the aversion of the old
to reduce their income and the desire of the new to acquire
profits, the result is an enlargement of discounts effected hy
a mutual spirit of forbearance ; an indisposition on the part
of each to oppress the other ; and, finally, the creation of a
common feeling to stigmatize and oppose those, whether
banks or individuals, who demand specie in payment of their
notes. This community of feeling, which ultimately identi
fies the whole as a peculiar and distinct interest in the com
munity, increases, and becomes more and more intense, just
in proportion as banks multiply — as they become, if I may
use the expression, too populous ; — when from the pressure
of increasing numbers, there results a corresponding increase
of issues, in proportion to their means ; which explains the
present extraordinary disproportion between specie and notes
in those States where banks have been most multiplied ;
equal, in some, to sixteen to one. There result from this
state of things some political considerations, which demand
the profound attention of all who value the liberty and peace
of the country.

While the banking system rests on a solid foundation,
there will be, on their part, but little dependence on the
Government, and but little means by which the Govern
ment can influence them, and as little disposition on the
part of the banks to be connected with the Government ;
but, in the progress of the system, when their number is
greatly multiplied, and their issues, in proportion to their
means, are correspondingly increased, the condition of the
banks becomes more and more critical. Every adverse event
in the commercial world, or political movement that dis
turbs the existing state of things, agitates and endangers
them. They become timid and anxious for their safety, and

356 SPEECHES.

necessarily court those in power, in order to secure their pro
tection. Property is, in its nature, timid, and seeks pro
tection, and nothing is more gratifying to Government than
to become a protector. An union is the result ; and when
that union takes place — when the Government, in fact, be
comes the bank direction, regulating its favors and accom
modations — the downfall of liberty is at hand. Are there
no indications that we are not far removed from this state of
things ? Do we not behold in the events which have so
deeply agitated us within the last few months, and which
have interrupted all the business transactions of this com
munity, a strong tendency to this union on the part of a
department of this Government, and a portion of the bank
ing system ? Has not this union been, in fact, consum
mated in the largest and most commercial of the States ?
What is the safety-fund system of New- York but an union
between the banks and the State, and a consummation, by
law, of that community of feeling in the banking system
which I have attempted to illustrate, the object of which is
to extend their discounts, and to obtain which, the interior
banks of that State have actually put themselves under the
immediate protection of the Government ? The effects have
been striking. Already have they become substantially mere
paper machines, several having not more than from one to
two cents in specie to the dollar, when compared with their cir
culation ; and, taking the aggregate, their average condition
will be found to be but little better. I care not, said Mr. C.,
whether the present commissioners are partisans of the pre
sent State administration or not, or whether the assertion of
the Senator from New- York (Mr. Wright), that the Gov
ernment of the State has not interfered in the control of
these institutions, be correct. Whether it has taken place
or not, interference is inevitable. In such state of weakness,
a feeling of dependence is unavoidable ; and the control of
the Government over the action of the banks, whenever that

SPEECHES. 357

control shall become necessary to subserve the ambition or
the avarice of those in power, is certain.

Such is the strong tendency of our banks to terminate
their career, in the paper system — in an open suspension of
specie payment. Whenever that event occurs, the progress
of convulsion and revolution will be rapid. The currency
will become local, and each State will have a powerful inter
est to depreciate its currency more rapidly than its neigh
bor, as means, at the same time; of exempting itself from
the taxes of the Government, and drawing the commerce of
the country to its ports. This was strongly exemplified
after the suspension of specie payments during the late war,
when the depreciation made the most rapid progress, till
checked by the establishment of the present Bank of the
United States ; and when the foreign trade of the country
was as rapidly converging to the point of the greatest depre
ciation, with a view of exemption from duties, by paying in
the debased currency of the place.

What, then, is the disease which afflicts the system ?
what the remedy ? and what the means of applying it ?
These are the questions wrhich I shall next proceed to con
sider. What I have already stated points out the disease.
It consists in a great and growing disproportion between the
metallic and paper circulation of the country, effected through
the instrumentality of the banks ; a disproportion daily and
hourly increasing, under the impulse of most powerful causes,
which are rapidly accelerating the country to that state of
convulsion and revolution which I have indicated. The rem
edy is, to arrest its future progress, and to diminish the ex
isting disproportion — to increase the metals and to diminish
the paper — advancing till the currency shall be restored to a
sound, safe, and settled condition. On these two points all
must be agreed. There is no man of any party, capable of
reflecting, and who will take the pains to inform himself, but
must agree that our currency is in a dangerous condition, and

358 SPEECHES.

that the danger is increasing ; nor is there any one who can
doubt that the only safe and effectual remedy is to diminish
this disproportion to which I have referred. Here the ex
tremes unite : the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Benton), and
the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster), who stands
here as the able and strenuous advocate of the banking sys
tem,, are on this point united, and must move from it in the
same direction ; though it may he the design of the one
to go through, and of the other to halt after a moderate ad
vance.

There is another point on which all must be agreed — that
the remedy must be gradual — the change from the present to
another and sounder condition, slow and cautious. The ne
cessity for this results from that highly delicate nature of
currency which I have already illustrated. Any sudden and
great change from our present to even a sounder condition
would agitate and convulse society to the centre. On anoth
er point there can be but little disagreement. Whatever
may be the different theoretical opinions of the members of
the Senate as to the extent to which the reformation of the
currency should be carried — even those who think it may be
carried practically and safely to the restoration of a metallic
currency, to the entire exclusion of paper, must agree that
the restoration ought not to be carried further than a cau
tious and slow experience shall prove it can be done, consist
ently with the prosperity of the country, in the existing
fiscal and commercial condition of the world. To go beyond
the point to which experience shall show it is proper to go,
would be to sacrifice the public interest merely to a favorite
conception. There may be ultimately a disagreement of
opinion where that point is ; but, since all must be agreed to
move forward in the same direction, and at the same pace,
let us set out in the spirit of harmony and peace, though we
intend to stop at different points. It may be that, enlight
ened by experience, those who intended to stop at the near-

SPEECHES. 359

est point, may be disposed to advance further, and that those
who intended the furthest, may halt on this side, so that
finally all may agree to terminate the journey together.

This brings us to the question, — How shall so salutary a
change be effected ? What the means, and the mode of ap
plication ? A great and difficult question, on which some
diversity of opinion may be expected.

No one can be more sensible than I am of the responsi
bility that must be incurred in proposing measures on ques
tions of so much magnitude, and which, in so distracted a
state, must affect seriously great and influential interests.
But this is no time to shun responsibility. The danger is
great and menacing, and delay hazardous, if not ruinous.
While, however, I would not shun, I have not sought the
responsibility. I have waited for others ; and had any one
proposed an adequate remedy, I would have remained silent.
And here, said Mr. Calhoun, let me express the deep regret
which I feel that the administration, with all the weight of
authority which belongs to its power and immense patronage,
had not, instead of the deposit question, which has caused
such agitation and distress, taken up the great subject of the
currency ; examined it gravely and deliberately in all its
bearings ; pointed out its diseased condition ; designated the
remedy, and proposed some safe, gradual, and effectual means
of applying it. Had this course been pursued, my zealous
and hearty co-operation would not have been wanting. Per
mit me, also, to express a similar regret that the administra
tion, having failed in this great point of duty, the opposi
tion, with all its weight and talents, headed, on this question,
by the distinguished and able Senator from Massachusetts,
who is so capable of comprehending this subject in all its
bearings, had not brought forward, under its auspices, some
permanent system of measures, based upon a deliberate and
mature investigation into the cause of the existing disease,
and calculated to remedy the disordered state of the curren-

360 SPEECHES.

cy. What might have been brought forward by them with
such fair prospects of success, has been thrown on more in
competent hands, unaided by patronage or influence, save
only that power which truth, clearly developed, and honestly
and zealously advanced, may be supposed to possess, and on
which I must wholly rely.

But to return to the subject. Whatever diversity of sen
timent there may be as to the means, on one point all must
be agreed : nothing effectual can be done, no check inter
posed to restore or arrest the progress of the system, by the
action of the States. The reasons already assigned to prove
that banking by one State compels all others to bank, and
that the excess of banking in one, in like manner, compels
all others to like excess, equally demonstrate that it is im
possible for the States, acting separately, to interpose any
means to prevent the catastrophe which certainly awaits the
system, and perhaps the Government itself, unless the great
and growing danger to which I refer be timely and effectu
ally arrested. There is no power any where but in this Gov
ernment — the joint agent of all the States, and through
which a concert of action can be effected, adequate to this
great task. The responsibility is upon us, and upon us alone.
The means, if means there be, must be applied by our hands,
or not applied at all — a consideration, in so great an emer
gency, and in the presence of such imminent danger, calcu
lated, I should suppose, to arouse even the least patriotic.

What means do we possess, and how can they be ap
plied ?

If the entire banking system were under the immediate
control of the General Government, there would be no diffi
culty in devising a safe and effectual remedy to restore the
equilibrium, so desirable, between the specie and the paper
which compose our currency. But the fact is otherwise.
With the exception of the Bank of the United States, all
the other banks owe their origin to the authority of the sev-

SPEECHES. 361

eral States, and are under their immediate control ; which
presents the great difficulty experienced in devising the pro
per means of effecting the remedy which all feel to be so de
sirable.

Among the means which have been suggested, a Senator
from Virginia, not now a member of this body (Mr. Eives),
proposed to apply the taxing power to suppress the circula
tion of small notes, with a view of diminishing the paper
and increasing the specie circulation. The remedy would be
simple and effective, but is liable to great objection. The
taxing power is odious under any circumstances ; it would be
doubly so when called into exercise with an overflowing
treasury ; and still more so, with the necessity of organizing
an expensive body of officers to collect a single tax, and that
of an inconsiderable amount. But there is another, and of
itself a decisive objection. It would be unconstitutional —
palpably and dangerously so. All political powers, as I
stated on another occasion, are trust powers, and limited in
their exercise by the subject and object of the grant. The
tax power was granted to raise revenue for the sole purpose
of supplying the necessary means of carrying on the opera
tions of the Government. To pervert this power from the
object thus intended by the constitution, to that of suppress
ing the circulation of bank-notes, would be to convert it
from a revenue into a penal power — a power in its nature
and object essentially different from that intended to be
granted in the constitution ; and a power which in its full
extension, if once admitted, would be sufficient of itself to
give an entire control to this Government over the property
and the pursuits of the community, and thus concentrate and
consolidate in it the entire power of the system.

Rejecting, then, the taxing power, there remain two ob
vious and direct means in possession of the Government,
which may be brought into action to effect the object intend
ed ; but neither of which, either separately or jointly, is of

362 SPEECHES.

sufficient efficacy, however indispensable they may be as a
part of an efficient system of measures, to correct the pres
ent, or repress the growing disorders of the currency ; I mean
that provision in the constitution which empowers Congress
to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign
coin, — and the power of prohibiting any thing but the legal
currency to be received, either in whole or in part, in the
dues of the Government. The mere power of coining and
regulating the value of coins, of itself, and unsustained by
any other measure, can exercise but a limited control over
the actual currency of the country, and is inadequate to
check excess or correct disorder, as is demonstrated by the
present diseased state of the currency. Congress has had,
from the beginning, laws upon the statute-books to regulate
the value of coins ; and at an early period of the Govern
ment the mint was erected, and has been in active operation
ever since ; and yet, of the immense amount which has been
coined, a small residue only remains in the country, the great
body having been expelled under the banking system. To
give efficiency to this power, then, some other must be com
bined with it. The most immediate and obvious is that
which has been suggested — of excluding all but specie in the
receipts of the Government. This measure would be effec
tual to a certain extent ; but with a declining income, which
must take place under the operation of the act of the last
session to adjust the tariff, and which must greatly reduce
the revenue (a point of the utmost importance to the re
formation and regeneration of our institutions), the efficacy
of the measure must be correspondingly diminished. From
the nature of things, it cannot greatly exceed the average of
the government deposits, which I hope will, before many
years, be reduced to the smallest possible amount, so as to
prevent the possibility of the recurrence of the shameful and
dangerous state of things which now exists, and which has
been caused by the vast amount of the surplus revenue.

SPEECHES. 363

But there is, in my opinion, a strong objection against re
sorting to this measure, resulting from the fact that an exclu
sive receipt of specie in the treasury would, to give it effica
cy, and to prevent extensive speculation and fraud, require
an entire disconnection on the part of the Government with
the banking system in all its forms, and a resort to the strong
box as the means of preserving and guarding its funds — a
means, if practicable, in the present state of things liable to
the objection of being far less safe, economical, and efficient
than the present.

What, then, Mr. Calhoun inquired, what other means
do we possess, of sufficient efficacy, in combination with
those to which I have referred, to arrest its progress, and
correct the disordered state of the currency ? This is the
deeply important question, and here some division of opinion
must be expected, however united we may be, as I trust we
are thus far, on all other points. I intend to meet this
question explicitly and directly, without reservation or con
cealment.

After a full survey of the whole subject, I see none, — I
can conjecture no means of extricating the country from the
present danger, and to arrest its further increase, but a
bank — the agency of which, in some form, or under some
authority, is indispensable. The country has been brought
into the present distressed state of currency by banks, and
must be extricated by their agency. We must, in a word,
use a bank to unbank the banks, to the extent that may be
necessary to restore a safe and stable currency — just as we
apply snow to a frozen limb in order to restore vitality and
circulation, or hold up a burn to the flame to extract the in
flammation. All must see that it is impossible to suppress
the banking system at once. It must continue for a time.
Its greatest enemies, and the advocates of an exclusive
specie circulation, must make it a part of their system to
tolerate the banks for a longer or a shorter period. To sup-

364 SPEECHES.

press them at once would, if it were possible, work a greater
revolution — a greater change in the relative condition of the
various classes of the community — than would the conquest
of the country by a savage enemy. What, then, must be
done ? I answer, a new and safe system must gradually
grow up under, and replace the old ; imitating, in this re
spect, the beautiful process which we sometimes see of a
wounded or diseased part in a living organic body gradually
superseded by the healing process of nature.

How is this to be effected ? How is a bank to be used
as the means of correcting the excess of the banking system ?
and what bank is to be selected as the agent to effect this
salutary change ? I know, said Mr. C., that a diversity of
opinion will be found to exist, as to the agent to be selected,
among those who agree on every other point, and who, in
particular, agree on the necessity of using some bank as the
means of effecting the object intended : one preferring a
simple recharter of the existing Bank ; another, the charter of
a new Bank of the United States ; a third, a new Bank in
grafted upon the old ; and a fourth, the use of the State
banks as the agent. I wish, said Mr. C., to leave all these
as open questions, to be carefully surveyed and compared
with each other, calmly and dispassionately, without preju
dice or party feeling ; and that to be selected, which, on the
whole, shall appear to be the best, the most safe, the most
efficient, the most prompt in application, and the least lia
ble to constitutional objections. It would, however, be
wanting in candor on my part not to declare that my impres
sion is, that a new Bank of the United States, ingrafted upon
the old, will be found, under all the circumstances of the
case, to combine the greatest advantages, and to be liable to
the fewest objections ; but this impression is not so firmly
fixed as to be inconsistent with a calm review of the whole
ground, or to prevent my yielding to the conviction of reason,
should the result of such review prove that any other is

SPEECHES. 365

preferable. Among its peculiar recommendations may be
ranked the consideration that, while it would afford the
means of a prompt and effectual application for mitigating
and finally removing the existing distress, it would, at the
same time, open to the whole community a fair opportunity
of participating in the advantages of the institution, be they
what they may.

Let us, then, suppose (in order to illustrate, and not to
indicate a preference) that the present Bank be selected as
the agent to effect the intended object. What provisions
will be necessary ? I will suggest those that have occurred
to me, mainly, however, with a view of exciting the reflec
tions of those much more familiar with banking operations
than myself, and who, of course, are more competent to form
a correct judgment of their practical effect.

Let, then, the Bank charter be renewed for twelve years
after the expiration of the present term, with such modifica
tions and limitations as may be judged proper ; and that
after that period it shall issue no notes under ten dollars —
that Government shall not receive in its dues any sum less
than ten dollars, except in the legal coins of the United
States ; that it shall not receive in its dues the notes of any
bank that issues notes of a denomination less than five dol
lars ; and that the United States Bank shall not receive in
payment, or on deposit, the notes of any bank whose notes
are not receivable in the dues of the Government, nor the
notes of any bank which may receive those of any other
whose notes are not receivable by the Government. At the
expiration of six years from the commencement of the re
newed charter, let the Bank be prohibited from issuing any
note under twenty dollars, and let no sum under that
amount be received in dues of the Government, except in
specie ; and let the value of gold be raised at least equal to
that of silver, to take effect immediately ; so that the coun
try may be replenished with the coin, the lightest and the

366 SPEECHES.

most portable in proportion to its value, to take the place of
the receding bank-notes. It is unnecessary for me to state,
that at present the standard value of gold is less than that
of silver ; the necessary effect of which has been to expel
gold entirely from circulation, and to deprive us of a coin so
well calculated for the circulation of a country so great in ex
tent, and having so vast an intercourse, commercial, social,
and political, between all its parts, as ours. As an addition
al recommendation to raise its relative value, gold has, of
late, become an important product of three considerable
States of the Union — Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia
— to the industry of which the measure proposed would give
a strong impulse, and which, in turn, would greatly increase
the quantity produced.

Such are the means which have occurred to me. There
are members of this body far more competent to judge of
their practical operation than myself; and as my object is
simply to suggest them for their reflection, and for that of
others who are more familiar with this part of the subject, I
will not at present enter into an inquiry as to their efficiency,
with a view of determining whether they are fully adequate
to effect the object in view or not. There are, doubtless,
others of a similar description, and perhaps more efficacious,
that may occur to the experienced, which I would freely
embrace, as my object is to adopt the best and most efficient.
And it may be hoped, that if, on experience, it should be
found that neither these provisions, nor any other in the
power of Congress, are fully adequate to effect the important
reform which I have proposed, the co-operation of the States
may be secured, at least to the extent of suppressing the cir
culation of notes under five dollars, where such are permitted
to be issued under their authority.

I omitted, in the proper place, to state my reason for
suggesting twelve years as the term for the renewal of the
charter of the Bank. It appears to me that it is long enough

SPEECHES. 367

to permit the agitation and distraction which now disturbs
the country to subside, while it is sufficiently short to enable
us to avail ourselves of the full benefit of the light of expe
rience, which may be expected to be derived from the opera
tion of the system under its new provisions. But there is
another reason which appears to me to be entitled to great
weight. The charter of the Bank of England has recently
been renewed for the term of ten years, with very important
changes, calculated to furnish much experience upon the
nature of banking operations and currency. It is highly
desirable, if the Bank charter should be renewed, or a new
Bank created, that we should have the full benefit of that
experience before the expiration of the term, which would be
effected by fixing the period I have designated. But as my
object in selecting the recharter of the Bank of the United
States was simply to enable me to present the suggestions I
have made in the clearest form, and not to advocate the rechar
ter, I shall omit to indicate many limitations and provisions,
which seem to me to be important to be considered, when
the question of its permanent renewal is presented, should it
ever be. Among others, I entirely concur in the suggestion
of the Senator from Georgia, of fixing the rate of interest at
five per cent. — a suggestion of importance, and to which but
one objection can, in my opinion, be presented — I mean the
opposing interest of existing State institutions, all of which
discount at higher rates, and which may defeat any measure
of which it constitutes a part. In addition, I will simply say
that I, for one, shall feel disposed to adopt such provisions
as are best calculated to secure the Government from any
supposed influence on the part of the Bank, or the Bank from
any improper interference on the part of the Government, or
which may be necessary to protect the rights or interests of
the States.

Having now stated the means necessary to apply the
remedy, I am thus brought to the question, Can the measure

368 SPEECHES.

succeed ? which brings up the inquiry of how far it may be
expected to receive the support of the several parties which
now compose the Senate, and on which I shall next proceed
to make a few remarks.

First, then, can the State Eights party give it their sup
port ? that party of which I am proud of being a member,
and for which I entertain so strong an attachment — the
stronger because we are few among many. In proposing this
question, I am not ignorant of their long-standing constitu
tional objection to the Bank, on the ground that this was
intended to be, as it is usually expressed, a hard-money Gov
ernment, whose circulating medium was intended to consist
of the precious metals, and for which object the power of
coining money, and regulating the value thereof, was express
ly conferred by the constitution. I know how long and how
sincerely this opinion has been entertained, and under how
many difficulties it has been maintained. It is not my in
tention to attempt to change an opinion so firmly fixed ; but
I may be permitted to make a few observations, in order to
present what appears to me to be the true question in refer
ence to this constitutional point, in order that we may fully
comprehend the circumstances under which we are placed in
reference to it.

With this view, I do not deem it necessary to inquire
whether, in conferring the power to coin money, and to reg
ulate the value thereof, the constitution intended to limit
the power strictly to coining money and regulating its value,
or whether it intended to confer a more general power over
the currency ; nor do I intend to inquire whether the word
coin is limited simply to the metals, or may be extended to
other substances, if, through a gradual change, they may be
come the medium of the general circulation of the world. I
pass these points. Whatever opinion there may be enter
tained in reference to them, we must all agree, as a fixed
principle in our system of thinking on constitutional ques-

SPEECHES. 369

tions, that the power under consideration, like other powers,
is a trust power ; and that, like all such powers, it must be
so exercised as to effect the object of the trust as far as it
may be practicable. Nor can we disagree that the object of
the power was to secure to these States a safe, uniform and
stable currency. The nature of the power, the terms used to
convey it, the history of the times, the necessity, with the
creation of a common government, of having a common and
uniform circulating medium, and the power conferred to
punish those, who, by counterfeiting, may attempt to debase
and degrade the coins of the country, all proclaim this to be
the object.

It is not my purpose to inquire whether, admitting this
to be the object, Congress is not bound to use all the means
in its power to give this safety, this stability, this uniformity
to the currency, for which the power was conferred ; nor to
inquire whether the States are not bound to abstain from acts,
on their part, inconsistent with them ; nor to inquire whether
the right of banking, on the part of a State, does not directly,
and by immediate consequence, injuriously affect the cur
rency — whether the effect of banking is not to expel the specie
currency, which, according to the assumption that this is a
hard-money Government, it was the object of the constitution
to furnish, in conferring the power to coin money ; or whether
the effect of banking does not necessarily tend to diminish
the value of a specie currency as certainly as clipping or re
ducing its weight would ; and whether it has not, in fact, since
its introduction, reduced the value of the coins one-half. Nor
do I intend to inquire whether Congress is not bound to
abstain from all acts, on its part, calculated to affect inju
riously the specie circulation, and whether the receiving any
thing but specie, in its dues, must not necessarily so affect it
by diminishing the quantity in circulation, and depreciating
the value of what remains. All these questions I leave open.
I decide none of them. There is one, however, that I will
VOL. n. — 24

3*70 SPEECHES.

decide. If Congress has a right to receive any thing else
than specie in its dues, they have the right to regulate its
value ; and have a right, of course, to adopt all necessary and
proper means, in the language of the constitution, to effect
the ohject. It matters not what they receive, tohacco, or
any thing else, this right must attach to it. I do not assert
the right of receiving, but I do hold it to be incontrovertible,
that, if Congress were to order the dues of the Government
to be paid, for instance, in tobacco, they would have the right,
nay, more, they would be bound to use all necessary and
proper means to give it an uniform and stable value — inspec
tions, appraisement, designation of qualities, and whatever
else would be necessary to that object. So, on the same
principle, if they receive bank-notes, they are equally bound
to use all means necessary and proper, according to the pecu
liar nature of the subject, to give them uniformity, stability,
and safety.

The very receipt of bank-notes, on the part of the Gov
ernment, in its dues, would, it is conceded, make them mon
ey, as far as the Government may be concerned, and, by a
necessary consequence, would make them, to a great extent,
the currency of the country. I say nothing of the positive
provisions in the constitution which declares that " all duties,
imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States," which cannot be, unless that in which they are paid
should also have, as nearly as practicable, an uniform value
throughout the country. To effect this, if bank-notes are
received, the banking power is necessary and proper within
the meaning of the constitution ; and, consequently, if the
Government has the right to receive bank-notes in its dues,
the power becomes constitutional. Here lies, said Mr. Cal-
houn, the real constitutional question : Has the Government
a right to receive bank-notes, or not ? The question is not
upon the mere power of incorporating a bank, as it has been
commonly argued : though even in that view there would be

SPEECHES. 371

as great a constitutional objection to any act on the part of
the Executive, or any other branch of the Government, which
should unite any association of State banks into one system,
as the means of giving the uniformity and stability to the cur
rency which the constitution intends to confer. The very
act of so associating or uniting them into one, by whatever
name called, or by whatever department performed, would
be; in fact, an act of incorporation.

But, said Mr. Calhoun, my object, as I have stated, is not
to discuss the constitutional questions, nor to determine whe
ther the Bank be constitutional or not. It is, I repeat, to
show where the difficulty lies — a difficulty which I have felt
from the time I first came into the public service. I found
then, as now, the currency of the country consisting almost
entirely of bank-notes. I found the Government intimately
connected with the system : receiving bank-notes in its dues,
and paying them away, under its appropriations, as cash.
The fact was beyond my control : it existed long before my
time, and without my agency ; and I was compelled to act
on the fact as it existed, without deciding on the many ques
tions which I have suggested as connected with this subject,
and on many of which I have never yet formed a definite
opinion. No one can pay less regard to precedent than I do,
acting here, in my representative and deliberative character,
on legal or constitutional questions ; but I have felt from the
beginning the full force of the distinction so sensibly taken
by the Senator from Virginia (Mr. Leigh) between doing and
undoing an act, and which he so strongly illustrated in the
case of the purchase of Louisiana. The constitutionality of
that act was doubted by many at the time, and among others
by its author himself ; yet he would be considered a mad
man who, coming into political life at this late period, would
now seriously take up the question of the constitutionality
of the purchase, and, coming to the conclusion that it was
unconstitutional, should propose to rescind the act, and eject

372 SPEECHES.

from the Union two flourishing States and a growing Terri
tory : nor would it be an act of much less madness thus to
treat the question of the currency, and undertake to suppress
at once the system of bank circulation which has been grow
ing up from the beginning of the Government, which has
penetrated into and connected itself with every department
of our political system, on the ground that the constitution
intended a specie circulation ; or who would treat the consti
tutional question as one to be taken up de novo, and decided
upon elementary principles, without reference to the impe
rious state of facts.

But in raising the question whether my friends of the
State Eights party can consistently vote for the measure
which I have suggested, I rest not its decision on the ground
that their constitutional opinion in reference to the Bank is
erroneous. I assume their opinion to be correct — I place the
argument, not on the constitutionality or unconstitutional-
ity, but on wholly different ground. I lay it down as an in
controvertible principle, that, admitting an act to be uncon
stitutional, but of such a nature that it cannot be reversed
at once, or at least without involving gross injustice to the
community, we may, under such circumstances, vote for its
temporary continuance — for undoing gradually, as the only
practicable mode of terminating it — consistently with the
strictest constitutional objects. The act of the last session,
adjusting the tariff, furnishes an apt illustration. All of us
believed that measure to be unconstitutional and oppressive,
yet we voted for it without supposing that we violated the
constitution in so doing, although it allowed upwards of eight
years for the termination of the system, on the ground, that
to reverse it at once, would spread desolation and ruin over a
large portion of the country. I ask the principle in that
case to be applied to this. It is equally as impossible to
terminate suddenly the present system of paper currency,
without spreading a desolation still wider and deeper over

SPEECHES. 373

the face of the country. If it can be reversed at all — if we
can ever return to a metallic currency, it must be by grad
ually undoing what we have done, and to tolerate the system
while the process is going on. This, the measure which I
have suggested, proposes ; for the period of twelve years to
be followed up by a similar process, as far as a slow and cau
tious experience shall prove we may go consistently with the
public interest, even to its entire reversal, if experience shall
prove we may go so far, which, however, I, for one, do not
anticipate ; but the effort, if it should be honestly commenc
ed and pursued, would present a case every way parallel with
the instance of the tariff to which I have already referred.
I go further, and ask the question, Can you, consistently with
your obligation to the constitution, refuse to vote for a mea
sure, if intended, in good faith, to effect the object already
stated ? Would not a refusal to vote for the only means of
terminating it consistently with justice, and without involv
ing the horror of revolution, amount in fact, and in all its
practical consequences, to a vote to perpetuate a state of
things which all must acknowledge to be eminently uncon
stitutional, and highly dangerous to the liberty of the coun
try ?

But I know it will be objected that the constitution
ought to be amended, and the power conferred in express
terms. I feel the full force of the objection. I hold the po
sition to be sound, that, when a constitutional question has
been agitated involving the powers of the Government, which
experience shall prove cannot be settled by reason, as in the
case of the bank question, those who claim the power ought
to abandon it, or obtain an express grant by an amendment
of the constitution ; and yet, even with this impression, I
would, at the present time, feel much, if not insuperable
objection, to vote for an amendment, till an effort shall be
fairly made, in order to ascertain to what extent the power
might be dispensed with, as I have proposed.

374 SPEECHES.

I hold it a sound principle, that no more power should be
conferred upon the General Government than is indispens
able ; and if experience should prove that the power of bank
ing is indispensable, in the actual condition of the currency
of this country and of the world generally, I should even
then think that, whatever power ought to be given, should
be given with such restrictions and limitations as would limit
it to the smallest amount necessary, and guard it with the
utmost care against abuse. As it is, without farther expe
rience, we are at a loss to determine how little or how much
would be required to correct a disease which must, if not
corrected, end in convulsions and revolution. I consider the
whole subject of banking and credit as undergoing at this
time, throughout the civilized world, a progressive change,
of which I think I perceive many indications. Among the
changes in progression, it appears to me there is a strong
tendency in the banking system to resolve itself into two
parts — one becoming a bank of circulation and exchange, for
the purpose of regulating and equalizing the circulating me
dium, and the other assuming more the character of private
banking ; of which separation there are indications in the
tendency of the English system, particularly perceptible in
the late modifications of the charter of the Bank of England.
In the mean time, it would be wise in us to avail ourselves
of the experience of the next few years before any change
be made in the constitution, particularly as the course which,
it seems to me, it would be advisable to pursue, would be the
same, whether the power be expressly conferred or not.

I next address myself to the members of the opposition,
who principally represent the commercial and manufacturing
portions of the country, where the banking system has been
the farthest extended, and where a larger portion of the pro
perty exists in the shape of credit than in any other section,
and to whom a sound and stable currency is most necessary,
and the opposite most dangerous. You have no constitu-

SPEECHES. 3*75

tional objection ; to you it is a mere question of expediency.
Viewed in this light, can you vote for the measure suggest
ed ? A measure designed to arrest the approach of events
which, I have demonstrated, must, if not arrested, create
convulsions and revolutions ; and to correct a disease which
must, if not corrected, subject the currency to continued
agitations and fluctuations ; and, in order to give that per
manence, stability, and uniformity, which is so essential to
your safety and prosperity. To effect this may require some
diminution of the profits of banking, some temporary sacri
fice of interest ; but if such should be the fact, it will be
compensated more than a hundred fold by increased security
and durable prosperity. If the system must advance in its
present course without a check, and if explosion must follow,
remember that where you stand will be the crater — should
the system quake, under your feet the chasm will open that
will ingulf your institutions and your prosperity.

Can the friends of the administration vote for this mea
sure ? If I understand their views, as expressed by the
Senator from Missouri, behind me (Mr. Bent on), and the
Senator from New- York (Mr. Wright), and other distin
guished members of the party, and the views of the President
as expressed in reported conversations, I see not how they
can reject it. They profess to be the advocates of a metal
lic currency. I propose to restore it by the most effectual
means that can be devised ; gradually and slowly, and to
the extent that experience may show that it can be done con
sistently with due regard to the public interest. Further no
one can desire to go. If the means I propose are not the best
and most effectual, let better and more effectual be devised.
If the process which I propose be too slow or too fast, let it
be accelerated or retarded. Permit me to add to these views
what, it appears to me, those whom I address ought to feel
with deep and solemn obligations of duty. They are the
advocates and the supporters of the administration. It is

376 SPEECHES,

now conceded, almost universally, that a rash and precipitate
act of the Executive, to speak in the mildest terms, has
plunged this country into deep and almost universal distress.
You are the supporters of that measure — you personally
incur the responsibility by that support. How are its conse
quences to terminate ? Do you see the end ? Can things
remain as they are, with the currency and the treasury of
the country under the exclusive control of the Executive ?
And by what scheme, what device, do you propose to extri
cate the country and the constitution from their present
dangers ?

I have now said what I intended. I have pointed out,
without reserve, what I believe in my conscience to be for the
public interest. May what I have said be received as favorably
as it has been sincerely uttered. In conclusion, I have but
to add, that, if what I have said shall in any degree contri
bute to the adjustment of this question, which I believe can
not be left open without imminent danger, I shall rejoice ;
but if not, I shall at least have the consolation of having
discharged my duty.

SPEECH

On the Bill, to repeal the Revenue Collection, or
Force Bill, delivered in the Senate, April 9th,
1834.

I HAVE, said Mr. Calhoun, introduced this bill from a
deep conviction that the act which it proposes to repeal is,
in its tendency, subversive of our political institutions, and
fatal to the liberty and happiness of the country ; which I
trust to be able to establish to the satisfaction of the Senate,

SPEECHES. 377

should I be so fortunate as to obtain a dispassionate and
favorable hearing.

In resting the repeal on this ground, it is not my inten
tion to avail myself of the objections to the details of the act,
repugnant as many of them are to the principles of our Gov
ernment. In illustration of the truth of this assertion, I
might select that provision which vests in the President, in
certain cases, of which he is made the judge, the entire force
of the country, civil, military, and naval, with the implied
power of pledging the public faith for whatever expenditure
he may choose to incur in its application. And, to prove
how dangerous it is to vest such extraordinary powers in the
Executive, I might avail myself of the experience which we
have had in the last few months of the aspiring character of
that department of the Government, and which has furnish
ed conclusive evidence of the danger of vesting in it even a
very limited discretion. It is not for me to judge of the pro
priety of the course which the members of this body may
think proper to pursue in reference to the question under
consideration ; but I must say that I am at a loss to under
stand how any one, who regards as I do the acts to which I
have referred, as palpable usurpations of power, and as in
dicating on the part of the Executive a dangerous spirit of
aggrandizement, can vote against the bill under consideration,
and thereby virtually vote to continue in the President the
extraordinary and dangerous power in question.

But it may be said that the provisions of the act which
confers this power will expire, by its own limitation, at the
termination of the present session. It is true it will then
cease to be law ; but it is no less true that the precedent,
unless the act be expunged from the statute-book, will
live for ever, ready, on any pretext of future danger, to be
quoted as an authority to confer on the chief magistrate
similar, or even more dangerous powers, if more dangerous
can be devised. We live in an eventful period ; and, among

378 SPEECHES.

other tilings, we have had, recently, some impressive lessons
on the danger of precedents. To them immediately we owe
the act which has caused the present calamitous and danger
ous condition of the country ; which has been defended
almost solely on the ground of precedents — precedents almost
unnoticed at the time ; but had they not existed, or had
they been reversed at the time by Congress, the condition of
the country would, this day, be far different from what it is.
With this knowledge of the facts, we must see that a bad
precedent is as dangerous as a bad measure itself ; and in
some respects more so, since it may give rise to acts far worse
than itself, as in the case to which I have alluded. In this
view of the subject, to refuse to vote for the repeal of the
act, and thereby constitute a precedent to confer similar, or
more dangerous powers hereafter, would be as dangerous as
to vote for an act to vest permanently in the President the
power in question.

But I pass over this and other objections to the details not
much less formidable. I take a higher stand against the
act : I object to the principle in which it originated, — put
ting the details aside, — on the ground, as I have stated, that
they are subversive of our political institutions, and fatal in
their tendency to the liberty and happiness of the country.
Fortunately, we are not left to conjecture or inference as to
what these principles are. It was openly proclaimed, both
here and elsewhere, in the debates of this body and the pro
clamation and message of the President, in which the act
originated, that the very basis on which it rests — the assump
tion on which only it could be supported — was, that this
Government had the final and conclusive right, in the last
resort, to judge of the extent of its powers ; and that, to
execute its decision, it had the right to use all the means of
the country, civil, military, and fiscal, not only against in
dividuals, but against the States themselves, and all acting

SPEECHES. 379

under their authority, whether in a legislative, executive, or
judicial capacity.

If further evidence be required, as to the nature and
character of the act, it will be found in the history of the
events in which it took its origin. It originated, as we all
know, in a controversy between this Government and the
State of South Carolina, in reference to a power which in
volved the question of the constitutionality of a protective
tariff. I do not intend to give the history of this controver
sy ; it is sufficient for my purpose to say, that the State, in
maintenance of what she believed to be her unquestionable
rights, assumed the highest ground : she placed herself on
her sovereign authority as a constituent member of this con
federacy, and made her opposition to the encroachment on
these rights through a convention of the people, the only or
gan by which, according to our conception, the sovereign will
of a State canjbe immediately and directly pronounced. This
Government, on its part, in resistance to the action of the
State, assumed the right to trample upon the authority of
the convention, and to look beyond the State to the individ
uals who compose it ; not as forming a political community,
but as a mere mass of isolated individuals, without political
character or authority ; and thus asserted in the strongest
manner, not only the right of judging of its own powers, but
that of overlooking, in a contest for power, the very exist
ence of the State itself, and of recognizing, in the assertion
of what it might claim to be its power, no other authority
whatever in the system but its own.

Such being the principle in which this bill originated, we
are brought to the consideration of a question of the deepest
import. Is an act, which assumes such powers for this Gov
ernment, consistent with the nature and character of our po
litical institutions ?

It is not my intention, in the discussion of this question,
to renew the debate of the last session. But, in declining to

380 SPEECHES.

renew that discussion, I wish to be distinctly understood that
I do so exclusively on the ground that I do not feel myself
justified in repeating arguments so recently advanced ; and
not on the ground that there is the least abatement of confi
dence in the positions then assumed, or in the decisive bear
ing which they ought to have against the act. So far other
wise, time and reflection have but served to confirm me
in the impression which I then entertained ; and, without
repeating the arguments, I now avail myself, in this discus
sion, of the positions then established, and stand prepared to
vindicate them against whatever assaults may be made upon
them, come from what quarter they may. Without, then,
reopening the discussion of the last session on the elementa
ry principles of our Government, which were then brought
into controversy, I shall now proceed to take the plainest and
most common-sense view of our political institutions, regard
ing them merely in a matter-of-fact way, in order ft) ascer
tain the parts of which they are composed, and the relations
which they bear to each other.

Thus regarding our institutions, we are struck, on the
first view, with the number and complexity of the parts —
with the division, classification, and organization which per
vade every part of the system. It is, in fact, a system of
governments ; and these, in turn, are a system of depart
ments — a system in which government bears the same rela
tion to government, in reference to the whole, as departments
do to departments, in reference to each particular govern
ment. As each government is made up of the legislative,
executive, and judicial departments organized into one, so
the system is made up of this Government, and the State
governments, in like manner, organized into one system. So,
too, as the powers which constitute the respective govern
ments are divided and organized into departments, in like
manner in the formation of the governments, their powers
are classed into two distinct divisions : the one containing

SPEECHES. 381

powers local and peculiar in their character, which the inter
ests of the States require to be exercised by each State
through a separate government ; the other containing those
which are more general and comprehensive, and which can
be best exercised in some uniform mode through a common
Government. The former of these divisions constitutes what,
in our system, are known as the reserved powers, and are ex
ercised by each State through its own separate Government.
The latter are known as the delegated powers, and are exer
cised through this, the common Government of the several
States. The division of power into two parts, with distinct
and independent governments, regularly organized into de
partments, legislative, executive, and judicial, to carry their
respective parts into effect, constitutes the great, striking
and peculiar character of our system— is without exam
ple in ancient or modern times — and may be regarded as the
fundamental distribution of power under the system, and as
constituting its great conservative principle.

If we extend our eyes beyond, we shall find another strik
ing division between the power of the people and that of the
Government — between that inherent, primitive, creative pow
er which resides exclusively in the people, and from which all
authority is derived, and the delegated power or trust con
ferred upon the governments to effect the object of their cre
ation. If we look still beyond, we shall find another and
most important division. The people, instead of being uni
ted in one general community, are divided into twenty-four
States, each forming a distinct sovereign community, and in
which, separately, the whole power of the system ultimately
resides.

If we examine how this ultimate power is called into
action, we shall find that its only organ is a primary assem
blage of the people, known under the name of a Convention,
through which their sovereign will is announced, and by
which governments are formed and organized. If we trace,

382 SPEECHES.

historically, the exertion of this power in the formation of
the governments constituting our system, we shall find that,
originally, on the separation of the thirteen colonies from the
crown of Great Britain, each State for itself, through its own
convention, formed separate constitutions and governments,
and that these governments, in turn, formed a league or con
federacy for the purpose of exercising those powers, in the
regulation of which the States had a common interest. But
this confederacy, proving incompetent for its object, was su
perseded by the present constitution, which essentially changed
the character of the system. If we compare the mode of the
adoption of this constitution with that of the adoption of the
original constitutions of the several States, we shall find them
precisely the same. In both, each State adopted the consti
tution through its own convention, by its separate act, each
for itself, and is only bound in consequence of its own adop
tion, without reference to the adoption of any other State.
The only point in which they can be distinguished is the mu
tual compact, in which each State stipulated with the others
to adopt it as a common constitution. Thus regarded, this
constitution is, in fact, the constitution of each State. In
Virginia, for instance, it is the constitution of Virginia ; and
so, too, this Government, and the laws which it enacts, are,
within the limits of the State, the government and the laws
of the State. It is, in fact, the constitution and government
of the whole, because it is the constitution and government
of each part ; and not the constitution and government of
the parts, because it is of the whole. The system commences
with the parts, and ends with the whole. The parts are the
units, and the whole the multiple, instead of the whole being
a unit and the parts the fractions. Thus viewed, each State
has two distinct constitutions and governments — a separate
constitution and government, instituted, as I have stated, to
regulate the objects in which each has a peculiar interest ;
and a general one to regulate the interests common to all,

SPEECHES. 383

and binding, by a common compact, the whole into one com
munity, in which the separate and independent existence of
each State as a sovereign community is preserved, instead of
being fused into a common mass.

Such is our system ; such are its parts, and such their
relation to each other. I have stated no fact that can be
questioned, nor have I omitted any that is essential which
I am capable of perceiving. In reviewing the whole, we
must be no less struck with the simplicity of the means by
which all are blended into one, than we are by the number
and complexity of the parts. I know of no system, in either
respect, ancient or modern, to be compared with it ; and can
compare it to nothing but that sublime and beautiful system
of which our globe constitutes a part, and to which it bears,
in many particulars, so striking a resemblance. In this
system, this Government, as we have seen, constitutes a part
— a prominent, but a subordinate part, with defined, limited,
and restricted powers.

I now repeat the question, Is the act which assumes for
this Government the right to interpret, in the last resort,
the extent of its powers, and to enforce its interpretation
against all other authority, consistent with our institutions ?
To state the question is to answer it. We might with equal
propriety ask whether a government of unlimited power is
consistent with one of enumerated and restricted powers. I
say unlimited ; for I would hold his understanding in low
estimation who can make, practically, any distinction between
a government of unlimited powers and one which has an
unlimited right to construe and enforce its powers as it
pleases. Who does not see that, to divide power, and to give
one of the parties the exclusive right to determine what
share belongs to him, is to annihilate the division, and to
vest the whole in him who possesses the right ? It would
be no less absurd than for one in private life to divide his
property with another, and vest in that other the absolute

384 SPEECHES.

and unconditional right to determine the extent of his share ;
which would be, in fact, to give him the whole. Nor could
I think much more highly of the understanding of him who
does not perceive that this exclusive right, on the part of
this Government, of determining the extent of its powers,
necessarily destroys all distinction between reserved and
delegated powers ; and that it thus strikes a fatal blow at
that fundamental distribution of power which lies at the
bottom of our system. It also, by inevitable consequence,
destroys all distinction between constitutional and unconsti
tutional acts, making the latter to the full as obligatory as
the former ; of which we had a remarkable example when
the act proposed to be repealed was before the Senate. It
is well known that the power in controversy between this
Government and the State of South Carolina had been pro
nounced to be unconstitutional by the legislatures of most of
the Southern States, and also by many of the members of
this body ; and yet there were instances, however extraor
dinary it may appear, of members of the body voting to en
force an act which they believed to be unconstitutional, and
that, too, at the hazard of civil war. As strange as such a
course must appear, it was the natural and legitimate conse
quence of the power which the act assumed for this Govern
ment, and illustrates, in the strongest manner imaginable,
the truth of what I have advanced.

But to proceed. This unlimited right of judging as to
its powers, not only destroys, as I have stated, all distinction
between constitutional and unconstitutional acts, but merges
in this Government the very existence of the separate govern
ments of the States, by reducing them from that independent
and distinct existence, as co-governments, assigned to them
in the system, to mere subordinate and dependent bodies,
holding their power and existence at the mercy of this Gov
ernment. It stops not here — it annihilates the States them
selves. The right which it assumes of trampling upon the

SPEECHES. 386

authority of a convention of the people of the States, the
only organ through which the sovereignty of the States can
exert itself, and to look beyond the States to the individuals
who compose them, and to treat them as entirely destitute
of all political character or power, is, in fact, to annihilate
the States, and to transfer their sovereignty and all their
powers to this Government.

If we now raise our eyes, and direct them towards that
once beautiful system, with all its various, separate, and in
dependent parts blended into one harmonious whole, we must
be struck with the mighty change ! All have disappeared —
gone — absorbed — concentrated and consolidated in this Gov
ernment — which is left alone in the midst of the desolation
of the system, the sole and unrestricted representative of an
absolute and despotic majority.

Will it be tolerated that I should ask whether an act
which has caused so complete a revolution — which has en
tirely subverted our political system, as it emanated from
the hands of its creators, and reared in its place one in every
respect so different — must not, in its consequences, prove
fatal to the liberty and the happiness of these States ? Can
it be necessary for me to prove that no other system which
human ingenuity can devise, or imagination conceive, but
that which this fatal act has subverted, can preserve the
liberty or secure the happiness of the country ? Need I show
that the most difficult problem which ever was presented to
the mind of a legislator to solve, was to devise a system of
government for a country of such vast extent, that should at
once possess sufficient power to hold the whole together,
without, at the same time, proving fatal to liberty ? There
never existed an example before of a free community spread
ing over such an extent of territory ; and the ablest and
profoundest thinkers, at the time, believed it to be utterly
impracticable that there should be. Yet this difficult prob
lem was solved — successfully solved — by the wise and saga-
VOL. ii. — 25

386 SPEECHES.

cious men who framed our constitution. No ; it was above
unaided human wisdom — above the sagacity of the most
enlightened. It was the result of a fortunate combination
of circumstances, co-operating and leading the way to its
formation ; directed by that kind Providence which has so
often and so signally disposed events in our favor.

To solve this difficult problem, and to overcome the ap
parently insuperable obstacle which it presents, required that
peculiar division, distribution, and organization of power,
which, as I have stated, so remarkably distinguish our sys
tem, and which serve as so many breakwaters to arrest the
angry waves of power, impelled by avarice and ambition,
and which, driven furiously over a broad and unbroken ex
panse, would be resistless. Of this partition and breaking up
of power into separate parts, the most remarkable division
is that between the reserved and delegated powers, which
forms the basis on which this arid the separate governments
of the States are organized, as the great and primary depart
ments of the system. It is this important division which
mainly gives that expansive character to our institutions, by
means of which they have the capacity of being spread over
the vast extent of our country, without exposing us on the
one side to the danger of disunion, or, on the other, to the
loss of liberty. Without this happy device, the people of
these States, after having achieved their independence, would
have been compelled to resolve themselves into small and
hostile communities, in despite of a common origin, a common
language, and the common renown and glory acquired by
their united wisdom and valor in the war of the Revolution,
or have submitted quietly to the yoke of despotic power as
the only alternative.

In the place of this admirably contrived system, the act
proposed to be repealed has erected one great Consolidated
Government. Can it be necessary for me to show what must
be the inevitable consequences ? Need I prove that all con-

SPEECHES. 387

solidated governments — governments in which a single power
predominates (for such is their essence), are necessarily
despotic — whether that power be wielded by the will of one
man, or that of an absolute and unchecked majority ?
Need I demonstrate that it is, on the contrary, of the very
essence of liberty that the power should be so divided, dis
tributed, and organized, that one interest may check the
other, so as to prevent the excessive action of the separate
interests of the community against each other ; on, the prin
ciple that organized power can only be checked by organized
power ?

The truth of these doctrines was fully understood at the
time of the formation of this constitution. It was then
clearly foreseen and foretold what must be the inevitable
consequences of concentrating all the powers of the system
in this Government. Yes, we are in the state predicted, fore
told, prophesied from the beginning. All the calamities we
have experienced, and those which are yet to come, are the
result of the consolidating tendency of the Government ; and
unless that tendency be arrested — unless we reverse our
steps, all that has been foretold will certainly befall us —
even to the pouring out of the last vial of wrath — military
despotism. To this fruitful source of woes may be traced
that remarkable decay of public virtue ; that rapid growth
of corruption and subserviency ; that decline of patriotism ;
that increase of faction ; that tendency to anarchy ; and,
finally, that visible approach of the absolute power of one
man which so lamentably characterizes the times. Should
there be any one seeing and acknowledging all these morbid
and dangerous symptoms, who should doubt whether the
disease is to be traced to the cause which I have assigned,
I would ask him, To what other can it be attributed ?
There is no event — no, not in the political or moral world,
more than in the physical — without an adequate cause. I
would ask him, Does he attribute it to the people ? to their

388 SPEECHES.

want of sufficient intelligence and virtue for self-govern
ment ? If the true cause may be traced to them, very mel
ancholy would be our situation ; gloomy would be the pros
pect before us. If such be the fact, that our people are,
indeed, incapable of self-government, I know of no people
upon earth with whom we might not desire to change con
ditions. When the day comes wherein this people shall be
compelled to surrender self-government — a people so spirited
and So long accustomed to liberty, it will be indeed a day of
revolution, of convulsion and blood, such as has rarely, if
ever, been witnessed in any age or country ; and, until com
pelled by irresistible evidence, so fearful a cause cannot be
admitted.

Can it be attributed to the nature of our system of
government ? Shall we pronounce it radically defective,
and incapable of effecting the objects for which it was cre
ated ? If that be, in truth, the case, our situation would
be, in fact, not much less calamitous than if attributable to
the people. To what other system could we resort ? To a
confederation ? That has already been tried, and has proved
utterly inadequate. To consolidation ? Keason and experi
ence (as far as we have had experience) proclaim it to be the
worst possible form. But if the cause be not in the people
or the system, to what can it be attributed but to some mis
apprehension of the nature and character of our institutions,
and consequent misdirection of their powers or functions ?
And if so, to what other misapprehension or misdirection
but that which directed our system towards consolidation,
and consummated its movement, in that direction, in the act
proposed to be repealed ? That such is the fact — that this
is the true explanation of all the symptoms of decay and
corruption which I have enumerated — is, in reality, our only
consolation — furnishes the only hope that can be ration
ally entertained of extricating ourselves from our present
calamity, and of averting the still greater that are impending

SPEECHES. 389

I know that there are those who take a different, but, in
my opinion, a very superficial view of the cause of our diffi
culties. They attribute it exclusively to those who are in
power, and see in the misconduct of General Jackson the
cause of all that has befallen us. That he has done much
to aggravate the evil, I acknowledge with pain. I had my
full share of responsibility in elevating him to power, and
there once existed between us friendly relations, personal
and political ; and I would rejoice had he so continued to
conduct himself as to advance the interests of the country,
and his own reputation and fame. He certainly might have
effected much good. He came into office under circum
stances, and had a weight of popularity which placed much
in his power, for good or for evil ; but either from a want of
a just comprehension of the duties attached to the situation
in which he is placed, or an indisposition to discharge them,
or the improper influence and control of those who, unfortu
nately for the country and for himself, have acquired,
through flattery and subserviency, an ascendency over him,
he has disappointed the hopes of his friends, and realized the
predictions of his enemies. But the question recurs, How
happened it that he who has proved himself so illy qualified
to fill the high station that he occupies, was elected by the
people ? If it be attributed to a misapprehension of his
qualifications, or to an undue gratitude for distinguished
military services, which at times leads astray the most intel
ligent and. virtuous people in the selection of rulers — how
shall we explain his re-election, after he had actually proved
himself so incompetent ; after he had violated every pledge
which he had made previous to his election ; after he had dis
regarded the principles on which he had permitted his friends
and partisans to place his elevation, and had outraged the
feelings of the community by attempting to regulate the
domestic intercourse and relations of society ? Shall we say
that the feelings of gratitude for military services outweighed

390 SPEECHES.

all this ? or that the people, with all this experience, were
incapable of forming a correct opinion of his conduct or
character, or of understanding the tendency of the measures
of his administration ? To assert this would be neither more
nor less than to assert that they have neither the intelli
gence nor the virtue for self-government ; as the very crite
rion by which their capacity in that respect is tested, is their
ability duly to appreciate the. character and conduct of public
rulers, and the true tendency of their public measures ; and
to admit their incapacity in that respect would, in fact, bring
ns back to the people as the cause.

To understand truly how the distinguished individual
now at the head of affairs was elevated to this exalted sta
tion, in despite of his acknowledged defects in several re
spects, and how he has retained his power among an intelli
gent and patriotic people, notwithstanding all the objections
to his administration that have been stated, we must elevate
our views from the individual, and his qualifications and con
duct, to the working of the system itself, by which only we
can come to a knowledge of the true cause of our present
condition ; how we have arrived at it, and by what means
we can extricate ourselves from its dangers and difficulties.
I do not deem it necessary, in taking this view, to go back
and trace the operation of our Government from the com
mencement, or to point out the departure from its true prin
ciples from the beginning, with the evils thence resulting,
however interesting and instructive the investigation might
be. I might show that, from the first — beginning with the
formation of our constitution — there were two parties in the
Convention ; one in favor of a national, or, what is the same
thing, a consolidated government, and the other in favor of
the confederative principle ; how the latter, from being in
the minority at first, gradually, and after a long struggle,
gained the ascendency ; and how the fortunate result of that
ascendency terminated in the establishment of that beautiful,

SPEECHES. 391

complex, federative system of government which I have at
tempted to explain.

I might show that the struggle between the two parties
did not terminate with the adoption of the constitution ; that
after it went into operation the national party gained the as
cendency in the councils, of the country ; and that the result
of that ascendency was to give an impulse to the Government
in the direction to which their principles led, and from which
it never afterwards recovered. I am far from attributing
this to any sinister design. The party were not less distin
guished for patriotism than for ability, and no doubt honestly
intended to give the system a fair trial ; but they would have
been more than men, if their attachment to a favorite plan
had not biased their feelings and judgment. I, said Mr. C.,
avail myself of the occasion to avow my high respect for both
of the great parties which divided the country in its early
history. They were both eminently honest and patriotic,
and the preference which each gave to its respective views
resulted from a zealous attachment to the public interest.
At that early period, before there was any experience as to
the operation of the system, it is not surprising that one
should believe that the danger was a tendency to anarchy,
while the other believed it to be towards despotism ; and that
these different theoretical views should honestly have had a
decided influence on their public conduct.

I pass over the intermediate events : the reaction against
the national, or, as it was then called, federal party — the
elevation of Mr. Jefferson in consequence of that reaction in
1801 — and the gradual departure (from the influence of
power) of the republican party from the principles which
brought them into office. I come down at once to the year
eighteen hundred and twenty-four, when a protective tariff
was for the first time adopted ; when the power to impose
duties, granted for the purpose of raising revenue, was con
verted into an instrument of regulating, controlling, and or-

392 SPEECHES.

ganizing the entire capital and industry of the country, and
placing them under the influence of this Government ; and
when the principles of consolidation gained an entire ascend
ency in both Houses of Congress. Its first fruit was to give
a sectional action to the Government, and, of course, a sec
tional character to political parties — arraying the non-export
ing States against the exporting, and the Northern against
the Southern section.

It is my wish to speak of the events to which I feel my
self compelled to refer, in illustration of the practical ope
ration of that consolidating tendency of the Government,
which was consummated by the act proposed to be repealed,
and which I believe to be the cause of all our evils, with the
greatest possible moderation. I know how delicate a task it
is to speak of recent political events, and of the actors con
cerned in them ; and I would, on this occasion, gladly avoid
so painful a duty, if I did not believe that truth and the pub
lic interest require it. Without a full understanding of the
events of this period, from 1824 down to the present time,
it is impossible that we can have a just knowledge of the
cause of our present condition, or a clear perception of the
means of remedying it, To avoid all personal feeling, I
shall endeavor to recede, in imagination, a century from the
present time, and from that distant position regard the events
to which I allude, in that spirit of philosophical inquiry by
which an earnest seeker after truth, at so remote a day, may
be supposed to be actuated. I feel I may be justified in
speaking with the less reserve of these events, as the great
question which, during the greater part of the period, so
deeply agitated the country (the protective tariff), may now
be considered as terminated in the adjustment of the last
winter, never to be reagitated, as I trust ; and, of course,
may be spoken of with the freedom of a past event.

But to proceed with the narrative. The Presidential
contest, which was terminated the next year, placed the ex-

SPEECHES. 393

ecutive department under the control of the same interest that
controlled the legislative — so that all the departments of this
Government were united in favor of that great interest. The
successful termination of the election in favor of the individ
ual then elevated to the chief magistracy, and for whom I
then and now entertain kind feelings, may be attributed in
part, no doubt, to the predominance of the tariff interest ; v
and may be considered as the first instance of the predomi
nance of that interest in a Presidential contest.

Let us pause at this point (it is an important one), in
order to survey the state of public affairs at that juncture.
In casting our eyes over the scene, we find the country divided
into two great hostile and sectional parties — placed in con
flict on a question, believed to be on both sides of vital im
portance, in reference to their respective interests ; and, on
the side of the weaker party, believed, in addition, to involve
a constitutional question of the greatest magnitude, and
having a direct and important bearing on the duration of the
liberty and constitution of the country. In this conflict, we
find both Houses of Congress, with the chief magistrate, and,
of course, the Government itself, on the side of the dominant
interest, and identified with it in principles and feelings. In
this state of things, a great and solemn question, What
ought to be done ? was forced on the decision of the minor
ity. Shall we acquiesce, or shall we oppose ? and if oppose,
how ? To acquiesce quietly would be to subject the property
and industry of an entire section of the country to an un
limited and indefinite exaction ; as it was openly avowed
that the protective system could only be perfected by being
carried to the point of prohibition on all articles of which a
sufficient supply could be made or manufactured in the
country. To submit under such circumstances would have
been, according to our view of the subject, a gross dereliction
both of interest and duty. It was impossible. But how
could the majority be successfully opposed, possessed, as they

394 SPEECHES.

were, of every department of the Government ? How, in this
state of things, could the minority effect a change in their
favor through the ordinary operations of the Government ?
They could effect no favorable change in this or the other
House — the majority in both but too faithfully representing
what their constituents believed to be the interests of their
section, to whom only, and not to us, they were responsible.
The only branch of the Government, then, on which the mi
nority could act, and through which they could hope to effect
a favorable change, was the Executive. The President is
elected by a majority of the whole electoral votes ; and, of
course, the minority have a weight in his election, in propor
tion to their number and the unity of their voice. Here was
all our hope, and to this point all our efforts to effect a change
were necessarily directed. But even here our power of act
ing with effect was limited to a narrow circle. It would
have been hopeless to present a candidate openly and fully
identified with our own interest. Defeat would have been
the certain result, had his acknowledged qualifications for
intelligence, experience, and patriotism been ever so great.
We were thus forced, by inevitable consequence, — neither to
be avoided nor resisted, — to abandon the contest, or to select
a candidate who, at best, was but a choice of evils ; one
whose opinions were intermediate or doubtful on the subject
which divided the two sections. However great the hazard,
or the objections to such a selection for such an office, it
must be charged, not to us, but to that action of the system
which compelled us to make the choice — compelling us by
that consolidating tendency which had drawn under the con
trol of this Government the local and reserved powers be
longing to the States separately ; the exercise of which had
necessarily given the direction to its action, that created and
placed in conflict the two great sectional, political parties.
But it was not sufficient that the opinion of our candi
date should not be fully in coincidence with our own. That

SPEECHES. 395

alone could not be sufficient to insure his success. It was ne
cessary that he should have great personal popularity, dis
tinct from political ; to be, in a word, a successful military
chieftain, which gives a popularity the most extensive, and
the least affected by political considerations ; and this was
another fruit — a necessary fruit of consolidation. To these
recommendations others must be added, in order to conciliate
the feelings of the minority — that he should be identified,
for instance, with them in interest — possess the same proper
ty, and pursue the same system of industry. These qualifica
tions, all of which were made indispensable by the juncture,
pointed clearly to one man, and but one — General Jackson.
There was, however, another circumstance which gave him
great prominence and strength, and which greatly contributed
to recommend him as the opposing candidate. He had been
defeated in the Presidential contest before the House of Kep-
resentatives (though returned with the highest vote) under
circumstances which were supposed to involve a disregard of
the public voice. I do not deem it necessary to enter into an
inquiry as to the principles which controlled the election, or
as to the view of the actors in that scene. Many considera
tions doubtless governed, and among others, the feelings of
prominent individuals in reference to the candidates, and
their opinion of their respective qualifications, besides the
one to which I have alluded — that of giving to the dominant
interest that control over the executive which they had over
the legislative department.

These combined motives, as I have stated, pointed dis
tinctly to General Jackson. He was selected as the candi
date of the minority — and the canvass entered into with all
that zeal which belonged to the magnitude of the stake,
united with the consciousness of honest and patriotic pur
pose. The leading objects were to effect a great political re
form, and to arrest, if possible, what we believed to be a
dangerous, and felt to be an oppressive action of the Govern-

396 SPEECHES.

ment. It is true that the qualifications of the individual,
thus necessarily selected, were believed to be, in many im
portant particulars, defective ; that he lacked experience, ex
tensive political information, and command of temper ; but
it was believed that his firmness of purpose, and his natural
sagacity, by calling to his aid the experience, the talents, the
patriotism of those who supported his claims, would com
pensate for these defects.

I do not deem it necessary to enter into a history of this
interesting and animated canvass ; but there is one circum
stance attending it so striking, so full of instruction, and so
illustrative of the point under consideration, that I cannot
pass it in silence. The canvass soon ran into the great and
absorbing question of the day, as all ordinary diseases run
into the prevailing one. Those in power sought to avail
themselves of the popularity of the system with which they
were identified. I speak it not in censure. It was natural,
perhaps unavoidable, as connected with the morbid action of
the Government. That portion of our allies identified with
the same interest, were in like manner, and from the same
motive and cause, forced into a rivalry of zeal for the same
interest. The result of these causes combined with a mo
nopolizing spirit of the protective system, was the tariff of
eighteen hundred and twenty-eight : that disastrous measure,
which has brought so many calamities upon us, and put in
peril the union and liberty of the country. It poured mil
lions into the treasury beyond even the most extravagant
wants of the Government ; which, on the payment of the
public debt, caused that hazardous juncture, resulting from
a large undisposable surplus revenue, which has spread such
deep corruption in every direction.

This disastrous event opened our eyes (I mean myself and
those immediately connected with me) as to the full extent
of the danger and oppression of the protective system, and
the hazard of failing to effect the reform intended through

SPEECHES. 397

the election of General Jackson. With these disclosures, it
became necessary to seek some other ultimate, but more cer
tain measure of protection. We turned to the constitution
to find this remedy. We directed a more diligent and care
ful scrutiny into its provisions, in order to ascertain fully the
nature and character of our political system. We found a
certain and effectual remedy in that great fundamental di
vision of the powers of the system between this Government
and its independent co-ordinates, — the separate governments
of the States ; — to be called into action to arrest the uncon
stitutional acts of this Government, by the interposition
of the States — the paramount source from which both
governments derive their power. But in relying on this
as our ultimate remedy, we did not abate our zeal in
the Presidential canvass ; we still «hoped that General Jack
son, if elected, would effect the necessary reform, and there
by supersede the necessity for calling into action the sover
eign authority of the State, which we were anxious to avoid.
With these views, the two were pushed with equal zeal at the
same time ; which double operation commenced in the fall
of eighteen hundred and twenty-eight, but a few months af
ter the passage of the tariff act of that year ; and at the
meeting of the Legislature of the State, at the same period,
a paper, known as the South Carolina Exposition, was re
ported to that body, containing a full development, as well on
the constitutional point, as on the operation of the protective
system, preparatory to a state of things which might eventual
ly render the action of the State necessary in order to protect
her rights and interests, and to stay a course of policy which
we believed would, if not arrested, prove destructive of lib
erty and the constitution. This movement on the part of
the State, places beyond all controversy the true character of
the motives which governed us in the Presidential canvass
We were not the mere partisans of the candidate we support
ed. We aimed at a far more exalted object than his elec-

398 SPEECHES.

tion — the defence of the rights of the State, and the security
of liberty and of the constitution. To this we held his
election entirely subordinate. This we pursued, unwarped
by selfish or ambitious views.

The contest terminated in the elevation of him who now
presides ; but it soon became apparent that our apprehen
sions that we might be disappointed in the expected reform,
were not without foundation. That occurred, which we
ought, perhaps, to have expected, and which, under similar
circumstances, has rarely failed to follow. He who was ele
vated to power proved to be more solicitous to retain what
he had acquired than to fulfil the expectation of those who
had honestly contributed to his elevation, with a view to
political reform. The tale may be readily told : not a promise
fulfilled — not a measure adopted to correct the abuses of the
system — not a step taken to arrest the progress of consoli
dation, and to restore the confederative principles of our
Government — not a look cast to the near approach of the
payment of the public debt — nor an effort made to reduce
gradually the duties, in order to prevent a surplus revenue,
and to save the manufactures which had grown up under the
protective system, from the hazard of a shock caused by a
sudden reduction of the duties. All were forgotten ; and,
instead of attempting to control events, the Executive was
only solicitous to occupy a position the most propitious to
retain and increase his power. It required but little pene
tration to see that the position sought was a middle one
between the contending parties ; — to be identified with no
principle or policy, but to rely on the personal popularity of
the incumbent, and the power and patronage of the Govern
ment, as the means of support. Hence a third party was
formed, a personal and Government party, made up of those
who were attached to the person and the fortunes of a suc
cessful political chief. In a word, we had exhibited to our
view; for the first time under our system, that most danger-

SPEECHES. 399

ous spectacle, in a country like ours, a prerogative party,
who take their creed wholly from the mandate of their chief.
The times were eminently propitious for the formation of
such a party. Millions were poured into the treasury hy the
high protective duties -of eighteen hundred and twenty- eight,
furnishing an overflowing fund to secure the services of ex
pectants and partisans. Against these superabundant means
of power there was not, nor could there be, as things were
situated, any effective resistance — all being necessarily with
drawn in consequence of the fierce contest between the two
sections which continued to rage with increasing violence,
and which wasted the strength of the parties on each other,
instead of opposing the rapidly-increasing power of the
Executive. This, and not the personal or the military pop
ularity of General Jackson, is the true explanation of the fact,
which has struck so many with wonder, that no misconduct
— that no neglect of duty nor perversions of the power of
Government, however gross, have been able to shake his
power and popularity ; and that the people have looked idly
on, apparently bereaved of every patriotic sentiment, or
joined to swell the tide of power with shouts of approbation
at every act, however outrageous. I do not doubt that his
personal popularity, arising from his military achievements,
contributed much to his elevation (in fact, it was one of the
elements, as stated, which governed his selection as a candi
date), and to sustain him while in power ; but I feel a
perfect conviction that, whatever advantage he has gained
from this source, has been more than counterbalanced by the
mismanagement and blunders of his administration ; and
that, under the circumstances, it would be equally diffi
cult to expel from power any individual of sagacity and
firmness, in possession of that department. Let us learn,
from the instructive history of this interesting period, that
despotic power, under our system, commences with the usur
pation of this Government on the reserved powers of the

400 SPEECHES.

States, and terminates in the concentration of all the powers
of this Government in the person of a chief magistrate ; and
that, unless the first be resisted, the latter follows by a law as
necessary, resistless, and inevitable, as that which governs the
movements of the solar system.

As soon as it was perceived that he whom we had ele
vated to office was, as I have stated, more intent to retain
and augment his power than to meet the just expectations on
which he was supported, we totally despaired of relief and
reform through the ordinary action of this Government, and
separated, from that moment, from the administration ; with
drew from the political contest here, and concentrated all our
energies on that ultimate remedy which we had taken the
precaution to prepare, in order to be called into action in the
event of things taking the direction they have.

An active discussion followed in the State, in which the
principles and character of our political institutions were fully
investigated, and a clear perception of the danger to which
the country was exposed was impressed upon the public
mind. Still, the determination was fixed not to act while
there was a ray of hope of redress from the Government ; and
we accordingly waited the approach of the final payment of
the public debt, when all pretexts for keeping up the extrav
agant duties of eighteen hundred and twenty-eight would
cease. The near approach of that event caused the passage
of the act of eighteen hundred and thirty-two, which was
proclaimed on both sides, by the opposition and the admin
istration, to be a final and permanent adjustment of the
protective system. We fert every disposition to acquiesce in
any reasonable adjustment, but it was impossible, consistently
with our views of the nature of our rights, and the conse
quences involved in the contest, to submit to the act. The
protective principle was fully maintained ; the reduction was
small, and the distribution of the burden between the two
sections more unequal than under the act of eighteen hun-

SPEECHES. 401

dred and twenty-eight. Every effort was made to magnify
the amount of reduction. With that view false and decep
tive calculations were made, and that, too, in official docu
ments, in order to make the impression that the revenue
would be reduced to the legitimate wants of the Government,
or, at least, nearly so. We were not to be imposed upon by
such calculations. We clearly perceived that the income
would be at least from twenty-two to twenty-five millions of
dollars, nearly double what the Government ought to expend;
and we as clearly saw how much so large a permanent sur
plus must contribute to corrupt the country and undermine
our political institutions. Seeing this, with a prospect of an
indefinite continuance of the heavy and useless tax levied in
the shape of duties, the State interposed, and by that inter
position prepared to arrest within its limits the operation of
the protective system — interposed, not to dissolve the Union,
as was calumniously charged, but to compel an adjustment
here or through a convention of the States, or, if an adjust
ment could not be had through either, to compel the Gov
ernment to abandon the protective system.

The moment was portentous. Our political system rocked
to the centre. Whatever diseases existed within, engendered
by long corruption and abuse, were struck to the surface.
The Proclamation and the message of the President appeared,
containing doctrines never before officially avowed — going far
beyond the extreme tenets of the federal party, and in direct
conflict with all that had ever been entertained by the re
publican party ; and yet, such was the corruption, such the
subserviency to power, that both parties, forgetting the past,
abandoning every political principle, however sacred or long
entertained, rushed to the embrace of the new creed — sud
denly, instantly, without the slightest hesitation. Never did
a free people exhibit so degraded a spectacle — give such
evidence of the loose attachment to principle, or greater sub
serviency to power. At this moment the current of events
VOL. ii. — 26

402 SPEECHES.

tended towards despotic authority in the person of the chief
magistrate on the one side, and to disunion on the other ; on one
side to clothe the President with power more than dictatorial,
in order to maintain the ascendency of the protective system ;
and, on the other, to resist the loss of liberty at every hazard.
Fortunately for the country, there was, at the time, in the
councils of the nation an individual who had the highest
weight of authority with the supporters of that system — one
who had done more to advance it than any other — who was
the most intimately identified with it, and to whom, of course,
the task of adjustment most appropriately belonged. For
tunately, also, he had the disposition and the fortitude to
undertake it. An adjustment followed ; the crisis of the
disease passed ; the body politic from that moment became
convalescent ; the tendency to despotic power in the Executive
was weakened — doubly weakened — by enabling those who had
been so long wasting their strength in mutual conflict, to
unite in resisting the usurpations of that department, as we
this day behold on the question of the deposits ; and by
diminishing the revenue — the food on which it had grown to
such enormous dimensions. In a short time the decreasing
scale of duties will cause the effect of this diminution to be
felt — a period that will be hastened by that profuse and
profligate disbursement which has nearly doubled the public
expenditure, and which is so rapidly absorbing the surplus
revenue.

I have said that the crisis is passed ; yet there remain
some troublesome and even dangerous symptoms, growing
out of the former cause of the disease, which, however, may
be overcome by skill and decision ; unless, indeed, they
should run into the lurking cause of another, and most dan
gerous disease, with which it is intimately connected, and
excite it into action ; I mean the rotten state of the cur
rency. There are indications, of a very dangerous and alarm
ing character, of this tendency, at the point where the cur-

SPEECHES. 403

rency is the most disordered. I refer to the measure now
pending before the Legislature of New- York, to pledge the
capital and the industry of the State, to the amount of six
millions of dollars, in support of the banks — a measure of a
kind that a British minister (Lord Althorp), with all the
power of parliament to support him, refused to adopt, be
cause of its dangerous and corrupting tendency.

Let us now turn, and inquire, What would have been
the course of events if the State had not interposed, and
things had been permitted to take their natural course ?
The act of eighteen hundred and thirty-two was proclaimed,
— as I have stated, — on both sides, to be a final settlement of
the tariff question, and of course, was intended to be a per
manent law of the land. The revenue, as I have already
said, under that act, and the sales of public lands, would,
in all probability, be not less than twenty-five millions of dol
lars per annum : a sum exceeding the legitimate wants of
the Government, estimated on a liberal scale, by ten or
eleven millions of dollars. Now, I ask, What would have
been our situation, with so large an annual surplus, and a
fierce sectional conflict raging between the Northern and
Southern portions of the Union ? If we find it so difficult
to resist the usurpation of the executive department with a
temporary surplus revenue, to continue at most but for one
or two years, how much more difficult would it have been to
resist with a permanent surplus such as I have stated ? If
we find it so difficult to resist that department when those
who have been separated by the tariff are united, how utterly
hopeless would have been the prospect of resistance were
that question now open, and were those who are now
united against executive encroachments exhausting their
strength against each other? Is it not obvious that the
executive power, under such circumstances, would have been
irresistible, and that we should have been impelled rapidly
to despotism or disunion ? One or the other would cer-

404 SPEECHES.

tainly have followed if events had been permitted to move
in the channel in which they were then flowing — and des
potism much more probable than disunion. It is almost
without example that free states should be disunited in con
sequence of the violence of internal conflicts ; but very nu
merous are the cases in which such conflicts have terminated
in the establishment of despotic power. The danger of dis
union is small ; that of despotism great. We have, how
ever, I trust, escaped, for the present, the danger of both, for
which we are indebted to that great conservative principle of
our system, which considers this Government and that of
the States as co-ordinates ; and which proved successful,
although rejected by every State but one, and although
called into action on the most trying occasion that can be
imagined, and under the most adverse circumstances.

I said that the danger has passed for the present. The
seeds of the disease still remain in the system. The act
which I propose to repeal accompanied the adjustment of
the tariff. It was passed solely on the ground of recognizing
the principles in which it originated, and to establish them,
as far as an act of Congress could do so, as the permanent
law of the land. While these seeds remain, it will be in
vain to expect a healthy state of the body politic : alienation,
the loss of confidence, suspicion, jealousy, on the part of the
weaker section at least, who have experienced the bitter
fruits that spring from those principles, must accompany the
movements of this Government. But these seeds will not
remain in the system without germinating. Unless removed,
the genius of consolidation will again exhibit itself ; but in
what form, whether in the revival of the question from whose
dangers we have not yet wholly escaped ; whether between
North and South, East and West ; whether between the slave-
holding and the non-slaveholding States ; the rich and poor,
or the capitalist and the operatives, it is not for me to say ;
but that it will again revive (unless, by your votes, you ex-

SPEECHES. 405

punge the act from your statute-book) , to divide, distract,
and corrupt the community, is certain. Nor is it much less
so that, when it again revives, it will pass through all those
stages which we have witnessed, and, in all human proba
bility, consummate itself, and terminate, finally, in a mili
tary despotism. Keverse the scene — let the act be oblite
rated for ever from among our laws ; let the principle of
consolidation be for ever suppressed, and that admirable and
beautiful federative system, which I have so imperfectly por
trayed, be firmly established, — and renovated health and
vigor wih1 be restored to the body politic, and our country
may yet realize that permanent state of liberty, prosperity,
and greatness, which we all once so fondly hoped was our
allotted destiny.

SPEECH

On the Protest of the President of the United States,
delivered in the Senate, May 6th, 1834

IN order to have a clear conception of the nature of the
controversy in which the Senate finds itself involved with the
President, it will be necessary to pass in review the events
of the last few months, however familiar they may be to the
members of this body.

Their history may be very briefly given. It is well
known to all, that the act incorporating the Bank of the
United States made that institution the fiscal agent of the
Government ; and that, among other provisions, it directed
that the public money should be deposited in its vaults.
The same act vested the Secretary of the Treasury with the
power of withholding the deposits, and, in the event of with
holding them, required him to report his reasons to Congress.

406 SPEECHES.

The late Secretary, on the interference of the President, re
fused to withhold the deposits, on the ground that satisfac
tory reasons could not be assigned ; for which the President
removed him, and appointed the present incumbent in his
place expressly with a view that he should perform the act
his predecessor had refused to do. He accordingly removed
the deposits, and reported his reasons to Congress ; and the
whole transaction was thus brought up for our approval or dis
approval entirely by the act of the Executive, without partici
pation or agency on our part ; and we were thus placed in a
situation in which we were compelled to express our appro
bation or disapprobation of the transaction, or to shrink from
the performance of an important duty. We could not hesi
tate. The subject was accordingly taken up, and after
months of deliberation, in which the whole transaction was
fully investigated and considered, and after the opinions of
all, the friends as well as the opponents of the administra
tion, were fully expressed, the Senate passed a resolution
disapproving the reasons of the Secretary. But they were
compelled to go further. That resolution covered only a
part of the transaction, and that not the most important.
The Secretary was but the agent of the President in the
transaction. He had been placed in the situation he occu
pied expressly with a view of executing the order of the
President, who had openly declared that he assumed the
responsibility, and his declaration was reiterated here in the
debate by those who are known to speak his sentiments. To
omit, under these circumstances, an expression of the opinion
of the Senate in relation to this transaction, viewed as the
act of the President, would have been, on the part of the
Senate, a manifest dereliction of duty.

With this impression the second resolution was adopted.
It was drawn up in the most general terms, and with great
care, with the view to avoid an expression of opinion as to the
motive of the Executive, and to limit the expression simply

SPEECHES. 407

to the fact, that, in the part he had taken in the transaction,
he had assumed powers neither conferred by the constitution
nor the laws, but in derogation of both. It is this resolution,
thus forced upon us, and thus cautiously expressed, which
has so deeply offended the President, and called forth his
Protest, in which he has undertaken to judge of the powers
of the Senate ; to assign limits in their exercise to which
they may, and beyond which they shall not go ; to deny
their right to pass the resolution ; to charge them with
usurpation and the violation of law and of the constitution
in adopting it ; and, finally* to interpose between the Senate
and their constituents, and virtually to pronounce upon the
validity of the votes of some of its members on the ground
that they do not conform with the will of their constituents.

This is a brief statement of the controversy, which pre
sents for consideration the question, What is the real nature of
the issue between the parties ? — a question of the utmost mag
nitude, and on the just and full comprehension of which the
wisdom and propriety of our course must mainly depend.

It would be a great mistake to suppose that the issue
involves the question, whether the Senate had a right to
pass the resolution or not ; or what is its character ; or
Avhether it be true in point of fact or principle ; or whether
it was expedient to adopt it. All these are important ques
tions, but they were fully and deliberately considered, and
were finally decided by the Senate, on their responsibility to
their constituents, in the adoption of the resolution — finally
and irrevocably decided ; so that they cannot be opened for
reconsideration and decision by the will of the body itself
according to the rules of its proceedings, much less on the
demand of the President. No ; the question is not whether
we had a right to pass the resolution. It is one of a very
different character, and of much greater magnitude. It is
whether the President lias a right to question our decision ?
This is the real question at issue — a question which goes

408 SPEECHES.

in its consequences to all the powers of the Senate, and
which involves in its decision the fact, whether it is a sepa
rate and independent branch of the Government, or a mere
appendix of the executive department. If the President
has, indeed, the right to question our opinion — if we are in
fact accountable to him, then all that he has done has been
rightfully done ; then he would have the right to send us his
Protest ; then he would have the right to judge of our
powers, and to assign limits beyond which we shall not pass ;
then he would have the right to deny our authority to pass
the resolution, and to accuse us of usurpation and the viola
tion of law and of the constitution in its adoption. But if
he has not the right, if we are not accountable to him, then
all that he has done has been wrongfully done, and his whole
course from beginning to end, in relation to this matter,
would be an open and palpable violation of the constitution
and the privileges of the Senate.

Fortunately, this very important question, which has so
direct a bearing on the very existence of the Senate as a
deliberative body, is susceptible of the most certain and
unquestionable solution. Under our system, all who exercise
power are bound to show, when questioned, by what author
ity it is exercised. I deny the right of the President to ques
tion the proceedings of the Senate — utterly deny it ; and I
call upon his advocates and supporters on this floor to exhibit
his authority ; to point out the article, the section, and the
clause of the constitution which contains it ; to show, in a
word, the express grant of the power. None other can fulfil
the requirements of the constitution. I proclaim it as a
truth — as an unquestionable truth of the highest import, and
heretofore not sufficiently understood, that the President has
no right to exercise any implied or constructive power. I
speak upon the authority of the constitution itself, which, by
an express grant, has vested all the implied and constructive
powers in Congress, and in Congress alone. Hear what the

SPEECHES. 409

constitution says : Congress shall have power "to make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers (those granted to Con
gress), and all other power vested by this constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any department
or officer thereof/'

Comment is unnecessary — the result is inevitable. The
Executive cannot, and, I may add, no department except the
legislative can exercise any power without express grant by
the constitution, or by authority of law — a noble and wise
provision, full of the most important consequences. By it,
ours is made emphatically a constitutional and legal govern
ment, instead of a government controlled by the discretion
or caprice of those who are appointed to administer and exe
cute its powers. By it, our Government, instead of consist
ing of three independent, separate, conflicting, and hostile
departments, has all its powers blended harmoniously into
one, without the danger of conflict, and without destroying
the separate and independent existence of the parts. Let us
pause for a moment to contemplate this admirable provision,
and the simple but efficient contrivance by which these hap
py results are secured.

It has often been said that this provision of the constitu
tion was unnecessary ; that it grew out of abundant caution,
to remove the possibility of a doubt as to the existence of
implied or constructive powers ; and that they would have
existed without it, and to the full extent that they now do.
They who consider the provision in this light, as mere sur
plusage, do great injustice to the wisdom of those who formed
the constitution. I shall not deny that implied or construc
tive powers would have existed, and to the full extent that
they now do, without this provision ; but, had it been omit
ted, a most important question would have been left open to
controversy — Where would such powers reside ? In each
department ? Would each have had the right to interpret

410 SPEECHES.

its own power, and to assume, on its own will and responsi
bility, all the powers necessary to carry into effect those grant
ed to it by the constitution ? What would have been the
consequence ? Who can doubt that a state of perpetual and
dangerous conflict between the departments would be the
necessary, the inevitable result, and that the strongest would
ultimately absorb all the powers of the other departments ?
Need I designate which is that strongest ? Need I prove
that the Executive, the armed interpreter, as I said on an
other occasion, vested with the patronage of the Government,
would ultimately become the sole expounder of the constitu
tion ? It was to avoid this dangerous conflict between the
departments, and to provide most effectually against the
abuses of discretionary or implied powers, that this provision
has vested all the implied powers in Congress. But, it may
be asked, are they not liable to abuse in the hands of Con
gress ? Will not the same principle of our nature, which
impels one department to encroach upon the other, equally
impel Congress to encroach upon the executive department ?
Those who framed the constitution clearly foresaw this dan
ger, and have taken measures effectually to guard against it.
With this view, the constitution has raised the President
from being a mere executive officer, to a participation in the
legislative functions of the Government ; and has, among
other legislative powers, clothed him with that of the veto,
mainly with a view to protect his rights against the encroach
ment of Congress. In virtue of this important power, no bill
can become a law till submitted for his consideration. If he
approves, it becomes a law ; but if he disapproves, it is re
turned to the House in which it originated, and cannot be
come one unless passed by two-thirds of both Houses. And
in order to guard his powers against the encroachments of
Congress, through all the avenues by which it can possibly be
approached, the constitution expressly provides, " that every
order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the

SPEECHES. 411

Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary,
[none other can operate beyond the limits of their respective
halls,] except on a question of adjournment, shall be pre
sented to the President of the United States, and, before the
same shall take effect, shall be approved by him ; or, being
disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two-thirds of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, according to the
rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill." These
provisions, with the patronage of the Executive, give ample
protection to the powers of the President against the en
croachment of Congress, as experience has abundantly shown.
But here a very important question presents itself, which,
when properly considered, throws a flood of light on the ques
tion under consideration. Why has the constitution limited
the veto power to bills, and to the orders, votes, and resolu
tions, requiring the concurrence of both Houses ? Why not
also extend it to their separate votes, orders, or resolutions ?
But one answer can be given. The object was to protect the
independence of the two Houses ; to prevent the Executive
from interfering with their proceedings, or to have any con
trol over them, as is attempted in his Protest ; — and this, on
the great principle which lies at the foundation of liberty,
and without which it cannot be preserved — that deliberative
bodies should be left without extraneous control or influence,
free to express their opinions and to conduct their proceed
ings, according to their own sense of propriety. And we
find, accordingly, that the constitution has not only limited
the veto to the cases requiring the concurring votes of the
two Houses, but has expressly vested each House with the
power of establishing its own rules of proceeding, according
to its will and pleasure, without limitation or check. With
in these walls, then, the Senate is the sole and absolute
judge of its own powers ; and as to the mode of conducting
the business, and determining how, and when, our opinions
ought to be expressed, there is no other standard of right oj

412 SPEECHES.

wrong to which an appeal can be made, but the constitution,
and the rules of proceeding established under the authority
of the Senate itself. And so solicitous is the constitution to
secure to each House a full control over its own proceedings,
and the freest and fullest expression of opinion on all sub
jects, that even the majesty of the laws are relaxed to insure
a perfect freedom of debate. It is worthy of remark, that
the provision of the constitution which I have cited, invest
ing Congress solely with the implied or constructive powers,
is so worded as not to comprehend the discretionary powers
of each of the two Houses in determining the rules of their
respective proceedings, and which, of course, places each be
yond the interference of Congress itself.

Let us now cast our eyes back, in order that we may
comprehend, at a single glance, the admirable arrangements
by which the harmony of the Government is secured, with
out impairing the separate existence and independence of
either of the departments. In order to prevent the conflicts
which would have resulted, necessarily, if each department
had been left to construe its own powers, all the implied or
constructive powers are vested in Congress ; that Congress
should not, through its implied powers, encroach upon the
executive department, the President is clothed with the veto
power ; and that his veto should not interfere with the rights
of the two Houses to control their respective proceedings, it
is limited to bills or votes that require the concurrence of the
two Houses. It is thus that walls are interposed to protect
the rights which belong to us, as a separate constituent mem
ber of the Government, from the encroachments of the Ex
ecutive power ; and it is thus that the power which is placed
in his hands, as a shield to protect him against the implied
or constructive powers of Congress, is prevented from being
converted into a sword to attack the rights exclusively vested
in the two Houses.

Having now established beyond controversy that the

SPEECHES. 413

President has no implied or constructive power ; that he has
no authority to exercise any right not expressly granted to
him by the constitution, or vested in him by law ; and that
the constitution has secured to the Senate the sole right of
regulating its own proceedings, free from all interference,
the fabric reared by this paper, and which rests upon the
opposite basis, presupposing the right to the fullest and
boldest assumption of discretionary powers on the part of the
President, falls prostrate in the dust. Entertaining these
views, it will not be expected that I should waste the time
of the Senate in examining its contents ; but, if additional
proofs were necessary to confirm the truth of my remarks,
and to show how strong would have been the tendency to
conflict, and how dangerous it would have been to have left
the several departments in possession of the right to exercise
implied powers at their pleasure, this paper would afford the
strongest. In illustration of the correctness of this assertion,
I will select two or three of its leading positions, which will
show what feeble barriers reason or regard to consistency
would interpose to prevent conflict between the departments,
or to protect the legislative from the executive branch of
the Government ; and how regardless the President is of
consistency and reason where the object is the advancement
of the powers of his department.

In order to prove that the Senate had no right to pass
the resolution in question, the President enters into a long
disquisition on the nature and character of our Government.
He tells us, that it consists of three separate and indepen
dent departments — the legislative, executive, and judicial.
That the first is vested in Congress ; the second in the Presi
dent ; and the last in the courts, with a few exceptions, which
he enumerates. He also informs us that these departments
are coequal, and that neither has the right to coerce or
control the other ; and then concludes that the Senate had
no right to pass the resolution in question.

414 SPEECHES.

It is not my intention to inquire whether the view of the
Government which the President has presented be, or be not
correct ; though it would not be difficult to show that his
conception as to their coequality and independence, taken
in the ordinary acceptation of these terms, would deprive the
Senate of all its judicial powers, and much of its legislative.
I will assume that his views are correct ; and that, as co
equal departments, neither has the right to interfere with
the other, — and what follows ? If we have no right to disap •
prove of his conduct, he surely has none, on his own prin
ciple, to disapprove of ours. It would seem impossible that
so obvious and necessary a consequence could be overlooked ;
yet so blind is ambition in pursuit of power, so regardless of
reason or consistency, that the President, while he denies to
us the right to interfere with him, or question his acts, does
not hesitate to charge the Senate, directly and repeatedh
with usurpation, and a violation of the laws and of the con
stitution.

The advocates of the President could not but feel the
glaring inconsistency and absurdity of his course ; and, in
order to reconcile his conduct with the principles he laid
down, asserted, in the discussion, that he sent his Protest, not
as President of the United States, but in his individual
character as Andrew Jackson. We may assert any thing —
that black is white, or that white is black. Every page,
every line of this paper contradicts the assertion. He,
throughout, speaks in his official character as President of
the United States, and regards the supposed injury that has
been done him, as an injury, not in his private, but in his
official character. But the explanation only removes the
difficulty one step further back. I would ask what right
has the President of the United States to divest himself of
his official character in a question between him and this body
touching his official conduct ? Where is his authority to
descend from his high station, in order to defend himself, as

SPEECHES. 415

a mere private individual, in what relates to him in his public
character ?

But the part of this paper which is the most character
istic, that which lets us into the real nature and character of
this movement, is the source from which the President de
rives the right to interfere with our proceedings. He does
not even pretend to derive it from any power vested in him
by the constitution, express or implied. He knew that such
an attempt would be utterly hopeless, and, accordingly, in
stead of a question of right, he makes it a question of duty ;
and thus inverts the order of things, referring rights to
duties, instead of duties to rights, and forgetting that rights
always precede duties, which are in fact but the obligations
they impose, and, of course, that they do not confer power.
The opposite view — that on which he acts, and which would
give to the President a right to assume whatever duty he
might choose, and to convert such duties into powers, would,
if admitted, render him as absolute as the Autocrat of all
the Eussias. Taking this erroneous view of his powers, he
could be at little loss to justify his conduct ; — to justify, did
I say ? He takes higher, far higher ground ; he makes his
interference a matter of obligation — of solemn obligation — of
imperious necessity, the tyrant's plea. He tells us that it
was due to his station — to public opinion — to proper self-
respect — to the obligation imposed by his constitutional oath
— his duty to see the laws faithfuUy executed — his respon
sibility as the head of the executive department — and to the
American people as their immediate representative, to inter
pose his authority against the usurpations of the Senate.
Infatuated man ! blinded by ambition — intoxicated by flat
tery and vanity ! Who, that is the least acquainted with
the human heart ; who, that is conversant with the pages of
history, does not see, under all this, the workings of a dark,
lawless, and insatiable ambition, which, if not arrested, must
finally impel him to his own or his country's ruin ?

416 SPEECHES.

It would be a great mistake to suppose that this Protest
is the termination of his hostility towards the Senate. It is
but the commencement — it is the proclamation in which he
makes known his will to the Senate, claims their obedience,
and admonishes them of their danger should they refuse to
repeal their ordinance — no, not ordinance — their resolution.
I am hurried away by the recollection of the events of the
last session. The hostilities then and now waged are the
same in their nature, character, and principle, differing only
in their objects and the parties. Then it was directed against
a sovereign member of this confederacy ; now against the
Senate. Then the Senate was associated with the Executive
as its ally ; now it is the object of his attack. I repeat,
hostilities will be prosecuted against us unless we repeal our
resolution — to effect which is the object of sending us this
Protest. For, disguise it as we may, to receive this Protest,
and to enter it upon our journals, would be a virtual repeal,
a surrender of our rights, and an acknowledgment of his su
periority ; and in that light it would be considered by the
country and the world — by the present and future genera
tions.

Should we repeal our resolutions, by receiving and enter
ing this Protest on the journals, we, no doubt, will be taken
into favor, and our past offences be forgiven : but if not, we
may expect that the war message (unless, indeed, the public
indignation should arrest it) will follow in due time, of which
the Protest contains many indications not to be misunder
stood.

It is impossible for the most careless observer to read
this paper without being struck with the extreme solicitude
which the President evinces to place himself in a position
between the Senate and the people. He tells us again and
again, with the greatest emphasis, that he is the immediate
representative of the American people. He the immediate
representative of the American people ! I thought the Pre-

SPEECHES. 417

sident professed to be a State Eights' man, placed at the
head of the State Eights' party ; that he believed the people
of these States were united in a constitutional compact, as
forming distinct and sovereign communities ; and that no
such community or people as the American people, taken
in the aggregate, existed. I had supposed that he was the
President of the United States, the only title by which he is
legally and constitutionally known ; and that the American
people are not represented in a single department of the
Government ; no, not even in the other House which repre
sents the people of the several States as distinct from the
people in the aggregate, as was solemnly determined at the
very commencement of the Government, under the imme
diate authority of Washington himself. Such, I had sup
posed, was the established political creed of the party at the
head of which he professed to be, and yet he claims to be
not only the representative, but the immediate representa
tive of the American people. What effrontery ! What
boldness of assertion ! The immediate representative ! Why,
he never received a vote from the American people. He was
elected by the electors chosen either by the people of the
States or by their legislatures ; and, of course, is at least as
far removed from the people as the members of this body,
who are elected by legislatures chosen by the people ; and
who, if the truth must be told, more fully and perfectly re
present the people of these States than the electoral colleges,
since the introduction of National Conventions composed of
office-holders and aspirants, under whose auspices the presi
dential candidate of the dominant party is selected, and who,
instead of the real voice of the people, utter that of a merce
nary corps, with interests directly hostile to theirs.

But why all this solicitude on the part of the President

to place himself near to the people, and to push us off 'to

the greatest distance ? Why this solicitude to make himself

their sole representative — their only guardian and protector

YOL. n. — 27

418 SPEECHES.

—their only friend and supporter ? The object cannot be
mistaken. It is preparatory to further hostilities — to an
appeal to the people ; and is intended to prepare the way in
order to transmit to them his declaration of war against the
Senate — to enlist them as his allies in the contest which he
contemplates waging against this branch of the Government.
If any one doubts his intention, let him cast his eyes over the
contents of this paper, and mark with what anxiety he seeks
to place himself in an attitude hostile to the Senate ; how he
has converted a simple expression of opinion into an accusa
tion — a charge of guilt ; a denunciation of his conduct, an
impeachment, — in which he represents himself as having been
tried and condemned without hearing or investigation. The
President is an old tactician, and understands well the
advantage of carrying 011 a defensive war with offensive
operations, in which the assailed assaults the assailant ; and
his object is to gain a position so commanding in the prose
cution of the hostilities which he meditates.

Having secured this important position, as he supposes,
he next endeavors to excite the sympathy of the people,
whom he seeks to make his allies in the contest. He tells
them of his wounds — wounds received in the war of the
Ke volution ; of his patriotism ; of his disinterestedness ; of
his freedom from avarice or ambition ; of his advanced age,
and, finally of his religion ; of his indifference to the affairs
of this life, and 'of his solicitude for that which is to come.
Can we mistake the object ? Who does not see what is in
tended ? Let us bring under a single glance the facts of
the case. He first seized upon the public money, took it
from the custody of the law, and placed it in his own pos
session, — as much so, as if placed in his own pocket. The
Senate disapproves of the act, and opposes the only obstacle
that prevents him from becoming complete master of the
public treasury. To crush the resistance which they inter
pose to his will, he seeks a quarrel with them ; and, with

SPEECHES. 419

this view, seizes on the resolution in question as the pretext.
He sends us a Protest against it, in which he resorts to every
art to enlist the feelings of the people on his side, prepara
tory to a direct appeal to them to engage as his allies in the
war which he intends to carry on against the Senate till they
submit to his authority. He has proclaimed, in advance,
that the right to interfere involves the right to make that
interference effectual. To make it so, force only is wanted.
Give him an adequate force, and a speedy termination would
be put to the controversy.

Since, then, hostilities are intended, it is time that we
should deliberate how we ought to act — how the assaults
upon our constitutional rights and privileges ought to be
met. If we consult what is due to the wisdom and dignity
of the Senate, there is but one mode : meet it at the thresh
old. Encroachments are most easily resisted at the com
mencement. It is at the extreme point — on the frontier,
that, in a contest of this description, the assailant is the
weakest, and the assailed the strongest. It is there that
the purpose of the usurper is the most feeble, and the in
dignation of those whose rights are encroached upon, the
strongest. Permit the frontier of our rights to be passed
and let the question be, — not resistance to usurpation, but
at what point we shall resist, — and the conquest will be more
than half achieved. I, at least, said Mr. Calhoun, will act
on these principles. I shall take my stand at the door of the
Senate, if I should stand there alone. I deny the right of
the President to send us his Protest. I deny his right to
question, within this chamber, our opinions in any case, or
in reference to any subject whatever. He has no right
to enter here in hostile array. These walls separate us.
Beyond this, he has his veto to protect his rights against
aggressions from us ; but within, our authority is above his
interference or control.

Entertaining these views, I, for one, cannot agree to re-

420 SPEECHES.

ceive the Protest. But it is said that the Senate nevei has
yet refused to receive a message from the President In
reply, I answer, it has never yet agreed to receive a Pro
test from him ; and I, at least, shall not contribute by my
vote to establish the first precedent of the kind. With these
impressions, although I agree to the resolutions offered by
the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Poindexter), as modified, a
sense of duty will compel me to go further, and to add, at
the proper time, two additional resolutions ; one affirming
that the President has no right to protest against our pro
ceedings, and the other refusing to receive this, his Protest.

I have now said all that I intend in reference to the ques
tion at issue between the Senate and the President ; and
will conclude by a few remarks addressed more directly to
the Senate itself.

Of all the surprising events, said Mr. C., in these sur
prising times, none has astonished me more than that there
should be any division of opinion, even the slightest, to the
right of the Senate to pass the resolution which has been
seized on as the pretext to send us this Protest. Before the
commencement of the discussion, I would not have believed
that there was a single individual in our country, the least
conversant with parliamentary proceedings, who entertained
any doubt of the right of any free and deliberative body fully
and freely to discuss and express their opinions on all sub
jects relating to the public interests, whether in reference to
men or measures, or whether in approbation or disapproba
tion. I venture the assertion that such a right, has never
been questioned before in this country ; either here, or in the
State legislatures, or in Great Britain, for the last century,
by any party, whig or tory. Nor is my astonishment dimi
nished by the distinction which has been attempted to be
drawn between the expression of an opinion in reference to
the conduct of public officers, intended to terminate in some
legislative act, and those not so intended — a distinction with-

SPEECHES. 421

out example or precedent, and without principle or reason.
Nor am I less surprised that it should be gravely asserted,
as it has been in debate, that the resolution in question was
not intended to terminate in some ulterior legislative mea
sure. How this impression was made, or ventured to be ex
pressed, I ana at a loss to conceive ; as it was openly avowed,
and fully understood, that we only waited for the proper
moment to carry the resolution into effect, by giving it the
form of a joint act of both Houses. Nor is the attempt to
limit our legislative functions by our judicial, in reference to
the resolutions, less extraordinary. I had supposed that our
judicial were in addition to our legislative functions, and not
in diminution ; and that we possess to the full extent, with
out limitation or subtraction, all the legislative powers pos
sessed by the House of Kepresentatives, with a single excep
tion, as provided in the constitution. Were it possible to
raise a rational doubt on the subject, the example of the
English parliament would clearly prove that our judicial
functions impose no restrictions on our legislative. It is
well known that the House of Lords, like the Senate, possesses
the power of trying impeachments — and I venture to assert,
that, in the long course of time in which it has exercised this
power, not a single case can be pointed out in which it was
supposed that its judicial functions were diminished in any
degree by its legislative ; — and when we consider that this
portion of our constitution is borrowed from the British,
their example must be considered decisive as to the point
under consideration.

But let us reflect a moment to what extent we must
necessarily be earned, if we once admit the principle. If
the Senate has no right, in consequence of its judicial
functions, to express an opinion, by vote or resolution, in
reference to the legality or illegality of the acts of public
functionaries, Senators can have no right to express such
opinion individually in debate ; as the objection, if it exists

422 SPEECHES.

at all, goes to the expression of an opinion by individuals as
well as by the body. He who has made up an opinion, and
avowed it in debate, would be as much disqualified to per
form his judicial functions as a judge on a trial of impeach
ment, as if he had expressed it by a vote ; and, of course,
whatever restrictions the judicial functions of the Senate
may be supposed to impose, would be restrictions on the
liberty of discussion, as well as that of voting ; and conse
quently destroy the freedom of debate secured to us by the
constitution.

I am, indeed, said Mr. Calhoun, amazed that so great a
misconception of the essential powers of a deliberative body
should be formed, as to deny to a legislative assembly the
right to express its opinions on all subjects of a public nature
freely, fully, and without restriction or limitation. It in
herently belongs to the law-making power — the power to
make, repeal, and to modify the laws — to deliberate upon
the state of the Union — to ascertain its actual condition—
the causes of existing disorders — to determine whether they
originated in the laws, or in their execution, and to devise
the proper remedy. What sort of a legislative body would
it be, that had no right to pronounce an opinion whether a
law was or was not in conformity to the constitution, and
whether it had or had not been violated by those appointed
to administer the laws ? What could be imagined more ab
surd ? And yet, if the principle contended for be correct,
such would be the character of the Senate. We would have
no right to pronounce a law unconstitutional, or to assert
that it had been violated, lest it should disqualify us from
performing our judicial functions'

There seems to be, said Mr. C., a great misconception in
reference to the real motive and character of the legislative
and executive functions. The former is, in its nature, de
liberative, and involves, necessarily, free discussion, and a full
expression of opinion on all subjects of public interest. The

SPEECHES. 423

latter is essentially the power of executing, and has no power
of deliberation beyond ascertaining the meaning of the law,
and carrying its enactments into execution ; and even within
this limited sphere, its constructions of its powers are formed
under responsibility not only to public opinion, but also to
the legislative department of the Government.

But wherever the Executive is vested with any portion
of legislative functions, so essentially do those functions in
volve the right of deliberation, and a full and free expression
of opinion, that they transfer with them, to t&e Executive,
the right of freely expressing his opinions on all subjects con
nected with such functions. Thus the President of the
United States, — who is vested by the constitution with the
right of communicating to Congress information on the state
of the Union ; of recommending to its consideration such
measures as, in his opinion, the public interests may require ;
to approve of its acts ; and to ratify treaties which have re
ceived the consent of the Senate, — has, in the performance
of all these high legislative functions, a right to express his
opinion as to the nature, and character, and constitutionality
of all the measures, the consideration of which may be in
volved in the performance of these duties — a right which the
present chief magistrate has, on all occasions, freely exer
cised, as we have witnessed this session, both in his annual
message, and the one announcing his veto on the land bill.
In the former he pronounced the United States Bank to be
unconstitutional, and has, of course, according to his own
principle, impeached the conduct of Washington and Madi
son (the former of whom signed the charter of the first
bank, and the latter of the present), and all of the mem
bers of both Houses of Congress who voted for the act incor
porating them.

I am mortified, said Mr. Calhoun, that in this coun
try, boasting of its Anglo-Saxon descent, any one of re
spectable standing, much less the President of the United

424 SPEECHES.

States, should be found to entertain principles leading to
such monstrous results ; and I can scarcely believe myself to
be breathing the air of our country, and to be within the
walls of the Senate chamber, when I hear such doctrines vin
dicated. It is proof of the wonderful degeneracy of the
times — of a total loss of the true conceptions of constitu
tional liberty. But, in the midst of this degeneracy, I per
ceive the symptoms of regeneration^ It is not my wish to
touch on the party designations that have recently obtained,
and which have been introduced in the debate on this occa
sion. I, however, cannot but remark, that the revival of the
party names of the Eevolution, after they had so long slum
bered, is not without a meaning, nor without an indication
of a return to those principles which lie at the foundation of
our liberty.

Gentlemen ought to reflect that the extensive and sud
den revival of these names could not be without some ade
quate cause. Names are not to be taken or given at pleas
ure ; there must be something to cause their application to
adhere. If I remember rightly, it was Augustus, in all the
plenitude of his power, who said that he found it impossible
to introduce a new word. What, then, is that something ?
What is there in the meaning of Whig and Tory, and what
in the character of the times, which has caused their sudden
revival as party designations, at this time ? I take it, that
the very essence of toryism — that which constitutes a tory,
is to sustain prerogative against privilege — to support the
executive against the legislative department of the Govern
ment, and to lean to the side of power against the side of
liberty • while whig is, in all these particulars, of the very
opposite principles. These are the leading characteristics of
the respective parties, whig and tory, and run through their
application in all the variety of circumstances in which they
have been applied either in this country or Great Britain.
Their sudden revival and application at this time ought to

SPEECHES. 425

admonish my old friends who are now on the side of the ad
ministration, that there is something in the times — some
thing in the existing struggle between the parties, and in the
principles and doctrines advocated by those in power, which
has caused so sudden a revival, and such extensive applica
tion of the terms. I have not contributed to their introduc
tion, nor am I desirous of seeing them applied ; but I must
say to those who are interested, that nothing but the reversal
of their course can possibly prevent their application. They
owe it to themselves — they owe it to the chief magistrate
whom they support (who, at least, is venerable for his years)
as the head of their party, that they should halt in their
support of the despotic and slavish doctrines which we hear
daily advanced, before a return of the reviving spirit of
liberty shall overwhelm them, with those who are leading
them, to their ruin.

I can speak, said Mr. Calhoun, with impartiality. As
far as I am concerned, I wish no change of party designa
tions — I am content with that which designates those with
whom I act. It is, I admit, not very popular, but is at least
an honest and patriotic name. It is synonymous with^re-
sistance to usurpation — usurpation, come from what quarter
and under what shape it* may ; whether it be of this Govern
ment on the rights of the States, or of the Executive on
those of the legislative department. '

426 SPEECHES.

SPEECH

On the Bill to Repeal the Four Years' Law, and to
Regulate the Power of Removal, delivered in the
Senate, February th, 1835.

MR. CALHOUN said : The question involved in the third
section of the bill, whether the power to dismiss an officer
of the Government can be controlled and regulated by Con
gress, or is under the exclusive and unlimited control of the
President, is no ordinary question, which may be decided
either way, without materially affecting the character and
practical operation of the Government. It is, on the con
trary, a great and fundamental question, on the decision of
which will materially depend the fact, whether this Govern
ment shall prove to be what those who framed it supposed it
was — a free, popular, and republican Government, or a mon
archy in disguise.

This important question, said Mr. C., has been very fully
and ably discussed by those who have preceded me on the
side I intend to advocate. It is not my intention to repeat
their arguments, nor to enforce them by additional illustra
tions. I propose to confine myself to a single point of view ;
but that point I hold to be decisive of the question.

If the power to dismiss is possessed by the Executive, he
must hold it in one of two modes : either by an express grant
of the power in the constitution, or as a power necessary and
proper to execute some power expressly granted by that in
strument. All the powers under the constitution may be
classed under one or the other of these heads ; there is no
intermediate class. The first question then is, Has the Presi
dent the power in question by any express grant in the con
stitution ? He who affirms he has, is bound to show it.

SPEECHES. 427

That instrument is in the hands of every member ; the por
tion containing the delegation of power to the President is
short. It is comprised in a few sentences. I ask Senators
to open the constitution, to examine it, and to find, if they
can, any authority given to the President to dismiss a public
officer. None such can be found ; the constitution has been
carefully examined, and no one pretends to have found such
a grant. Well, then, as there is none such, if it exists at
all, it must exist as a power necessary and proper to execute
some granted power ; but if it exists in that character, it
belongs to Congress, and not to the Executive. I venture not
this assertion hastily ; I speak on the authority of the con
stitution itself — an express and unequivocal authority which
cannot be denied nor contradicted. Hear what that sacred
instrument says : " Congress shall have power to make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers (those granted to Congress
itself), and all other powers vested by this constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any department
or officer thereof." Mark the fulness of the expression. Con
gress shall have power to make all laws, not only to carry
into effect the powers expressly delegated to itself, but those
delegated to the Government, or any department or officer
thereof; comprehending, of course, the power to pass laws
necessary and proper to carry into effect the powers express
ly granted to the executive department. It follows that, to
whatever express grant of power to the Executive the power
of dismissal may be supposed to attach ; whether to that of
seeing the laws faithfully executed, or to the still more com
prehensive grant, as contended for by some, vesting execu
tive powers in the President, the mere fact that it is a power
appurtenant to another power, and necessary to carry it into
effect, transfers it, by the provisions of the constitution cited,
from the Executive to Congress, and places it under its con
trol, to be regulated in the manner which it may judge best.

428 SPEECHES.

If there be truth in reasoning on political subjects, the con
clusion at which I have arrived cannot be resisted. I would
entreat gentlemen who are opposed to me, said Mr. C., to
pause and reflect ; and to point out, if possible, the slightest
flaw in the argument, or to find a peg on which to hang a
doubt. Can they deny that all powers under the constitution
are either powers specifically granted, or powers necessary and
proper to carry such into execution ? Can it be said that
there are inherent powers comprehended in neither of these
classes, and existing by a sort of divine right in the Govern
ment ? The Senator from New- York (Mr. Wright) attempt
ed to establish some such position ; but the moment my col
league touched it with the spear of truth, he, Mr. W., shrunk
from the deformity of his own conception. Or can it be as
serted that there are powers derived from obligations higher
than the constitution itself ? The very intimation of such a
source of power hurled from office the predecessor of the
present incumbent. But if it cannot be denied that all the
powers under the constitution are comprised under one or the
other of these classes, and if it is acknowledged, as it is on
all sides, that the power of dismissal is not specifically grant
ed by the constitution, it follows by an irresistible and neces
sary consequence, that the power belongs not to the Execu
tive, but to Congress, to be regulated and controlled at its
pleasure.

I should be gratified, said Mr. C., if any one who enter
tains an opposite opinion would attempt to refute this argu
ment, and to point out wherein it is defective ; for such per
fect confidence do I feel in its soundness, that I will yield the
floor to any Senator who may rise and say that he is prepared
to refute it.

[Here Mr. Talmadge, from New- York, rose, and said that he was
not satisfied with the argument, and would attempt to show its error.
Mr. C. sat down for the purpose of giving him an opportunity, when

SPEECHES. 429

Mr. T. began a formal speech on the subject generally, without at
tempting to meet Mr. C.'s argument, when the latter arose and said,
that Mr. T. had mistaken him ; that he did not yield the floor for the
purpose of enabling Mr. T. to make a speech, but to enable him to
refute the argument which Mr. C. had advanced ; and that if Mr. T.
was not prepared to do so, he, Mr. C., would proceed in the dis
cussion.]

Mr. C. proceeded, and said : The argument on which I
have relied, has been alluded to by the Senator from Ten
nessee (Judge White), and my friend from Kentucky, who
sits before me (Judge Bibb) ; — and tbe Senator from Tennes
see (Mr. Grrundy), whom I am sorry not to see in his place,
attempted a reply. He objected to the argument, on the
ground that the construction put upon the clause wbich has
been quoted, would divest the President of a power express
ly granted him by the constitution. I must, said Mr. C.,
express my amazement, that one so clear-sigbted, and so ca
pable of appreciating the just force of an argument, should
give such an answer. Were tbe power of dismissal a grant
ed power, the argument would be sound ; but as it is not, to
contend that the construction would divest him of the power,
is an assumption, without the slightest foundation to sustain
it. It is his construction, in fact, which divests Congress of
an expressly granted power, and not ours which divests the
President : by his, he would take from Congress the author
ity expressly granted, of passing all laws necessary and pro
per to carry into effect trie granted powers, under the pre
text that the exercise of such a power on the part of Con
gress would divest the Executive of a power nowhere grant
ed in the constitution.

I feel, said Mr. C., that I must appear to repeat unneces
sarily, wbat of itself is so clear and simple as to require no
illustration ; but I know tbe obstinacy of party feelings and
preconceived opinions, and with what difficulty they yield to

430 SPEECHES.

the clearest demonstration. Nothing can overthrow them but
repeated blows.

Such, said Mr. C., are the arguments by which I have
been forced to conclude, that the power of dismissing is not
lodged in the President, but is subject to be controlled and
regulated by Congress. I say forced, because I have been
compelled to the conclusion in spite of my previous impres
sions. Belying upon the early decision of the question, and
the long acquiescence in that decision, I had concluded, with
out examination, that it had not been disturbed, because it
rested upon principles too clear and strong to admit of doubt.
I remained passively under this impression, until it became
necessary, during the last session, to examine the question —
when I took up the discussion on it in 1789, with the expec
tation of having my previous impression confirmed. The re
sult was different. I was struck, on reading the debate, with
the force of the arguments of those who contended that the
power was not vested by the constitution in the Executive.
To me they appeared to be far more statesman-like than the
opposite arguments, and to partake much more of the spirit
of the constitution. After reading this debate, I turned to
the constitution, which I read with care in reference to the
subject discussed, when, for the first time, I was struck with
the full force of the clause which I have quoted, and which,
in my opinion, for ever settles the controversy.

I will now, said Mr. C., proceed to consider what will
be the effect on the operation of the system under the con
struction which I have given. In the first place, it would
put down all discretionary power, and convert the Govern
ment into what the framers intended it should be — a govern
ment of laws and not of discretion. If the construction be
established, no officer from the President to the constable,
and from the Chief Justice to the lowest judicial officer,
could exercise any power but what is expressly granted by
the constitution or by some act of Congress : and thus that.

SPEECHES. 431

which in a free state is the most odious and dangerous of all
things — the discretionary power of those who are charged
with the execution of the laws — will be effectually suppressed,
and the dominion of the laws be fully established.

It would, in the next place, unite, harmonize, and blend
into one whole all the powers of the Government, and pre
vent that perpetual and dangerous conflict which would neces
sarily exist between its departments, under the opposite con
struction. Permit each department to judge of the extent
of its own powers, and to assume the right to exercise all
powers which it may deem necessary and proper to execute
the powers granted to it, and who does not see that, in fact
the Government would consist of three independent, separate,
and conflicting departments, without any common point of
union — instead of one united authority controlling the whole ?
Nor would it be difficult to foresee in what this contest be
tween conflicting departments would terminate. The Exec
utive must prevail over the other departments ; for without
its concurrence the action of the other departments are im
potent. Neither the decrees of the Court nor the acts of
Congress can be executed but through the executive author
ity ; and if the President be permitted to assume whatever
power he may deem to be appurtenant to his granted powers,
and to decide according to his will and pleasure, and on his
own responsibility, whether the decision of the Court or the
acts of Congress are or are not consistent with the rights
which he may arrogate to himself, it is impossible not to see
that the authority of the legislative and judicial departments
would be under his control. Nor is it difficult to foresee that
if he may add the power of dismissal to that of appointment,
and thus assert unlimited control over all who hold office, he
would find but little difficulty in maintaining himself in the
most extravagant assumptions of power. We are not with
out experience on this subject. To what but to the false and
dangerous doctrine against which I am contending, and into

432 SPEECHES.

which the present Chief Magistrate has fallen, are we to at
tribute the frequent conflicts between the Executive and the
other departments of the Government ; and which so strongly
illustrate the truth of what I have stated ? Under the op
posite and true view of our system, all these dangerous jars
and conflicts would cease. It unites the whole into one, and
the legislative Incomes, as it ought to be, the centre of the
system, — the stomach, and the brain, — into which all is
taken, digested, and assimilated, and by which the action of
the whole is regulated by a common intelligence ; and this
without destroying the distinct and independent functions of
the parts. Each is left in possession of the powers expressly
granted by the constitution, and which may be executed
without the aid of the legislative department, and, in the
exercise of which, there is no possibility of coming into con
flict with the other departments; while all discretionary
powers necessary to execute the granted, and in the exercise
of which the separate departments would necessarily come
into conflict, are by a wise and beautiful provision of the
constitution transferred to Congress, to be exercised solely
according to its discretion ; — thus avoiding, as far as the de
partments of the Government are concerned, the possibility
of collision betwen the parts. By a provision no less wise,
this union of power in Congress is so regulated as to prevent
the legislative from absorbing the other departments of the
Government. To guard the Executive against the encroach
ments of Congress, the President is raised from his mere
ministerial functions to a participation in the enactment of
laws. By'a provision in the constitution, his approval is re
quired to the acts of Congress ; and his veto, given him as
a shield to protect him against the encroachments of the leg
islative department, can arrest the acts of Congress, unless
passed by two-thirds of both Houses. And here let me say,
that I cannot concur in the resolution offered by my friend
from Maryland (Mr. Kent), which proposes to divest the Ex-

SPEECHES. 433

ecutive of his veto. I hold it to be indispensable ; mainly
on the ground that the constitution has vested in Congress
the high discretionary power under consideration, which, but
for the veto, however necessary for the harmony and unity
of the Government, might prove destructive to the indepen
dence of the President. He must indeed be a most feeble
and incompetent Chief Magistrate if, aided by the veto, he
would not have sufficient influence to protect his necessary
powers against the encroachments of Congress. Nor is the
judiciary left without ample protection against the encroach
ment of Congress. The independent tenure by which the
judges hold their office, and the right of the Court to pro
nounce when a case comes before them upon the constitu
tionality of the acts of Congress, as far at least as the other
departments are concerned, affords to the judiciary an ample
protection. Thus all the departments are united in one, so
as to constitute a single government, instead of three distinct,
separate, and conflicting departments, without impairing
their separate and distinct functions, while at the same time
the peace and harmony of the whole are preserved.

There remains, said Mr. C., to be noticed another conse
quence not less important. The construction for which I
contend strikes at the root of that dangerous control which
the President would have over all who hold office, if the power
of appointment and removal without limitation or restriction
were united in him. Let us not be deceived by names. The
power in question is too great for the Chief Magistrate of a
free state. It is in its nature an imperial power, and if he
be permitted to exercise it, his authority must become as ab
solute as that of the autocrat of all the Kussias. To give
him the power to dismiss at his will and pleasure, without
limitation or control, is to give him an absolute and unlim
ited control over the subsistence of almost all who hold office
under Government. Let him have the power, and the sixty
thousand who now hold employments under Government would
VOL. ii. — 28

434 SPEECHES.

become dependent upon him for the means of existence. Of
that vast multitude, I may venture to assert that there are
very few whose subsistence does not, more or less, depend
upon their public employments. Who does not see that a
power so unlimited and despotic over this great and powerful
corps must tend to corrupt and debase those who compose it,
and to convert them into the supple and willing instruments
of him who wields it ? And here let me remark, said Mr.
C., that I have been unfairly represented in reference to this
point. I have been charged with asserting that the whole
body of office-holders is corrupt, debased, and subservient :
with what views, those who make the charge can best ex
plain. I have made no such assertion, nor could it with
truth be made. I know that there are many virtuous and
high-minded citizens who hold public office • but it is not,
therefore, the less true that the tendency of the power of dis
missal is such as I have attributed to it ; and that if the
power be left unqualified, and the practice be continued as it
has of late, the result must be the complete corruption and
debasement of those in public employment. What, Mr. C.
asked, has been the powerful cause that has wrought the
wonderful changes which history teaches us have occurred at
different periods in the character of nations ? What has
bowed down that high, generous, and chivalrous feeling — that
independent and proud spirit which characterized all free
states in rising from the barbarous to the civilized condition,
and which finally converted their citizens into base sycophants
and flatterers ? Under the operation of what cause did the
proud and stubborn conquerors of the world, the haughty
Komans, sink down to that low and servile debasement which
followed the decay of the republic ? What but the mighty
cause which I am considering ; the power which one man
exercised over the fortunes and subsistence, the honor and
the standing of all those in office, or who aspire to public
employment ? Man is naturally proud and independent ;

SPEECHES. 435

and if he loses these noble qualities in the progress of civi
lization, it is because, by the concentration of power, he who
controls the government becomes deified in the eyes of those
who live or expect to live by its bounty. Instead of resting
their hopes on a kind Providence and their own honest exer
tions, all who aspire are taught to believe that the most cer
tain road to honor and fortune is servility and flattery. We
already experience its corroding operation. With the growth
of executive patronage and the control which the Executive
has established over those in office by the exercise of this
tremendous power, we witness among ourselves the progress
of this base and servile spirit, which already presents so strik
ing a contrast between the former and present character of
our people.

It is in vain to attempt to deny the charge. I have
marked its progress in a thousand instances within the last
few years. I have seen the spirit of independent men, hold
ing public office, sink under the dread of this fearful power ;
too honest and too firm to become the instruments or flat
terers of power, yet too prudent, with all the consequences
before them, to whisper disapprobation of what, in their
hearts, they condemned. Let the present state of things
continue — let it be understood that none are to acquire the
public honors or to obtain them but by flattery and base
compliance, and in a few generations the American character
will become utterly corrupt and debased.

Now is the time to arrest this fatal tendency. Much will
depend upon the vote on the measure which is now before
you. Should it receive the sanction of this body and the
other branch of the legislature, and the principle be once es
tablished that the power of dismissal is subject to be regulat
ed by the action of Congress, and is not, as is contended, under
the sole control of the Executive, the danger which now
menaces the destruction of our system may yet be arrested.
The discretionary and despotic power which the President

436 SPEECHES.

has assumed to exercise over all in public employment would
be subject to the control of law ; and public officers instead
of considering themselves as the mere agents of the execu
tive department, and liable to be dismissed at his will and
pleasure without regard to conduct, would be placed under
the protection of the law.

But it is objected by the Senator from Tennessee (Mr.
Grrundy), that the construction for which I contend, would
destroy the power of the President, and arrest the action of
the Government. I must be permitted to express my sur
prise, said Mr. C., that such an objection should come from
that experienced and sagacious Senator. He seems entirely
to forget that the President not only possesses executive pow
ers, but also legislative ; and that he is not only a Chief
Magistrate, but also a part of the law-making power. Does
he not recollect that the President has his veto ; and that no
law can be passed which would improperly diminish the au
thority which ought to belong to him as Chief Magistrate
without his consent, unless passed against his veto by two-
thirds of both Houses ? — an event which it is believed has
not occurred since the commencement of the Government,
and the occurrence of which is highly improbable. How
then can it be asserted, that the construction for which I
contend would destroy the just authority of the President ?
Let it be established, and what would follow ? Every pro
position to regulate and control the power of dismissal would
become a question of expediency, and would be liable to be
assailed by all who might suppose that it would impair im
properly the power of the Chief Magistrate. And seconded
as they would be by the veto, if necessary, there could be but
little danger that restrictions too rigid would be imposed on
his authority. The Senator from Tennessee also objects that
the measure would be impracticable, and asks with an air
of triumph, what would the Senate do if the reasons of the
President should be unsatisfactory ? I do not, said Mr. C.,

SPEECHES. 437

agree with those who think that the Senate can or ought to
continue to reject the nominations of the President in such
cases, until the officer who has heen dismissed shall he restor
ed. I believe that course to be impracticable ; and that, in
such a struggle, the resistance of the Senate would be finally
overcome. My hope is, that the fact itself that the President
must assign reasons for removals, will go far to check the abu
ses which now exist. I cannot think that any President would
assign to the Senate as a reason for removal, that the officer re
moved was opposed to him on party grounds. Such is the de
ceptive character of the human heart, that it is reconciled to
do many things under plausible covering which it would not
openly avow. But suppose there should be a President who
would act upon the principle of removing on a mere difference
of opinion without any other fault in the officer, and who
would be bold enough to avow such a reason, Congress would
not be at a loss for a remedy, on the principles for which I
contend. A law might be passed that would reach the case ;
it might be declared that the removal of the President, if
his reasons should not prove satisfactory, should act merely
as a suspension to the termination of the next ensuing ses
sion, unless filled by the advice and consent of the Senate.

The Senator from Tennessee has conjured up a state of
frightful collision between the Executive and the dismissed
officers, and has represented the Senate chamber as the arena
where this conflict must be carried on. He says, if the Pres
ident should be bound to assign his reasons, the party dis
missed would of right have a claim to be heard as to the
truth and correctness of those reasons, and that the Senate
would have its whole time engrossed in listening to the trial.
All this is mere imagination, if the President on his part
should exercise the power of removal with the discretion
and justice which he ought, and with which all the prede
cessors of the present Chief Magistrate have in fact exercis
ed it. Does he suDpose if a measure, such as is now before

438 SPEECHES.

the Senate, had been in operation at the commencement of
the Government, that the Father of his country — a man no
less distinguished by his moderation than his wisdom, would
have experienced the least embarrassment from its opera
tion ? Does he suppose that the dismissal of nine officers
in eight years during his presidency, would have given all
that annoyance to him and to this body, which the Senator
anticipates from the measure ? Would there have been any
difficulty in the time of the elder Adams, either to himself
or to the Senate, from the ten officers whom he dismissed
during his presidency ? Would any have been experienced
during Mr. Jefferson's term of eight years, even with the
forty-two whom he dismissed ? Or in the presidency of Mr.
Madison, that mild and amiable man, who, in eight years of
great excitement, of which nearly three was a period of war,
dismissed but five officers ? Or, during the presidency of
Mr. Monroe, who in eight years dismissed but nine officers ?
Or of the younger Mr. Adams, who in four years dismissed
but two officers ? I come now, said Mr C., to the present
administration ; and here I concede, that with the dismissal
of two hundred and thirty officers in the first year, and I
know not how many since, the scene of trouble and difficul
ty both to the President and the Senate, which the Senator
from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy) painted in such lively colors,
might have occurred, had the measure been in operation.
This, however, constitutes no objection to the measure, but
to the abuse — the gross and dangerous abuse of the power
of dismissal which it is intended to correct. It is a recom
mendation that it would impede aud embarrass the abuse of
so dangerous a power. The more numerous and powerful the
impediments to such abuses, the better. I apprehend, said
Mr. C., that the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy) en
tirely misconceives the operation of the measure under a dis
creet and moderate administration. Under such an one, the
charges exhibited against an officer would be transmitted to

SPEECHES. 439

the accused ; would undergo a regular investigation in the
presence of the party, and the accused would be heard in his
own defence before the charge would be acted on. If sus
tained, and the officer be discharged, the whole proceedings
would accompany the nomination of the successor as show
ing the grounds on which he was dismissed.

During the time, said Mr. C., that I occupied the place
of Secretary of War under Mr. Monroe, two officers of the
Government holding civil employments connected with that
department, were dismissed for improper conduct ; and in
both cases the course which I have indicated was adopted.
The officers were not dismissed until after a full investiga
tion, and the reasons for dismission reduced to writing and
communicated to them.

But the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy) further
objects, that the construction for which we contend would con
centrate all the powers of the Government in Congress, and
would thus constitute the very essence of despotism, which
consists, as he asserts, in uniting the powers of the three de
partments in one. I could, said Mr. C., hardly have antici
pated, that one whose conceptions are so clear on most sub
jects would venture so bold an assertion. Has not the
Senator reflected on the nature of the legislative department
in our system ? To make a law, it is necessary not only to
have the participation of the two Houses, but that also of
the Executive ; except, indeed, in the case of a veto, when,
as has been stated, the measure must be passed by two-thirds
of both Houses. Does he not see from this, that to vest
Congress, as the constitution has done, with all the discre
tionary power, is to vest the power not simply in the two
Houses, but also in the President, and in fact to require the
concurrence of both departments to the exercise of such high
and dangerous powers, instead of leaving it to each separ
ately, as would have been the fact without this wise pro
vision ! I will tell the Senator, that it is the doctrine for

440 SPEECHES.

which he, and not that for which we contend, which leads to
concentration — a doctrine which would leave to each depart
ment to assume whatever power it might choose, and which
in its necessary effects, as has been shown, would concentrate
all the powers of the Government in the Chief Magistrate.
This process has been going on under our eyes rapidly for the
last few years ; and yet the gentleman who appears now to
be so sensitive as to the danger of concentration, looks on
with perfect indifference, not to say with approbation. We
have, said Mr. C., lost all sensibility ; we have become callous
and hardened under the operation of those deleterious prac
tices and principles which characterize the times. What a
few years since would have shocked and roused the whole
community, is now scarcely perceived or felt. Then the
dismissal of a few inconsiderable officers, on party grounds as
was supposed, was followed by a general burst of indignation ;
but now the dismissal of thousands, when it is openly avowed
that the public offices are the " spoils of the victors," pro
duces scarcely a sensation. It passes as an ordinary event.
The present state of the country, said Mr. C., was then anti
cipated. It was foreseen, as far back as 1826, that the time
would come when the income of the Government and the
number of those in its employment would be doubled — and
that the control of the President, with the power of dis
missal, would become irresistible. All of which was urged
as an inducement for reform at that early period ; and as a
reason why the administration then in power should be ex
pelled, and those opposed to them should be elevated to their
places. But now when this prophecy has been realized, we
seem perfectly insensible of the danger to which the liberty
and institutions of the country are exposed. Among the
symptoms of the times, said Mr. C., which indicate a deep
and growing decay, I would place among the most striking,
the difference in the conduct of those who seek public em
ployment before and after their elevation. In the language

SPEECHES. 441

of the indignant Boman, they solicit offices in one manner and
use them in another. And this remark was not more true
of that degenerated state of the noblest of all the republics
of antiquity, than it is of ours at the present time. It is
not only, said Mr. C., a symptom of decay, but it is also
a powerful cause. When it comes to be once understood
that politics is a game ; that those who are engaged in it but
act a part ; that they make this or that profession, not from
honest conviction or an intent to fulfil them, but as the
means of deluding the people, and through that delusion to
acquire power ; — when such professions are to be entirely
forgotten — the people will lose all confidence in public men ;
all will be regarded as mere jugglers- — the honest and the
patriotic as well as the cunning and the profligate ; and the
people will become indifferent and passive to the grossest
abuses of power, on the ground that those whom they may
elevate under whatever pledges, instead of reforming, will but
imitate the example of those whom they have expelled.

I, said Mr. C., rejoice, however, that there are many who
are counted in the administration ranks, who have a proper
regard for the professions of the party while canvassing for
power. I see the commencement of a separation between
those who are disposed to go all lengths, to abandon all for
mer principles in the support of power, and those who are
not disposed to advance beyond the point where they now
stand. Let those who are disposed to sustain the power of
the Executive, however extravagant, reflect on what has
occurred during the present discussion, and the manly and
independent sentiments which have been expressed in the
ranks of the administration itself, and they will see cause to
halt in their course. They have pushed things as far as they
can be pushed with safety — to push them further must end
in division and overthrow.

But the Senator from New- York (Mr. Wright) regards
all this alarm on account of the vast increase of executive

442 SPEECHES.

power, as perfectly imaginary. He contends that the view
drawn in the report of the committee, as to the extent of
patronage, is greatly exaggerated ; and for this purpose
assails that part of the report which treats of the number of
those in the employment of the Government and living on
its bounty, as constituting one of the elements of Executive
patronage. The Senator is possessed of clear perception and
strong powers of discrimination, and I anticipated from the
confident manner in which he expressed himself, that he had
discovered some flaw or weakness in that portion of the re
port. He is not usually the man to make bold assertions
without his proof ; but I must say that, in this case, the
Senator has disappointed me. What error or exaggeration
has he discovered in the report ? Has he shown the num
ber stated to be greater than in reality it is ? Has he shown
that there is any error in the various heads under which they
'are classified ? Or that there is a single class which does not
contribute to swell the power and influence of the Execu
tive ? He has not even made an attempt to point out any
error of the kind. He drew his number and classification
from the report itself, and has not pretended to show that
there has been any over estimate on the part of the com
mittee attached to any one of the classes. But though the
Senator has not succeeded in showing an over estimate, he
has labored strenuously, though I must say unsuccessfully,
to show that the patronage is far less than in reality it is.
The Senator would, for instance, have us lay aside the pen
sioners, as adding little or nothing to the patronage of the
Government ! I had, said Mr. C., supposed that he was too
good a judge of human nature, not to know that the mere fact
of living on the bounty of Government, naturally disposes a
man to take sides with power. If to this we add the fact,
that the pensioner is liable to have his pension questioned,
whether he is rightfully entitled to it or not, and that the
decision of this question, so important to him, rests with

SPEECHES. 443

those in power ; that there are thousands who are seeking
pensions who must look in the same direction for the grati
fication of their wishes — to say nothing of the host of pension-
agents in and out of Congress whose importance and influ
ence with the people may depend upon their success in
obtaining pensions — we may realize the vast addition which
so large a pension-list as ours is calculated to give to the
patronage of the Executive. I am informed, said Mr. C., that
a single member, in one session, obtained upwards of three
hundred and fifty pensions ; and can the Senator doubt how
much he was strengthened in his district by his success,
when a majority of those whom he so successfully served
were probably voters ? Taking every thing into considera
tion, so far from considering the pensions as an inconsider
able source of influence and patronage, as the Senator would
have us believe, I am of the impression that it is among the
most fruitful sources of both ; and that to the late extension
of the number of pensioners, we may attribute the strength
of the administration in some of the States of the Union. I
have great respect for the Secretary of War and the Chief of
the Pension Bureau, and I do not wish to be considered as
making any personal imputations.

The Senator from New- York next tells us that the army
contributes very little to the influence and patronage of the
Executive ; that it consists principally of soldiers, and those
for the most part located on the frontiers, far removed from
the scenes of political struggles. The Senator would seem
to have very imperfect conceptions of the nature of the in
fluence which an army brings to a government. Is he igno
rant that it is to be fed, and clothed, and housed, and
removed, at the expense of millions, wherever employed ?
and that all this heavy expenditure must bring a correspond
ing increase of power and influence ? I, for my part, said
Mr. C., consider an army among a spirited people, armed and
accustomed to the use of arms as the Americans are, as far

444 SPEECHES.

more dangerous on account of the patronage which it brings
to the Government, than on account of its physical force ;
and it is mainly under this impression, that I have ever been
opposed to its increase beyond the point necessary to pre
serve proper military organization and skill.

The Senator, taking the same fallacious view, would put
the navy out of the list, as contributing but little to the
patronage of the Government. What I have said in reference
to the army is equally applicable to the navy, and supersedes
the necessity of saying more on the subject.

But the final objection of the Senator implies that the
power and patronage of the Government would be great, as far
as the number of officers who are employed may contribute
to it, if they were ah1 custom-house officers, and some other
classes of officers, which he estimates at some three or four
thousand, and which he admits are calculated to exercise
some influence. I acknowledge, said Mr. Calhoun, they are
not so powerful as they would be if they consisted of the
classes referred to by the Senator ; but let me tell him, that
if we had a corps of one hundred thousand such, the friends
of liberty might surrender in despair — our cause would be
hopeless ! The people could not resist them for six months.

I have now, said Mr. C., concluded what I intended to
say on the question involved in the third section of the bill,
and will next proceed to notice some objections to the other
portions. The Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy) ob
jects to the first section, which proposes to repeal the Four
Years' Law, on the ground that it would diminish the power
of the Senate, and increase that of the President. If such
was the fact, the last quarter from which I should expect
such an objection would be that from which it comes. But
the Senator may dismiss his fears. There is not the slight
est ground for the apprehension which he professes. It
is true that, without that law, the Senate would not have
the opportunity of passing, on the conduct of the officers who

SPEECHES. 445

may be renominated under it ; but let me bring the Senator
to reflect how little influence that fact gives to the Senate,
compared to the influence which the President acquires
by the law over all those who must depend on him under
its provisions, for a renomination. Let him reflect how
few of those renominated are rejected by the Senate,
compared to those whom the President has refused to
nominate ; and how little influence the Senate acquires, or
the President loses, by the rejection of the former. Should
the Senate reject on party grounds, it has no power to fill
the place of the person rejected — that depends upon the
President. What, then, is the fact ? The Senate makes
an enemy without acquiring a friend, while the President is
sure to acquire two friends without making an enemy — the
rejected and the one who fills his place. If to this we add,
that the present President has made it an invariable practice
to reward, in some shape or other, every man rejected by the
Senate, however good the cause for rejection, it must be ob
vious that the apprehension of the Senator from Tennessee,
that the repeal of the Four Years' Law would weaken the
Senate and strengthen the Executive, is without foundation.
He may dismiss all anxiety on that head.

But it is further objected that the repeal of the Four
Years' Law would destroy the principle of rotation in office,
which the Senator from Maine (Mr. Shepley), and some
others on the same side, represent as the very basis of repub
lican institutions. We often, said Mr. C., confound things
that are entirely dissimilar, by not making the proper dis
tinction. I will not undertake to inquire now whether the
principle of rotation, as applied to the ordinary ministerial
officers of a government, may not be favorable to popular and
free institutions, when such officers are chosen by the people
themselves. It certainly would have a tendency to cause
those who desire office, when the choice is in the people, to
seek their favor ; but certain it is, that in a Government

446 SPEECHES

where the Chief Magistrate has the filling of vacancies instead
of the people, there will be an opposite tendency — to court
the favor of him who has the disposal of offices — and this for
the very reason that when the choice is in the people their
favor is courted. If the latter has a popular tendency, it is
no less certain that the former must have a contrary one.
I, for my part, must say, that, according to my conception,
the true principle is, to render those who are charged with
mere ministerial offices secure in their places, so long as they
continue to discharge their duty with ability and integrity ;
and I would no more permit the Chief Magistrate of a
country to displace them without cause, on party grounds,
than I would permit him to divest them of their freeholds :
the power to divest them of the one is calculated to make
them as servile and dependent as the power to divest them
of the other.

I have now, said Mr. C., concluded what I intended to
say. I have omitted several subjects which I was desirous
of discussing connected with the highly important question
which has so deeply occupied the attention of the Senate ;
but the session is so near a close that I feel the necessity of
brevity, and will therefore forego what I would otherwise
say.

SPEECH

On the Bill reported by the Select Committee on
Executive Patronage, delivered in the Senate,
February 13th, 1835.

MR. CALHOUN said : This is not the first time that the
measure now under consideration has been before the Senate.
It was introduced eight years ago, on the report of a select

SPEECHES. 447

committee raised on Executive Patronage, as one of the
measures then thought necessary to curtail what, at that
time, was thought to be the excessive patronage of the Ex
ecutive. The party then in opposition, and now in power,
then pledged themselves to the community that, should they
be elevated to power, they would administer the Government
on the principles laid down in the report. Mr. C. said, that
it was now high time to inquire how this solemn pledge,
which, in his opinion, imposed a sacred obligation, has been
redeemed ? Has the plighted faith been kept which the
committee gave in the name of the party ? Before I under
take to answer this question, it may be proper to inquire —
Who constituted that committee, and what is the position
they now occupy ? The chairman was Mr. Benton, now a
member of the Senate and of the present committee. The
name of Mr. Macon, then a Senator from North Carolina, so
well known to the country, stands next * Mr. Van Buren,
now Vice-President ; Mr. Dickerson, now Secretary of the
Treasury • Mr. Johnson, now a member of the House from
Kentucky ; Mr. White, then, as now, Senator from Tennes
see ; Mr. Holmes of Maine ; Mr. Hayne of South Carolina ;
Mr. Findlay of Pennsylvania ; all, at the time, distinguished
members of this body.

Such was the committee, which, then and now, stands so
high in the confidence of the party now in power. Hear
what their report says upon the subject of Executive
Patronage.

[Here an extract from the Report was read as follows :]

u To be able to show to the Senate a full and perfect view of the power
and workings of Federal patronage, the committee addressed a note, im
mediately after they were charged with this inquiry, to each of the de
partments, and to the Postmaster-General, requesting to be informed of
the whole number of persons employed, and the wrhole amount of money
paid out, under the direction of their respective departments ? The an
swers received are herewith submitted, and made part of this report.

448 SPEECHES.

With the ' Blue Book,' they will discover enough to show that the pre
dictions of those who were not blind to the defects of the constitution, are
ready to be realized ; that the power and influence of Federal patronage,
contrary to the argument in the 'Federalist,' is an overmatch for the
power and influence of State patronage ; that its workings will contami
nate the purity of all elections, and enable the Federal Government,
eventually, to govern throughout the States, as effectually as if they were
so many provinces of one vast empire.

" The whole of this great power will centre in the President. The
King of England is the ' fountain of honor ; ' the President of the United
States is the source of patronage. He presides over the entire system of
Federal appointments, jobs, and contracts. He has 'power' over the
'support' of the individuals who administer the system. He makes and
unmakes them. He chooses from the circle of his friends and supporters,
and may dismiss them ; and, upon all the principles of human actions,
will dismiss them, as often as they disappoint his expectations. His
spirit will animate their actions in all the elections to State and Federal
offices. There may be exceptions; but the truth of a general rule is
proved by the exception. The intended check and control of the Senate,
without new constitutional or statutory provisions, will cease to operate.
Patronage will penetrate this body, subdue its capacity of resistance,
chain it to the car of power, and enable the President to rule as easily,
and much more securely with, than without the nominal check of the
Senate. If the President was himself the officer of the people, elected by
them, and responsible to them, there would be less danger from this con
centration of all power in his hands ; but it is the business of statesmen to
act upon things as they are, not as they would wish them to be. We
must then look forward to the time when the public revenue will be
doubled ; when the civil and military officers of the Federal Government
will be quadrupled ; when its influence over individuals will be multiplied
to an indefinite extent ; when the nomination by the President can carry
any man through the Senate, and his recommendation can carry any
measure through the two Houses of Congress; when the principle of
public action will be open and avowed ; the President wants my vote,
and I want his patronage ; I will vote as he wishes, and he will give
me the office I wish for. What will this be, but the government of one
man ? and what is the government of one man, but a monarchy ? Names
are nothing. The nature of a thing is in its substance, and the name soon
accommodates itself to the substance. The first Roman Emperor was
styled Emperor of the Republic, and the last French Emperor took the
same title ; and their respective countries were just as essentially mo
narchical before, as after the assumption of these titles. It cannot be

SPEECHES. 449

denied or dissembled but that the Federal Government gravitates to the
same point, and that the election of the Executive by the Legislature
quickens the impulsion.

" Those who make the President must support him. Their political
fate becomes identified, and they must stand or fall together. Eight or
wrong, they must support him ; and if he is made contrary to the will of
the people, he must be supported not only by votes and speeches, but by
arms. A violent and forced state of things will ensue ; individual com
bats will take place ; and the combats of individuals will be the forerun
ner to general engagements. The array of man against man will be the
prelude to the array of army against army, and of State against State.
Such is the law of nature ; and it is equally in vain for one set of men to
claim an exemption from its operation, as it would be for any other set to
suppose that, under the same circumstances, they would not act in the
same manner. The natural remedy for all these evils, would be to place
the election of President in the hands of the people of the United States.
He would then have a power to support him, which would be as able, as
willing to aid him when he was himself supporting the interests of the
country, as they would be to put him down when he should neglect or
oppose those interests. Your committee, looking at the present mode of
electing the President as the principal source of all this evil, have com
menced their labors at the beginning of this session, by recommending an
amendment to the constitution in that essential and vital particular ; but
in this, as in many other things, they find the greatest difficulty to be in the
first step. The committee recommend the amendment, but the people
cannot act upon it until Congress shall ' propose ' it, and peradventure
Congress will not ' propose ' it to them at all.

'• It is no longer true that the President, in dealing out offices to Mem
bers of Congress, will be limited, as supposed in the Federalist, to the in
considerable number of places which may become vacant by the ordinary
casualties of deaths and resignations ; on the contrary, he may now draw,
for that purpose, upon the entire fund of the Executive patronage. Con
struction and legislation have accomplished this change. In the very first
year of the constitution, a construction was put upon that instrument
which enabled the President to create as many vacancies as he pleased,
and at any moment that he thought proper. This was effected by yield
ing to him the kingly prerogative of dismissing officers without the for
mality of a trial. The authors of the Federalist had not foreseen this con
struction ; so far from it, they had asserted the contrary, and, arguing
logically from the premises, '• that the dismissing power was appurte
nant to the appointing power," they had maintained, in No. 77 of that
standard work, that, as the consent of the Senate was necessary to the
TOL. n.— 29

450 SPEECHES.

appointment of an officer, so the consent of the same body would be
equally necessary to his dismission from office. But this construction was
overruled by the first Congress which was formed under the constitu
tion ; the power of dismission from office was abandoned to the Presi
dent alone, and, with the acquisition of this prerogative alone, the power
and patronage of the Presidential office was instantly increased to an in
definite extent, and the argument of the Federalist against the capacity of
the President, to corrupt the Members of Congress, founded upon the
small number of places which he could use for that purpose, was totally
overthrown. So much for construction. Now for the effects of legisla
tion ; and without going into an enumeration of statutes which unneces
sarily increase the Executive patronage, the Four Years' Appointment Law
will alone be mentioned ; for this single act, by vacating almost the entire
civil list, once in every period of a presidential term of service, places more
offices at the command of the President than were known to the constitu
tion at the time of its adoption, and is, of itself amply sufficient to over
throw the whole of the argument which was used in the Federalist."

It is impossible, said Mr. C., to read this report, which
denounces in such unqualified terms the excess and the
abuses of patronage at that time, without being struck with
the deplorable change which a few short years have wrought
in the character of our country. Then we were sensitive in
all that related to our liberty ; and jealous of patronage and
governmental influence : so much so, that a few inconsiderable
removals, three or four printers, roused the indignation of the
whole country — events which would now pass unnoticed. We
have grown insensible, become callous and stupid.

But let us turn to the question which I have asked. How
has the plighted faith of the party been fulfilled ? Have the
abuses then denounced been corrected ? Has the Four Years'
Law been repealed ? Has the election of the President been
given to the people ? Has the exercise of the dismissing
power by the President, which was then pronounced to be a
dangerous violation of the constitution, been restored to Con
gress? All these pledges have been forgotten. Not one
has been fulfilled. And what justification, I ask, is offered
for so gross a violation of faith ? None is even attempted —

SPEECHES. 451

the delinquency is acknowledged ; and the only effort which
the Senator from Missouri has made to defend his own con
duct, and that of the administration, in adopting the practice
which he then denounced, is on the plea of retaliation. He
says that he has heen fourteen years a member of the Senate ;
and that, during the first seven, no friend of his had received
the favor of the Government ; and contends that it became
necessary to dismiss those in office, to make room for others
who had been, for so long a time, beyond the circle of Exe
cutive favor. What, Mr. C. asked, is the principle, when
correctly understood, on which this defence rests ? It assumes
that retaliation is a principle in its nature so sacred, that it
justifies the violation of the constitution, the breach of
plighted faith, and the subversion of principles, the observ
ance of which had been declared to be essential to the liberty
of .the country. The avowal of such a principle may be
justified at this time by interested partisans ; but the time
must arrive, when a more impartial tribunal will regard it in
a far different light, and pronounce that sentence which
violated faith and broken pledges deserve. Mr. C. said, the
bill now before the Senate affords an opportunity to the
dominant party to redeem its pledges, as late as it is, and to
avert, at least in part, that just denunciation which an im
partial posterity will otherwise most certainly pronounce on
them. He hoped that they would embrace the opportunity,
and thereby prove that, in expelling the former administra
tion they were not merely acting a part, and that the solemn
pledges and promises then given were not electioneering
tricks, devoid of sincerity and truth. I consider it, said Mr.
C., as an evidence of that deep degeneracy, which precedes
the downfall of a republic, when those elevated to power,
forget the promises on which they were elevated ; the certain
effect of which is to make an impression on the public mind,
that all is juggling and tricky in politics — and to create an

452 SPEECHES.

indifference to political struggles, highly favorable to the
growth of despotic power.

[Mr. Benton here rose and made some remarks in defence of him
self and the administration ; after which] —

Mr. Calhoun proceeded to show, that the prerogative of
turning out of office, committed, without limitation to the
President, is a means of increasing at once the Executive
power to a dangerous and ruinous extent ; rendering him the
head of a party, not founded on principles, hut resting on
the worst of all bases, that of personal interest and fear.

Having shown that the present administration rose to
power by the hopes excited, and professions held out against
the very abuses which now had grown to so alarming an
excess, Mr. Calhoun deplored, in energetic terms, the falsifi
cation of those hopes ; urging the fatal effects which .are
produced, when the solemn promises and plighted faith of
men are broken, and when the people are led to believe that
political truth is extinguished, and the most solemn engage
ments are merely made as stepping stones to power, and as
instruments of electioneering.

[Mr. Benton here again rose, and in his usual strain of rude and
vulgar insolence, interrupted the debate. He was called to order by
Mr. Poindexter of Mississippi, and after some time spent in discussing
the point, Mr. Calhoun rose and said :]

I rise to express my surprise at the course pursued by the
member from Missouri (Col. Benton) who has just taken
his seat. He is a member of the committee, and regularly
attended its meetings. While the report was before the
committee for consideration, he sat in silence, without whis
pering the objections now urged with so much violence, and
in language so unwarranted. I had not intended to go into
the report while the present bill was under consideration.
It met the approbation of the whole committee, including

SPEECHES. 453

that of the Senator from Missouri, and I had a right to ex
pect, at least as. far as he was concerned, that it would pass
without opposition. Under this impression I had proposed
to myself to delay the discussion on the merits of the report,
till the resolution to amend the constitution, from which the
member dissented, came under consideration ; when an op
portunity would be afforded to repel his broad and unfounded
assertions and fallacious conclusions, and to establish the
correctness of the report on all the points on which it had
been assailed ; but the course pursued by the Senator compels
me to repel his assertions without further delay.

When the subject of printing the report was under con
sideration a few days since, he asserted, in the boldest man
ner, that the estimate of the committee in relation to the
surplus revenue was so wild, that wild was a term too mod
erate ; and that none less strong than " hallucination " could
be applied. I then repelled his objections in a manner which
I trust was satisfactory to every one capable of estimating
the force of just reasoning ; but in order that there might
not be a shadow of doubt on a point of so much importance,
I have since re-examined the subject, and now pronounce,
without the fear of contradiction, that on the Senator's own
premises, the estimate of the surplus, as reported by the com
mittee, is correct — notwithstanding the outrageous extrava
gance of his assertions. The Senator did not venture any
argument of his own to rebut the conclusion of the commit
tee ; but, with that deference to power which is one of the
characteristics of those with whom he is politically associa
ted, he relied solely upon the statement of the Secretary of
the Treasury, furnished in his annual report. Now, said Mr.
C., it is remarkable that the estimates of the Secretary of the
income of the current year, instead of supporting the un
warranted assertions of the Senator from Missouri, coincide
remarkably with the estimate of the committee ; which shows
with what disregard to the state of the facts the Senator ven-

454 SPEECHES.

tures his assertions, though uttered with so much confidence.
But that there may be no further question pn this point, I
will turn to the report of the Secretary itself, and compare
in detail his estimate with that submitted by the committee.
Beginning, then, with the customs, which is the principal
source of our revenue, the Secretary estimates the income
from this source at sixteen millions of dollars j the commit
tee at sixteen millions three hundred and seventy thousand
dollars ; making a difference of but three hundred and sev
enty thousand dollars — a very striking coincidence, consider
ing that the calculations rest upon grounds so essentially dif
ferent. The Secretary assumes as his basis the income from
the customs for the last year, without taking into the esti
mate that a very considerable portion of the receipts from
that source last year were derived from duties accruing the
preceding year, when the rates were much higher than they
are now ; but to balance this error, he omits to take into the
account the diminution of the imports of articles subject to
duty, in consequence of the disturbed state of the currency,
which two sums nearly balance each other ; and thus, by two
errors of an opposite character, and of nearly equal magni
tude, he has accidentally fallen upon the truth.

As to the next greatest source of our revenue, the public
lands, the estimates of the Secretary and the committee ex
actly coincide ; both placing it at three millions five hun
dred thousand dollars. The estimates of the remaining re
sources are placed by the Secretary at $500,070 ; by the
committee at $450,000 ; making a difference of $50,070
only. Adding these several items on both sides, the aggre
gate of the Secretary amounts to $20,000,070 ; and that of
the committee to $20,320,000 ; making a difference of but
$319,930. So much for the income. As to the expendi
ture, I am not ignorant that the Secretary estimates it at
$19,683,541 — making a difference between that and his esti
mate of the income, of $316,529. The committee, on the

SPEECHES. 455

contrary, make no estimate of the actual expenditure. Its
object was not to estimate the expenditure on the present
scale, which is admitted by the Senator himself to be enor
mous, profuse, and profligate. On the contrary, the object
of the committee was to ascertain to what these expenditures
might safely be reduced, consistently with the just efficiency
of the Government. For this purpose, they selected the year
1823 as the basis on which to rest their estimate — a year
which the Senator at that time, and those with whom he then
acted, denounced as profuse and extravagant (Mr. Benton as
sented), and which he even now has the assurance to allude
to as extravagant, and attempts to hold me responsible as
its author. Well, then, I have taken this extravagant pe
riod. I have allowed twenty per cent, upon its expenditure —
which so many who now support the present administration,
then pronounced as so extravagant. Yes, twenty per cent,
on the then expenditure on fortifications — on internal im
provements — on pensions, and every other item, all of which
the Senator has pronounced to have been so extravagant at
that period, that even now he holds the then administration
responsible, in his zeal to defend the present. I have gone
further. I have added the actual increase of pensions, of
which he now complains so much, and to which he mainly
attributes the present great increase of expenditure, to the
twenty per cent., and find that, with all these heavy ad
ditions, the expenditure ought not, at present, to exceed
$12,060,412 per annum for the next seven years ; which,
deducted from the estimate of the receipts of the present
year, as given by the Secretary of the Treasury, and on
which the Senator relies for his uncourteous and extravagant
assertions, leaves a balance of $7,939,658. If we allow for
the surplus revenue now in the treasury, deducting two
millions for contingent expense, and the Government por
tion of the United States Bank stock — making together
$13.039,381 — and distribute this sum equally in the next

456 SPEECHES.

seven years, it would give $1,862,768 to each year. Add
this to the surplus already obtained, and it would give a balance
of upwards of nine millions, as estimated by the committee.

Thus, said Mr. C., the very authority which the Senator
resorts to, and on the strength of which he has ventured to
utter his bold and lawless denunciations of the report, sus
tains it in a most remarkable manner, and furnishes a strik
ing proof of the carelessness and inattention of the Senator
in his assumptions and his arguments.

Nature, said Mr. C., has bestowed her gifts very unequal
ly and partially upon men. To some she has given one qual
ity, and to others another. She has certainly been profuse
of her gifts to the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bent on), in
one particular ; she has endowed him, above all men, with
boldness — yes, boldness of assertion ; but I must say she has
been more niggard in the power of ratiocination. In the face
of this confirmation of the estimate of the committee, by his
own authority, he has ventured to assail the correctness of
the report in the most unqualified manner, and bellowed out
that the estimate was extravagant — a fallacy — hallucination !

He has, said Mr. C., not thought proper to repeat these
offensive epithets in the speech which he has just delivered ;
but in lieu of them he tells us that the report is deceptive —
fallacious ; and that, while pretending to moderation but thin
ly veiled, it partakes of the most bitter party character ; and
in the same breath with which he makes these charges, he
alleges, as a serious charge against the committee, that they
did not go into an inquiry of the cause of the enormous in
crease of patronage and expenditure, which the Senator can
not deny. I repel, said Mr. C., the charges of the Senator
as destitute of any foundation, and affirm that the report is
as free from party spirit as it is possible for a paper of this
description to be, consistently with truth and a regard to
duty. The Senate charged the committee, in its resolution,
to inquire into the extent of Executive patronage — its great

SPEECHES. 457

increase of late — and the expediency and practicability of re
ducing it ; and how could the committee perform this duty
without speaking freely of facts as they exist ? How could
they inform the people of these States of the extent of Ex
ecutive patronage, and the cause of its great increase of late, if
they had said less than they have ? The truth is, the com
mittee looked to the facts, and to the facts only ; and treated
of them, as much as possible, separate from all personal or
party considerations ; and yet the Senator from Missouri,
while he charges the committee with giving a party charac
ter to the report, with a strange inconsistency and confusion
of ideas, blames them for not inquiring into the fact of who
were the authors of the present extravagant expenditure and
enormous patronage, which he does not pretend to deny.
Can the Senator be so blind as not to see that it was impos
sible to discuss that point without giving a violent party
character to the report, which would have ended in prevent
ing the possibility of applying a remedy to what all (and he
with others) admit to be a deep and dangerous disease ? I
must tell the Senator what, as a member, he ought to know,
that the committee were actuated by far higher and more
patriotic considerations. They were more studious of devis
ing a remedy to arrest the dangerous progress of events, than
of giving a party character to their proceedings, which, how
ever it might bear upon those in power, could not but defeat
the object which the Senate had in view in instituting the
inquiry. This is the reason why the committee did not in
quire wrho were the authors of the present state of things.
They were not deterred, as the Senator seems to insinuate, by
the apprehension that the inquiry would implicate others as
the authors of the present diseased condition of the country,
and exempt the administration. The result of such an in
quiry, so far from acquitting, would deeply implicate the ad
ministration in all the extravagant expenditures to which the
Senator alludes — internal improvements, pensions, removal of

458 SPEECHES.

the Indians, and those connected with the tariff, as I am
prepared to show, whenever a suitable opportunity offers.
But before I quit this part of the subject, let ine correct an
error, into which it would seem . strange that the Senator
should have fallen. He tells us, with his usual confidence,
that Andrew Jackson was the author of the plan of re
moving the Indians to the west of the Mississippi, and be
stows upon him all the honor and the glory, and calls upon
the State of Mississippi and the new States to pay the debt
of gratitude which they owe him as the author of this noble
policy. Is it possible that the Senator could have been igno
rant that it was Thomas Jefferson, and not the object of his
adoration, who was the real author ? Can he be ignorant
that Andrew Jackson himself (as he calls the President), in
the treaty with the Cherokees, in 1817, acknowledges this
fact ? To come to a later period, is he ignorant that Mr.
Monroe recommended, in one of his messages, in the fullest
and most explicit manner, the adoption of the policy of the
removal of all the Indian tribes within our limits on the east
of the Mississippi, to the west of that river ? and that the
message of Mr. Monroe was founded on a report of which I
was the author, as Secretary of War ? How, with all these
facts before him, could the Senator pronounce, as he has, that
the present President was the author of the system, and
that, as such, he ought to have bestowed upon him exclu
sively whatever honor and gratitude may belong to it ? Let
me tell the Senator, that he who undertakes to correct the
errors of others, ought to be very cautious of committing
errors himself.

But it seems that the committee have committed an enor
mous error in the statement of the expenditure which they
have given for the ten years from 1823 to 1833. The Sen
ator says that they have entirely overlooked the extraordinary
expenditure for the last of these years. A very simple an
swer will set him right. The object of the committee as

SPEECHES. 459

the statement itself on its face purports to be, is to exhibit
the amount of the expenditures only for the period in ques
tion, without inquiring into their nature and character, or for
what reason or objects they were incurred, with the view of
showing that there was a regular progression and great in
crease of the expenditures of late. The statement is taken
from the official returns of the expenditure during the ten
years, and in addition to which the report gives the estimat
ed expenditure for 1834, and the annual report of the Se
cretary of the Treasury gives the estimate of the expendi
ture of the current year : so that the committee could have
had no object in selecting 1833 with a view of exhibiting the
increase to be greater than it really is. It was selected sim
ply because it is the last year of which we have official and
certain returns of the expenditures — those of 1834 and 1835
being as yet in some degree uncertain and conjectural. Now,
said Mr. C., if the expenditure of 1833 gives us so unfair a
result ; if, as the Senator contends, it was swelled so enor
mously by accidental circumstances, that seven millions ought
to be deducted to obtain the true result, what will he say to
the estimated expenditure of 1834 and 1835, which are but
little short of twenty millions of dollars for each year ? Will
he pretend to say that any extraordinary occurrences affect
ed the disbursements of the last year, or that those of the
present, as estimated by the Secretary, were not based on the
usual items of expenditure ? Let us then lay aside the
year 1833, to which the Senator so strenuously objects as
being a year of extraordinary disbursements, and take that
of the last or present year, the expenditure of which, as I
have stated, is estimated at nearly twenty millions of dol
lars, and how much will the Senator gain by comparing either
of those years with 1823 instead of 1833, to which he ob
jects. He will find, on comparison, that the expenditures of
1823, compared with the estimates of this and the last year,
are less than one half ; and how will he, who in 1826 condemn-

460 SPEECHES.

ed the comparatively moderate expenditure of that period,
undertake now to justify this enormous increase since — an
increase which has occurred mainly under this reform admin
istration, of which the Senator is one of the warmest and
most unqualified supporters. But let us turn and examine
the items of 1833, to which the Senator objects as heing im
properly charged upon that year.

First, the Black Hawk war, to which he charges nine
hundred thousand dollars. Now, sir, said Mr. C., if I am
not greatly mistaken, it was charged on this floor by a gentle
man, a friend of the administration, well acquainted with
that petty contest, that it originated in the misconduct of
the officers and agents of the government ; and might easily
have been prevented if the complaints of the Indians had
not been improperly neglected by those whose duty it was to
attend to them. The Senator then tells us that there were
extraordinary Indian treaties in that year, and large sums paid
for the removal and subsistence of the Indians — which to
gether amounted to more than one million of dollars. I cannot,
said Mr. C., admit this deduction. Of the present extrava
gant and unreasonable disbursements, there are none more
reckless and profuse than those for holding Indian treaties,
purchasing Indian lands and removing Indians — which exceed
many fold what has heretofore been usual ; and I firmly
believe have been the subject of as much, if not more abuse
and corruption, than the post-office department.

The Senator next deducts the expenditure under the pen
sion act of 1832, which he denominates loose and wild, but
which he takes care to charge to the credit of Congress. I
will not, said Mr. C., permit the Senator to shift the respon
sibility from the shoulders of the administration. It is not
to be tolerated that, those who expelled a former administra
tion because of its extravagance, shall now, when the admin
istration thus brought into power proves to be doubly so, lay
the blame upon Congress instead of taking it to themselves.

SPEECHES. 46)

I would ask the Senator, when he drew his report in 1826
and denounced the then administration in such severe and
unqualified terms for their extravagance, whether every item
of expenditure at that time had not been authorized by Con
gress ? and with what semblance of justice could he then
transfer the blame from Congress to the administration, and
now, under precisely similar circumstances, from the admin
istration to Congress ? He, and those who are now in power,
have reaped the fruit — and as they obtained power by holding
others responsible, so it is just that theyshould, in turn, be
held responsible. I go further. I maintain as a sound rule,
that every administration, unless it be in a minority in both
Houses, ought, upon every principle of justice and policy, to
be held responsible ; and it is one of the striking eviden
ces of the diseased and corrupt state of the present times,
that such is not the fact. Has not the present administration
had, at all times, a majority either in this or the other House ?
and has not the President freely exercised his veto whenever
any party object was to be effected ? Why then has this
appropriation, which the Senator designates as so extravagant
and improper, been permitted to pass ? Why was it not de
feated in the House of Representatives, where the adminis
tration had a settled majority, or arrested by the President's
veto ? I will answer these questions. It is because the ad
ministration has not thought proper to make either this, or
any other question of principle or policy, a party question.
A member may vote on any question of the kind for or
against, and be still a good Jackson man. He may be for
or against internal improvements — for or against the tariff —
for or against this or that expenditure — for or against the
Bank, without forfeiting his party character, provided always
and nevertheless, he shall submit to party discipline and sus
tain the party candidates for office. This is the only cohe
sive principle ; this is the only subject deemed of sufficient
importance to be raised to the dignity of a party question.

462 SPEECHES.

All others, however important in themselves ; however sa
cred the principle involved ; however essential the measure
to the public prosperity, are all, it seems, too insignificant
to be made party questions. They are all left open ques
tions, in reference to which the faithful may take either
side. Yes, even the Bank itself is not a party question — of
which we have a most striking illustration in the fact that
General Jackson bestowed the highest gift in his power on a
Senator (Mr. Forsyth), who had openly, on this floor, in the
very heat of the controversy, avowed himself a Bank man —
while other Senators who were openly opposed to the institu
tion were denounced ; thus furnishing a most striking illus
tration of the truth of what I have asserted, that the only
cohesive principle which binds together the powerful party
rallied under the name of General Jackson, is official patron
age. Their object is to get and to hold office ; and their lead
ing political maxim, openly avowed on this floor by one of
the former Senators from New- York, now governor of that
State (Mr. Marcy), is that, "to the victors belong the
spoils of victory ! " a sentiment recently reiterated during
the present session, as I understand, by an influential mem
ber in the other House, and who had the assurance to
declare every man a hypocrite who does not avow it. Can
any one, who will duly reflect • on these things, venture to
say that all is sound, and that our Government is not un
dergoing a great and fatal change ? Let us* not deceive
ourselves — the very essence of a free government consists in
considering offices as public trusts, bestowed for the good of
the country, and not for the benefit of an individual or a
party ; and that system of political morals which regards
offices in a different light, as public prizes to be won by com
batants most skilled in all the arts and corruption of political
tactics, and to be used and enjoyed as their proper spoils-
strikes a fatal blow at the very vitals of free institutions.
Mr. C. said, experience has shown that there is a great

SPEECHES. 463

tendency in our system to degenerate into this diseased state ;
and I will venture to repeat (it cannot be done too often),
what is stated in the report, that whenever the Executive
patronage shall become sufficiently strong to form a party
based on its influence exclusively, the liberty of the country,
should that state of things continue for any considerable
period, must be lost. We would make a great mistake were
we to suppose that, because the Government of Great Bri
tain can maintain its freedom under an immense patronage,
ours also can. The genius of the two governments in
this particular is wholly dissimilar ; so much so as to form a
perfect contrast. It is the feature by which they are
most distinguished. No free government that ever existed
could maintain its liberty under so much patronage as that
of Great Britain, and there are few that could not bear more
than ours. But, said Mr. C., it is a great subject, which
I cannot enter upon on the present occasion. I return to
the objection which the Senator made to the statement of
the expenditures of the year 1833. I could not be ignorant,
said Mr. C., in making a movement against Executive patron
age, that I would bring down upon me the vengeance of that
great and powerful corps now held together by this single
cohesive principle — a principle as flexible as India rubber,
and as tough too. The history of the world proves that he
who attempts reformation, attempts it at no small hazard.
I know the relation which the Senator bears to the dominant
party. He is identified with them,

[Here Mr. Benton said, Mrs. Royal says so ; to which Mr. C. re
plied, she says truly ; and proceeded,]

and is their organ on the present occasion. His position
compels him to adopt the course he has pursued.

There remain, then, only two items of the seven millions
to be deducted : certain refunded duties, and the payment
under the Danish convention, amounting to less than one

464 SPEECHES.

million and a half, which, if they were paid during the year,
may be deducted as of an extraordinary nature, and for
which the administration is not responsible ; and thus the
seven millions of the Senator dwindles down to about one-
fifth of the amount, and the expenditures of the year, after
being freed of all the items of which it can justly be, will
give an increase of expenditure in the year 1833, over that
of 1822, of $11,429,750.

• When the report asserted, said Mr. C., that the period
from 1823 to 1833, was one of profound peace, to which the
Senator so violently objects, the committee were not ignorant
of the disturbance with Black Hawk and his followers, on
our northwest frontier, which the Senator has attempted to
dignify by calling it a war. If my memory serves me, it was
limited to a single tribe, headed by a single chief, and did
not extend to the nation to which he belonged, and lasted
but a few months ; and it is in vain for the Senator from
Missouri to impeach the correctness of the report, which
asserts the period to be one of profound peace, by calling to
our recollection this paltry affair, which originated in the
misconduct of the administration, and has swelled into the
little magnitude which it attained, by its mismanagement.
The Senator from Missouri endeavors to escape from the
inconsistency in which he is placed by his report in 1826 and
hjs present position. He says that I was mistaken in placing
his defence of General Jackson's removals from office on
political grounds, on the principle of retaliation ; that it was
not on that principle, but that of equalizing the offices
between the parties. I, said Mr. C., have not the sagacity
to perceive the difference as applied to the present case, or
by what possibility the Senator can escape from the incon
sistency in which he is involved, by substituting the one for
the other. What are the facts ? In 1826, as Chairman of
the Select Committee on Executive Patronage, he made a
report, in which he condemned the principle of removal from

SPEECHES. 465

office in the severest terms, more severe than those used in
the present report. He traced its destructive tendency to
the great increase which it was calculated to give to Execu
tive patronage, and pronounced the exercise of the power by
the President to be unconstitutional ; and now, when the
present administration has carried the exercise of this very
power, thus condemned by the Senator, more than thirty-
fold beyond any or all preceding administrations, the Senator
ventures to rest his vindication of the administration and his
support of it on the ground of equalization — equalization !
What allusion, what exception did the Senator make in favor
of equalization in his report ? and how can equalization any
more than retaliation justify a violation of the constitution.

Mr. C. said, I regret that I have been forced to the dis
cussion of these topics on the present bill, in reference to
which the committee is unanimous ; but the extraordinary
course of the Senator from Missouri, his bold and unfounded
charges and unwarranted imputations, . compel me to adopt
the course which I have. I now hope that the bill may be
allowed to proceed, and that further discussion on the merits
of the report will be postponed to some future and more
suitable occasion.

SPEECH

On the Abolition Petitions, delivered in the Senate,
March 9th, 1836.

[The question of receiving the petitions from Pennsylvania for the
abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, being under considera
tion : — ]

MR. CALHOUN rose, and said : If we may judge from
what has been said, the mind of the Senate is fully made up
on the subject of these petitions. With the exception of the

YOL. II. — 30

466 SPEECHES.

two Senators from Vermont, all who have spoken have
avowed their conviction., not only that they contain nothing
requiring the action of the Senate, but that the petitions are
highly mischievous, as tending to agitate and distract the
country, and to endanger the Union itself. With these con
cessions, I may fairly ask, why should these petitions be re
ceived ? Why receive, when we have made up our mind not
to act ? Why idly waste our time and lower our dignity in
the useless ceremony of- receiving to reject, as is proposed,
should the petitions be received ? Why finally receive what
all acknowledge to be highly dangerous and mischievous ?
But one reason has or can be assigned — that not to receive
would be a violation of the right of petition, and, of course,
that we are bound to receive, however objectionable and
dangerous the petitions may be. If such be the fact, there
is an end to the question. As great as would be the advan
tage to the abolitionists, if we are bound to receive — if it
would be a violation of the right of petition not to receive,
we must acquiesce. On the other hand, if it shall be shown,
not only that we are not bound to receive, but that to receive
on the ground on which it has been placed, would sacrifice
the constitutional rights of this body, would yield to the
abolitionists all they could hope at this time, and would sur
render all the outworks by which the slaveholding States can
defend their rights and property HERE, then an unanimous re
jection of these petitions ought of right to follow.

The decision, then, of the question now before the Senate
is reduced to the single point — Are we bound to receive
these petitions ? Or, to vary the form of the question —
Would it be a violation of the right of petition not to re
ceive them ?

When the ground was first taken that it would be a
violation, I could scarcely persuade myself that those whc
took it were in earnest, so contrary was it to all my concep
tions of the rights of this body, and the provisions of the

SPEECHES. 467

constitution ; but finding it so earnestly maintained, I have
since carefully investigated the subject, and the result has
been a confirmation of my first impression, and a conviction
that the claim of right is without shadow of foundation.
The question, I must say, has not been fairly met. Those
opposed to the side which we support, have discussed the
question as if we denied the right of petition, when they
could not but know that the true issue is not as to the exist
ence of the right, which is acknowledged by all, but its extent
and limits, which not one of our opponents has so much as
attempted to ascertain. What they have declined doing I
undertake to perform.

There must be some point, all will agree, where the right
of petition ends, and that of this body begins. Where is
that point ? I have examined this question carefully, and I
assert boldly, without the least fear of refutation, that,
stretched to the utmost, the right cannot be extended beyond
the presentation of a petition, at which point the rights of
this body commence. When a petition is presented, it is
before the Senate. It must then be acted on. Some dis
position must be made of it before the Senate can proceed to
the consideration of any other subject. This no one will
deny. With the action of the Senate its right commences —
a right secured by an express provision of the constitution,
which vests each House with the authority of regulating its
own proceedings, — that is, of determining by fixed rules the
order and form of its action. To extend the right of petition
beyond presentation, is clearly to extend it beyond that
point where the action of the Senate commences, and, as such,
is a manifest violation of its constitutional rights. Here
then we have the limits between the right of petition and
the right of the Senate to regulate its proceedings clearly
fixed, and so perfectly defined as not to admit of mistake —
and I would add of controversy, had it not been questioned
in this discussion.

468 SPEECHES.

If what I have asserted required confirmation, ample
might be found in our rules, which embody the deliberate
sense of the Senate on this point, from the commencement
of the Government to this day. Among them the Senate
has prescribed that of its proceedings on the presentation of
petitions. It is contained in the 24th Eule, which I ask the
Secretary to read, with Mr. Jefferson's remarks in reference
to it :—

" Before any petition or memorial addressed to the Senate shall be
received, and read at the table, whether the same shall be introduced by
the President or a member, a brief statement of the contents of the petition
or memorial shall verbally be made by the introducer." — Rule 24.

Mr. Jefferson's remarks :—

" Regularly a motion for receiving it must be made and seconded,
and the question put whether it shall be received ; but a cry from the
House of ' receive,' or even a silence, dispenses with the formality of the
question."

Here we have a confirmation of all I have asserted. It
clearly proves that when a petition is presented, the action
of the Senate commences. The first act is to receive the
petition. Keceived by whom ? Not the Secretary, but the
Senate. And how can it be received by the Senate but on a
motion to receive, and a vote of a majority of the body ?
And Mr. Jefferson accordingly tells us that, regularly, such
a motion must be made and seconded. On this question
then, the right of the Senate begins, and its right is as per
fect and full to receive or reject, as it is to adopt or reject any
other question, in any subsequent stage of its proceedings.
When I add, that this rule was adopted as far back as the
19th of April, 1789, at the first session of the Senate, and
that it has been retained, without alteration, in all the sub
sequent changes and modifications of the rules, we have the
strongest evidence of the deliberate sense of this body in
reference to the point under consideration.

SPEECHES. 469

I feel that I might here terminate the discussion. I have
shown conclusively that the right of petition cannot possibly
be extended beyond presentation. At that point it is met
by the rights of the Senate ; and it follows as a necessary
consequence, that so far from being bound to receive these
petitions — so far would a rejection be from violating the
right of petition, we are left perfectly free to reject or to re
ceive at pleasure, and that we cannot be deprived of it with
out violating the rights of this body, secured by the consti
tution.

But on a question of such magnitude, I feel it to be a
duty to remove every difficulty ; and, that not the shadow of a
doubt may remain, I shall next proceed to reply to the ob
jections our opponents have made to the grounds I have
taken. At the head of these, it has been urged, again and
again, that petitioners have a right to be heard ; and that not
to receive petitions is to refuse a hearing. It is to be re
gretted that throughout this discussion those opposed to us
have dealt in such vague generalities, and ventured assertions
with so little attention to facts. Why have they not in
formed us, in the present instance, what is meant by the right
to be heard, and how that right is violated by a refusal to
receive ? Had they thought proper to give us this informa
tion, it would at least have greatly facilitated my reply ; but
as it is, I am constrained to inquire into the different senses
in which the assertion may be taken, and then to show that
in not one of them is the right of petition in the slightest
degree infringed by a refusal to receive.

What then is meant by the assertion that these peti
tioners have a right to be heard ? Is it meant that they
have a right to appear in the Senate chamber in person to
present their petition, and to be heard in its defence ? If this
be the meaning, the dullest apprehension must see that the
question of receiving has not the slightest bearing on such
right. If they have the right to be heard personally at our

470 SPEECHES.

bar, it is not the 24th rule of our proceedings, but the 19th
which violates that right. This rule expressly provides that
a motion to admit any person whatever within the doors of
the Senate to present a petition shall be out of order, % and
of course excludes the petitioners from being heard in per
son. But it may be meant that petitioners have a right to
have their petitions presented to the Senate, and read in their
hearing. If this be the meaning, the right has been enjoyed
in the present instance to the fullest extent. The petition
was presented by the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Bu
chanan) in the usual mode, by giving a statement of its con
tents, and on my call was read by the Secretary at his table.

But one more sense can be attached to the assertion. It
may be meant that the petitioners have a right to have their
petitions discussed by the Senate. If this be intended,
I will venture to say, there never was an assertion more
directly in the teeth of facts than that which has been so
frequently made in the course of this discussion — that, to re
fuse to receive the petition, is to refuse a hearing to the pe
titioners. Has not this question been before us for months ?
Has not the petition been discussed day after day, fully and
freely, in all its bearings ? And how, with these facts
before us, with the debates still ringing in our ears, any Sen
ator can rise in his place, and gravely pronounce that, to re
fuse to receive this petition is to refuse a hearing to the pe
titioners — to refuse discussion, in the broadest sense, is past
my comprehension. Our opponents, as if in their eagerness
to circumscribe the rights of the Senate, and to enlarge those
of the abolitionists (for such must be the effect of their
course), have closed their senses against facts passing before
their eyes ; and have entirely overlooked the nature of the
question now before the Senate, and which they have been
so long discussing.

The question on receiving the petition not only admits
discussion, but admits it in the most ample manner ; more

SPEECHES. 4*71

so, in fact, than any other, except the final question on the
rejection of the prayer of the petition, or some tantamount-
question. Whatever may go to show that the petition is or
is not deserving the action of this body may be freely urged
for or against it, as has been done on the present occasion. In
this respect there is a striking difference between it and many
of the subsequent questions which may be raised after recep
tion, and particularly the one made by the Senator from
Tennessee (Mr. Grundy), who now is so strenuous an advo
cate in favor of the right of the petitioners to be heard. He
spoke with apparent complacency of his course, as it re
spects another of these petitions. And what was that
course ? He who is now so eager for discussion, to give a
hearing, moved to lay the petition on the table — a motion
which cuts off all discussion.

But it may be asked, if the question on receiving peti
tions admits of so wide a scope for discussion, why not re
ceive this petition, and discuss it at some subsequent stage ?
Why not receive, it in order to reject its prayer, as proposed
by the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan), instead
of rejecting the petition itself on the question of receiving,
as we propose ? What is the difference betwen the two ?

I do not intend at this stage to compare, or rather to
contrast the two courses, for they admit of no comparison.
My object at present is to establish beyond the possibility of
doubt that we are not bound to receive these petitions ; and
when that is accomplished, I will then show the disastrous
consequences which must follow the reception of the petition,
be the after disposition what it may. In the mean time it is
sufficient to remark that, it is only on the question of re
ceiving that opposition can be made to the petition itself. On
all others, the opposition is to its prayer. On the decision,
then, of the question of receiving depends the important
question of jurisdiction. To receive is to take jurisdiction —
to give an implied pledge to investigate and decide on the

472 SPEECHES.

prayer, — to give the petition a place in our archives, and
become responsible for its safe-keeping ; and he who votes for
receiving this petition on the ground on which its reception
is placed, votes that Congress is bound to take jurisdiction
of the question of abolishing slavery both here and in the
States — gives an implied pledge to take the subject under
consideration, and orders the petition to be placed among the
public records for safe-keeping.

But to proceed in reply to the objections of our opponents.
It is next urged that precedents are against the side we
support. I meet this objection with a direct denial. From
the beginning of the Government to the commencement of
this session, there is not a single precedent that justifies the
receiving of these petitions on the ground on which their
reception is urged. The real state of the case is, that we
are not following but making precedents. For the first time
has the principle been assumed, that we are bound to receive
petitions ; that we have no discretion, but must take juris
diction over them, however absurd, frivolous, mischievous, or
foreign from the purpose for which the Government was
created. Keceive these petitions, and you will create a pre
cedent which will hereafter establish this monstrous principle.
As yet there are none. The case relied on by the Senator
from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy) is in no respect analogous.
No question in that case was made on the reception of the
petition. The petition slipped in without taking a vote, as
is daily done, when the attention of the Senate is not par
ticularly called to the subject. The question on which the
discussion took place was on the reference, and not on the
reception, as in this case. But what is decisive against the
precedent, and which I regret the Senator (Mr. Grundy) did
not state, so that it might accompany his remarks, is the
fact, that the petition was not for abolishing slavery. The
subject was the African slave trade ; and the petition simply
prayed that Congress would inquire whether they might not

SPEECHES. 4*73

adopt some measure of interdiction prior to 1808, when, by
the constitution, they would be authorized to suppress that
trade. I ask the Secretary to read the prayer of the pe
tition :

" But we find it indispensably incumbent on us. as a religious body, —
assuredly believing that both the true temporal interests of nations, and
eternal well-being of individuals, depend on doing justly, loving mercy, and
walking humbly before God, the creator, preserver, and benefactor of men, —
thus to attempt to excite your attention to the affecting subject (of the slave
trade), earnestly desiring that the infinite Father of Spirits may so enrich
your minds with his love and truth, and so influence your understanding
by that pure wisdom which is full of mercy and good fruits, as that a sincere
and an impartial inquiry may take place, whether it be not an essential
part of the duty of your exalted station to exert upright endeavors, to the
full extent of your power, to remove every obstruction to public righteous
ness, which the influence or artifice of particular persons governed by the
narrow, mistaken views of self-interest has occasioned ; and whether, not
withstanding such seeming impediments, it be not really within your
power to exercise justice and mercy, which, if adhered to, we cannot doubt
abolition must produce the abolition of the slave trade."

Now, I ask the Senator, where is the analogy between
this and the present petition, the reception of which he so
strenuously urges ? He is a lawyer of long experience and
of distinguished reputation — and I put the question to him,
on what possible principle can a case so perfectly dissimilar
justify the vote he intends to give on the present occasion ?
On what possible ground can the vote of Mr. Madison to refer
that petition, on which he has so much relied, justify him in
receiving this ? Does he not perceive, in his own example,
the danger of forming precedents ? If he may call to his
aid the authority of Mr. Madison, in a case so dissimilar, to
justify the reception of this petition, and thereby extend the
jurisdiction of Congress over the question of emancipation, to
what purpose hereafter may not the example of his course on
the present occasion be perverted ?

It is not my design to censure Mr. Madison's course, but

4*74 SPEECHES.

I cannot refrain from expressing my regret that his name is
not found associated, on that occasion, with the sagacious and
firm representatives from the South — Smith, Tucker and
Brooke, of South Carolina, James Jackson, of Georgia, and
many others who, at that early period, foresaw the danger,
and met it as it ought ever to be met by those who regard
the peace and security of the slaveholding States. Had he
added the weight of his talents and authority to theirs, a
more healthy tone of sentiment than that which now unfortu
nately exists, would this day have been the consequence.

Another case has been cited, to justify the vote for recep
tion. I refer to the petition from the Quakers, in 1805,
which the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan) relies
on to sustain him in receiving the present petition. What I
have said in reply to the precedent cited by the Senator from
Tennessee, applies equally to this. Like that, the petition
prayed legislation, not on the abolition of slavery, but the Afri
can slave trade, over which subject Congress, then in a few
years, would have full jurisdiction by the constitution, and
might well have their attention called to it in advance. But,
though their objects were the same, the manner in which the
petitions were met was very dissimilar. Instead of being
permitted to be received silently, like the former, this petition
was met at the threshold. The question of receiving was
made, as on the present occasion, and its rejection sustained
by a strong Southern vote, as the journal will show. The
Secretary will read the journal :

" Mr. Logan presented a petition signed Thomas Morris, clerk, on
behalf of the meeting of the representatives of the people called Quakers,
in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, &c., stating that the petitioners, from a
sense of religious duty, had again come forward to plead the cause of their
oppressed and degraded fellow-men of the African race. On the question.
; Shall this petition be received ? ' it passed in the affirmative — yeas, 19 ;
nays, 9."

Among those to receive the petition, there were but four

SPEECHES. 475

from the slaveholding States, and this on a simple petition
praying for legislation on a subject over which Congress in so
short a time would have full authority. What an example
to us on the present occasion ! Can any man doubt, from
the vote, if the Southern Senators on that occasion had been
placed in our present situation — that, had it been their lot
as it is ours, to meet that torrent of petitions which is now
poured in on Congress — not from peaceable Quakers, but
ferocious incendiaries — not to suppress the African slave
trade, but to abolish slavery — they would, with united voice,
have rejected the petition with scorn and indignation ? Can
any one who knew him doubt, that one of the Senators from
the South (the gallant Sumter), who on that occasion voted
for receiving the petition, would have been among the first
to vindicate the interests of those whom he represented, had
the question at that day been what it is on the present
occasion ?

We are next told that, instead of looking to the consti
tution, in order to ascertain what are the limits to the right
of petition, we must push that instrument aside, and go back
to Magna Charta and the Declaration of Eights for its origin
and limitation. We live in strange times. It seems there
are Christians now more orthodox than the Bible, and poli
ticians whose standard is higher than the constitution ; but
I object not to tracing the right to these ancient and venera
ted sources ; I hold in high estimation the institutions of our
English ancestors. They grew up gradually through many
generations, by the incessant and untiring efforts of an intel
ligent and brave people struggling for centuries against the
power of the crown. To them we are indebted for nearly
all that has been gained for liberty in modern times, except
ing what we have added. But may I not ask how it has
happened that our opponents, in going back to these sacred
instruments, have not thought proper to cite their provisions,
or to show in what manner our refusal to receive these

476 SPEECHES.

petitions violates the right of petition as secured by them ?
I feel under no obligation to supply the omission — to cite
what they have omitted to cite, or to prove, from the instru
ments themselves, that to be no violation of them which they
have not proved to be a violation. It is unnecessary. The
practice of parliament is sufficient for my purpose. It proves
conclusively that it is no violation of the right, as secured by
those instruments, to refuse to receive petitions. To estab
lish what this practice is, I ask the Secretary to read from
Hatsell, a work of the highest authority, the several para
graphs which are marked with a pencil, commencing at page
760, under the head of Petitions on Matter of Supply :

" On the 9th of April 1694, a petition was tendered to the House, re
lating to the bill for granting to their Majesties several duties upon the
tonnage of ships ; and the question being put, that the petition be received,
it passed in the negative.

" On the 28th of April, 1698, a petition was offered to the House
against the bill for laying a duty upon inland pit coal ; and the question
being put, that the petition be received, it passed in the negative. See,
also, the 29th and 30th of June, 1698, petitions relating to the duties
upon Scotch linens, and upon whale fins imported. — Vide 20th of April,
1698.

" On the 5th of January, 1703, a petition of the maltsters of Notting
ham being offered, against the bill for continuing the duties on malt, and
the question being put, that the petition be brought up, it passed in the
negative.

" On the 21st December, 1706, Resolved, That this House will receive
no petition for any sum of money relating to public service, but what is
recommended from the Crown. Upon the llth of June, 1713, this is de
clared to be a standing order of the House.

" On the 29th of March, 1707, Resolved, That the House will not pro
ceed on any petition, motion, or bill for granting any money, or for releasing
or compounding any money owing to the crown, but in a Committee of
the Whole House ; and this is declared to be a standing order. See, also,
the 29th of November, 1710.

" On the 23d of April, 1713, Resolved, That the House will receive no
petition for compounding debts to the Crown, upon any branch of the
revenue, without a certificate from the proper officer annexed, stating the

SPEECHES. 477

debt, what prosecutions have been made for the recovery thereof, and
what the petitioner and his security are able to pay.

" On the 25th of March, 1715, this is declared to be a standing order.
See the 2d of March, 1735, and the 9th of January 1752, the proceedings
upon petitions of this sort.

" On the 8th of March, 1732, a petition being offered against a bill
depending for securing the trade of the sugar colonies, it was refused to be
brought up. A motion was then made that a committee be appointed to
search precedents in relation to the receiving or not receiving petitions
against the imposing of duties ; and the question being put, it passed in
the negative."

Nothing can be more conclusive. Not only are peti
tions rejected, but resolutions are passed refusing to receive
entire classes of petitions, and that too on the subject of im
posing taxes — a subject, above all others, in relation to which
we would suppose the right ought to be held most sacred,—
and this within a few years after the declaration of rights.
With these facts before us, what are we to think of the as
sertion of the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. G-rundy), who
pronounced in his place, in the boldest and most unqualified
manner, that there was no deliberative body which did not
act on the principle that it was bound to receive petitions ?
That a member of his long experience and caution should
venture to make an assertion so unfounded, is one of the
many proofs of the carelessness, both as to facts and argu
ment, with which this important subject has been examined
and discussed on that side.

But it is not necessary to cross the Atlantic, or to go
back to remote periods to find precedents for the rejection
of petitions. This body on a memorable occasion, and after
full deliberation, a short time since, rejected a petition : and
among those who voted for the rejection will be found the
names (of course I exclude my own) of the most able and
experienced members of the Senate. I refer to the case of
resolutions in the nature of a remonstrance from the citizens
of York, Pennsylvania, approving the act of the President in

478 SPEECHES.

removing the deposits. I ask the Secretary to read the jour
nals on the occasion :

" The Vice-President communicated a preamble and a series of resolu
tions adopted at a meeting of the citizens of York county, Pennsylvania,
approving the act of the Executive removing the public money from the
Bank of the United States, and opposed to the renewal of the charter of
said bank ; which having been read, Mr. Clay objected to the reception.
And on the question, Shall they be received ? it was determined in the
negative — yeas, 20 ; nays, 24.

"On motion of Mr. Preston, the yeas and nays being desired by one-
fifth of the Senators present, those who voted in the affirmative, are,

"Messrs. Benton, Brown, Forsyth, Grundy, Hendricks, Hill, Kane,
King of Alabama ; King of Georgia ; Linn, McKean, Mangum, Morris,
Robinson, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tipton, White, Wilkins, Wright.

" Those who voted in the negative are,

" Messrs. Bibb, Black, Calhoun, Clay, Clayton, Ewing, Frelinghuysen,
Kent, Leigh, Moore, Naudain, Poindexter, Porter, Prentiss, Preston,
Robbins, Silsbee, Smith, Southard, Sprague, Swift, Tomlinson, Wagga-
nian, Webster."

In citing this case it is not my intention to call in ques
tion the consistency of any member on this floor ; it would
be unworthy of the occasion. I doubt not the vote then given
was given from a full conviction of its correctness, as it will
doubtless be in the present case, on whatever side it may be
found. My object is to show that the principle for which
I contend, so far from being opposed, is sustained by pre
cedents, here and elsewhere, ancient and modern.

In following, as I have, those opposed to me, to Magna
Charta, and the Declaration of Rights, for the origin and
the limits of the right of petition, I am not disposed with
them to set aside the constitution. I assent to the position
they assume, that the right of petition existed before the
constitution, and that it is not derived from it ; but while
I look beyond that instrument for the right, I hold the con
stitution, on a question as to its extent and limits, to be
the highest authority. The first amended article of the
constitution, which provides that Congress shall pass no law

SPEECHES. 479

to prevent the people from peaceably assembling and peti
tioning for a redress of grievances, was clearly intended to
prescribe the limits within which the right might be exer
cised. It is not pretended that to refuse to receive petitions
touches in the slightest degree on these limits. To suppose
that the framers of the constitution — no, not its framers,
but those jealous patriots who were not satisfied with that
instrument as it came from the hands of its framers, and
who proposed this very provision to guard what they con
sidered a sacred right — performed their task so bunglingly as
to omit any essential guard, would be to do great injustice to
the memory of those stern and sagacious men ; and yet this
is what the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy) has ven
tured to assert. He said that no provision was added to guard
against the rejection of petitions, because the obligation to
receive was considered so clear that it was deemed unneces
sary ; when he oght to have known that, according to the
standing practice at the time, parliament was in the constant
habit as has been shown, of refusing to receive petitions — a
practice which could not have been unknown to the authors
of the amendment ; and from which it may be fairly inferred
that, in omitting to provide that petitions should be received,
it was not intended to comprehend their reception in the
right of petition.

I have now, I trust, established beyond all controversy,
that we are not bound to receive these petitions ; and that
if we should reject them we would not, in the slightest de
gree, infringe the right of petition. It is now time to look
to the rights of this body, and to see whether, if we should
receive them, when it is acknowledged that the only reason
for receiving is, that we are bound to do so, we would not es
tablish a principle which would trench deeply on the rights
of the Senate. I have already shown, that where the action
of the Senate commences, there also its right to determine
how and when it shall act also commences. I have also

480 SPEECHES.

shown that the action of the Senate necessarily begins on the
presentation of a petition ; that the petition is then before
the body ; that the Senate cannot proceed to other business
without making some disposition of it ; and that, by the
24th rule, the first action after presentation is on a question
to receive the petition. To extend the right of petition to
the question of receiving, is to expunge this rule — to abolish
this unquestionable right of the Senate, and that, too, for the
benefit, in this case, of the abolitionists. Their gain would
be at the loss of this body. I have not expressed myself too
strongly. Give the right of petition the extent contended
for ; decide that we are bound, under the constitution, to
receive these incendiary petitions, and the very motion before
the Senate would be out of order. If the constitution makes
it our duty to receive, we would have no discretion left to
reject, as the motion presupposes. Our rules of proceeding
must accord with the constitution. Thus, in the case of rev
enue bills, which, by the constitution, must originate in the
other House, it would be out of order to introduce them
here, and it has accordingly been so decided. For like rea
son, if we are bound to receive petitions, the present motion
would be out of order ; and, if such be your opinion, it is
your duty, as the presiding officer, to call me to order, and
to arrest all further discussion on the question of reception.
Let us now turn our eyes for a moment to the nature of the
right which I fear we are about to abandon, with the view to
ascertain what must be the consequence if we should surren
der it.

Of all the rights belonging to a deliberative body, I know
of none more universal, or indispensable to a proper perform
ance of its functions, than the right to determine at its dis
cretion ,what it shall receive, over what it shall extend its
jurisdiction, and to what it shall direct its deliberation and
action. It is the first and universal law of all such bodies,
and extends not only to petitions, but to reports, to bills,

SPEECHES. 481

and resolutions, varied only, in the two latter, in the form of
the question. It may be compared to the function in the
animal economy, with which all living creatures are endowed,
of selecting, through the instinct of taste, what to receive or
reject ; and on which the preservation of their existence de
pends. Deprive them of this function, and the poisonous as
well as the wholesome would he indifferently received into
their system. So with deliberative bodies ; deprive them of
the essential and primary right to determine at their pleasure
what to receive or reject, and they would become the passive
receptacles, indifferently, of all that is frivolous, absurd, un
constitutional, immoral, and impious, as well as what may
properly demand their deliberation and action. Establish
this monstrous, this impious principle (as it would prove to
be in practice), and what must be the consequence ? To
what would we commit ourselves ? If a petition should be
presented, praying the abolition of the constitution (which
we are all bound by our oaths to protect), according to this
abominable doctrine, it must be received. So if it prayed
the abolition of the Decalogue, or of the Bible itself. I go
further. If the abolition societies should be converted into
a body of atheists, and should ask the passage of a law de
nying the existence of the Almighty Being above us, the
Creator of all, according to this blasphemous doctrine, we
would be bound to receive the petition — to take jurisdiction
of it. I ask the Senators from Tennessee and Pennsylvania
(Mr. Grundy -and Mr. Buchanan), would they vote to receive
such a petition ? I wait not an answer. They would instantly
reject it with loathing. What, then, becomes of the unlim
ited, unqualified, and universal obligation to receive petitions,
which they so strenuously maintain, and to which they are
prepared to sacrifice the constitutional rights of this body ?

I shall now descend from these hypothetical cases, to the
particular question before the Senate — What, then, must be
the consequences of receiving this petition, on the principle
VOL. n. — 31

482 SPEECHES.

that we are bound to receive it, and all similar petitions,
whenever presented ? I have considered this question calm
ly in all its bearings, and do not hesitate to pronounce that,
to receive, would be to yield to the abolitionists all that the
most sanguine could for the present hope, and to abandon all
the outworks upon which we of the South rely for our de
fence against their attacks here.

No one can believe that the fanatics, who have flooded
this and the other House with their petitions, entertain the
slightest hope that Congress would pass a law, at this time,
to abolish slavery in this District. Infatuated as they are,
they must see that public opinion at the North is not yet
prepared for so decisive a step, and that seriously to attempt
it now would be fatal to their cause. What, then, do they
hope ? What, but that Congress should take jurisdiction of
the subject of abolishing slavery — should throw open to the
abolitionists the halls of legislation, and enable them to es
tablish a permanent position within their walls, from which
hereafter to carry on their operations against the institutions
of the slaveholding States ? If we receive this petition, all
these advantages will be realized to them to the fullest ex
tent. Permanent jurisdiction would be assumed over the
subject of slavery, not only in this District, but in the States
themselves, whenever the abolitionists might choose to ask
Congress, by sending their petitions here, for the abolition
of slavery in the States. We would be bound to receive
such petitions, and, by receiving, would be fairly pledged to
deliberate and decide on them. Having succeeded in this
point, a most favorable position would be gained. The cen
tre of operations would be transferred from Nassau Hall to
the Halls of Congress. To this common centre the incendi
ary publications of the abolitionists would flow, in the form
of petitions, to be received and preserved among the public
records. Here the subject of abolition would be agitated
session after session, and from hence the assaults on the pro-

SPEECHES. 483

perty and institutions of the people of the slaveholding States
would be disseminated, in the guise of speeches, over the
whole Union. A

Such would be the advantages yielded to the abolitionists. \
In proportion to their gain would be our loss. What would
be yielded to them would be taken from us. Our true
position — that which is indispensable to our defence here, is,
that Congress has no legitimate jurisdiction over the subject
of slavery either here or elsewhere. The reception of this
petition surrenders this commanding position ; yields the
question of jurisdiction, so important to the cause of abolition
and so injurious to us ; compels us to sit in silence to wit
ness the assaults on our character and institutions, or to
engage in an endless contest in their defence. Such a con
test is beyond mortal endurance. We must in the end be
humbled, degraded, broken down, and worn out.

The Senators from the slaveholding States, who, most
unfortunately, have committed themselves to vote for receiv
ing these incendiary petitions, tell us that whenever the
attempt shall be made to abolish slavery they will join with
us to repel it. I doubt not the sincerity of their declaration.
We all have a common interest, and they cannot betray
ours without betraying, at the same time, their own. But
I announce to them that they are now called on to redeem
their pledge. The attempt is NOW being made. The work
is going on daily and hourly. The war is waged, not only
in the most dangerous manner, but in the only manner that
it can be waged. Do they expect that the abolitionists will
resort to arms, and commence a crusade to liberate our slaves
by force ? Is this what they mean when they speak of the
attempt to abolish slavery ? If so, let me tell our friends
of the South who differ from us, that the war which the
abolitionists wage against us is of a very different character,
and far more effective. It is a war of religious and political
fanaticism, mingled, on the part of the leaders, with ambition

484 SPEECHES.

and the love of notoriety — and waged, not against our lives,
but our character. The object is to humble and debase us
in our own estimation, and that of the world in general ; to
blast our reputation, while they overthrow our domestic
institutions. This is the mode in which they are attempting
abolition, with such ample means and untiring industry ;
and now is the time for all who are opposed to them to meet
the attack. How can it be successfully met ? This is the
important question. There is but one way : we must meet
the enemy on the frontier — on the question of receiving ; we
must secure that important pass — it is our Thermopylae.
The power of resistance, by an universal law of nature, is on
the exterior. Break through the shell — penetrate the crust,
and there is no resistance within. In the present contest,
the question on receiving constitutes our frontier. It is the
first, the exterior question, that covers and protects all the
others. Let it be penetrated by receiving this petition, and
not a point of resistance can be found within, as far as this
Government is concerned. If we cannot maintain ourselves
there, we cannot on any interior position. Of all the queV
tions that can be raised, there is not one on which we can
rally on ground more tenable for ourselves, or more untenable
for our opponents, not excepting the ultimate question of
abolition in the States. For our right to reject this petition
is as clear and unquestionable as that Congress has no right
to abolish slavery in the States.

Such is the importance of taking our stand immovably on
the question now before us. Such are the advantages that
we of the South would sacrifice, and the abolitionists would
gain, were we to surrender that important position by re
ceiving this petition. What motives have we for making
so great a sacrifice ? What advantages can we hope to gain
that would justify us ?

We are told of the great advantages of a strong majority.
I acknowledge it in a good cause, and on sound principles.

SPEECHES. 485

I feel in the present instance how much our cause would be
strengthened by a strong and decided majority for the rejec
tion of these incendiary- petitions. If any thing we could
do here could arrest the progress of the abolitionists, it would
be such a rejection. But as advantageous as would be a
strong majority on sound principles, it is in the same degree
dangerous when on the opposite — when it rests on improper
concessions, and the surrender of principles — which would be
the case at present. Such a majority must, in this instance,
be purchased by concessions to the abolitionists, and a sur
render, on our part, that would demolish all our outworks,
give up all our strong positions, and open all the passages to
the free admission of our enemies. It is only on this condi
tion that we can hope to obtain such a majority — a majority
which must be gathered together from all sides, and enter
taining every variety of opinion. To rally such a majority,
the Senator from Pennsylvania has fallen on the device to
receive this petition, and immediately reject it, without con
sideration or reflection. To my mind the movement looks
like a trick — a mere piece of artifice to juggle and deceive.
I intend no disrespect to the Senator. I doubt not his in
tention is good, and believe his feelings are with us ; but
I must say that the course he has intimated, is, in my opin
ion, the worst possible for the slaveholding States. It sur
renders all to the abolitionists, and gives nothing, in turn,
that would be of the least advantage to us. Let the majority
for the course he indicates be ever so strong, can the Senator
hope that it will make any impression on the abolitionists ?
Can he even hope to maintain his position of rejecting their
petitions without consideration, against them ? Does he not
see that, in assuming jurisdiction by receiving their petitions,
he gives an implied pledge to inquire, to deliberate, and
decide on them ? Experience will teach him that we must
either refuse to receive, or go through. I entirely concur
with the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Prentiss), on that

486 SPEECHES.

point. There is no middle ground that is tenable, and least
of all that proposed to be occupied by the Senator from
Pennsylvania, and those who act with him. In the mean
time, the course he proposes is calculated to lull the people
of the slaveholding States into a false security, under the
delusive impression which it is calculated to make, that there
is more strength here against the abolitionists than really
does exist.

But we are told that the right of petition is popular in
the North, and that to make an issue, however true, which
might bring it in question, would weaken our friends herp,
and strengthen the abolitionists. I have no doubt of the
kind feelings of our brethren from the North on this floor ;
but I clearly see that while we have their feelings in our
favor, their constituents, right or wrong, will have their votes,
however we may be affected. But I assure our friends that .
we would not do any thing, willingly, which would weaken
them at home ; and, if we could be assured that, by yielding
to their wishes the right of receiving petitions, they would
be able to arrest, permanently, the progress of the abolition
ists, we then might be induced to yield ; but nothing short
of the certainty of permanent security can induce us to yield
an inch. If to maintain our rights must increase the abo
litionists, be it so. I would at no period make the least
sacrifice of principle for any temporary advantage, and much
less at the present. If there must be an issue, now is our
time. We never can be more united or better prepared for
the struggle ; and I, for one, would much rather meet the
danger now, than turn it over to those who are to come
after us.

But putting these views aside, it seems to me, taking a
general view of the subject, that the course intimated by the
Senator from Pennsylvania is radically wrong, and must end
in disappointment. The attempt to unite all must, as it
usually does, terminate in division and distraction. It will

SPEECHES. 487

divide the South on the question of receiving, and the North
on that of rejection, with a mutual weakening of both. I
already see indications of division among the Northern gentle
men on this floor, even in this stage of the question. A division
among them would give a great impulse to the cause of aboli
tion. Whatever position the parties may take, in the event of
such division, one or the other would be considered more or less
favorable to the abolition cause, which could not fail to run
it into the political struggles of the two great parties of the
North. With these views, I hold, that the only possible hope
of arresting the progress of the abolitionists in that quarter,
is to keep the two great parties there united against them, which
would be impossible if they divide here. The course inti
mated by the Senator from Pennsylvania will effect a division
here, and, instead of uniting the North, and thereby arrest
ing the progress of the abolitionists, as he anticipates, will
end in division and distraction, and in giving thereby a more
powerful impulse to their cause. I must say, before I close
my remarks in this connection, that the members from the
North, it seems to me, are not duly sensible of the deep in
terest which they have in this question, not only as affecting
the Union, but as it relates immediately and directly to their
particular section. As great as may be our interest, theirs
is not less. If the tide continues to roll on its turbid waves
of folly and fanaticism, it must, in the end, prostrate in the
North all the institutions that uphold their peace and pros
perity, and ultimately overwhelm all that is eminent, morally
and intellectually.

I have now concluded what I intended to say on the
question immediately before the Senate. If I have spoken
earnestly, it is because I feel the subject to be one of the
deepest interest. We are about to take the first step
that must control all our subsequent movements. If it
should be such as I fear it will, if we receive this petition,
and thereby establish the principle that we are obliged to

488 SPEECHES.

receive all such petitions ; if we shall determine to take per
manent jurisdiction over the subject of abolition, whenever
and in whatever manner the abolitionists may ask, either
here or in the States, I fear that the consequences will be
ultimately disastrous. Such a course would destroy the con
fidence of the people of the slaveholding States in this Gov
ernment. We love and cherish the Union ; we remembei-
with the kindest feelings our common origin, with pride our
common achievements, and fondly anticipate the common
greatness and glory that seem to await us ; but origin, achieve
ments, and anticipation of coming greatness are to us as no
thing, compared to this question. It is to us a vital ques
tion. It involves not only our liberty, but, what is greater
(if to freemen any thing can be), existence itself. The
relation which now exists between the two races in the slave-
holding States has existed for two centuries. It has grown
with our growth, and strengthened with our strength. It
has entered into and modified all our institutions, civil and
political. None other can be substituted. We will not,
cannot permit it to be destroyed. If we were base enough
to do so, wTe would be traitors to our section, to ourselves, our
families, and to posterity. It is our anxious desire to protect
and preserve this relation by the joint action of this Govern
ment and the confederated States of the Union ; but if, in
stead of closing the door — if, instead of denying all jurisdic
tion and all interference in this question, the doors of
Congress are to be thrown open ; and if we are to be exposed
here, in the heart of the Union, to endless attacks on our
rights, our character, and our institutions ; if the other
States are to stand and look on without attempting to sup
press these attacks, originating within their borders ; and,
finally, if this is to be our fixed and permanent condition, as
members of this Confederacy, we will then be compelled to
turn our eyes on ourselves. Come what will, should it cost
ever}' drop of blood, and every cent of property, we must

SPEECHES. 489

defend ourselves ; and if compelled, we would stand justified
by all laws, human and divine.

If I feel alarm, it is not for ourselves, but the Union,
and the institutions of the country — to which I have ever
been devotedly attached, however calumniated and slandered.
Few have made greater sacrifices to maintain them, and no
one is more anxious to perpetuate them to the latest genera
tion ; but they can and ought to be perpetuated only on the
condition that they fulfil the great objects for which they
were created — the liberty and protection of these States.

As for ourselves, I feel no apprehension. I know, to the -
fullest extent, the magnitude of the danger that surrounds
us. I am not disposed to under-estimate it. My colleague
has painted it truly. But, as great as is the danger, we
have nothing to fear if true to ourselves. We have many
and great resources ; a numerous, intelligent, and brave
population ; great and valuable staples ; ample fiscal means ;
unity of feeling and interest, and an entire exemption from
those dangers originating in a conflict between labor and
capital, which at this time threatens so much danger to
constitutional governments. To these may be added that
we would act under an imperious necessity. There would be
to us but one alternative — to triumph or perish as a people.
We would stand alone, compelled to defend life, character,
and institutions. A necessity so stern and imperious would
develop to the full all the great qualities of our nature,
mental and moral, requisite for defence — intelligence, forti
tude, courage, and patriotism ; and these, with our ample
means, and our admirable materials for the construction of
durable free States, would insure security, liberty, and re
nown.

With these impressions, I ask neither sympathy nor com
passion for the slaveholding States. We can take care of
ourselves. It is not we, but the Union which is in danger.
It is that which demands our care — demands that the agita-

490 SPEECHES.

tion of this question shall cease here — that you shall refuse
to receive these-petitions, and decline all jurisdiction over the
subject of abolition^ in every form and shape. It is only on
these terms that the Union can be safe. We cannot remain
here in an endless struggle in defence of our character, our
property, and institutions.

I shall now, in conclusion, make a single remark, as to
the course I shall feel myself compelled to pursue, should the
Senate, by receiving this petition, determine to entertain
jurisdiction over the question of abolition. Thinking as I
do, I can perform no act that would countenance so danger
ous an assumption ; and as a participation in the subsequent
proceedings on this petition, should it unfortunately be re
ceived, might be so construed, in that event I shall feel my
self constrained to decline such participation, and to leave
the responsibility wholly on those who may assume it.

EEM ARKS

On the Resolution providing for the safe-keeping of
the Public Records, made in the Senate March
26th, 1836.

[!N Senate March 25th, 1836. The following resolution submit
ted yesterday, by Mr. Calhoun, was taken up for consideration.

Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary be instructed to
inquire into the expediency of providing proper measures for the safe
keeping of the journals of the two Houses and other public records,
and of protecting them by other legal enactments from being mutilat
ed, obliterated, erased, defaced, expunged, disfigured, altered, or other
wise destroyed or injured.]

MR. CALHOUN observed : It had been said that there was

SPEECHES. 491

no evil under the sun without a remedy ; and that the truth
of the remark was very strongly illustrated in the case which
occasioned the introduction of this resolution. Unconstitu
tional and odious as was the attempt that had been made to
expunge the recorded proceedings of this body, it had caused
its attention to be turned to the unprotected state of the
public records. He had entered into a diligent examination
of the laws, to see if there were any legal enactments for the
protection of the public journals, and had found that, with a
slight exception in one unimportant particular, there was no
thing to protect them from being expunged, obliterated, de
faced or destroyed. This was a state of things which he
presumed no Senator would wish to continue. As it now was,
any individual, whether the public records were in his custody
or not, might deface or destroy them — however important to
the country — with impunity. A leaf might be torn out, or
the record might be disfigured or defaced, and no punishment
would follow. Setting aside the constitutional injunction to
preserve a correct journal of the proceedings of the two
Houses, the importance of some law of the kind must be
evident. These public records were the only authentic ac
counts of the history of this Government in all its branches
—legislative, judicial and executive. If to this it be added,
that they involve the important interests of individuals, there
was the most powerful obligation on both Houses of Congress to
preserve them from injury, and to keep them. Yes, sir, said he,
to keep them ; for, in spite of the sophistry used to obscure the
meaning of the word, to keep them means to preserve them
from injury. There was no word in the English language less
susceptible of doubtful construction, than the word " keep." It
implied, not only to record their proceedings in their journals,
but to preserve them. It would be in vain that the constitution
required them to record their proceedings, if it did not also re
quire them to protect and preserve them from injury. Was the
injunction in the constitution merely for the childish purpose

492 SPEECHES.

that they should record their proceedings that they might be
afterwards thrown away, or obliterated, defaced or disfigured ?
No — it was that they might go down to the latest posterity,
as a faithful and authentic history of the times. These
meanings of the word " keep," as used in the constitution, —
to record, to preserve, to protect, — were enforced on them by
the sacred obligation of an oath. He knew that this obli
gation could not prevent the Senate from passing the resolu
tion which had given rise to his motion ; but the Senate
could not perform the act of obliteration — it must be per
formed by some individual under their order ; and if they
passed an act making it penal to deface, destroy, or obliterate
the journals, the individual who did it would be subject to
its penalties. Sir, said Mr. C., we can give no dispensation
to any one to violate the constitution. If he had given the
true construction to the word " keep" no order of this body,
in any shape or form, could exempt the Secretary from the
sacred obligations of his oath ; and if the order should be
given to him to deface or obliterate the journals, he would
have to turn his eyes to the constitution, which he has sworn
not to violate. He thought that no Secretary of the body
would ever dare to violate his oath, and the obligations im
posed by the constitution, by obliterating or defacing the
public records. He had but little fear for the present Secre
tary ; but he knew not who might fill the office hereafter —
and who, influenced by the force of party discipline, might
be willing to plead the order of a majority of the body, to
justify a violation of the constitution.

The framers of the constitution, in putting in the provi
sion that the journals should be kept, foresaw the danger
that might threaten their preservation, from party feelings,
and intended to provide against it. Now, he wished to go
one step further — to sustain the constitution — to make it
penal in any one, whether ordered by this body or otherwise,
to obliterate or disfigure the public records. It is in vain,

SPEECHES. 493

said Mr. C., for us to suppose that we have the slightest pro
perty in these journals. They are called, it is true, our jour
nals ; — but they are the records of what we do, and are not
our property, but the property of the people of the United
States. We are sent here, continued Mr. C., among other
things, to preserve those precious records of our history
from being obliterated, disfigured, or destroyed ; and we have
no more property in them than we have in the records of the
other House. Does it make it a less heinous offence in us, ask
ed Mr. C., to destroy these records, because we are their guar
dians ? On the contrary, the crime would be greater ; be
cause they were intrusted to our guardianship. As well
might the guardian waste or destroy the property of his ward,
under the plea of his guardianship. In every view he could take
of the subject, whether in regard to the injunctions of the
constitution, the obligations of their oaths, or the importance
of preserving in their utmost purity, the authentic originals of
the history of the country — there seemed to be an imperious
obligation on them to provide such legal enactments for the
protection and preservation, not only of the journals of the
two Houses of Congress, but also of the other public records,
as, he regretted to say, were not now to be found on the sta
tute book. It was with these views he had submitted his
resolution ; and he hoped the committee would give to it
its most serious consideration.

[Here Mr. Niles made a few remarks in opposition, declaring he
could not perceive why, if the constitution required the two Houses to
keep journals of their proceedings, any legal enactments should be ne
cessary. To violate the constitution was an offence, a crime, on gen
eral principles — on the principles of the common law.]

Mr. Calhoun said : In reply to the Senator from Con
necticut, it is only necessary to state, that it has been long
since established, that the common law forms no part of the
laws of the Union. In reply to another part of the Senator's

494 SPEECHES.

argument, he would observe that there were other persons,
into whose possession the journals might fall, who could in
jure or deface them without incurring any punishment. They
saw the force of party discipline, and how the judgment was
warped by party feeling. Attempts had been made by the
most respectable men, and by the legislatures of some of
the States, acting under the force of party, to mutilate the
journal ; — showing to what an extent party feeling might
be carried, and the necessity of guarding against it. The
act of mutilation could not be performed by twenty-five per
sons — the majority of the Senate ; it must be performed by
one single person, under the order of the majority, and he
would answer for it, if they would pass a law making it pe
nal to mutilate the public records, no person would be found
to plead the order of the Senate in justification of such an
act. My object, said Mr. C., is to pass a law containing
guards and checks against ourselves — to prevent us, under
the influence of party feelings, from tampering with records
of so sacred a character. The Committee on the Judiciary
were all legal men, and by giving their attention to the sub
ject, they would, no doubt, see how necessary it was that
some legal enactments should be framed, which should effec
tually sustain the particular provision in the constitution
in question.

[Mr. Shepley of Maine here rose and objected to the motion,
chiefly on the ground that its object was, indirectly, to withdraw the
attention of the Senate from the resolution of the Senator from Mis
souri (Mr. Benton), now pending, to expunge a record now on the
journals of the Senate, to strike a side-blow at the said resolution.
He was followed by Mr. Benton, in his usual strain ; — when Mr. Clay
ton of Delaware took the floor, and spoke for some time, in reply to
the imputations of Mr. Benton. On his taking his seat, Mr. Calhoun
resumed.]

This proposition, as had been well remarked by the Sen-

SPEECHES. 495

ator from Delaware, was totally dissimilar to the resolution
introduced by the Senator from Missouri. It proposed an
examination, by the Committee on the Judiciary, into the
expediency, not only of protecting the journals of the Sen
ate, but all other public records ; and it was designed to
protect them, not only against the action of this body, but
against the action of all persons whatsoever. As it was, any
stranger might deface or obliterate the public records with
perfect impunity. It was true, that the movement of the
Senator from Missouri was the occasion of his offering this
resolution ; but this was no reason why the deficiency he had
alluded to, should not now be supplied. He wished to call
the attention of the Senate and the public to the subject.
He had no idea that this resolution could arrest the one
offered by the Senator from Missouri, which must come up
long before it. His object was a general one, and applied to
all the public records, as well as to the journals of the Senate.
He had no reference to the resolution of the Senator from Mis
souri, in offering his ; but, at the same time, he must say,
that he had no idea the Senate had the slightest authority to
mutilate the journals ; which belonged, not to them, but to
the people of the United States.

[After some further remarks from Messrs. Walker of Mississippi,
and Ewing of Ohio, Mr. Shepley moved to lay the resolution on the
table, which was carried — yeas, 19 ; nays, 15.]

496 SPEECHES.

SPEECH

On the motion of Mr. Porter, of Louisiana, to recom
mit the Bill to establish the northern boundary of
of Ohio, and for the admission of Michigan into the
Union, delivered in the Senate, April 2d, 1836.

[THE bill to establish the northern boundary of Ohio, and for the
admission of Michigan into the Union, came up in the Senate on its
third reading.

Mr. Porter moved to recommit the bill for the purpose of amend
ing it, on the subject of the right of suffrage, and more effectually to
secure the rights of the United States to the public lands within the
new State.

On this motion a debate ensued, in which it was supported by
Messrs. Porter, Calhoun, Crittenden, Black, Clay, White, Manguin
and Clayton, and opposed by Messrs. Walker, Wright, and Benton ;
and Mr. Preston, though in favor of the recommitment, opposed the
principle of interfering with the right of the .new State to settle the
qualification of its voters. During this debate, Mr. Calhoun said :]

I REGRET that ray colleague has thought proper to raise
the question, whether a State has a right to make an alien a
citizen of the State. The question is one of great magnitude
— presented for the first time — and claiming a more full and
deliberate consideration, than can he bestowed on it now.
It is not necessarily involved in the present question. The
point now at issue is, not whether a State or territory has a
right to make an alien a citizen ; but whether Congress has
a right to prescribe the qualifications of the voters for mem
bers of the convention to form a constitution, preparatory to
the admission of a territory into the Union. I presume,
that even my colleague will not deny that Congress has the
right. The constitution confers on Congress the power to

SPEECHES. 497

govern the territories ; and, of course, to prescribe the quali
fications of voters within them — without any restriction —
unless, indeed, such as the ordinance and the constitution may
enforce — a power that expires only when a territory becomes
a State. The practice of the Government has been in con
formity with these views ; and there is not an instance of the
admission of a territory into the Union, in which Congress
has not prescribed the qualifications of the voters for members
of the convention to form a constitution for the government
of the State, on its admission. The power which Congress
has thus invariably exercised, we claim to exercise on the
present occasion — by prescribing who shall be the voters to
form the constitution for the government of Michigan, when
admitted into the Union. Michigan is not yet a State.
Her constitution is not yet formed. It is, at best, but in an
incipient state — which can only be consummated by comply
ing with the conditions which we may prescribe for her
admission. A convention is to be called, under this bill, to
agree to these conditions. On motion of the Senator from
New- York (Mr. Wright) a provision was introduced into the
bill, giving the right to the people of the territory at large —
without limitation, or restriction, as to age, sex, color, or
citizenship — to vote for the members of the convention. The
Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay), while the amendment of
the Senator from New- York was pending, moved to amend
the amendment by striking out people, and inserting free
white male citizens of twenty-one years of age — thus restrict
ing the voters to the free white citizens of the United States,
in conformity with what has been usual on such occasions.

Believing that Congress had the unquestionable right to
prescribe the qualifications of voters, as proposed by the
Senator from Kentucky, and that the exercise of such right
does not involve, in any degree, the question whether a State
has a right to confer on an alien the rights of citizenship,
I must repeat the expression of my regret, that my colleague
VOL. ii.— 32

498 SPEECHES.

has felt it to be his duty to raise a question so novel and
important, when we have so little leisure for bestowing on it
the attention which it deserves. But, since he considers its
decision as necessarily involved in the question before us, I feel
it to be my duty to state the reasons why I cannot concur
with him in opinion.

I do not deem it necessary to follow my colleague and the
Senator from Kentucky, in their attempt to define or de
scribe a citizen. Nothing is more difficult than the defini
tion, or even description, of so complex an idea ; and hence,
all arguments resting on one definition in such cases, almost
necessarily lead to uncertainty and doubt. But though we
may not be able to say, with precision, what a citizen is, we
may say, with the utmost certainty, what he is not. He
is not an alien. Alien and citizen are correlative terms,
and stand in contradistinction to each other. They, of
course, cannot coexist. They are, in fact, so opposite in
their nature, that we conceive of the one but in contradis
tinction to the other. Thus far, all must be agreed. My
next step is not less certain.

The constitution confers on Congress the authority to
pass uniform laws of naturalization. This will not be ques
tioned ; nor will it be, that the effect of naturalization is to
remove alienage. I am not certain that the word is a legiti
mate one.

[Mr. Preston said, in a low tone, it was.]

My colleague says it is. His authority is high on such
questions ; and with it, I feel myself at liberty to use the
word. To remove alienage, is simply to put the foreigner in
the condition of a native born. To this extent the act of
naturalization goes, and no further.

The next position I assume is no less certain : that,
when Congress has exercised its authority by passing a uni
form law of naturalization (as it has), it excludes the right

SPEECHES. 499

of exercising a similar authority on the part of the State. To
suppose that the States could pass naturalization acts of their
own, after Congress had passed an uniform law of naturaliza
tion, would be to make the provision of the constitution nu
gatory. I do not deem it necessary to dwell on this point,
as I understood my colleague as acquiescing in its cor
rectness.

I am now prepared to decide the question which my
colleague has raised. I have shown that a citizen is not an
alien, and that alienage is an insuperable barrier, till
removed, to citizenship ; and that it can only be removed
by complying with the act of Congress. It follows, of
course, that a State cannot, of its own authority, make
an alien a citizen without such compliance. To suppose
it can, involves, in my opinion, a confusion of ideas, which
must lead to innumerable absurdities and contradictions. I
propose to notice but a few. In fact, the discussion has
come on so unexpectedly, and has been urged on so pre
cipitately, through the force of party discipline, that little
leisure has been afforded to trace to their consequences the
many novel and dangerous principles involved in the bill I,
in particular, have not had due time for reflection, which I
exceedingly regret. Attendance on the sick bed of a friend
drew off my attention till yesterday ; when, for the first
time, I turned my thoughts on its provisions. The nu
merous objections which it presented, and the many and im
portant amendments which were moved to correct them, in
rapid succession, until a late hour of the night, allowed but
little time for reflection. Seeing that the majority had pre
determined to pass the bill, with all its faults, I retired,
when I found my presence could no longer be of any
service, and remained ignorant that the Senate had rescinded
the order to adjourn over till Monday, until a short time be-
fore its meeting this morning : so that I came here wholly
unprepared to discuss this and the other important questions

500 SPEECHES.

involved in the bill. Under such circumstances, it must not
be supposed that, in pointing out the few instances of what
appear to me the absurdities and contradictions necessarily
resulting from the principle against which I contend, there
are not many others, equally striking. I but suggest those
which first occurred to me.

Whatever difference of opinion there may be as to what
other rights appertain to a citizen, all must at least agree, that
he has the right to petition, and also to claim the protection
of his Government. These belong to him as a member of the
body politic, — and the possession of them, is what separates
citizens of the lowest condition from aliens and slaves. To
suppose, that a State can make an alien a citizen of the State —
or, to present the question more specifically, can confer on him
the right of voting, would involve the absurdity of giving him
a direct and immediate control over the action of the Gene
ral Government, from which he has no right to claim the protec
tion, and to which he has no right to present a petition. That
the full force of the absurdity may be felt, it must be borne
in mind, that every department of the General Government
is either directly or indirectly under the control of the voters
in the several States. The constitution wisely provides, that
the voters for the most numerous branch of the legislatures
in the several States, shall vote for the members of the House
of Kepresentatives, — and, as the members of this body are
chosen by the legislatures of the States, and the Presiden
tial electors either by the legislatures, .or voters in the several
States, it follows, as I have stated, that the action of the
General Government is either directly or indirectly under the
control of the voters in the several States. Now, admit, that
a State may confer the right of voting on all aliens, and it
will follow as a necessary consequence, that we might have
among our constituents, persons who have not the right to
claim the protection of the Government, or to present a pe
tition to it. I would ask my colleague, if he would willingly

SPEECHES. 501

bear the relation of representative to those, who could not
claim his aid, as Senator, to protect them from oppression, or
to present a petition through him to the Senate, praying for
a redress of grievance ? — and yet such might be his condition
on the principle for which he contends.

But a still greater difficulty remains. Suppose a war
should be declared between the United States and the coun
try to which the alien belongs — suppose, for instance, that
South Carolina should confer the right of voting on alien sub
jects of Great Britain residing within her limits, and that war
should be declared between the two countries ; what, in such
event, would be the condition of that portion of our voters ?
They, as alien enemies, would be liable to be seized under the
laws of Congress, and to have their goods confiscated and
themselves imprisoned, or sent out of the country. The prin
ciple that leads to such consequences cannot be true ; and I
venture nothing in asserting, that Carolina, at least, will never
give it her sanction, or consent to act on it. She never will
assent to incorporate, as members of her body politic, those
who might be placed in so degraded a condition and so com
pletely under the control of the General Government.

But let us pass from these (as it appears to me conclu
sive) views, and inquire what were the objects of the consti
tution in conferring on Congress the authority of passing
uniform laws of naturalization — from which, if I mistake not,
arguments not less conclusive may be drawn, in support of
the position for which I contend.

In conferring this power the framers of the constitution
must have had two objects in view ; one to prevent compe
tition between the States in holding out inducements for the
emigration of foreigners, — and the other to prevent their im
proper influence over the General Government, through such
States as might naturalize foreigners, and could confer on
them the right of exercising the elective franchise, before they
could be sufficiently informed of the nature of our institu-

502 SPEECHES.

tions, or were interested in their preservation. Both of these
objects would be defeated, if the States may confer on aliens
the right of voting and the other privileges belonging to
citizens. On that supposition, it would be almost impossible
to conceive what good could be obtained, or evil prevented by
conferring the power on Congress. The power would be
perfectly nugatory. A State might hold out every improper
inducement to emigration, as freely as if the power did not
exist ; and might confer on the alien all the political privileges
belonging to a native born citizen ; — not only to the great
injury of the Government of the State, but to an improper
control over the Government of the Union. To illustrate
what I have said, — suppose the dominant party in New- York,
finding political power about to depart from them, should, to
maintain their ascendency, extend the right of suffrage to
the thousands of aliens of every language and from every
portion of the world, that annually pour into her great em
porium — how dee ly might the destiny of the whole Union be
affected ' by such a measure. It might, in fact, place the
control over the General Government in the hands of those
who know nothing of our institutions and are indifferent as
to the interests of the country. New- York gives about one-
sixth of the electoral votes in the choice of President and Vice-
President ; and it is well known that her political institu
tions keep the State nearly equally divided into two great
political parties. The addition of a few thousand votes
either way might turn the scale, and the electors might, in
fact, owe their election, on the supposition, to the votes of
unnaturalized foreigners. The Presidential election might
depend on the electoral vote of the State, and a President
be chosen in reality by them ; that is, they might give us a
king — for, under the usurpations of the present Chief Magis
trate, the President is in fact a king. I ask my colleague if
we ought willingly to yield our assent to a principle that
would lead to such results — and if there be any danger on

SPEECHES. 503

the side for which I contend, comparable to those which I
have stated ? I know how sincere he is in the truth of the
position for which he contends, and that his opinion was
founded anterior to this discussion. We have rarely differed
in our views on the questions which have conie before the
Senate ; and I deeply regret, as I am sure he does, that we
should differ on this highly important subject.

My colleague cites, in support of his position, the example
of Vermont, North Carolina, and, if I recollect rightly,
Khode Island — under whose constitutions aliens, it seems,
may vote. It is a sufficient answer to say, that their con
stitutions were adopted before the existence of the General
Government, and that the provisions which permitted aliens
to vote constituted a portion of their constitutions when they
came into the Union. North Carolina has since amended
hers, and limited the right of voting to citizens. If Ver
mont and Ehode Island have not done the same, it must be
attributed to that vis inertia which indisposes most States to
alter their constitutions, or to accidental omission. But we
have the authority of the Senator from North Carolina (Mr.
Mangum), and also the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Prentiss),
that under the decision of the courts of the respective States,
their constitutions have been so construed, since they entered
the Union, as to confine the right of voting and holding lands
to citizens of the States, so as to conform to the principle for
which I contend. To cite a case in point, my colleague
ought to show that, under the constitution of any State,
formed since the adoption of the constitution of the Union,
the right of voting has been conferred on an alien. There
is not, I believe, an example of the kind ; — from which I
infer the deep and universal conviction which has pervaded
the public mind, that a State has no authority to confer such
right ; and thus the very example cited by my colleague,
serves but to strengthen instead of refuting the position
which I seek to maintain.

504 SPEECHES.

My colleague also cites the example of Louisiana, which
was admitted into the Union without requiring the in
habitants, at the time, to conform to the act of naturaliza
tion. I must think the instance is not in point. That was
a case of the incorporation of a foreign community, which
had been acquired by treaty, as a member of our con
federacy. At the time of the acquisition, they were subjects
of France, and owed their allegiance to that government.
The treaty transferred their allegiance to the United States ;
and the difficulty of incorporating Louisiana into the Union,
arose, not under the act of naturalization, but the right
of acquiring foreign possession by purchase, and the right of
incorporating such possessions into the Union. These were
felt, at the time, to be questions of great difficulty. Mr.
Jefferson himself, under whose administration the purchase
was made, doubted the right, and suggested the necessity of
an alteration of the constitution to meet the case ; and if
the example of the admission is now to be used to establish
the principle that a State may confer citizenship on an alien,
we may all live to regret that the constitution was not amend
ed according to the suggestion. My colleague insists that, to
deny the right for which he contends, would be to confer
on Congress the right of prescribing who should or should
not be entitled to vote in the State, and exercise the other
privileges belonging to citizens ; and portrayed in strong lan
guage the danger to the rights of the States from such au
thority. If his views are correct in this respect, the danger
would, indeed, be imminent ; but I cannot concur in their
correctness. Under the view which I have taken, the au
thority of Congress is limited to the simple point of passing
uniform laws of naturalization, or, as I have shown, simply
to remove alienage. To this extent it may clearly go, un
der the constitution ; and it is no less clear that it cannot
go an inch beyond, without palpably transcending its powers,
and violating the constitution. Every other privilege except

SPEECHES. 505

those which necessarily flow from the removal of alienage,
must be conferred by the constitution and the authority of
the State. My remarks are, of course, confined to the
States ; for, within the territories, the authority of Congress
is as complete, in this respect, as that of the States within
their respective limits, with the exception of such limi
tations as the ordinance to which I have referred may
impose.

But, to pass to the question immediately before us.
This, as I have stated, does not involve the question whether
a State can make an alien a citizen ; but whether Congress
has a right to prescribe the qualifications to be possessed by
those who shall vote for members of a convention to form a
constitution for Michigan. Reason and precedent concur,
that Congress has the right. It has, as I have stated, been
exercised in every similar case. If the right does not exist
in Congress, it exists nowhere. A territor}^ until it becomes
a State, is a dependent community, and possesses no political
rights but what are derived from the community on which it
depends. Who shall or shall not exercise political power ?
and what shall be the qualifications possessed by them ? and
how they shall be appointed ? are all questions to be de
termined by the paramount community ; and in the case under
consideration, to be determined by Congress, which has the
right, under the constitution, to prescribe all necessary rules
for the government of the territories, not inconsistent with
the provisions of the constitution. This very bill, in fact,
admits the right. It prescribes that the people of Michigan
shall vote for the convention to form her constitution, on be
coming a State. If it belongs to the territory of Michigan
(she is not yet a State) to determine who shall vote for the
members of the convention, this attempt on our part to
designate who shall be the voters, would be an unconsti
tutional interference with her right, and ought to be ob
jected to, as such, by those opposed to our views. But if,

506 SPEECHES.

on the other hand, the view I take be correct, that the right
belongs to Congress, and not to the territory, the loose,
vague, and indefinite manner in which the voters are de
scribed in the bill, affords a decisive reason for its recom
mitment. I ask, who are the people of Michigan ? Taken
in the ordinary sense, it means every body, of every age,
of every sex, of every complexion, white, black, or red,
aliens as well as citizens. Kegarded in this light, to pass
this bill, would sanction the principle that Congress may
authorize an alien to vote, or confer that high privilege on
the runaway slaves from Kentucky, Virginia, or elsewhere ;
and thus elevate them to the condition of citizens, en
joying under the constitution all the rights and privileges in
the States of the Union which appertain to citizenship.
But my colleague says that this must be acquiesced in, if
such should be the case, as it results from the principles of
the constitution. I know we are bound to submit to what
ever are the provisions of that instrument ; but surely my
colleague will agree with me, that the danger of such a prece
dent would be great ; that the principles on which it is
justified ought to be clear and free from all doubt ; and I
trust I have, at least, shown that such is not the fact in
this case.

But, we are told, that the people of Michigan means, in
this case, the qualified voters. Why, then, was it not so
expressed ? Why was vague and general language used,
when more certain and precise terms might have been em
ployed ? But, I would ask, who are the qualified voters ?
Are they those authorized to vote under the existing laws
established for the government of the territory ? or are they
those who, under the instrument called the constitution,
are authorized to vote ? Why leave so essential a point in
so uncertain a condition, when we have the power to remove
the uncertainty ? If it be meant by the people of Michigan,
the qualified voters under her incipient constitution (as stated

SPEECHES. 507

by the Senator from New- York), then are we sanctioning
the right of aliens to vote. Michigan has attempted to
confer this right on that portion of her inhabitants. She
has no authority to confer such right under the constitution.
I have conclusively shown that a State does not possess it —
much less a Territory, which possesses no power except such
as is conferred by Congress. Congress has conferred no such
power on Michigan — nor, indeed, could confer it — as it has
no authority, under the constitution, over the subject, except
to pass uniform laws of naturalization.

But this is only one of the many objections to the bill
before us ; and I regret to say, that the friends of the mea
sure have not even attempted to explain the many, and, to
my mind, decided objections which have been urged against
it. Among others, it leaves open the question of the public
lands — to be settled hereafter between Congress and the
State, contrary to all past precedents, and at the imminent
danger, ultimately, of our rights to the lands within her
limits. This is the more remarkable, as an opposite course,
I understand, has been adopted in the bill for the admission
of Arkansas.

What has caused the distinction ? Why has one measure
been meted out to the one, and another to the other ?

Here let me express my regret that this Bill for the
admission of Michigan has been furthered so far ahead of
that for the admission of Arkansas. They ought to have
progressed together, and both been sent to the House of
Kepresentatives at the same time. We all remember the
difficulty of admitting Missouri, and ought to be admonished
by the example, to use all possible precaution that a similar
difficulty may not occur in the instance of Arkansas.

But, I again ask, why not at once settle the question of
the public lands in Michigan, as has invariably been done
on the admission of other territories ? What must be the
effect of leaving it open, but to throw the State into the

508 SPEECHES.

hands of the dominant party, at this critical moment, when
the Presidential election is pending? It is a misfortune
that the power and influence of the Executive over the
new States are so great. Through the medium of the public
lands they are ramified in every direction, accompanied by
that corruption and subserviency, which are their never
failing companions. It is our duty to check, instead of in
creasing this evil ; — but, instead of this, »ve seem to seek
every opportunity of increasing its impulse. In the present
case, we have placed Michigan,, in a position calculated to
give almost unlimited control to executive influence, as the
final arrangement in respect to the public lands (a question
of such deep importance to her) must mainly depend on
that branch of the Government. Not satisfied with this,
we have divested ourselves of the right to determine whether
Michigan shall comply with the condition which we are
about to prescribe for her admission, and to confer it on
the President, with the corresponding diminution of our in
fluence and the increase of his over the State. In our eager
ness to divest the Senate of its power, we propose to go still
further. In direct violation of an express provision of the con
stitution, which confers on this body the right to judge of
the qualifications of its members, this bill provides for the
creation of two Senators by law, the first instance of the
kind ever attempted since the commencement of the Govern
ment.

Such are the leading objections to the bill. There are
others of no inconsiderable magnitude. I have never read
one, containing more objectionable provisions, submitted to
the consideration of Congress. And yet it has been urged
with as much precipitancy through the body, as if its pro
visions were in accordance with those which are usual on
such occasions. A trained and despotic majority have re
sisted every attempt at amendment, and every effort to gain
time to reflect on the extraordinary and dangerous provisions

SPEECHES. 509

which it contains. If there were any reason for this urgency,
I would be the last to complain ; but none has been assigned,
or can be imagined. We all agree that Michigan should be
admitted, and are anxious for the admission. I, individually,
feel solicitous that the bill should be so modified that I can
reconcile it to my conscience and views of expediency to vote
for it. For this purpose, I only ask that it shall be put in
the usual form ; and that the numerous precedents which
we have, shall not be departed from. But the majority, as
if anxious to force a division, seem obstinately bent on re
fusing compliance to so reasonable a request.

SPEECH

On the Bill to prohibit Deputy-Postmasters from re
ceiving and transmitting through the Mail, to any
State, Territory, or District, certain Papers therein
mentioned, the circulation of which is prohibited
by the Laws of said State, Territory, or District ;
delivered in the Senate, April 12, 1836.

I AM aware, said Mr. Calhoun, how offensive it is to
speak of one's self; but as the Senator from Georgia on
my right (Mr. King) has thought fit to impute to me im
proper motives, I feel myself compelled in self-defence to state
the reasons which have governed my course in reference to
the subject now under consideration. The Senator is greatly
mistaken in supposing that I am governed by hostility to
General Jackson. So far is that from being the fact, that I
came here at the commencement of the session with fixed and
settled principles on the subject now under discussion, and

510 SPEECHES.

which, in pursuing the course the Senator condemns, I have
but attempted to carry into effect.

As soon as the subject of abolition began to agitate the
South, last summer, in consequence of the transmission of
incendiary publications through the mail, I saw at once that
it would force itself on the notice of Congress at the present
session ; and that it involved questions of great delicacy and
difficulty. I immediately turned my attention in consequence
to the subject, and after due reflection arrived at the conclu
sion, that Congress could exercise no direct power over it ;
and that, if it acted at all, the only mode in which it could
act, consistently with the constitution and the rights and
safety of the slaveholding States, would be in the manner
proposed by this bill. I also saw that there was no incon
siderable danger in the excited state of the feelings of the
South : that the power, however dangerous and unconsti
tutional, might be thoughtlessly yielded to Congress — know
ing full well how apt the weak and timid are, in a state of
excitement and alarm, to seek temporary protection in any
quarter, regardless of after consequences ; and how ready the
artful and designing ever are to seize on such occasions to
extend and perpetuate their power.

With these impressions I arrived here at the beginning of
the session. The President's Message was not calculated to
remove my apprehensions. He assumed for Congress direct
power over the subject, and that on the broadest, most un
qualified, and dangerous principles. Knowing the influence
of his name — by reason of his great patronage and the rigid
discipline of his party — with a large portion of the country,
who have scarcely any other standard of constitution, politics,
or morals, I saw the full extent of the danger of having
these dangerous principles reduced to practice, and I deter
mined at once to use every effort to prevent it. The Senator
from Georgia will, of course, understand that I do not include
him in this subservient portion of his party. So far from it.

SPEECHES. 511

I have always considered him as one of the most independent.
It has been our fortune to concur in opinion in relation to
most of the important measures which have been agitated
since he became a member of this body, two years ago, at
the commencement of the session during which the deposit
question was agitated. On that important question, if I
mistake not, the Senator and myself concurred in opinion, at
least as to its inexpediency, and the dangerous consequences
to which it would probably lead. If my memory serves me
well, we also agreed in opinion on the connected subject of
the currency, which was then incidentally discussed We
agreed, too, on the question of raising the value of gold to its
present standard, and in opposition to the bill for the distri
bution of the proceeds of the public lands, introduced by the
Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay). In recurring to the
events of that interesting session, I can remember but one
important subject on which we disagreed, and that was the
President's protest. Passing to the next, I find the same
concurrence of opinion on most of the important subjects of
the session. We agreed on the question of executive pa
tronage — on the propriety of amending the constitution for a
temporary distribution of the surplus revenue — on the sub
ject of regulating the deposits — and in support of the bill
for restricting the power of the Executive in making removals
from office. We also agreed on the propriety of establishing
branch mints in the South and West — a subject not a little
contested at the time.

Even at the present session we have* not been so unfor
tunate as to disagree entirely. We have, it is true, on the
question of receiving abolition petitions, which I regret, as I
must consider their reception, on the principle on which they
were received, as a surrender of the whole ground to the
abolitionists, as far as this Government is concerned. It is
also true, that we disagreed, in part, in reference to the
present subject. The Senator has divided, in relation to it,

512 SPEECHES.

between myself and General Jackson. He has given his
speech in support of his Message, and announced the inten*
tion of giving his vote in favor of my bill. I certainly have no
right to complain of this division. I had rather have his vote
than his speech. The one will stand for ever on the records
of the Senate (unless expunged) in favor of the bill, and the
important principles on which it rests — while the other is
destined, at no distant day, to oblivion.

I now put to the Senator from Georgia two short ques
tions. In the numerous and important instances in which
we have agreed, I must have been either right or wrong. If
right, how could he be so uncharitable as to attribute my
course to the low and unworthy motive of inveterate hostility
to General Jackson ? But if wrong, in what condition does
his charge against me place himself, who has concurred with
me in ah1 these measures ?

[Here Mr. King- disclaimed the imputation of improper motives to
Mr. C.]

I am glad to hear the gentleman's disclaimer, said Mr. 0.,
but I certainly understood him as asserting, that such was
my hostility to General Jackson, that his support of a measure
was sufficient to insure my opposition ; and this he undertook
to illustrate by an anecdote borrowed from O'Connell and the
pig, which I must tell the Senator was much better suited
to the Irish mob to which it was originally addressed, than to
the dignity of the Senate, where he has repeated it.

But to return from this long digression. I saw, as I have
remarked, there was reason to apprehend that the principles
embraced in the Message might be reduced to practice —
principles which I believed to be dangerous to the South,
and subversive of the liberty of the press. The report fully
states what those principles are, but it may not be useless to
refer to them briefly on the present occasion.

The Message assumed for Congress the right of determin
ing what publications are incendiary and calculated to excite

SPEECHES. 513

the slaves to insurrection, and of prohibiting the transmission
of such publications through the mail ; and, of course, it also
assumed the right of deciding what are not incendiary, and
of enforcing the transmission of such through the mail. But
the Senator from Georgia denies this inference, and treats it
as a monstrous absurdity. I had, said Mr. C., considered it
so nearly intuitive, that I had not supposed it necessary in
the report to add any thing in illustration of its truth ; but
as it has been contested by the Senator, I will add, in illus
tration, a single remark.

The Senator will not deny that the right of determining
what papers are incendiary and of preventing their circula
tion, implies that Congress has jurisdiction over the subject ;
that is, of discriminating as to what papers ought or ought
not to be transmitted by the mail. Nor will he deny that
Congress has a right, when acting within its acknowledged
jurisdiction, to enforce the execution of its acts ; and yet the
admission of these unquestionable truths involves the conse
quence asserted by the report, and so sneered at by the
Senator. But lest he should controvert so plain a deduc
tion, — to cut the matter short, I shall propound a plain
question to him. He believes that Congress has the right
to say what papers are incendiary, and to prohibit their cir
culation. Now, I ask him if he does not also believe that it
has the right to enforce the circulation of such as it may
determine not to be incendiary, even against the law of
Georgia that might prohibit their circulation ? If the
Senator should answer in the affirmative, I then would prove,
by his admission, the truth of the inference for which I con
tend, and which he has pronounced to be so absurd : but if
he should answer in the negative, and deny that Congress
can enforce the circulation against the law of the State, I
must tell him he would place himself in the neighborhood
of nullification. He would in fact go beyond. The denial
would assume the right of nullifying what the Senator him-

YOL. II. — 33

514 SPEECHES.

self must, with his views, consider a constitutional act —
when nullification only assumes the right of a State to
nullify an unconstitutional act.

But the principle of the Message goes still further. It
assumes for Congress jurisdiction over the liberty of the press.
The framers of the constitution (or rather those jealous
patriots who refused to consent to its adoption without amend
ments to guard against the abuse of power) have, by the
first amended article, provided that Congress shall pass no
law abridging the liberty of the press — with the view of
placing the press beyond the control of Congressional legisla
tion. But this cautious foresight would prove to be vain, if
we should concede to Congress the power which the President
assumes of discriminating, in reference to character, what
publications shall not be transmitted by the mail. It would
place in the hands of the General Government an instrument
more potent to control the freedom of the press than the
Sedition Law itself, as is fully established in the report.

Thus regarding the Message, the question which pre
sented itself on its first perusal was, how to prevent powers
so dangerous and unconstitutional from being carried into
practice ? To permit the portion of the Message relating to
the subject under consideration to take its regular course,
and be referred to the Committee on Post-Offices and Post
Roads, would, I saw, be the most certain way to defeat what
I had in view. I could not doubt, from the composition of
the committee, that the report would coincide with the
Message ; and that it would be drawn up with all that tact,
ingenuity, and address, for which the Chairman of the Com
mittee and the head of the post-office department are not
a little distinguished. With this impression, I could not
but apprehend that the authority of the President, backed
by such a report, would go far to rivet in the public mind
the dangerous principles which it was my design to defeat,
and which could only be effected by referring the portion of

SPEECHES. 515

the Message in question to a select committee, by which the
subject might be thoroughly investigated, and the result pre
sented in a report. With this view I moved the committee,
and the bill and report which the Senator has attacked so
violently are the result.

These are the reasons which governed me in the course I
took, and not the base and unworthy motive of hostility to
General Jackson. I appeal with confidence to my life to
prove, that neither hostility nor attachment to any man or
any party, can influence me in the discharge of my public
duties ; — but were I capable of being influenced by such
motives, I must tell the Senator from Georgia, that I have
too little regard for the opinion of General Jackson, and,
were it not for his high station, I would add, his character
too, to permit his course to influence me in the slightest
degree, either for or against any measure.

Having now assigned the motives which governed me, it is
with satisfaction I add that I have a fair prospect of success.
So entirely are the principles of the Message abandoned, that
not a friend of the President has ventured, and I hazard no
thing in saying will venture, to assert them practically, what
ever they may venture to do in argument. They will know
now that, since the subject has been investigated, a bill to
carry into effect the recommendation of the Message would
receive no support even from the ranks of the Administra
tion, devoted as they are to their chieftain.

The Senator from Georgia made other objections to the
report beside those which I have thus incidentally noticed,
to which I do not deem it necessary to reply. I am content
with his vote, and cheerfully leave the report and his speech
to abide their fate, with a brief notice of a single objection.

The Senator charges me with, what he considers, a strange
and unaccountable contradiction. He says that the freedom
of the press, and the right of petition, are both secured by
the same article of the constitution, and both stand on the

516 SPEECHES.

same principle ; yet I who decidedly opposed the receiving
of abolition petitions, now as decidedly support the liberty
of the press. To make out the contradiction, he assumes
that the constitution places the right of petitioners to have
their petitions received, and the liberty of the press on the
same ground. I do not deem it necessary to show that, in
this, he is entirely mistaken, and that my course on both
occasions is perfectly consistent. I take the Senator at his
word, and put to him a question for his decision. If, in op
posing the reception of the abolition petitions, and advocat
ing the freedom of the press, I have involved myself in a
palpable contradiction, how can he escape a similar charge,
when his course was the reverse of mine on both occasions ?
Does he not see that if mine be contradictory, as he supposes,
his too must necessarily be so ? But the Senator forgets his
own argument, of which I must remind him, in order to re
lieve him from the awkward dilemma in which he has placed
himself, in his eagerness to fix on me the charge of contra
diction. He seems not to recollect that, in his speech on
receiving the abolition petitions, he was compelled to aban
don the constitution, and to place the right, not on that
instrument, as he would now have us believe, but expressly
on the ground that the right existed anterior to the consti
tution, and that we must look for its limits, not to the constitu
tion, but to Magna Charta and the Declaration of Eights.

Having now concluded what I intended to say in reply to
the Senator from Georgia, I turn to the objections of the
Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Davis), which were direct
ed, not against the report, but the bill itself. The Senator
confined his objections to the principles of the bill, which he
pronounces dangerous and unconstitutional. It is my wish
to meet his objections fully, fairly, and directly. For this
purpose, it will be necessary to have an accurate and clear
conception of the principles of the bill, as it is impossible
without it to estimate correctly the force either of the objec-

SPEECHES. 517

tions or the reply, I am thus constrained to restate what
the principles are, at the hazard of "being considered somewhat
tedious.

The first and leading principle is, that the subject of
slavery is under the sole and exclusive control of the States
where the institution exists. It belongs to them to determine
what may endanger its existence, and when and how it may
be defended. In the exercise of this right, they may pro
hibit the introduction or circulation of any paper or publica
tion, which may, in their opinion, disturb or endanger the
institution. Thus far all are agreed. To this extent no one
has questioned the right of the States ; not even the Sena
tor from Massachusetts in his numerous objections to the
bill.

The next and remaining principle of the bill is intimately
connected with the preceding ; and, in fact, springs directly
from it. It assumes that it is the duty of the General Gov
ernment, in the exercise of its delegated rights, to respect
the laws which the slaveholding States may pass in protec
tion of its institutions ; or, to express it differently, it is its
duty to pass such laws as may be necessary to make it obli
gatory on its officers and agents to abstain from violating the
laws of the States, and to co-operate, as far as it may consist
ently be done, in their execution. It is against this princi
ple that the objections of the Senator from Massachusetts
have been directed, and to which I now proceed to reply.

His first objection is, that the principle is new ; by which
I understand him to mean, that it never has heretofore been
acted on by the Government. The objection presents two
questions : is it true, in point of fact ? and if so, what weight
or force properly belongs to it ? If I am not greatly mis
taken, it will be found wanting in both particulars ; and
that, so far from being new, it has been frequently acted on ;
and that, if it were new, the fact would have little or no
force.

518 SPEECHES.

If our Government had been in operation for centuries,
and had been exposed to the various changes and trials to
which political institutions, in a long protracted existence,
are exposed in the vicissitudes of events, the objection, under
such circumstances, that a principle has never been acted up
on, if not decisive, would be exceedingly strong • but when
made in reference to our Government, which has been in op
eration for less than half a century, and which is so complex
and novel in its structure, it is very feeble. We all know
that new principles are daily developing themselves under our
system, with the changing condition of the country, and
doubtless will long continue so to do, in the new and trying
scenes through which we are destined to pass. It may, I ad
mit, be good reason even with us for caution, — for thorough
and careful investigation, — if a principle proposed to be acted
upon be new ; for I have long since been taught by experi
ence, that whatever is untried is to be received with caution
in politics, however plausible. But to go further in this early
stage of our political existence, would be to deprive ourselves
of means that might be indispensable to meet future dangers
and difficulties.

But I take higher grounds in reply to the objection. I
deny its truth in point of fact, and assert, that the principle
is not new. The report refers to two instances in which
it has been acted on, and to which, for the present, I shall
confine myself ; one in reference to the quarantine laws of
the States, and the other more directly connected with the
subject of this bill. I propose to make a few remarks in re
ference to both ; beginning with the former, with the view of
showing that the principle in both cases is strictly analogous,
or rather identical with the present.

The health of the State, like that of the subject of slave
ry, belongs exclusively to the States. It is reserved and not
delegated ; and, of course, each State has a right to judge for
itself, what may endanger the health of its citizens, what

SPEECHES. 519

measures are necessary to prevent it, and when and how such
measures are to be carried into effect. Among the causes
which may endanger the health of a State, is the introduc
tion of infectious or contagious diseases, through the medium
of commerce. The vessel returning with a rich cargo, in ex
change for the products of a State, may also come freighted
with the seeds of disease and death. To guard against this
danger, the States at a very early period adopted quarantine
or health laws. These laws, it is obvious, must necessarily
interfere with the power of Congress to regulate commerce —
a power as expressly given as that to regulate the mail, and,
as far as the present question is concerned, every way analo
gous ; and acting accordingly on the principles of this bill,
Congress, as far back as the year 1796, passed an act making
it the duty of its civil and military officers to abstain from
the violation of the health laws of the States, and to co-op
erate in their execution. This act was modified and repeal
ed by that of 1799, which has since remained unchanged on
the statute book.

But the other precedent referred to in the report is still
more direct and important. That case, like the present, in
volved the right of the slaveholding States to adopt such
measures as they may think proper, to prevent their domes
tic institutions from being disturbed or endangered. They
may be endangered, not only by introducing and circulating
inflammatory publications, calculated to excite insurrection,
but also by the introduction of free people of color from
abroad, who may come as emissaries, or with opinions and
sentiments hostile to the peace and security of those States.
The right of a State to pass laws to prevent danger from pub
lications, is not more clear than the right to pass those which
may be necessary to guard against this danger. The act of
1803, to which the report refers, as a precedent, recognizes
this right to the fullest extent. It was intended to sustain
the laws of the States against the introduction of free people

520 SPEECHES.

of color from the West India Islands. The Senator from
Massachusetts, in his remarks upon this precedent, supposes
the law to have been passed under the power given to Con
gress by the constitution to suppress the slave trade. I have
turned to the journals in order to ascertain the facts, and find
that the Senator is entirely mistaken. The law was passed
on a memorial of the citizens of Wilmington, North Carolina,
and originated in the following facts.

After the successful rebellion of the slaves of St. Domin
go, and the expulsion of the French power, the government of
the other French West India Islands, in order to guard against
the danger from the example of St. Domingo, adopted rigid
measures to expel their free blacks. In 1803, a brig, having on
board five persons of this description who were driven from
Guadaloupe, arrived at Wilmington. The alarm which this
caused gave birth to the memorial, and the memorial to the
act. I learn from the journals, that the subject was fully
investigated and discussed in both Houses, and that it pass
ed by a very large majority. The first section of the bill
prevents the introduction of any negro, mulatto, or mustee,
into any State by the laws of which they are prevented from
being introduced, except persons of the description from be
yond the Cape of Good Hope, or registered seamen, or na
tives of the United States. The second section prohibits
the entry of vessels having such persons on board, and sub
jects the vessels to seizure and forfeiture for landing, or at
tempting to land them contrary to the laws of the States ;
and the third and last section makes it the duty of the officers
of the General Government to co-operate with those of the
States in the execution of their laws against their introduc
tion. I consider this precedent to be one of vast impor
tance to the slaveholding States. It not only recognizes the
right of these States to pass such laws as they may deem
necessary to protect themselves as to the slave population,
and the duty of the General Government to respect those

SPEECHES. 521

laws, hut also the very important right that the States have
the authority to exclude the introduction of such persons as
may he dangerous to their institutions — a principle of great
extent and importance, and applicable to other States as well
as slaveholding, and to other persons as well as blacks — and
which may hereafter occupy a prominent place in the history
of our legislation.

Having now, I trust, fully and successfully replied to the
first objection of the Senator from Massachusetts, by showing
that it is not true in fact, — and if it were, that it would have
little or no force, — I shall now proceed to reply to the second
objection, which assumes that the principles for which I con
tend would, if admitted, transfer the power over the mail
from the General Government to the States.

If the objection be well founded, it must prove fatal to
the bill. The power over the mail is, beyond all doubt, a
delegated power ; and whatever would divest the Government
of this power, and transfer it to the States, would certainly
be a violation of the constitution. But would the principle,
if acted on, transfer the power ? If admitted to its full ex
tent, its only effect would be to make it the duty of Con
gress, in the exercise of its power over the mail, to abstain
from violating the laws of the State in protection of their
slave property, and to co-operate, where it could with pro
priety, in their execution. Its utmost effect would then be
a modification, and not a transfer or destruction of the pow
er ; and surely the Senator will not contend that to modify
a right amounts either to its transfer or annihilation. He can
not forget that all rights are subject to modifications, and all,
from the highest to the lowest, are held under one universal
condition — that their possessors should so use them as not to
injure others. Nor can he contend that the power of the
General Government over the mail is without modification
or limitation. He, himself, admits that it is subject to a
very important modification, when he concedes that the Gov-

522 SPEECHES.

eminent cannot discriminate in reference to the character
of the publications to be transmitted by the mail, without
violating the first amended article of the constitution, which
prohibits Congress from passing laws abridging the liberty of
the press. Other modifications of the right might be shown
to exist, not less clear nor of much less importance. It
might be easily shown, for instance, that the power over the
mail is limited to the transmission of intelligence, — and that
Congress cannot, consistently with the nature and the object of
the power, extend it to the ordinary subjects of transportation,
without a manifest violation of the constitution, and the as
sumption of a principle which would give the Government
control over the general transportation of the country, both by
land and water. But, if it be subject to these modifications,
without either annihilating or transferring the power, why
should the modification for which I contend, and which, as I
shall hereafter prove, rests upon unquestionable principles,
have such effect ? That it would not in fact, might be shown,
if other proof were necessary, by a reference to the practical
operation of the principle in the two instances already refer
red to. In both, the principle which I contend for in rela
tion to the mail, has long been in operation in reference to
commerce, without the transfer of the power of Congress to
regulate commerce to the States, which the Senator contends
would be its effect if applied to the mail. So far otherwise,
so little has it affected the power of Congress to regulate the
commerce of the country, that few persons comparatively
are aware that the principle has been recognized and acted
on by the General Government.

I come next, said Mr. Calhoun, to what the Senator
seemed to rely upon as his main objection. He stated that
the principles asserted in the report were contradicted in the
bill, and that the latter undertakes to do, indirectly, what the
former asserts that the General Government cannot do at all.

Admit, said Mr. C., the objection to be true in fact, and

SPEECHES. 523

what does it prove, — but that the author of the report is a
bad logician, and that there is error somewhere ; but without
proving that it is in the bill, and that it ought therefore to
be rejected, as the Senator contends. If there be error, it
may be in the report instead of the bill, and till the Senator
can fix it on the latter, he cannot avail himself of the objec
tion. But does the contradiction which he alleges exist ?
Let us turn to the principles asserted in the report, and com
pare them with those of the bill in order to determine this
point.

What are the principles which the report maintains ?
It asserts that Congress has no right to determine what pa
pers are incendiary, and calculated to excite insurrection,
and as such to prohibit their circulation ; but, on the con
trary, that it belongs to the States to determine on the char
acter and tendency of such publications, and to adopt such
measures as they may think proper to prevent their introduc
tion or circulation. Does the bill deny any of these princi
ples ? Does it not assume them all ? Is it not drawn up on
the supposition that the General Government has none of
the powers denied by the report, and that the States possess
all for which it contends ? How then can it be said that
the bill contradicts the report ? But the difficulty, it seems,
is, that the General Government would do, through the
States under the provisions of the bill, what the report de
nies that it can do directly ; and this, according to the Sen
ator from Georgia, is so manifest and palpable a contradic
tion, that he can find no explanation for my conduct but an
inveterate hostility to General Jackson, which he is pleased
to attribute to me.

I have, I trust, successfully repelled already the imputa
tion, and it now remains to show that the gross and palpable
errors which the Senator perceives, exist only in his own
imagination ; and that,- instead of the cause he supposes, it
originates on his part in a dangerous and fundamental mis-

524 SPEECHES.

conception of the nature of our political system — par
ticularly of the relation between the States and General
Government. Were the States the agents of the General
Government, as the objection clearly presupposes, then
what he says would be true — and the Government in re
cognizing the laws of the States would adopt the acts of
its agents. But the fact is far otherwise. The General
Government and the governments of the States are distinct
and independent departments in our complex political sys
tem. The States, in passing laws for the protection of their
domestic institutions, act in a sphere as independent as the
General Government when passing laws in regulation of the
mail ; and the latter, in abstaining from violating the laws
of the States, as provided for in the bill, so far from making
the States its agents, but recognizes the rights of the States,
and performs, on its part, a corresponding duty. Eights and
duties are in their nature reciprocal. The existence of one
presupposes that of the other ; and the performance of the
duty, so far from denying the right, distinctly recognizes its
existence. The Senator, for example, next to me (Judge
White), has the unquestionable right to the occupation of
his chair, and I am of course in duty bound to abstain from
violating that right ; but would it not be absurd to say, that
in performing that duty by abstaining from violating his
right, I assumed the right of occupation ? Again ; suppose
the very quiet and peaceable Senator from Maine (Mr. Shep-
ley), who is his next neighbor on the other side, should under
take to oust the Senator from Tennessee, would it not be
strange doctrine to contend, that if I were to co-operate
with the Senator of Tennessee in maintaining possession of
his chair, that it would be an assumption on my part of a
right to the chair ? And yet this is the identical principle
which the Senator from Georgia assumed, in charging a
manifest and palpable contradiction between the bill and the
report.

SPEECHES. 525

But to proceed with the objections of the Senator from
Massachusetts. He asserts, and asserts truly, that rights
and duties are reciprocal ; and that if it be the duty of the
General Government to respect the laws of the States, it is,
in like manner, the duty of the States to respect those of
the General Government. The practice of both has been
in conformity with the principle. I have already cited in
stances of the General Government respecting the laws of
the States, and many might be shown of the States respect
ing those of the General Government.

But the Senator from Massachusetts affirms that the
laws of the General Government regulating the mail, and
those of the governments of the States prohibiting the intro
duction and circulation of incendiary publications, may come
into conflict — and that in such event the latter must yield to
the former ; and he rests this assertion on the ground, that
the power of the General Government is expressly delegated
by the constitution. I regard the argument as wholly in
conclusive. Why should the mere fact that a power is
expressly delegated, give it paramount control over the re
served powers ? What possible superiority can the mere
fact of delegation give, unless indeed it be supposed to ren
der the right more clear, and, of course, less questionable ?
Now I deny that it has in this instance any such superiority.
Though the power of the General Government over the mail
is delegated, it is not more clear and unquestionable than the
reserved right of the States over the subject of slavery — a
right which neither has nor can be denied. In fact, I might
take higher grounds, — if higher grounds were possible, — by
showing that the rights of the States are as expressly reserved
as those of the General Government are delegated ; for in order
to place the reserved rights beyond controversy, the tenth
amended article of the constitution expressly provides, that
all powers not delegated to the United States nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States or the people ; and

526 SPEECHES.

as the rights in respect to the subject of slavery are acknowledg
ed by all not to be delegated, they may be fairly considered
as expressly reserved under this provision of the constitution.

But while I deny his conclusion, I agree with the Senator
that the laws of the States and General Government may
come into conflict, and that if they do, one or the other must
yield : and the question is, which ought to yield ? The
question is one of great importance. It involves the whole
merit of the controversy, and I must entreat the Senate to
give me an attentive hearing while I state my views in rela
tion to it.

In order to determine satisfactorily which ought to yield,
it becomes necessary to have a clear and full understanding
of the point of difficulty ; and for this purpose it is necessary
to make a few preliminary remarks.

Properly considered, the reserved and delegated powers
can never come into conflict. The fact that a power is
delegated, is conclusive that it is not reserved ; and that, if
not delegated, it is reserved, unless indeed it be prohibited
to the States. There is but a single exception ; the case of
powers of such nature that they may be exercised concur
rently by the State and General Government — such as the
power of laying taxes, which, though delegated, may also be
exercised by the States. In illustration of the truth of the
position I have laid down, I might refer to the case now under
consideration. Regarded in the abstract, there is not the
slightest conflict between the power delegated by the consti
tution to the General Government to establish post-offices
and post-roads, and that reserved to the States over the
subject of slavery. How then can there be conflict ? It
occurs, not between the powers themselves, but the laws
respectively passed to carry them into effect. The laws of
the State, prohibiting the introduction or circulation of in
cendiary publications, may come in conflict with the laws of
the General Government in relation to the mail ; and the

SPEECHES. 527

question to be determined is, which, in the event, ought to
give way ?

I will not pretend to enter into a full and systematic
investigation of this highly important question, which in
volves, as I have said, the merits of the whole controversy.
I do not deem it necessary. I propose to lay down a single
principle, which I hold to be not only unquestionable, but
decisive of the question as far as the present controversy is
concerned. My position is, that in deciding which ought to
yield, regard must be had to the nature and magnitude of
the powers to which the laws respecting it relate. The low
must yield to the high ; the convenient to the necessary ;
mere accommodation to safety and security. This is the
universal principle which governs in all analogous cases, both
in our social and political relations. Wherever the means
of enjoying or securing rights come into conflict (rights them
selves never can), this universal and fundamental principle is
the one which, by the consent of mankind, governs in all
such cases. Apply it to the case under consideration, and
need I ask which ought to yield ? Will any rational being
say that the laws of eleven States of this Union, which are
necessary to their peace, security and very existence, ought
to yield to the laws of the General Government regulating
the post-office, which at the best is a mere accommodation
and convenience — and this when the Government was formed
by the States mainly with a view to secure more perfectly their
peace and safety ? But one answer can be given. All
must feel, that it would be improper for the laws of the
States, in such case, to yield to those of the General Govern
ment, and, of course, that the latter ought to yield to the
former. When I say ought, I do not mean on the principle
of concession. I take higher grounds. I mean under the
obligation of the constitution itself. That instrument does
not leave this important question to be decided by mere in
ference. It contains an express provision which is deci-

528 SPEECHES.

sive of the question. I refer to that which invests Con
gress with the power of passing laws to carry into effect the
granted powers, and which expressly restricts its power to
laws necessary and proper to carry into effect the delegated
powers. We here have the limitation on the power of pass
ing laws. They must be necessary and proper. I pass the
term necessary with the single remark, that whatever may
be its true and accurate meaning, it clearly indicates that
this important power was sparingly granted by the framers
of the constitution. I come to the term proper ; and boldly
assert, if it has any meaning at all — if it can be said of any
law whatever that it is not proper, and that, as such Con
gress has no constitutional right to pass it, surely it may be
said of that which would abrogate, in fact, the laws of nearly
half of the States of the Union, and which are conceded to
be necessary for their peace and safety. If it be proper for
Congress to pass such a law, what law could possibly be
improper ? We have heard much of late of State Eights.
All parties profess to respect them, as essential to the pre
servation of our liberty. I do not except the members of
the old federal party — that honest, high-minded, patriotic
party, though mistaken as to the principles and tendency of
the Government. But what, let me ask, would be the value
of State Eights, if the laws of Congress in such cases ought
not to yield to those of the States ? If they must be consider
ed paramount, whenever they come into conflict with those
of the States, without regard to their safety, what possible
value can be attached to the rights of the States, and how
perfectly unmeaning their reserved powers ? Surrender the
principle, and there is not one of the reserved powers which
may not be annulled by Congress under the pretext of pass
ing laws to carry into effect the delegated powers.

The Senator from Massachusetts next objects, that if the
principles of the bill be admitted, they may be extended to
morals and religion. I do not feel bound to admit or deny

SPEECHES. 529

the truth of this assertion ; but if the Senator will show me
a case in which a State has passed laws under its unques
tionably reserved powers, in protection of its morality or re
ligion, I would hold it to be the duty of the General Govern
ment to respect the laws of the States, in conformity with
the principles which I maintain.

His next objection is, that the bill is a manifest viola
tion of the liberty of the press. He has not thought
proper to specify wherein the violation consists. Does he
mean to say that the laws of the States prohibiting the in
troduction and circulation of papers calculated to excite
insurrection, are in violation of the liberty of the press ?
Does he mean that the slaveholding States have no right to
pass such laws ? I cannot suppose such to be his meaning :
for I understood him, throughout his remarks, to admit the
right of the States — a right which they have always exercised,
without restriction or limitation, before and since the adop
tion of the constitution, without ever having been ques
tioned. But if this be not his meaning, he must mean that
this bill, in making it the duty of the officers and agents of
the Government to respect the laws of the States, violates
the liberty of the press, and thus involves the old miscon
ception, that the States are the agents of this Government,
which pervades the whole argument of the Senator, and to
which I have already replied.

The Senator next objects, that the bill makes it penal
on deputy postmasters to receive the papers and publica
tions which it embraces. I must say, that my friend from
Massachusetts (for such I consider him, though we differ in
politics) has not expressed himself with his usual accuracy
on the present occasion. If he will turn to the provisions of
the bill, he will find that the penalty attaches only in cases
of knowingly receiving and delivering out the papers and
publications in question. All the consequences which the
Senator drew from the view which he took of the bill, of
VOL. ii. — 34

530 SPEECHES.

course fall ; which relieves me from the necessity of showing
that the deputy postmasters will not be compelled to resort
to the espionage into letters and packages, in order to ex
onerate themselves from the penalty of the bill, which he
supposed.

The last objection of the Senator is, that under the pro
visions of the bill, every thing touching on the subject of
slavery will be prohibited from passing through the mail. I
again must repeat, that the Senator has not expressed him
self with sufficient accuracy. The provisions of the bill are
limited to the transmission of such papers, in reference to
slavery, as are prohibited by the laws of the slaveholding
States ; that is, by eleven States of the Union — leaving the
circulation through the mail without restriction or qualifica
tion as to all other papers, and wholly so as to the remaining
thirteen States. But the Senator seems to think that even
this restriction, as limited as it is, would be a very great in
convenience. It may indeed prove so to the lawless abo
litionists, who, without regard to the obligations of the con
stitution, are attempting to scatter their firebrands through
out the Union. But is their convenience the only thing to
be taken into the estimate ? Are the peace, security, and
safety of the slaveholding States nothing ? or are these to be

sacrificed for the accommodation of the abolitionists ?

•

I have now replied directly, fully, and, I trust, success
fully, to the objections to the bill ; and shall close what I
intended to say, by a few general and brief remarks.

We have arrived at a new and important point in refer
ence to the abolition question. It is no longer in the hands
of quiet and peaceful, but I cannot add, harmless Quakers.
It is now under the control of ferocious zealots, blinded by
fanaticism, and, in pursuit of their object, regardless of the
obligations of religion or morality. They are organized
throughout every section of the non-slaveholding States ;
they have the disposition of almost unlimited funds, and are

SPEECHES. 531

in possession of a powerful press, which, for the first time, is
enlisted in the cause of abolition, and turned against the
domestic institutions, and the peace and security of the
South. To guard against the danger in this new and more
menacing form, the slaveholding States will be compelled to
revise their laws against the introduction and circulation of
publications calculated to disturb their peace and endanger
their security, and to render them far more full and efficient
than they have heretofore been. In this new state of things,
the probable conflict between the laws which those States
may think proper to adopt, and those of the General Govern
ment regulating the mail, becomes far more important than
at any former stage of the controversy ; and Congress is now
called upon to say what part it will take in reference to this
deeply interesting subject. We of the slaveholding States
ask nothing of the Government, but that it should abstain
from violating laws passed within our acknowledged consti
tutional competency, and conceded to be essential to our
peace and security. I am anxious to see how this question
will be decided. I am desirous that my constituents should
know what they have to expect, either from this Govern
ment or from the non-slaveholding States. Much that I
have said and done during the session, has been with the
view of affording them correct information on this point, in
order that they might know to what extent they might rely
upon others, and how far they must depend on themselves.

Thus far (I say it with regret) our just hopes have not
been realized. The legislatures of the South, backed by the
voice of their constituents, expressed through innumerable
meetings, have called upon the non-slaveholding States to
repress the movements made within the jurisdiction of those
States, against their peace and security. Not a step has been
taken ; not a law has been passed, or even proposed ; and
I venture to assert that none will be. Not but that there is
a favorable dispositions towards us in the North, but I clearly

532 SPEECHES.

see the state of political parties there presents insuperable
impediments to any legislation on the subject. I rest my
opinion on the fact; that the non-slaveholding States, from
the elements of their population, are, and will continue to
be, divided and distracted by parties of nearly equal strength ;
and that each will always be ready to seize on every move
ment of the other which may give them the superiority,
without much regard to consequences as affecting their own
States, much less of remote and distant sections.

Nor have we been less disappointed as to the proceedings
of Congress. Believing that the General Government has
no right or authority over the subject of slavery, we had just
grounds to hope Congress would refuse all jurisdiction in
reference to it, in whatever form it might be presented. The
very opposite course has been pursued. Abolition petitions
have not only been received in both Houses, but received on
the most obnoxious and dangerous of all grounds — that ive
are bound to receive them ; that is, to take jurisdiction of
the question of slavery whenever the abolitionists may think
proper to petition for its abolition, either here or in the
States.

Thus far, then, we of the slaveholding States have been
grievously disappointed. One question still remains to be
decided — that presented by this bill. To refuse to pass this
bill would be virtually to co-operate with the abolitionists —
would be to make the officers and agents of the post-office
department, in effect, their agents and abettors in the cir
culation of their incendiary publications in violation of the
laws of the States. It is your unquestionable duty, as I
have demonstrably proved, to abstain from their violation ;
and by refusing or neglecting to discharge this duty, you
would clearly enlist, in the existing controversy, on the side
of the abolitionists, against the Southern States. Should
such be your decision, by refusing to pass this bill, I shall
say to the people of the South, look to yourselves — you have

SPEECHES. 533

nothing to hope from others. But I must tell the Senate,
be your decision what it may, the South will never abandon
the principles of this bill. If you refuse co-operation with
our laws., and conflict should ensue between yours and ours,
the Southern States will never yield to the superiority
of yours. We have a remedy in our hands, which, in such
event, we shall not fail to apply. We have high authority
for asserting, that, in such cases, " State interposition is the
rightful remedy" — a doctrine first announced by Jefferson —
adopted by the patriotic and republican State of Kentucky,
by a solemn resolution in '98, and finally carried out into
successful practice on a recent occasion, ever to be remem
bered, by the gallant State, which I, in part, have the honor
to represent. In this well tested and efficient remedy, sus
tained by the principles developed in the report, and asserted
in this bill, the slaveholding States have an ample protection.
Let it be fixed — let it be riveted in every Southern mind,
that the laws of the slaveholding States for the protection of
their domestic institutions are paramount to the laws of the
General Government in regulation of commerce and the
mail; — that the latter must yield to the former in the
event of conflict ; and that if the Government should refuse
to yield, the States have a right to interpose, and we are
safe. With these principles, nothing but concert would be
wanting to bid defiance to the movements of the abolition
ists, whether at home or abroad ; and to place our domestic
institutions, and with them our security and peace, under
our own protection, and beyond the reach of danger.

534 SPEECHES.

SPEECH

On the Bill to regulate the Deposits of the Public
Money, delivered in the Senate, May 28th, 1836.

[AFTER some remarks from Mr. Wright, in explanation, Mr. Cal-
houn said:]

THIS bill, which the Senator from New- York proposes to
strike out; in order to substitute his amendment, is no
stranger to this body. It was reported at the last session
by the Select Committee on Executive Patronage, and passed
the Senate, after a full and deliberate investigation, by a
mixed vote of all parties, of twenty to twelve. As strong
as is this presumptive evidence in its favor, I would, not
withstanding, readily surrender the bill, and adopt the
amendment of the Senator from New- York, if I did not
sincerely believe that it is liable to strong and decisive objec
tions. I seek no lead on this important subject ; my sole
aim is to aid in applying a remedy to what I honestly believe
to be a deep and dangerous disease of the body politic ; and
I stand prepared to co-operate with any one, be he of what
party he may, who may propose a remedy, provided it shall
promise to be safe and efficient. I, in particular, am de
sirous of co-operating with the Senator from New- York, not
only because I desire the aid of his distinguished talents, but,
still more, of his decisive influence with the powerful party
of which he is so distinguished a member, and which now,
for good or evil, holds the destinies of the country in its hands.
It was in this spirit that I examined the amendment pro
posed by the Senator ; and, I regret to say, after a full in
vestigation, I cannot acquiesce in it, as I feel a deep convic
tion that it will be neither safe nor efficient. So far from
being substantially the same as the bill, as stated by the

SPEECHES. 535

Senator, I cannot but regard it as essentially different, both
as to objects and means. The objects of the bill are : first,
to secure the public interest as far as it is connected with
the deposits ; and, next, to protect the banks in which they
are made against the influence and control of the executive
branch of this Government, with a view both to their and
the public interest. Compared with the bill, in respect to
both, the proposed amendment will be found to favor the
banks against the people, and the Executive against the
banks. I do not desire the Senate to form their opinion
on my authority. I wish them to examine for themselves ;
and, in order to aid them in the examination, I shall now
proceed to state, and briefly illustrate, the several points of
difference between the bill and the proposed amendment,
taking them in the order in which they stand in the bill.

The first section of the bill provides that the banks shall
pay at the rate of two per cent, per annum on the deposits
for the use of the public money. This provision is entirely
omitted in the amendment, which proposes to give to the
banks the use of the money without interest. That the
banks ought to pay something for the use of the public money,
all must agree, whatever diversity of opinion there may be as
to the amount. According to the last return of the treasury
department, there was, on the first of this month, $45,000,000
of public money in the thirty-six depository banks, which
they are at liberty to use as their own for discount or business,
till drawn out for disbursements — an event that may not
happen for years. In a word, this vast amount is so much
additional banking capital, giving the same, or nearly the
same, profit to those institutions as their permanent chartered
capital, without rendering any other service to the public
than paying away, from time to time, the portion that may
be required for the service of the Government. Assuming
that the banks realize a profit of six per cent, on these depo
sits (it cannot be estimated at less), it would give, on the

536 SPEECHES.

present amount, nearly three millions of dollars per annum ;
and on the probable average public deposits of the year, up
wards of two millions of dollars ; which enormous profit is
derived from the public by comparatively few individuals,
without any return or charge, except the inconsiderable ser
vice of paying out the draughts of the treasury when pre
sented. But it is due to the Senator to acknowledge that
his amendment is predicated on the supposition that some
disposition must be made of the surplus revenue, which would
leave in the banks a sum not greater than would be requisite
to meet the current expenditure : a supposition which must
necessarily affect, very materially affect, the decision of the
question as to the amount of compensation the banks ought to
make to the public for the use of its funds. But, let the
decision be what it may, the omission in the amendment
of any compensation whatever is, in my opinion, wholly inde
fensible.

The next point of difference relates to transfer warrants.
The bill prohibits the use of transfer warrants, except with
a view to disbursement — while the amendment leaves them,
without regulation, under the sole control of the treasury
department. To understand the importance of this difference,
it must be borne in mind that the transfer warrants are the
lever by which the whole banking operations of the country
may be controlled through the deposits. By them the public
money may be transferred from one bank to another, or from
one State or section of the country to another State or sec
tion ; and thus one bank may be elevated and another
depressed, and a redundant currency created in one State or
section, and a deficient in another ; and, through such re
dundancy or deficiency, all the moneyed engagements and
business transactions of the whole community may be made
dependent on the will of one man. With the present enor
mous surplus, it is difficult to assign limits to the extent of
this power. The Secretary — or the irresponsible agent un-

SPEECHES. 537

known to the laws, who, rumor says, has the direction of this
immense power (we are permitted to have no certain infor
mation), may raise and depress stocks and property of all
descriptions at his pleasure, by withdrawing from one place
and transferring to another, to the unlimited gain of those who
are in the secret, and the certain ruin of those who are not.
Such a field of speculation has never before been opened in
any country ; a field so great, that the Kothschilds themselves
might be tempted to enter it with their immense funds. Nor
is the control which it would give over the politics of the
country much less unlimited. To the same extent that it
may be used to affect the interests and the fortunes of indi
viduals, to the ]ike extent it may be employed as an instru
ment of political influence and control. I do not intend to
assert that it has or will be so employed ; it is not essential at
present to inquire how it has been or will be used. It is suffi
cient for my purpose to show, as I trust I have satisfactorily,
that it may be so employed. To guard against the abuse of
so dangerous a power, the provision was inserted in the bill
to prohibit the use of transfer warrants, except, as stated,
for the purpose of disbursement ; the omission of which pro
vision in the amendment is a fatal objection to it of itself, were
there no other. But it is far from standing alone : the next
point of difference will be found to be not less striking and
fatal.

The professed object of both the bill and the amendment
is, to place the safe-keeping of the public money under the
regulation and control of law, instead of being left, as it now
is, at the discretion of the Executive. However strange it
may seem, the fact is nevertheless so, that the amendment
entirely fails to effect the object which it is its professed
aim to accomplish. In order that it may be distinctly seen
that what I state is the case, it will be necessary to view the
provisions of the bill and the amendment in reference to the
deposit separately — as they relate to the banks in which the

538 SPEECHES.

public funds are now deposited — and as to those which may
hereafter be selected to receive them.

The bill commences with the former, which it adopts as
banks of deposit, and prescribes the regulations and con
ditions on the observance of which they shall continue such ;
while, at the same time, it puts them beyond the control
and influence of the executive department, by placing them
tinder the protection of law so long as they continue faith
fully to perform their duty as fiscal agents of the Government.
It next authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to select,
under certain circumstances, additional banks of deposit, as
the exigency of the public service may require, on which it
imposes like regulations and conditions, and places, in like
manner, under the protection of law. In all this, the amend
ment pursues a very different course. It begins with author
izing the Secretary to select the banks of deposit, and limits
the regulations and conditions it imposes on such banks ;
leaving, by an express provision, the present banks wholly
under the control of the treasury or the executive department,
as they now are, without prescribing any time for the selec
tion of other banks of deposit, or making it the duty of the
Secretary so to do. The consequence is obvious. The
Secretary may continue the present banks as long as he
pleases ; and so long as he may choose to continue them, the
provisions of the amendment, so far as relates to the deposits,
will be a dead letter ; and the banks, of course, instead of
being under the control of the law, will be — contrary, as I have
said, to the professed object both of the bill and amendment
— subject exclusively to his will.

The Senator has attempted to explain this difference, but,
I must say, very unsatisfactorily. He said that the bill pro
hibited the selection of other banks ; and, as he deemed others
to be necessary, at certain important points, in consequence
of the present enormous surplus, he inserted the provision
authorizing the selection of other banks. The Senator has

SPEECHES. 539

not stated the provisions of the bill accurately. So far from
not authorizing, it expressly authorizes the selection of other
banks where there are now none. But I presume he intended
to limit his remarks to places where there are no existing
banks of deposit. Thus limited, the fact is as he states ; but
it by no means explains the extraordinary omission (for such
I must consider it) of not extending the regulations to the
existing banks, as well as to those hereafter to be selected.
If the public service requires additional banks at New- York
and other important points, in consequence of the vast sums
deposited there (as I readily agree it does) ; if no disposition
is to be made of the surplus, it is certainly a very good reason
for enlarging the provisions of the bill, by authorizing the
Secretary to select other banks at those points ; but it is
impossible for me to comprehend how it proves that the reg
ulations which the amendment proposes to impose should be
exclusively limited to such newly-selected banks. Nor do I
see why the Senator has not observed the same rule, in this
case, as that which he adopted in reference to the compensa
tion the banks ought to pay for the use of the public money.
He omitted to provide for any compensation, on the ground
that his amendment proposed to dispose of all the surplus
money, leaving in the possession of the banks a sum barely
sufficient to meet the current expenditure, for the use of
which he did not consider it right to charge a compensation.
On the same principle, it was unnecessary to provide for the
selection of additional banks where there are now banks of
deposit, as they would be ample if the surplus were disposed
of. In this I understood the Senator himself to concur.

But it is not only in the important point of extend
ing the regulations to existing banks of deposit that the
bill and the amendment differ. There is a striking dif
ference between them in reference to the authority of Con
gress over the banks of deposit embraced both in the bill
and the amendment. The latter, following the provision in

540 SPEECHES.

the charter of the late Bank of the United States, autho
rizes the Secretary to withdraw the public deposits, and to
discontinue the use of any one of the banks whenever, in his
opinion, such a bank shall have violated the conditions on
which it has been employed, or the public funds are not safe
in its vaults, with the simple restriction, that he shall report
the fact to Congress. We know, from experience, how slight
is the check which this restriction imposes. It not only re
quires the concurrence of both Houses of Congress to over
rule the act of the Secretary, where his power may be im
properly exercised, but the act of Congress itself, intended
to control such exercise of power, may be overruled by the
veto of the President, at whose will the Secretary holds his
place ; so as to leave the control of the banks virtually under
the control of the executive department of the Government.
To obviate this, the bill vests the Secretary with the power
simply of withdrawing the deposits and suspending the use
of the bank as a place of deposit ; and provides that, if
Congress shall not confirm the removal, the deposits shall be
returned to the bank after the termination of the next ses
sion of Congress.

The next point of difference is of far less importance,
and is only mentioned as tending to illustrate the different
character of the bill and the amendment. The former pro
vides that the banks of deposit shall perform the duties of
commissioners of loans without compensation, in like man
ner as it was required of the late Bank of the United States
and its branches, under its charter. Among these duties is that
of paying the pensioners — a very heavy branch of disburse
ment, and attended with considerable expense, which will
be saved to the Government under the bill, but will be lost
if the amendment should prevail.

Another difference remains to be pointed out, relating to
the security of the deposits. With so large an amount
of public money in their vaults, it is important that the

SPEECHES. 541

banks should always be provided with ample means to meet
their engagements. With this view, the bill provides that
the specie in the vaults of the several banks, and the aggre
gate of the balance in their favor with other specie-paying
banks, shall be equal to one-fifth of the entire amount of
their notes and bills in circulation, and their public and pri
vate deposits — a sum believed to be sufficient to keep them
in a sound, solvent condition. The amendment, on the con
trary, provides that the banks shall keep in their own vaults,
or the vaults of other banks, specie equal to one-fourth of its
notes and bills in circulation, and the balance of its accounts
with other banks payable on demand.

I regret that the Senator has thought proper to change
the phraseology, and to use terms less clear and explicit than
those in the bill. I am not certain that I comprehend the
exact meaning of the provision in the amendment. What
is meant by specie in the vaults of other banks ? In a gen
eral sense, all deposits are considered as specie ; but I cannot
suppose that to be the meaning in this instance, as it would
render the provision in a great measure inoperative. I pre
sume the amendment means special deposits in gold and
silver in other banks, placed there for safe-keeping, or to
be drawn on, and not to be used by the bank in which it is
deposited. Taking this to be the meaning, what is there to
prevent the same sum from being twice counted in estimat
ing the means of the several banks of deposit ? Take two
of them — one having $100,000 in specie in its vaults, and
the other the same amount in the vaults of the other bank,
which, in addition, has, besides, another $100,000 of its own ;
what is there to prevent the latter from returning, under the
amendment, $200,000 of specie in its vaults, while the for
mer would return $100,000 in its own vaults, and another in
the vaults of the other bank, making in the aggregate, be
tween them, $400,000, when, in reality, the amount in both
would be but $300,000 ?

542 SPEECHES.

But this is not the only difference between the bill and
amendment, in this particular, deserving of notice. The
object of the provision is to compel the banks of deposit to
have, at all times, ample means to meet their liabilities ; so
that the Government should have sufficient assurance that
the public moneys in their vaults would be forthcoming when
demanded. With this view, the bill provides that the avail
able means of the bank shall never be less than one-fifth of
its aggregate liabilities, including bills, notes, and deposits,
public and private ; while the amendment entirely omits the
private deposits, and includes only the balance of its deposits
with other banks. This omission is the more remarkable,
inasmuch as the greater portion of the liabilities of the de
posit banks must, with the present large surplus, result from
their deposits — as every one who is familiar with banking op
erations will readily perceive.

I have now presented to the Senate the several points of
difference which I deem material between the bill and the
amendment, with such remarks as may enable them to form
their own opinion in reference to the difference, so that they
may decide how far the assertion is true with which I set out,
that, wherever they differ, the amendment favors the banks
against the interests of the public, and the Executive against
the banks.

The Senator, acting on the supposition that there would
be a permanent surplus beyond the expenditures of the Gov
ernment, which neither justice nor regard to the public in
terest would permit to remain in the banks, has extended
the provisions of his amendment, with great propriety, so as
to comprehend a plan to withdraw the surplus from the
banks. His plan is to vest the commissioners of the sinking
fund with authority to estimate, at the beginning of every
quarter, the probable receipts and expenditures of the quar
ter ; and if, in their opinion, the receipts, with the money in
the treasury, should exceed the estimated expenditure by a cer-

SPEECHES. 543

tain sum, say $5,000,000, the excess should be vested in State
stocks ; and if it should fall short of that sum, a sufficient
amount of the stocks should be sold to make up the deficit.
We have thus presented for consideration the important sub
ject of the surplus revenue, and with it the question so anx
iously and universally asked, What shall be done with the sur
plus ? Shall it be expended by the Government, or remain
where it is, or be disposed of as proposed by the Senator ? or,
if not, what other disposition shall be made of it ? questions,
the investigation of which necessarily embraces the entire
circle of our policy, and on the decision of which the future
destiny of the country may depend.

But before we enter on the discussion of this important
question, it will be proper to ascertain what will be the
probable available means of the year, in order that some con
ception may be formed of the probable surplus which may
remain, by comparing it with the appropriations that may
be authorized.

According to the late report of the Secretary of the
Treasury, there were deposited in the several banks a little
upwards of $33,000,000 at the termination of the first quar
ter of the year, not including the sum. of about $3,000,000
deposited by the disbursing agents of the Government. The
same report stated the receipts of the quarter at about
$11,000,000, of which lands and customs yielded nearly an
equal amount. Assuming for the three remaining quarters
an equal amount, it would give, for the entire receipts of the
year, $44,000,000. I agree with the Senator, that this sum
is too large. The customs will probably average an amount
throughout the year corresponding with the receipts of the
first quarter, but there probably will be a considerable fall
ing off in the receipts from the public lands. Assuming
$7,000,000 as the probable amount, which I presume will be
ample, the receipts of the year, subtracting that sum from
$44,000,000, will be $37,000,000 ; and subtracting from

544 SPEECHES

this, $11,000,000, the receipts of the first quarter, would
leave $26,000,000 as the probable receipts of the last three
quarters. Add to this sum $33,000,000, the amount in the
treasury on the last day of the first quarter, and it gives
$59,000,000. To this add the amount of stock in the
United States Bank, which, at the market price, is worth at
least $7,000,000, and we have $66,000,000, which I con
sider as the least amount at which the probable available
means of the year can be fairly estimated. It will, probably,
very considerably exceed this amount. The range may be
put down at between $66,000,000 and $73,000,000, which
may be considered as the two extremes between which
the means of the year may vibrate. But, in order to be safe,
I have assumed the least of the two.

The first question which I propose to consider is, Shall
this sum be expended by the Government in the course of
the year ? A sum nearly equal to the entire debt of the
war of the Revolution, by which the liberty and independence
of these States were established ; more than five times
greater than the expenditure of the Government at the com
mencement of the present administration, — deducting the
payments on account of the public debt, — and more than
four times greater than the average annual expenditure of
the present administration, making the same deduction,
extravagant as its expenditure has been. The very magni
tude of the sum decides the question against expenditure.
It may be wasted, thrown away, but it cannot be expended.
There are not objects on which to expend it ; for proof of
which I appeal to the appropriations already made and con
templated. We have passed the navy appropriations, which,
as liberal as they are admitted to be on all sides, are raised only
about $2,000,000 compared with the appropriations of last
year. The appropriations for fortifications, supposing the bills
now pending should pass, wiU amount to about $3,500,000,
and would exceed the ordinary appropriations, assuming them

SPEECHES. 545

at $1,000,000, which I hold to be ample, by $2,500,000.
Add a million for ordnance, seven or eight for Indian treaties,
and four for Indian wars, and supposing the companies of the
regular arrny to be filled as recommended by the war depart
ment, the aggregate amount, including the ordinary expendi
tures, would be between thirty and thirty-five millions, which
would leave a balance of at least $30,000.000 in the treasury
at the end of the year.

But suppose objects could be devised on which to expend
the whole of the available means of the year, it would still be
impossible to make the expenditure without immense waste
and confusion. To expend so large an amount, regularly
and methodically, would require a vast increase of able and
experienced disbursing officers, and a great enlargement of
the organization of the Government, in all tlie branches con
nected with disbursements. To effect such an enlargement,
and to give suitable organization, placed under the control of
skilful and efficient officers, must necessarily be a work of
time ; but, without it, so sudden and great an increase of ex
penditure would necessarily be followed by inextricable con
fusion and heavy losses.

But suppose this difficulty overcome, and suitable objects
be devised, would it be advisable to make the expendi
ture ? Would it be wise to draw off so vast an amount of
productive labor, to be employed in unproductive objects — in
building fortifications, dead walls, and in lining the interior
frontier with a large military force, neither of which would
add a cent to the productive power of the country ?

The ordinary expenditure of the Government, under the
present administration, may be estimated, say at $18,000,000,
a sum exceeding by five or six millions what, in my opinion,
is sufficient for a just and efficient administration of the
Government. Taking eighteen from sixty-six would leave
forty-eight millions as the surplus, if the affairs of the Gov
ernment had been so administered as to avoid the heavy
VOL. ii. 35

SPEECHES,

expenditures of the year, which I firmly believe, by early
and prudent management, might have been effected. The
expenditure of this sum, estimating labor at $20 a mouth,
would require 200,000 operatives, equal to one-third of the
whole number of laborers employed in producing the great
staple of our country, which is spreading wealth and pros
perity over the land, and controlling, in a great measure, the
commerce and manufactures of the world. But take what
will be the actual surplus, and estimate that at half the
sum which, with prudence and economy, it might have been,
and it would require the subtraction of 100,000 operatives
from their present useful employment, to be employed in the
unproductive service of the Government. Would it, I again
repeat, be wise to draw off this immense mass of productive
labor, in order to employ it in building fortifications and swell
ing the military establishment of the country ? Would it add
to the strength of the Union, or give increased security to its
liberty, or accelerate its prosperity ? the great objects for
which the Government was constituted.

To ascertain how the strength of any country may be
best developed, its peculiar state and condition must be taken
into consideration. Looking to ours with this view, who can
doubt that, next to our free institutions, the main source of
our growing greatness and power is to be found in our great
and astonishing increase of numbers, wealth, and facility of
intercourse ? If we desire to see our country powerful,
we ought to avoid any measure opposed to their develop
ment, an4, in particular, to make the smallest possible
draught, consistent with our peace and security, on the pro
ductive powers of the country. Let these have the freest
possible play. Leave the resources of individuals under
their own direction, to be employed in advancing their own
and their country's wealth and prosperity, with the extrac
tion of the least amount required for the expenditure of the
Government ; and draw off not a single laborer from his pre-

BPKKUflKB. MY

neat productive pnrfUitl to the; unproductive employment
of tho Government, excepting such an tho public service inay
render indispeniable, Who can doubt that such a policy
would add infinitely more to tho power and strength of tho
country than the extravagant schemes of gpending millions on
fortification! and the increase of the military establishment ?

Let us next examine how the liberty of the country may
JK; affected hy the scheme of difpOiing of the surplus hy dis
bursements. Arid here I would ank, Is the liberty of tho
country at present in a secure and Htable condition ? and,
if riot, hy what is it endangered ? and will an increase of
diibunementi augment or diminish the danger.

Whatever may bo the diversity c^f o|;in ion on other points,
there in not an intelligent individual of any party, who regards
bin reputation, that will venture to deny t)iat the liberty of
the country in at thia time more insecure and unstable than
it ever ha» been. We all know that there i» in every portion
of the Union, and with every party, a deep feeling that our
political institution* are undergoing a great and hawirdoun
change. Nor \n the feeling much le** strong, that the vflft in-
; of the patronage an/1 influence c/f the Goveniment i» the

o of the great arid fearful change which i» »o extensively
affecting the character r/f our peojdo and institutions Tho
effect oi' increasing the expenditures at this time, so as to ab-
H/;rb the surplus, would bo to double the number of those who
Jive, or expwt it) live, by the Government, and, in the samo
degre';, to augment its patronage and influence, and aocolerato
that downward courso which, if not arrested, must speedily
terminate in the overthrc/w of our freo institutions,

The^ views I hold to be dedsive against tho wild attempt
to absorb the immense means of the Government by the ex
penditures of the year. In fact, with the exception of a few
individuals, all seem to regard tho schemo either as imprac
ticable or unsafe ; but there are others, who, while they con
demn the attempt to dispose of the surplus by immediate ex-

548 SPEECHES.

penditures, believe it can be safely and expediently expend
ed in a period of four or five years, on what they choose to
call the defences of the country.

In order to determine how far this opinion may be correct,
it will be necessary first to ascertain what will be the avail
able means of the next four or five years ; by comparing which
with what ought to be the expenditure, we may determine
whether the plan would, or would not, be expedient. In
making the calculation, I will take the term of five years, in
cluding the present, and which will, of course, include 1840,
after the termination of which, the duties above twenty per
cent, are to go off, by the provisions of the Compromise Act,
in eighteen months, when the revenue is to be reduced to the
economical and just wants of the Government.

The available means of the present year, as I have al
ready shown, will equal at least $66,000,000. That of the
next succeeding four years (including 1840) may be as
sumed to be 21,000,000 annually. The reason for this as
sumption may be seen in the report of the select committee
at ifee last session, which I have reviewed, and in the cor
rectness of which I feel increased confidence. The amount
may fall short of, but will certainly not exceed, the estimate
in the report, unless some unforeseen event should occur.
Assuming, then, $21,000,000 as the average receipts of the
next four years, it will give an aggregate of $84,000,000,
which, added to the available means of- this year, will give
$150,000,000 as the sum that will be at the disposal of the
Government for the period assumed. Divide this sum by
five, the number of years, and it will give $30,000,000 as the
average annual available means of the period.

The next question for consideration is, Will it be expedi
ent to raise the disbursements during the period to an average
expenditure of $30,000,000 annually ? The first and strong
objection to the scheme is, that it would leave in the deposit
banks a heavy surplus during the greater part of the time, —

SPEECHES. 549

beginning with a surplu s of upward of thirty millions at the com
mencement of next year, and decreasing at the rate of eight
or nine milHons a year till the termination of the period.
But, passing this objection by, I meet the question directly.
It would be highly inexpedient and dangerous to attempt to
keep up the disbursements at so high a rate. I ask, On what
shall this money be expended ? Shall it be expended by an
increase of the military establishment ? by an enlargement
of the appropriations for fortifications, ordnance, and the
navy, far beyond what is proposed for the present year ?
Have those who advocate the scheme reflected to what ex
tent this enlargement must be carried to absorb so great a
sum ? Even this year, with the extraordinary expenditure
upon Indian treaties and Indian wars, and with profuse ex
penditures in every other branch of service, the aggregate
amount of appropriations will not greatly exceed $30,000,000,
and that of disbursements will not, probably, equal that sum.

To what extent, then, must the appropriations for the
army, the navy, the fortifications, and the like, be carried, in
order to* absorb this sum, especially with a declining expen
diture in several branches of the service, particularly in the
pensions, which, during the period, will fall off more than a
million of dollars ? But, in order to perceive fully the folly
and danger of the scheme, it will be necessary to extend our
view beyond 1842, in order to form some opinion of what
will be the income of the Government when the tariff shall be
so reduced, under the Compromise Act, that no duty shall
exceed twenty per cent, ad valorem. I know that any esti
mate made at this time cannot be considered much more
than conjectural ; but still, it would be imprudent to adopt
a system of expenditure now, without taking into consider
ation the probable state of the revenue a few years hence.

After bestowing due reflection on the subject, I am of the
impression that the income from the imposts, after the pe
riod in question, will not exceed $10,000,000. It will prob-

550 SPEECHES.

ably fall below, rather than rise above, that sum. I assume
as the basis of this estimate, that our consumption of foreign
articles will not then exceed $150,000,000. We all know
that the capacity of the country to consume depends iipon
the value of its domestic exports, and the profits of its com
merce and navigation. Of its domestic exports it would not
be safe to assume any considerable increase in any article ex
cept cotton. To what extent the production and consumption
of this great staple, which puts in motion so vast an amount of
the industry and commerce of the world, may be increased
between now and 1842, it is difficult to conjecture ; but I
deem it unsafe to suppose that it can be so increased as to
extend the capacity of the country to consume beyond the
limits I have assigned. Assuming, then, the amount which
I have, and dividing the imports into free and dutiable arti
cles, the latter, according to the existing proportion between
the two descriptions, would amount in value to something
less than $70,000,000. According to the Compromise Act
no duty after the period in question, can exceed twenty per
cent., and the rates would range from that down to five or
six per cent. Taking fifteen per cent, as the average, which
would be, probably, full high, and allowing for the expenses
of collection, the net income would be something less than
$10,000,000.

The income from public lands is still more conjectural
than that from customs. There are so many, and such vari
ous causes in operation affecting this source of the public in
come, that it is exceedingly difficult to form even a conjectu
ral estimate as to its amount, beyond the current year. But,
in the midst of this uncertainty, one fact may be safely as
sumed, that the purchasers during the last year, and thus far
during this, greatly exceed the steady, progressive demand
for public lands, from increased population, and the conse
quent emigration to the new States and territories. Many
of the purchases have been, unquestionably, upon specula-

SPEECHES. 551

tion, with a view to resales ; and must, of course, come into
market hereafter in competition with the lands of the Gov
ernment, and to that extent reduce the income from their
sales. Estimating the demand for public lands even from
what it was previous to the recent large sales, and taking
into estimate the increased population and wealth of the
country, I do not consider it safe to assume more than
$5,000,000 annually from this branch of the revenue, which,
added to the customs, would give for the annual receipts be
tween fourteen and fifteen millions of dollars after 1842.

I now ask whether it would be prudent to raise the pub
lic expenditures to the sum of $30,000,000 annually during
the intermediate period, with the prospect that they must
be suddenly reduced to half that amount ? Who does not
see the fierce conflict which must follow between those who
may be interested in keeping up the expenditures, and those
who have an equal interest against an increase of the duties
as the means of keeping them up ? I appeal to the Senators
from the South, whose constituents have so deep an interest
in low duties, to resist a course so impolitic, unwise, and ex
travagant — and which, if adopted, might again renew the tar
iff, so recently thrown off by such hazardous and strenuous
efforts, with all its oppression and disaster. Let us remem
ber what occurred in the fatal session of 1828. With a folly
unparalleled, Congress then raised the duties to a rate so
enormous as to average one-half the value of the imports,
when on the eve of discharging the debt, and when, of course,
there would be no objects on which the immense income from
such extravagant duties could be justly and constitutionally
expended. It is amazing that there was such blindness then
as not to see what has since followed — the sudden discharge
of the debt, and an overflowing treasury, without the means
of absorbing the surplus ; the violent conflict resulting from
such a state of things ; and the vast increase of the power
and patronage of the Government, with all its corrupting con-

552 SPEECHES.

sequences. We are now about to commit an error of a differ
ent character : to raise the expenditure far beyond all exam
ple, in time of peace, and with a decreasing revenue — which
must, with equal certainty, bring on another conflict, not
much less dangerous, in which the struggle will not be to
find objects to absorb an overflowing treasury, but to devise
means to continue an expenditure far beyond the just and
legitimate wants of the country. It is easy to foresee that,
if we are thus blindly to go on in the management of our af
fairs, without regard to the future, the frequent and violent
concussions which must follow from such folly cannot but end
in a catastrophe that will ingulf our political institutions.

With such decided objections to the dangerous and ex
travagant scheme of absorbing the surplus by disbursements,
I proceed to the next question, Shall the public money re
main where it now is ? Shall the present extraordinary
state of things, without example or parallel, continue — of a
Government, calling itself free, exacting from the people
millions beyond what it can expend, and placing that vast
sum in the custody of a few monopolizing corporations, se
lected at the sole will of the Executive, and continued during
his pleasure, to be used as their own from the time it is col
lected till it is disbursed ? To this question there must
burst from the lips of every man who loves his country and
its institutions, and who is the enemy of monopoly, injustice,
and oppression, an indignant No. And here let me express
the pleasure I feel that the Senator from New- York, in
moving his amendment, however objectionable his scheme,
has placed himself in opposition to the continuance of the
present unheard-of and dangerous state of things ; and I add,
as a simple act of justice, that the tone and temper of his
remarks in support of his amendment, were characterized by
a courtesy and liberality which I, on my part, shah1 endeavor
to imitate. But I fear, notwithstanding this favorable indi
cation in so influential a quarter, the very magnitude of the

SPEECHES. 553

evil (too great to be concealed) will but serve to perpetuate
it. So great and various are the interests enlisted in its
favor, that I greatly fear all the efforts of the wise and
patriotic to arrest it will prove unavailing. At the head of
these stand the depository banks themselves, with their nu
merous stockholders and officers ; with their $40,000,000 of
capital, and an equal amount of public deposits, associated in
to one great combination extending over the whole Union, and
under the influence and control of the treasury department.
The whole weight of this mighty combination, so deeply in
terested in the continuance of the present state of things, is
opposed to any change. To this powerful combination must
be added the numerous and influential body who are de
pendent on banks to meet their engagements, and who,
whatever may be their political opinions, must be alarmed
at any change which may limit their discounts and accom
modations. Then come the stock-jobbers, a growing and
formidable class, who live by raising and depressing stocks,
and who behold in the present state of things the most favor
able opportunity of carrying on their dangerous and corrupt
ing pursuits. With the control which the Secretary of the
Treasury has over the banks of deposit, through transfer
warrants, with the power of withdrawing the deposits at
pleasure, he may, whenever he chooses, raise or depress the
stock of any bank ; and, if disposed to use this tremendous
power for corrupt purposes, may make the fortunes of the
initiated, and overwhelm in sudden ruin those not in the
secret. To the stock-jobbers must be added speculators of
every hue and form ; and, in particular, the speculators in
public lands, who, by the use of the public funds, are rapidly
divesting the people of the noble patrimony left by our an
cestors in the public domain, by giving in exchange what
may, in the end, prove to be broken credit and worthless
rags. To these we must add the artful and crafty politicians,
who wield this mighty combination of interests for political

554 SPEECHES.

purposes. I am anxious to avoid mingling party politics in
this discussion ; and, that I may not even seem to do so,
I shall not attempt to exhibit, in all its details, the fearful,
and, I was about to add, the overwhelming power which the
present state of things places in the hands of those who
have control of the Government, and which, if it be not
wielded to overthrow our institutions and destroy all respon
sibility, must be attributed to their want of inclination, and
not to their want of means.

Such is the power and influence interested to continue
the public money where it is now deposited. To these there
are opposed the honest, virtuous, and patriotic of every party,
who behold in the continuance of the present state of things
the almost certain convulsion and overthrow of our liberty.
There would be found, on the same side, the great mass of
the industrious and labouring portion of the community,
whose hard earnings are extracted from them without their
knowledge, were it not that what is improperly taken from
them is successfully used as the means of deceiving and
controlling them. If such were not the case — if those who
work could see how those who profit are enriched at their
expense — the present state of things would not be endured
for a moment ; but as it is, I fear that, from misconception,
and consequent want of union and co-operation, things may
continue as they are, till it will be too late to apply a remedy.
I trust, however, that such will not be the fact ; that the
people will be roused from their false security ; and that
Congress will refuse to adjourn till an efficient remedy is
applied. In this hope, I recur to the inquiry, What shall
that remedy be ? Shall we adopt the measure recommended
by the Senator from New- York, which, as has been stated,
proposes to authorize the Commissioners of the Sinking
Fund to ascertain the probable income of each quarter, and,
if there should be a probable excess above $5,000,000, to
vest the surplus in the purchase of State stocks ; but, if

SPEECHES. 555

there shall be a deficiency, to sell so much of the stock pre
viously purchased as would make up the difference ?

I regret that the Senator has not furnished a statement
of facts sufficiently full to enable us to form an opinion of
what will be the practical operation of his scheme. He has
omitted, for instance, to state what is the aggregate amount
of stocks issued by the several States — a fact indispensable
in order to ascertain how the price of the stocks would be
affected by the application of the surplus to their purchase.
All who are in the least familiar with subjects of this kind,
must know that the price of stocks rises proportionably
with the amount of the sum applied to their purchase.
I have already shown that the probable surplus at the end
of this year, notwithstanding the extravagance of the appro
priations, will be between thirty and thirty-five millions ;
and, before we can decide understandingly, whether this
great sum can with propriety be applied as the Senator pro
poses, we should know whether the amount of State stocks
be sufficient to absorb it, without raising their price extrava
gantly high.

The Senator should also have informed us, not only as
to the amount of the stock, but how it is distributed among
the States, in order to enable us to determine whether his
scheme would operate equally between them. In the absence
of correct information on both of these points, we are com
pelled to use such as we may possess, however defective and
uncertain, in order to make up our mind on his amendment.

We all know, then, that while several of the States have no
stocks, and many a very inconsiderable amount, three of the
large States (Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New- York) have a very
large amount — not less in the aggregate, if I am correctly in
formed, than thirty-five or forty millions. What amount is held
by the rest of the States is uncertain ; but I suppose it may
be safely assumed that, taking the whole, it is less than that
held by those States. With these facts, it cannot be doubted

556 SPEECHES.

that the application of the surplus, as proposed by the
Senator, would be exceedingly unequal among the States,
and that the advantage of the application would mainly
accrue to these States. To most of these objections, the
Senator, while he does not deny that the application of the
surplus will greatly raise the price of stocks, insists that
the States issiiing them will not derive any benefit from the
advance, and, consequently, have no interest in the question
of the application of the surplus to their purchase.

If by States he means the governments of the States, the
-.iew of the Senator may be correct. They may, as he says,
have but little interest in the market value of their stocks, as
it must be redeemed by the same amount, whether that be
high or low. But if we take a more enlarged view, and com
prehend the people of the States as well as their government,
the argument entirely fails. The Senator will not deny that
the holders have a deep interest in the application of so large
a sum as the present surplus to the purchase of their stocks.
He will not deny that such application must greatly advance
the price ; and, of course, in determining whether the States
having stocks will be benefited by applying the surplus as he
proposes, we must first ascertain who are the holders. Where
do they reside ? Are they foreigners residing abroad ? If
so, would it be wise to apply the public money so as to ad
vance the interests of foreigners, to whom the States are
under no obligation but honestly to pay to them the debts
which they have contracted ? But if not held by foreigners,
are they held by citizens of such States ? If such be the
fact, will the Senator deny that those States will be deeply
interested in the application of the surplus, as proposed in
his amendment, when the effects of such application must be,
as is conceded on all sides, greatly to enhance the price of the
stocks, and, consequently, to increase the wealth of their
citizens ? Let us suppose that, instead of purchasing the
stocks of the States in which his constituents are interested,

SPEECHES. 557

the Senator's amendment had proposed to apply the present
enormous surplus to the purchase of cotton or slaves, in which
the constituents of the Southern Senators are interested,
would any one doubt that the cotton-growing or slaveholding
States would have a deep interest in the question ? It will
not be denied that, if so applied, their price would be greatly
advanced, and the wealth of their citizens proportionably
increased. Precisely the same effect would result from the
application to the purchase of stocks, with like benefits to the
citizens of the States which have issued large amounts of
stock. The principle is the same in both cases.

But there is another view of the subject which demands
most serious consideration. Assuming, what will not be
questioned, that the application of the surplus, as proposed
by the amendment, will be very unequal among the States,
some having little or none, and others a large amount of
stocks, the result would necessarily be to create, in effect, the
relation of debtor and creditor between the States. The
States whose stocks might be purchased by the commissioners
would become the debtors of the Government ; and as the
Government would, in fact, be but the agent between them
and the other States, the latter would, in reality, be their
creditors. This relation between them could not fail to be
productive of important political consequences, which would
influence all the operations of the Government. It would,
in particular, have a powerful bearing upon the presidential
election ; the debtor and creditor States each striving to give
such a result to the elections as might be favorable to their
respective interests ; the one to exact, and the other to ex
empt themselves from the payment of the debt. Supposing
the three great States to which I have referred, whose united
influence would have so decided a control, to be the principal
debtor States, as would, in all probability, be the fact, it is
easy to see that the result would be, finally, the release of

558 SPEECHES.

the debt, and,, consequently, a corresponding loss to the cred
itor, and gain to the debtor States.

But there is another view of the subject still more de
serving, if possible, of attention than either of those which
have been presented. It is impossible not to see, after what
has been said, that the power proposed to be conferred by the
amendment of the Senator, of applying the surplus in buying
and selling the stocks of the States, is one of great extent,
and calculated to have powerful influence, not only on a large
body of the most wealthy and influential citizens of the States
which have issued stocks, but on the States themselves. The
next question is, In whom is the exercise of this power to be
vested ? Where shall we find individuals sufficiently de
tached from the politics of the day, and whose virtue, patriot
ism, disinterestedness, arid firmness can raise them so far
above political and sinister motives as to exercise powers
so high and influential exclusively for the public good, with
out any view to personal or political aggrandizement ? Who
has the amendment selected as standing aloof from politics,
and possessing these high qualifications ? Who are the
present commissioners of the sinking fund, to whom this high
and responsible trust is to be confided ? At the head stands
the Vice-President of the United States, with whom the
Chief-Justice of the United States, the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Attorney General, are
associated ; all party men, deeply interested in the mainte
nance of power in the present hands, and having the strongest
motives to apply the vast power which the amendment would
confer upon them, should it become a law, to party purposes.
I do not say it would be so applied ; but I must ask, Would
it be prudent, would it be wise, would it be seemly, to vest
such great and dangerous powers in those who have so strong
a motive to abuse it — and who, if they should have elevation
and virtue enough to resist the temptation, would still be
suspected of having used the power for sinister and corrupt

SPEECHES. 559

purposes? I am persuaded, in drawing the amendment,
the Senator from New- York has, without due reflection on
the impropriety of vesting the power where he proposes, in
advertently inserted the provision which he has ; and that, on
a review, he will concur with me, that, should his amendment
be adopted, the power ought to be vested in others, less ex
posed to temptation, and, consequently, less exposed to sus
picion.

I have now stated the leading objections to the several
modes of disposing of the surplus revenue which I proposed to
consider ; and the question again recurs, What shall be done
with the surplus ? The Senate is not uninformed of my
opinion on this important subject. Foreseeing that there
would be a large surplus, and the mischievous consequences
that must follow, I moved, during the last session, for a select
committee, which, among other measures, reported a resolu
tion so to amend the constitution as to authorize the tem
porary distribution of the surplus among the States ; but so
many doubted whether there would be a surplus at the time,
that it rendered all prospect of carrying the resolution hope
less. My opinion still remains unchanged, that the measure
then proposed was the best ; but so rapid has been the accu
mulation of the surplus, even beyond my calculation, and so
pressing the danger, that what would have been then an effi
cient remedy, would now be too tardy to meet the danger ;
and, of course, another remedy must be devised, more speedy
in its action.

After bestowing on the subject the most deliberate atten
tion, I have come to the conclusion that there is no other so
safe, so efficient, and so free from objections as the one I have
proposed, of depositing the surplus that may remain at the
termination of the year, in the treasuries of the several States,
in the manner provided for in the amendment. But the
Senator from New- York objects to the measure, that it would,
in effect, amount to a distribution — on the ground, as he con-

560 SPEECHES.

ceives, that the States would never refund. He does not
doubt but that they would refund, if called on by the Gov
ernment ; but he says that Congress will, in fact, never make
the call. He rests this conclusion on the supposition that
there would be a majority of the States opposed to it. He
admits, in case the revenue should become deficient, that
the Southern or staple States would prefer to refund their
quota rather than to raise the imposts to meet the deficit ;
but he insists that the contrary would be the case with the
manufacturing States, which would prefer to increase the
imposts to refunding their quota, on the ground that the in
crease of the duties would promote the interests of manu
factures. I cannot agree with the Senator that those States
would assume a position so entirely untenable as to refuse
to refund a deposit which their faith would be plighted to
return, and rest the refusal on the ground of preferring to lay
a tax, because it would be a bounty to them, and would con
sequently, throw the whole burden of the tax on the other
States. But, be this as it may, I can tell the Senator that,
if they should take a course so unjust and monstrous, he may
rest assured that the other States would most unquestionably
resist the increase of the imposts ; so that the Government
would have to take its choice, either to go without the money,
or call on the States to refund the deposits. But I so far
agree with the Senator as to believe that Congress would be
very reluctant to make the call ; that it would not make it
till, from the wants of the treasury, it should become abso
lutely necessary ; and that, in order to avoid such necessity,
it would resort to a just and proper economy in the public
expenditures as the preferable alternative. I see in this,
however, much good instead of evil. The Government has
long since departed from habits of economy, and fallen into
a profusion, a waste, and an extravagance in its disbursements,
rarely equalled by any free state, and which threatens the
most disastrous consequences.

SPEECHES. 561

Bat I am happy to think that the ground on which the
objection of the Senator stands may be removed, without
materially impairing the provisions of the bill. It will re
quire but the addition of a few words to remove it, by giv
ing to the deposits all the advantages, without the objections,
which he proposes by his plan. It will be easy to provide
that the States shall authorize the proper officers to give ne
gotiable certificates of deposit, which shall not bear interest
till demanded, when they shall bear the usual rates till paid.
Such certificates would be, in feet, State stocks, every way
similar to that in which the Senator proposes to vest the sur
plus, but with this striking superiority — that, instead of being
partial, and limited to a few States, they would be fairly and
justly apportioned among the several States. They would
have another striking advantage over his. They would cre
ate among all the members of the confederacy, reciprocally,
the relation of debtor and creditor, in proportion to their re
lative weight in the Union ;. which, in effect, would leave
them in their present relation, and, of course, avoid the
danger that would result from his plan, which, as has been
shown, would necessarily make a part of the States debt
ors to the rest, with all the dangers resulting from such re
lation.

The next objection of the Senator is to the ratio of dis
tribution, proposed in the bill, among the States, which he
pronounces to be unequal, if not unconstitutional. He in
sists that the. true principle would be, to distribute the sur
plus among the States in proportion to the representation in
the House of Representatives, without including the Sena
tors, as is proposed in the bill — for which he relies on the fact,
that, by the constitution, representation and taxation are to
be apportioned in the same manner among the States.

The Senate will see that the effect of adopting the ratio
supported by the Senator would be to favor the large States,
while that in the bill will be more favorable to the small.
VOL. ii. — 36

562 SPEECHES.

The State I in part represent, occupies a neutral posi
tion between the two. She cannot be considered either a
large or a small State, forming, as she does, one twenty-
fourth part of the Union ; and, of course, it is the same to
her whichever ratio may be adopted. But I prefer the one
contained in my amendment, on the ground that it represents
the relative weight of the States in the Government. It is
the weight assigned to them in the choice of the President
and Vice-President in the electoral college, and, of course, in
the administration of the laws. It is also that assigned to
them in the making of the laws by the action of the two
Houses, and corresponds very nearly to their weight in the
judicial department of the Government — the judges being
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
In addition, I was influenced, in selecting the ratio, by the
belief that it was a wise and magnanimous course, in case of
doubt, to favor the weaker members of the confederacy. The
larger can always take care of themselves ; and, to avoid
jealousy and improper feelings, ought to act liberally towards
the weaker members of the confederacy. To which may be
added, that I am of the impression — even on the princi
ple assumed by the Senator, that the distribution of the sur
plus ought to be apportioned on the ratio of direct taxation
(which may be well doubted) — the ratio which I support
would conform, in practice, more nearly to the principle than
that which he supports. It is a fact not generally known,
that representation in the other House, and direct taxes,
should they be laid, would be very far from being equal, al
though the constitution provides that they shall be. The
inequality would result from the mode of apportioning the
representatives. Instead of apportioning them among the
States, as near as may be, as directed by the constitution,
an artificial mode of distribution has been adopted, which,
in its effects, gives to the large States a greater, and to the
small a less number, than that to which they are entitled.

SPEECHES. 563

I would refer those who may desire to understand how this
inequality is effected, to the discussion in this body on the
apportionment bill under the last census. So great is this
inequality, that, were a direct tax to be laid, New- York, for
instance, would have at least three members more than her
apportionment of the tax would require. The ratio which I
have proposed would, I admit, produce as great an inequality
in favor of some of the small States — particularly the old,
whose population is nearly stationary ; but among the new
and growing members of the confederacy, which constitute
the greater portion of the small States, it would not give
a larger share of the deposits than what they would be
entitled to on the principle of direct taxes. But the objec
tion of the Senator to the ratio of distribution, like his ob
jection to the condition on which the bill proposes to make
it, is a matter of small comparative consequence. I am
prepared, in the spirit of concession, to adopt either, as one
or the other may be more acceptable to the Senate.

It now remains to compare the disposition of the surplus
proposed in the bill with the others I have discussed ; and
unless I am greatly deceived, it possesses great advantages
over them. Compared with the scheme of expending the
surplus, its advantages are, that it would avoid the ex
travagance and waste which must result from suddenly more
than quadrupling the expenditures, without a corresponding
organization in the disbursing department of the Government
to enforce economy and responsibility. It would also avoid
the diversion of so large a portion of the industry of the
country from its present useful direction to unproductive ob
jects, with heavy loss to the wealth and prosperity of the coun
try, as has been shown ; — while it would, at the same time,
avoid the increase of the patronage and influence of the Gov
ernment, with all their corruption and danger to the liberty
and institutions of the country. But its advantages would
not be limited simply to avoiding the evil of extravagant and

564 SPEECHES.

useless disbursements. It would confer positive benefits, by
enabling the States to discharge their debts, and complete a
system of internal improvements, by railroads and canals,
which would not only greatly strengthen the bonds of the
confederacy, but increase its power, by augmenting infinitely
our resources and prosperity.

I do not deem it necessary to compare the disposition of
the surplus which is proposed in the bill with the dangerous,
and, I must say, wicked scheme of leaving the public funds
where they are, in the banks of deposit, to be loaned out by
those institutions to speculators and partisans, without au
thority or control of law.

Compared with the plan proposed by the Senator from
New- York, it is sufficient, to prove its superiority, to say
that, while it avoids all the objections to which his is liable,
it at the same time possesses all the advantages, with others
peculiar to itself. Among these, one of the most prominent
is, that it provides the only efficient remedy for the deep-
seated disease which now afflicts the body politic, and which
threatens to terminate so fatally, unless it be speedily and ef
fectually arrested.

All who have reflected on the nature of our complex sys
tem of government, and the dangers to which it is exposed,
have seen that it is susceptible, from its structure, to two dan
gers of an opposite character — one threatening consolidation,
and the other anarchy and dissolution. From the beginning
of the Government, we find a difference of opinion among
the wise and patriotic as to which the Government was most
exposed : one part believing the danger was, that the Gov
ernment would absorb the reserved powers of the States,
and terminate in consolidation, while the other were equally
confident that the States would absorb the powers of the
Government, and the system end in anarchy and dissolution.
It was this diversity of opinion which gave birth to the two
great, honest, and patriotic parties which so long divided the

SPEECHES. 565

community, and to the many political conflicts which so long
agitated the country. Time has decided the controversy.
We are no longer left to douht that the danger is on the
side of this Government ; and that, if not arrested, the sys
tem must terminate in an entire absorption of the powers
of the States.

Looking back, with the light which experience has fur
nished, we now clearly see that both of the parties took a
false view of the operation of the' system. It was admitted
by both, that there would be a conflict for power between
the Government and the States, arising from a disposition on
the part of those who, for the time being, exercised the
powers of the Government and the States, to enlarge their
respective powers at the expense of each other, and which
would induce each to watch the other with incessant vigi
lance. Had such proved to be the fact, I readily concede
that the result would have been the opposite of what has
occurred, and the republican, and not the federal party,
would have been mistaken as to the tendency of the system.
But so far from this jealousy, experience has shown that, in
the operation of the system, a majority of the States have
acted in concert with the Government at all times, except
upon the eve of political revolution, when one party was
about to go out, to make room for the other to come in ; and
we now clearly see that this has not been the result of acci
dent, but that the habitual operation must necessarily be so.
The misconception resulted from overlooking the fact, that
the Government is but an agent of the States, and that the
dominant majority of the Union, which elect and control a
majority of the State Legislatures, would elect also those
who would control this Government ; — whether that majority
rested on sectional interests, on patronage and influence, or on
whatever other basis, and that they would use the influence
both of the General and State Governments jointly, for ag
grandizement and the perpetuation of their power. Regarded

566 SPEECHES.

in this light, it is not at all surprising that the tendency of
the system is such as it has proved itself to be, — and which
any intelligent observer now sees must necessarily terminate
in a central, absolute, irresponsible, and despotic power. It
is this fatal tendency that the measure proposed in the bill
is calculated to counteract, and which, I believe, would prove
effective if now applied. It would place the States in the
relation in which it was universally believed they would stand
to this Government at the time of its formation ; and make
them those jealous and vigilant guardians of its action on all
measures touching the disbursements and expenditures of
the Government, which it was confidently believed they
would be ; which would arrest the fatal tendency to the con
centration of the entire powers of the system in this Govern
ment, if any thing on earth can.

But it is objected that the remedy would be too powerful,
and would produce an opposite and equally dangerous ten
dency. I coincide that such would be the danger, if per
manently applied ; and, under that impression, and believ
ing that the present excess of revenue would not continue
longer, I have limited the measure to the duration of the
Compromise Act. Thus limited, it will act sufficiently long,
I trust, to eradicate the present disease, without superin
ducing one of an opposite character.

But the plan proposed is supported by its justice, as well
as these high considerations of political expediency. The
surplus money in the treasury is not ours. It properly be
longs to those who made it, and from whom it has been un
justly taken. I hold it an unquestionable principle, that the
Government has no right to take a cent from the people be
yond what is necessary to meet its legitimate and consti
tutional wants. To take more intentionally would be rob
bery ; and, if the Government has not incurred the guilt in
the present case, its exemption can only be found in its folly
— the folly of not seeing and guarding against a vast excess

SPEECHES. 567

of revenue, which the most ordinary understanding ought to
have foreseen and prevented. If it were in our power — if we
could ascertain from whom the vast amount now in the trea
sury was improperly taken, justice would demand that it
should be returned to its lawful owners. But, as that is im
possible, the measure next best, as approaching nearest to
restitution, is that which is proposed, to deposit it in the
treasuries of the several States, which will place it under the
disposition of the immediate representatives of the people,
to be used by them as they may think fit, till the wants of
the Government may require its return.

But it is objected that such a disposition would be a bribe
to the people. A bribe to the people to return it to those
to whom it justly belongs, and from whose pockets it
should never have been taken ! A bribe to place it in the
charge of the immediate representatives of those from whom
we derive our authority, and who may employ it so
much more usefully than we can ! But what is to be
done ? If not returned to the people, it must go some
where ; and is there no danger of bribing those to whom
it may go ? If we disburse it, is there no danger of brib
ing the thousands of agents, contractors, and jobbers,
through whose hands it must pass, and in whose pockets,
and those of their associates, so large a part would be
deposited ? If, to avoid this, we leave it where it is, in
the banks, — is there no danger of bribing the banks in whose
custody it is, with their various dependants, and the nu
merous swarms of speculators which hover about them in
hopes of participating in the spoil ? Is there no danger of
bribing the political managers, who, through the deposits,
have the control of these banks, and, by them, of their de
pendants, and the hungry and voracious hosts of speculators
who have overspread and are devouring the land ? Yes, lite
rally devouring the land. Finally, if it should be vested, as
proposed by the Senator from New- York, is there no danger

568 SPEECHES.

of bribing the holders of State stocks, and, through them,
the States which have issued them ? Are the agents, the
jobbers, and contractors ; are the directors and stockholders
of the banks ; are the speculators and stock-jobbers ; are the
political managers and holders of State securities, the only
honest portion of the community ? Are they alone incapa
ble of being bribed ? And are the people the least honest,
and most liable to be bribed ? Is this the creed of those
now in power ? of those who profess to be the friends of the
people, and to place implicit confidence in their virtue and
patriotism ?

I have now, said Mr. Calhoun, stated what, in my opin
ion, ought to be done with the surplus. Another question
still remains : not what shall, but what will be done with
the surplus ? With a few remarks on this question, I shall
conclude what I intended to say.

There was a time, in the better days of the republic,
when to show what ought to be done was to insure the
adoption of the measure. Those days have passed away, I
fear, for ever. A power- has risen up in the Government
greater than the people themselves, consisting of many, and
various, and powerful interests, combined into one mass, and
held together by the cohesive power of the vast surplus in
the banks. This mighty combination will be opposed to
any change ; and it is to be feared that, such is its influ
ence, no measure to which it is opposed can become a law,
however expedient and necessary ; and that the public money
will remain in their possession, to be disposed of, not as the
public interest, but as theirs may dictate. The time, indeed,
seems fast approaching, when no law can pass, nor any honor
be conferred, from the Chief Magistrate to the tide-waiter,
without the assent of this powerful and interested combina
tion, which is steadily becoming the Government itself, to
the utter subversion of the authority of the people. Nay,
I fear we are in the midst of it ; and I look with anxiety

SPEECHES. 569

to the fate of this measure as the test whether we are or
not.

If nothing should be done — if the money which justly
belongs to the people be left where it is, with the many
and overwhelming objections to it — the fact will prove that
a great and radical change has been effected ; that the Gov
ernment is subverted ; that the authority of the people is
suppressed by an union of the banks and the Executive — an
union a hundred times more dangerous than that of church
and state, against which the constitution has so jealously
guarded. It would be the announcement of a state of
things from which, it is to be feared, there can be no recovery
— a state of boundless corruption, and the lowest and basest
subserviency. It seems to be the order of Providence that,
with the exception of these, a people may recover from
any evil. Piracy, robbery, and violence of every descrip
tion may, as history proves, be followed by virtue, patriot
ism, and national greatness ; but where is the example to be
found of a degenerate, corrupt and subservient people, who
have ever recovered their virtue and patriotism ? Their
lot has ever been the lowest state of wretchedness and
misery : scorned, trodden down, and obliterated for ever from
the list of nations. May Heaven grant that such may
never be our doom !

SPEECH

On the Deposit Bill, delivered in the Senate, Decem
ber 21, 1836.

[MR. CALHOUN, agreeably to notice, asked and obtained leave to
introduce the following Bill : —

A Bill to extend the provisions of certain sections therein named

570 SPEECHES.

of the act of the 23d June, 1836, regulating the deposits of the money
that may be in the treasury on the 1st January, 1838.

Be it enacted, <&c. That the money which shall be in the treasury
of the United States on the first day of January, 1838, reserving the
sum of five millions of dollars, shall be deposited with the several
States, on the terms, and according to the provisions of the 13th.
14th, and 15th sections of the act to regulate the deposits of the
public money, approved the 23d day of June, 1836.]

MR. CALHOUN, in introducing the bill, observed that he
had not asked leave to introduce this bill without satisfying
himself that there would be a large surplus of the public
revenue remaining in the treasury at the termination of the
next year, after allowing for very liberal appropriations on
all proper subjects of expenditure. From the calculations
he had made, he was convinced tbat the amount of this sur
plus would not fall short of eigbt millions of dollars.

He was fully aware that the Secretary of the Treasury, in
the report submitted by that officer to Congress, had taken
a very different view ; yet Mr. C. thought be hazarded little
when he said that, on tbis subject tbe Secretary was cer
tainly mistaken. He knew, indeed, tbat formerly such an
assertion from a member of Congress, in relation to the
higbest fiscal officer of the Government would bave been
deemed adventurous ; but so vague, so uncertain, so con
jectural, and so very erroneous bad been tbe reports from that
department for two or three years last past, that he could
not be considered as risking much in taking such a position.
That, in this remark, he did no injustice to the Secretary of
the Treasury (toward whom he cherished no personal hos
tility or unkind feelings whatsoever), he would take the liberty
of presenting to the Senate the estimates made by that
officer in December last, for the present year, and compare
with it the actual result, as now ascertained from the Sec
retary's own report, made the present session. His esti
mate of the receipts from all sources, including the public

SPEECHES. 571

lands and every other branch of the revenue, amounted to
$19,750,000 ; — whereas the report stated those receipts to
have amounted to $47,691,898 — presenting a difference in
the estimate, for a single year, of $27,941,898. Thus the
excess of the actual receipts had exceeded the estimate by
more than one-third of the whole amount of the estimate.
Each of the great branches of revenue, the customs and the
public lands, exceeded the estimate by millions of dollars.

Again : the Secretary had estimated the balance at the
end of the year, then within four weeks of its termination,
at $18,047,598 ; — whereas the report showed that the bal
ance actually amounted to $26,749;S03 — being an error of
$8,702,250 for that short period. How these errors arose,
whether from negligence or inattention, or whether they
were made purposely, to subserve certain political views, it
was not for him to say ; but they were sufficient to show
that he ran no very formidable hazard in venturing to say
that the views of the Secretary in respect to what was yet
future might be erroneous.

But further : the Secretary, in his report last year, had
estimated the available means of the treasury, for the cur
rent year, at $37,797,598 ; they were now ascertained to
have been $74,441,701, exhibiting the error of $46,644,104.
We might search the fiscal records of all civilized nations,
and would not find, in the compass of history, an error so
monstrous. He stated this with no feelings of ill-will to
ward the Secretary, but with emotions of shame and mortifi
cation for the honor of the country. How must errors like
these appear in the eyes of foreign nations ? How would
they look to posterity ?

But he was not yet done. The Secretary estimated the ex
penditure of the year at $23,103,444 ; — whereas they turned
out to' be $31,435,032— making a difference of $8,331,588.
He estimated the balance in the treasury at the end of this
year at $14,500,000. He now admits that it will equal

572 SPEECHES.

$43,005,669— making an error of $28,505,669, and this not-
withstanding he had made an under estimate of the expendi
ture of more than eight millions, which, if added, as it ought
to be, would make a mistake of nearly thirty-seven millions.

The Secretary, however, had profited by the errors of
last year. The estimates in the present report were some
what nearer to the truth, but still far removed from
it. Indeed, so small was the extent to which he had
profited, that he had risked an opinion that the expenditure
would exceed the income ; so that, of the sum which had
been deposited with tfye States, a portion, amounting to be
tween two and three millions, would have to be refunded.
The Secretary held out language of this kind, when he acknow
ledges that the income of the year would be $24,000,000.
Mr. C. said he would be glad to see the administration, with
such an income, venture to call upon the States to pay back
the moneys they had received. No administration would
venture the call, except in the case of a foreign war ; in which
event these deposits would prove a timely and precious re
source. With proper management, they would enable the
Government to avoid the necessity, at the commencement of
a war, of resorting to war taxes and loans. All those gentle
men — and he saw several of them around him who were here
at the commencement of the last war — would well remember
the difficulty and embarrassment which attended the op
eration of raising the revenue from a peace to a war
establishment.

Assuming, then, that there would be a surplus, the ques
tion presented itself as to what should be done with it.
That question Mr. C. would not now attempt to argue.
The discussion of it at this time would be premature and
out of place. He proposed to himself a more limited object ;
which was, to state the points connected with this subject,
which he considered as established, and to point out what
was the real issue at present. One point was perfectly es-

SPEECHES. 573

tablished by the proceedings of the last session — that, when
there was an unavoidable surplus, it ought not to be left in
the treasury, or in the deposit banks, but should be de
posited with the States. It was not only the most safe, but
the most just, that the States should have the use of the
money, in preference to the banks. This, in fact, was the
great and leading principle which lay at the foundation of
the act of last session — an act that would for ever distinguish
the twenty-fourth Congress — an act which will go down with
honor to posterity, as it had obtained the almost unanimous
approbation of the present day. Its passage had inspired
the country with new hopes. It was beheld abroad as a
matter of wonder ; a phenomenon in the fiscal world ; such
as could have sprang out of no institutions but ours, and
which went, in a powerful and impressive manner, to illus
trate the genius of our Government.

He considered it no less fully established, that there
ought to be no surplus, if it could be avoided. The money
belonged to those who made it, and Government had no right
to exact it unless necessary. What, then, was the true
question at issue ? It was this, Can you reduce the reve
nue to the wants of the people ? — he meant in a large politi
cal sense. Could the reduction be made without an injury
that would more than countervail' the benefit ? The Presi
dent thought it could be done ; and Mr. C. hoped he was
correct in that opinion. If it be practicable, then, beyond
all question it was the proper and natural course to be
adopted. It was under this impression that he had moved
to refer this part of the President's Message to the Com
mittee on Finance. He not only considered that as the
appropriate committee, but there were other reasons that
governed him in making the reference. A majority of that
committee were known to be hostile to the Deposit Bill, and
would, therefore, do all in their power to avoid the possibility
of having a surplus. If, then, that committee could not

574 SPEECHES.

effect a reduction, then it might be safely assumed as im
practicable. If they could agree on a reduction, the Senate
no doubt would concur with them.

There was one point on which the committee need have
have no apprehension : that any reduction they might pro
pose to make would be considered by the South as a breach
of the Compromise Act. Her interest in that act is not
against the reduction, but the increase of duties. If it be
the pleasure of other sections to reduce, she will certainly
not complain.

Mr. C. said he would take this occasion to define with
exactness the position he occupied in regard to the compro
mise. He stood, personally, without pledge or plighted
faith, as far as that act was concerned. He clearly foresaw,
at the time that bill passed, that there would be a surplus
of revenue in the treasury. He knew that result to be un
avoidable, unless by a reduction so sudden as to overthrow
our manufacturing establishments — a catastrophe which he
sincerely desired to avoid. Whatever might be thought to
the contrary, he had always been the friend of those estab
lishments. He thought, at the time, that the reduction pro
vided for in the bill had not been made to take place as fast
as it might have been. But the terms of the bill formed
the only ground on which the opposing interests could agree,
and he, as representing, in part, one of the Southern States,
had accepted it — believing it, on the whole, to be the best
arrangement which could be effected ; yet he saw (it did not,
indeed, require much of a prophetic spirit) that there were
those who were then ready to collect the tariff at the point
of the bayonet rather than yield an inch, who, when the in
jurious effects of the surplus should be felt, would throw the
responsibility on those who supported the bill. Seeing this,
Mr. C. had determined that it should not be thrown upon
him. He had therefore risen in his place, and, after calling
on the stenographers to note his words, he had declared that

SPEECHES. 575

he voted for that bill in the same manner, and no other,
that he did for all other bills, — and that he held himself no
further personally pledged in its passage than in any other.
Mr. C. was therefore at perfect liberty to select his position,
which he would now state. We of the South had derived
incalculable advantages from that act ; and, as one belong
ing to that section, he claimed all those advantages to the
very last letter. That act had reduced the income of the
Government greatly. Few, he believed, were fully aware of
the extent to which it had operated. It was a fact, which
documents would show, that the act of 1828 arrested at the
custom-house one-half in value of the amount of the imports.
The imports at that time, deducting reshipments, were
about sixty-five millions of dollars in value — out of which the
Government collected about thirty-two millions in the gross
The imports of the last year, deducting reshipments,
amounted to $120,000,000, which, if the tariff of 1828
had not been reduced, would have given an increase of
$60,000,000, instead of something upwards of $21,000,000.
He claimed not the whole difference for the compromise, but
upwards of $20,000,000 may be fairly carried to its credit.
Under this great reduction, we of the South began to revive.
Our business began to thrive and to look up. But the Com
promise Act had not yet fully discharged its functions. Its
operation would continue until the revenue shall be brought
down till no duty shall exceed twenty per cent, ad valorem,
and the revenue be reduced to the actual wants of the
Government. But, while he claimed for the South all these
very important advantages, Mr. C. trusted he was too honest
as well as too proud, while he claimed those benefits on her
part, to withhold whatever advantage the North may derive
from the compromise. His position, then, on the question
of reduction, was to follow, and not to lead ; and such he be
lieved to be the true position of the South. If it be the wish
of other sections to reduce, she will cheerfully follow ; but I

576 SPEECHES.

trust she will be the last to disturb the present state of
things.

Having thus clearly defined his own position, Mr. C.
said he would venture a suggestion. If the manufacturing
interests would listen to the voice of one who had never been
their enemy, he would venture to advise them to a course
which he should consider as wise on all sides.

It is well known, said Mr. C., that the Compromise Act
makes a very great and sudden reduction in the years 1841
and 1842. He doubted the wisdom of this provision at the
time ; but those who represented the manufacturing interest
thought it was safer and better to reduce more slowly at
first, and more rapidly at the end of the term, in order to
avoid the possibility of a shock at the commencement. He
thought experience had clearly shown that there could be no
hazard in accelerating the rate of reduction . now, in order to
avoid the great and rapid descent of 1841 and 1842 ; and in
this view, it seemed to him that it would be wise to distribute
the remaining reduction equally on the six remaining years of
the act. It was, however, but a suggestion.

Mr. C. observed, that had not this been the short session
of Congress, he should have postponed the introduction of
the present bill, and awaited the action of the Committee on
Finance. But it was possible that committee might find it
impracticable to reduce the revenue ; and as there were but
about two months of the session left, if something were not
effected in the mean time, a large surplus might be left in
the treasury, or rather in the deposit banks — left there to
disturb and disorder the currency of the country ; to cherish
and foster a spirit of wild and boundless speculation, and
be wielded for electioneering purposes. A standing surplus
in the deposit banks was almost universally condemned.
The President himself had denounced it in his message, and
-Mr. C. heartily agreed with him in every word he had said
on that subject.

SPEECHES. 5*77

Before sending the bill to the Chair, he would take the
liberty of expressing his hope that the subject would be dis
cussed in the same spirit of moderation that had characterized
the debates upon it last year. It was a noble example, and
he hoped it would be followed. Let the Subject be argued
on great public grounds, and let all party spirit be sacrificed,
on this great question, to the good of the country. Yet, he
would say to the friends of the administration, that it was
not from any fear, on party ground, that he uttered this
sentiment ; for he believed there was no subject which,
in the hands of a skilful opposition, would be more fatal to
power.

[The bill was, by consent, read twice ; when Mr. Calhoun moved
that it be made the order of the day for Monday next. He saw no
necessity for its commitment.

Mr. Clay here rose, expressed his opposition to any essential modi
fication of the Compromise Act, and urged the adoption of the
proposition to distribute the proceeds of the sales of the public lands
among the States, as the most efficient mode of getting rid of the sur
plus. He was followed by Mr. Walker of Mississippi, who moved to
refer the bill to the Committee on Finance ; and, during his remarks,
charged Mr. Calhoun with the design of raising money for the purpose
of distribution, and making the system the settled policy of the
country.]

Mr. Calhoun, in reply, complained of having been entirely
misstated by the Senator from Mississippi. He had not
invoked the Senate to any such act, nor had he said any
thing like it. But he had said that no administration could
honestly plead any necessity for demanding back the deposits
from the States, unless in the contingency of a foreign war.
So far from having expressed a desire to create and distribute
a surplus, he had, on the contrary, expressly declared that
he should greatly prefer a reduction of the revenue, if it could
be safely effected ; and he had expressed his willingness to
send the bill to a committee opposed to his own views, that,
VOL. n. — 37

578 SPEECHES.

if possible, this might be effected. Yet, the gentleman ac
cused him of a design to create a surplus.

The gentleman had again said, that one of the argu
ments urged by him in favor of the Distribution Bill had
been, that the deposit of the public money in banks was a
great instrument of fraud and speculation. This was a
great mistake. He had said no such thing. The President,
however, had undertaken to legislate on the subject, and had
issued an order, which was much more like an act of Con
gress than an executive measure. The President deemed
the evil so great, and the remedy so specific, that he had
ventured on a great stretch of power to realize the object.
Now, after what the President had said on this subject, any
man who should vote to leave the public money in de
posit banks stood openly convicted of being in favor of specu
lators.

Mr. C. hoped the Senator would not persist in his motion
to refer the bill to a committee which he knew to be utterly
opposed to it. Nothing could be more unparliamentary. He
hoped the gentleman would at least indulge him with a
special committee.

[Here, after some remarks from Mr. Buchanan, in favor of the
motion to refer the hill to the Committee of Finance, Mr. Walker
again rose in support of his motion ; and alleged that Mr. Calhoun,
by not advocating the recommendation of the President in regard to a
reduction of duties, was, in fact, voting to create a surplus for distri
bution.]

Mr. Calhoun rejoined and explained, with a view to show
that the case of which the gentleman from Mississippi
complained was not parallel to the present, and still in
sisted on the propriety of allowing him a special commit
tee. If, however, the Senate should resolve to send this
bill to the Committee of Finance, he should not be at a loss
to understand the movement. He had read the President's

SPEECHES. 579

Message attentively. It was an extraordinary document.
He read with no less care the report of the Secretary of the
Treasury ; that, too, was an extraordinary document. The
perusal had suggested some suspicions to his mind ; and
should the present bill be sent to the Finance Committee,
those suspicions would be fully confirmed. Such a measure
would go far to convince him that the policy of the adminis
tration was agreed upon, and that it would be — to make a
demonstration on a reduction of the revenue, but, in fact, to
leave the revenue in the deposit banks. The end of this
session was not far off, and that would tell whether he was
not correct in his opinion. He would now, in his turn, ven
ture to become a prophet ; and he would predict that, if the
present motion succeeded, the very thing which the Presi
dent in his Message had most decidedly condemned, would
be the thing actually realized. Notwithstanding the Presi
dent's opposition to the collecting of surplus revenue, and
all he had said on its tendency to promote speculation
and corrupt the public morals, that was the thing which
would be done. He was sorry he did not see the Senator
from New- York (Mr. Wright) in his place. On that gentle
man, peculiarly, lies the obligation to provide for the re
duction of the revenue. Mr. C. well knew the difficulty of
touching this subject. He had himself had a full and sound
trial of that operation. He knew the efforts by which the
existing reduction had been effected, and he felt very sure
that the Senator from New- York could not be sanguine in
the expectation of effecting a reduction to any great amount.
He had heard much said in private on that subject, and he
could not but regret that the President, when alluding to
it in his Message, had not referred to the difficulties attend
ing it. Mr. C. thought he saw how things were to go, and
he thus openly announced what his conviction was. He
believed nothing would be done to reduce the revenue ; that
the money would still be collected, and would be left, not

580 « SPEECHES.

where it ought to be found, in the treasuries of the States.
but in the deposit banks.

If the Finance Committee would report an adequate re
duction, of the revenue, Mr. C. would consent to withdraw
his bill. He should infinitely prefer a reduction to a distri
bution provided the thing could be done. In the mean
while the South claimed the execution of the Compromise
Bill ; it had not only closed a long and painful controversy,
but had enabled them to make some feeble stand against the
progress of executive influence. He concluded by moving
for a special committee.

[Here Mr. Rives of Virginia said something in support of the
motion of the Senator from Mississippi, and taxed Mr. C. with incon
sistency in voting to refer the question of reduction to the Committee
on Finance, while he opposed the present motion.]

Mr. Calhoun repelled the charge of inconsistency. He
had been in favor of sending the subject of a reduction of the
revenue to the Committee on Finance, because he considered
the subject as appropriate to their specific duties ; but he
was opposed to sending this bill to that committee, because
they were known to be adverse to its object. In one case he
had gone on the great parliamentary principle, that proposi
tions were to be referred to committees favorable to the ob
ject proposed ; and in the other case, he still had sent it to
a committee at least not unfavorable to the measure. He
was rejoiced to hear the honorable Senator from Virginia de
clare so explicitly that he did not repent the course he had
taken in reference to the Compromise Bill. He was confident
the gentleman never would have reason to repent the able
and honorable course he had pursued on that memorable
occasion ; and he trusted the gentleman would agree in
sentiment with those who were opposed to leaving the public
money in the deposit banks. Mr. C. had given many evi
dences of his desire that a reduction should be made in the

SPEECHES. 581

revenue ; and had, the last session, sent a bill to the Com
mittee on Manufactures for that object, which afterwards had
passed the Senate almost unanimously, and had been sent to
the other House, after which, it was never again heard of.
He was not the man, however, to disturb the terms of the
compromise, which had so happily been effected, unless it
could be done by common consent. The South were pre
pared to assent to such a step, and if the North would also
agree to it, there need be no difficulty in the case. The
gentleman from Virginia seemed to suppose that, because it
was the duty of the Finance Committee to consider the ques
tion, whether there was likely to be a surplus revenue or not,
therefore, this bill ought to be sent to them. The argu
ment was too wide ; — on the same principle, every proposition
which related to the application of any portion of the public
resources must be sent to that committee. It would swal
low up almost all the business of the Senate. He concluded
by demanding the- yeas and nays on the question of com
mitment.

REMARKS

On Mr. Benton's proposition to apply the unexpended
balances of Appropriations in the Treasury to
objects of National Defence ; made in the Senate,
December 28th, 1836.

[MR. BENTON, after stating the contents of the report of the Secre
tary of the Treasury (called for on his motion), showing the amount
of unexpended balances of appropriations made at the last session,
and commenting, at some length, on them, moved the printing of the
document, and that five copies be sent to the Governor of each State,
ten copies to each branch of the State Legislatures, and one thousand
copies retained for the use of the Senate.

582 SPEECHES.

The main objects of the movement being to retain these balances
in the treasury, and to withdraw from the States the surplus revenues
which had been deposited with them, under an act of the previous
session, Mr. Calhoun rose and said :]

HE desired to make a very few remarks on the very ex
traordinary motion of the Senator from Missouri, and to ask
for the yeas and nays on the question. The sending out
this paper in the manner proposed, would make an erroneous
impression on the minds of those to whom it would be sent,
and would be an unusual departure from the ordinary prac
tice of the Senate. Did not every Senator know that there
was a large amount left in the treasury, say five millions of
dollars, by the Deposit Law of the last session, for the pur
pose of meeting these balances ? Did not every Senator
know that, by the report of the Secretary of the Treasury,
there were three millions of dollars of these appropriations
that would not be wanted, and were therefore transferred to
the surplus fund in pursuance of a standing law ? And was
there not besides, a large sum in the hands of the disbursing
officers of the Government ? He knew, Mr. C. said, that
every exertion would be made in order to defeat the Deposit
Bill at this session. He knew well that the battle was yet
to be fought — a battle in which the people would be on one
side, and the office-holders and office-seekers on the other.
While up, he would refer to the Committee on Finance, and
make one remark in reference to the report of that committee
on the bill introduced by him a few days since, and, much
against his wishes, referred to them. They had reported
against the bill, and it was not strange that they should do
so ; because a majority of that committee were three out of
the six who voted against the Deposit Bill at the last session.
But what he complained of was, that they had reported it
without one single word of explanation ; the chairman simply
saying that he was instructed by the committee to move for
its indefinite postponement. He would now ask the chair-

SPEECHES. 583

man on what grounds he had reported against this bill?
Was it because the committee were satisfied that there
would not be a surplus ? If so, said Mr. C., let us know it.
I shall be glad to hear that such was their reason, because it
is a debatable proposition. Was it because they would not
have the surplus deposited with the States ? If this was
the case, it was directly contrary to the known sense of that
body, expressed almost unanimously at the last session. He
could scarcely believe that the committee reported against
the bill on such grounds. With the denunciations of the
President himself against the corrupting influence of a large
surplus in the treasury, and his declarations that the worst
disposition that could be made of it was to let it remain in
the deposit banks, he did suppose that the committee could
not contemplate either result. He could not believe but
that, from courtesy, the chairman would make such a report
as would put the Senate in possession of the grounds on
which the committee objected to the bill.

[Here Mr. Wright rose, and, in a few remarks, objected to the in
quiry, and declined making any direct response. He further stated,
that the committee did not design to submit any detailed report, but
that, when the bill of the Senator from South Carolina (to extend the
provisions of the Deposit Act to the surplus revenues remaining in the
treasury on the 1st of January, 1838) came up for consideration, he
should feel bound to assign the reasons which governed the committee
in the course they had adopted.]

Mr. Calhoun, in reply, said, that, although he very
much regretted that they were not to have a detailed report,
yet he must be permitted to say that he thought the course
of the committee a very unusual one. A bill of acknowledg
ed importance, if he might judge from the President's Mes
sage and the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, together
with the course of the Senate last session, was, after a full
debate, referred to the Committee on Finance, because that

584 SPEECHES.

committee was particularly constituted to advise on the
subjects to which it related ; yet that committee treated it
as one of the most insignificant questions, and despatched it
without a written report. This all might be very right, but
it certainly was very extraordinary and unusual.

He had been here many years, both as presiding officer
and as a member of the body, and he must say, that this
was the first time he had ever known a question to be put
to the chairman of a committee which he refused to answer.
As a representative of one of the States of this Union, he
must say that he had a right to an answer. The bill had
gone to the committee, had received its disapprobation, and
the committee ought to let them know the grounds on which
they objected to it. If there was no surplus, let us, said
Mr. 0., hear the committee say so. If there was one, then,
said he, let us hear what objections the committee have to
depositing it with the States. He made no complaints ; but
he must say the course of the committee was very extraordi
nary.

[Mr. Hubbard of New Hampshire here made some remarks in
opposition to the course adopted by the committee, and to the motion
of Mr. Benton, as calculated, if not designed, to mislead the State
Legislatures and the people.

Mr. Benton replied at some length in defence of the report, and
his own course, when Mr. Calhoun again rose and remarked :]

That he found the information, which the gentleman from
Missouri was so anxious to give the country, was already
before the Senate in a very authentic form. It was to be
found in the table of estimates accompanying the report of
the Secretary of the Treasury. He argued that, according
to the assertion of the Secretary of the Treasury, who
estimated the unexpended balances of appropriations at
$14,636,063, the sum of $3,013,389 would not be wanted.
The Senator, therefore, in sending out a document, setting

SPEECHES. 585

forth that $14,500,000 were required for outstanding appro
priations, would mislead the public, and make a false impres
sion. Mr. C. contended that, taking the five millions which
must be left in the treasury, on account of the Deposit Act,
from the eleven and odd remaining of the fourteen millions,
together with the money at present in the hands of the dis
bursing officers, there would be funds enough on hand, within
a small amount, to meet the outstanding appropriations.
Now, when it was admitted by every one that the surplus
which would be on hand at the end of the next year would
amount to at least twenty-five millions of dollars (and, for
himself, he entertained no doubt that it would be thirty,
unless the country should be disturbed by a war or some
other unforeseen catastrophe), he would seriously ask, was
there a Senator on the floor, of any party, who would say,
in a time of profound peace (for he would not call the
Seminole war interrupting the peace of the Union), and
recollecting the fact that this administration came in as a
reform administration, that a tax should be raised, or that
the money distributed under the Deposit Bill should be re
funded, in order to make extravagant appropriations ? He
(Mr. Calhoun) could not believe it. He knew that attempts
would be made to prevent the renewal of the Deposit Act,
though he could not say that this was one of them. But let
him tell gentlemen that these attempts would only produce
a reaction, and end in their defeat.

Mr. C., in conclusion, adverted to the subject of a reduc
tion of the revenue, and the necessity of bringing it down to
the legitimate wants of the Government. He insisted that
the Committee on Finance, to whom was referred the con
sideration of this matter, were bound to show, in a satisfac
tory manner, either that there would be a surplus next year,
or to admit the necessity of making an adequate reduction
of the revenue.

586 SPEECHES.

[Mr. Benton here again rose, and spoke at some length.]

Mr. Calhoun, in reply, said : He had certainly made no
complaint of inaccuracy on the part of the Secretary of the
Treasury. He presumed that his calculations were perfectly
accurate ; but what he complained of was, that the Senator
from Missouri proposed to send out a document which was
not correct, with a view to show the outstanding appropria
tions remaining unsatisfied. He maintained that the docu
ment was entirely pernicious ; for it set forth what was not
really the truth of the case, and all that he desired was that
the public should not be deceived on the subject.

SPEECH

On the bill for the Admission of Michigan, delivered
in the Senate, Jan'y 2, 1837.

[MR. GRUNDY moved that the previous orders of the day be post
poned, for the purpose of considering the Bill to admit the State of
Michigan into the Union.

Mr. Calhoun was opposed to the motion ; the documents accom
panying the Bill had but this morning been laid upon the table, and
no time had been allowed for even reading them over.

Mr. Grundy insisted on his motion. Of one point he was fully sat
isfied, that Michigan had a right to be received into the Union ; on this,
he presumed, there would be but little difference of opinion, the chief
difficulty having respect to the mode in which it was to be done. There
seemed more difference of opinion, and he presumed there would be
more debate, touching the preamble than concerning the Bill itself; but
he could not consent to postpone the subject. Congress was daily
passing laws, the effect of which pressed immediately upon the people
of Michigan, and concerning which they were entitled to have a voice
and a vote upon this floor ; and, therefore, the Bill for their admission
ought to receive the immediate action of the Senate. As to the docu-

SPEECHES. 587

mcntSj they were not numerous. The gentleman from South Carolina
might readily run his eye over them, and he would perceive that the
facts of the case were easily understood. Indeed, there was but one of
any consequence, respecting which there was any controversy. When
the Senate adjourned on Thursday, many Senators had been prepared
and were desirous to speak, although the documents were not then
printed. It was the great principles involved in the case which would
form the subjects of discussion, and they could as well be discussed
now. He thought the Senate had better proceed. One fact in the
case was very certain ; there had been more votes for the members to
the last convention than for the first. How many more was a matter
of little comparative consequence. The great question for the Senate
to consider was this : What is the will of Michigan on the subject of en
tering the Union ?

If this should be decided, it was of less consequence whether the Bill
should or should not expressly state that the last convention, and the
assent by it given, formed the ground of the admission of the State.

Mr. Calhoun here inquired whether the chairman of the committee
was to be understood as being now ready to abandon the preamble ?
If the Judiciary Committee were agreed to do this, he thought all diffi
culty would be at an end.

Mr. Grundy replied, that, as chairman of the Judiciary Committee
he had no authority to reply to the inquiry, but, as an individual, he
considered the preamble as of little consequence, and he should vote for
the Bill whether it were in or out. Michigan ought undoubtedly to be
admitted, and all the consequences would result, whether the preamble
were retained or not. He had received no authority from the commit
tee to consent that it should be stricken out For himself he was set
tled in the belief that Congress possessed full power to prescribe the
boundaries of a territory, and that when that territory passed into a
State the right remained still the same. Congress had already estab
lished the boundary of Ohio, and that settled the question. He never
had perceived the necessity of inserting in the Admission Bill the sec
tion which made the assent of Michigan to the boundaries fixed for her
by Congress a prerequisite to her admission, because the disputed
boundary line was fixed by another bill ; and whether the preamble
to this Bill should be retained or not, Michigan could not pass the line,
so that the preamble was really of very little consequence.

588 SPEECHES.

Mr. Calhoun said that? in inquiring of the honorable chairman
whether he intended to abandon the preamble of the Bill, his question
had had respect not to any pledge respecting boundaries, but to the re
cognition of the second convention and of its doings. He wanted to
know whether the chairman was ready to abandon that principle. He
had examined the subject a good deal, and his own mind was fully
made up that Michigan could not be admitted on the ground of that
second convention ; but the Senate might set aside the whole of what
had been done, and receive Michigan as she stood at the commence
ment of the last session.

Mr. Grundy observed that, if the gentleman's mind was fully made
up, then there could be no necessity of postponing the subject. The
gentleman has fully satisfied himself, and now, said Mr. G., let us see
if he can satisfy us. His argument, it seems, has been fully matured,
and we are now ready to listen to it. Though I consider that there
is no virtue in the preamble, and that the effect of the Bill will be the
same whether it is stricken out or retained ; yet I am not ready to say
that I shall vote to strike it out. I am ready to hear what can be said
both for and against it.

The question was now put on the motion of Mr. Grundy to post
pone the previous orders, and carried, 22 to 16. So the orders were
postponed, and the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which having
been again read at the Clerk's table as follows :

A Bill to admit the State of Michigan into the Union upon an equal
footing with the original States.

Whereas, in pursuance of the act of Congress of June the fifteenth,
eighteen hundred and thirty-six, entitled "An act to establish the
northern boundary of the State of Ohio, and to provide for the admis
sion of the State of Michigan into the Union, upon the conditions therein
expressed," a convention of delegates, elected by the people of the said
State of Michigan, for the sole purpose of giving their consent to the
boundaries of the said State of Michigan as described, declared, and estab
lished, in and by the said act, did on the fifteenth of December, eighteen
hundred and thirty-six, assent to the provisions of said act : therefore,

Be it enacted, &c. That the State of Michigan shall be one, and is
hereby declared to be one, of the United States of America, and ad
mitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States in
all respects whatever.

SPEECHES. 589

SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That the Secretary of the Trea
sury, in carrying into effect the thirteenth and fourteenth sections of
the twenty-third of June, eighteen hundred and thirty-six, entitled " An
act to regulate the deposits of the public money," shall consider the
State of Michigan as being one of the United States.

Mr. Calhoun then rose and addressed the Senate as follows :]

I HAVE bestowed on this subject all the attention that was
in my power, and; although actuated by a most anxious de
sire for the admission of Michigan into the Union, I find it
impossible to give my assent to this bill. I am satisfied the
Judiciary Committee has not bestowed upon the subject all
that attention which its magnitude requires ; and I can ex
plain, on no other supposition, why they should place the ad
mission on the grounds they have. One of the committee,
the Senator from Ohio on my left (Mr. Morris), has pro
nounced the grounds dangerous and revolutionary. He
might have gone further, and with truth pronounced them
utterly repugnant to the principles of the constitution.

I have not ventured this assertion, as strong as it is, with
out due reflection, and weighing the full force of the terms I
have used ; and do not fear, with an impartial hearing, to es
tablish its truth beyond the power of controversy.

To understand fully the objection to this bill, it is neces
sary that we should have a correct conception of the facts.
They are few, and may be briefly told.

Some time previous to the last session of Congress, the
Territory of Michigan, through its Legislature, authorized the
people to meet in convention, for the purpose of forming a
State Government. They met accordingly, and agreed up
on a constitution, which they forthwith transmitted to Con
gress. It was fully discussed in this Chamber, and, objection
able as the instrument was, an act was finally passed, which
accepted the constitution, and declared Michigan to be a
State, and admitted into tke Union, on the single condition,

590 SPEECHES.

that she should, by a convention of the people, assent to the
boundaries prescribed by the act. Soon after our adjourn
ment the Legislature of the State of Michigan (for she had
been raised by our assent to the dignity of a State) called
a convention of the people of the State, in conformity to the
act — which met at the time appointed, at Ann Arbor. After
full discussion, the convention withheld its assent, and for
mally transmitted the result to the President of the United
States. This is the first part of the story. I will now give
the sequel. Since then, during the last month, a self-con
stituted assembly met, — professedly as a convention of the
people of the State, — but without the authority of the State.
This unauthorized and lawless assemblage assumed the high
function of giving the assent of the State of Michigan to the
condition of admission, as prescribed in the act of Congress.
They communicated their assent to the Executive of the
United States, and he to the Senate. The Senate referred
his message to the Committee on the Judiciary, and that
committee reported this bill for the admission of the State.

Such are the facts out of which grows the important ques
tion, Had this self-constituted assembly the authority to as
sent for the State ? Had they the authority to do what is
implied in giving assent to the condition of admission ? That
assent introduces the State into the Union, and pledges it in
the most solemn manner to the constitutional compact which
binds these States in one confederated body ; imposes on her
all its obligations, and confers on her all its benefits. Had
this irregular, self-constituted Assemblage the authority to
perform these high and solemn acts of sovereignty in the name
of the State of Michigan ? She could only come in as a State,
and none could act or speak for her without her express au
thority ; and to assume the authority without her sanction is
nothing short of treason against the State.

Again : the assent to the conditions prescribed by Con
gress implies an authority in those who gave it, to supersede

SPEECHES. 591

in part the constitution of the State of Michigan ; for her
constitution fixes the boundaries of the State as part of that
instrument which the condition of admission entirely alters,
and to that extent the assent would supersede the constitu
tion ; and thus the question is presented, whether this self-
constituted assembly, styling itself a convention, had the
authority to do an act which necessarily implies the right to
supersede, in part, the constitution.

But further : the State of Michigan, through its legisla
ture, authorized a convention of the people, in order to de
termine whether the condition of admission should be assent
ed to or not. The convention met ; and, after mature de
liberation, it dissented from the condition of admission ; and
thus again the question is presented, whether this self-called,
self-constituted assemblage, this caucus — for it is entitled to
no higher name — had the authority to annul the dissent of
the State, solemnly given by a convention of the people, reg
ularly convoked under the express sanction of the constituted
authorities of the State ?

If all or any of these questions be answered in the nega
tive — if the self-created assemblage of December had no
authority to speak in the name of the State of Michigan —
if none to supersede any portion of her constitution — if none
to annul her dissent to the condition of admission regularly
given by a convention of the people of the State, convoked
by the authority of the State — to introduce her on its au
thority would be, not only revolutionary and dangerous, but
utterly repugnant to the principles of our constitution. The
question then submitted to the Senate is, Had that assem
blage the authority to perform these high and solemn acts ?

The chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary holds
that this self-constituted assemblage had the authority ; and
what is his reason ? Why, truly, because a greater number
of votes were given for those who constituted that assem
blage than for those who constituted the convention of the

592 SPEECHES.

people of the State, convened under its constituted author
ities. This argument resolves itself into two questions — the
first of fact, and the second of principle. I shall not discuss
the first. It is not necessary to do so. But if it were, it would
be easy to show that never was so important a fact so loosely
testified. There is not one particle of official evidence be
fore us. We had nothing but the private letters of indi
viduals, who do not know even the numbers that voted on
either occasion ; they know nothing of the qualification of
voters, nor how their votes were received, nor by whom
counted. Now, none knows better than the honorable chair
man himself, that such testimony as is submitted to us to
establish a fact of this moment, would not be received in the
lowest magistrate's court in the land. But I waive this. I
come to the question of the principle involved ; and what is
it ? The argument is, that a greater number of persons
voted for the last convention than for the first ; and therefore
the acts of the last of right abrogated those of the first ; in
other words, that mere numbers, without regard to the forms
of law, or the principles of the constitution, give authority.
The authority of numbers, according to this argument, sets
aside the authority of the law and the constitution. Need I
show that such a principle goes to the entire overthrow of
our constitutional Government, and would subvert all social
order ? It is the identical principle which prompted the late
revolutionary and anarchical movement in Maryland, and
which has done more to shake confidence in our system of
government than any event since the adoption of our con
stitution, — but which, happily, has been frowned down by
the patriotism and intelligence of the people of that State.

What was the ground of this insurrectionary measure,
but that the government of Maryland did not represent the
voice of the numerical majority of the people of Maryland,
and that the authority of law and constitution was nothing
against that of numbers ? Here we find, on this floor, and

SPEECHES. 593

from the head of the Judiciary Committee, the same princi
ple revived, and, if possible, in a worse form ; for, in Mary
land, the anarchists assumed that they were sustained by
the numerical majority of the people of the State in their
revolutionary movements ; but the utmost the chairman can
pretend to have is a mere plurality. The largest number of
votes claimed for this self-created assemblage is 8,000 ; and
no man will undertake to say that this constitutes any thing
like a majority of the voters of Michigan : and he claims
the high authority which he does for it, not because it is a
majority of the people of Michigan, but because it is a
greater number than voted for the authorized convention of
the people that refused to agree to the condition of admis
sion. It may be shown by his own witness, that a majority
of the voters of Michigan greatly exceed 8,000. Mr. Wil
liams, the president of the self-created assemblage, states that
the population of that State amounted to nearly 200,000
persons. If so, there cannot be less than from 21,000 to
30,000 voters, considering how nearly universal the right
of suffrage is under its constitution ; and it thus appears
that this irregular, self-constituted meeting, did not represent
the vote of one-third of the State : and yet, on a mere prin
ciple of plurality, we are to supersede the • constitution of
Michigan, and annul the act of a convention of the people
regularly convened under the authority of the government
of the State.

But. says the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Bucha
nan), this assembly was not self-constituted. It met under
the authority of an act of Congress ; and that act had no refer
ence to the State, but only to the people ; and that the assem
blage in December was just such a meeting as that act contem
plated. It is not my intention to discuss the question, whether
the honorable Senator has given a plausible interpretation to
the act ; but, if he has, I could very easily show his interpreta
tion to be erroneous ; for, if such had been the intention of
VOL. ii.— 38 *

594 SPEECHES,

Congress, the act surely would have specified the time when
the convention was to be held — who were to be the managers
—who the voters — and would not have left it to individuals,
who might choose to assume the authority to determine all
these important points. I might also readily show that the
word " convention " of the people, as used in law or the consti
tution, always means a meeting of the people regularly conven
ed by the constituted authority of the States, in their high sov
ereign capacity, and never such an assemblage as the one in
question. But I waive this ; I take higher ground. If the
act be, indeed, such as the Senator says it is, then I main
tain that it is utterly opposed to the fundamental principles
of our Federal Union. Congress has no right whatever to
call a convention in a State. It can call but one convention,
and that is a convention of the United States to amend the
federal constitution ; nor can it call that, except authorized
by two-thirds of the States.

Ours is a Federal Republic — a union of States. Michi
gan is a State, — a State in the course of admission, — and dif
fering only from the other States in her federal relations.
She is declared to be a State in the most solemn manner by
your own act. She can come into the Union only as a State ;
and by her voluntary assent, given by the people of the State
in convention, called by the constituted authorities of the
State. To admit the State of Michigan on the authority
of a self-created meeting, or one called by the direct author
ity of Congress, passing by the authorities of thg State,
would be the most monstrous proceeding under our constitu
tion that can be conceived ; the most repugnant to its prin
ciples, and dangerous in its consequences. It would establish
a direct relation between the individual citizens of a State
and the General Government, in utter subversion of the fed
eral character of our system. The relation of their citizens
to this Government, is through the States exclusively. They
are subject to its authority and laws only because the State

SPEECHES. 595

has assented to it. If she dissents, their assent is nothing ;
on the other hand, if she assents, their dissent is nothing.
It is through the State, then, and through the State alone,
that the United States Government can have any connection
with the people of a State ; and does not, then, the Senator
from Pennsylvania see, that if Congress can authorize a con
vention of the people in the State of Michigan, without the
authority of the State — it matters not what is the object —
it may in like manner authorize conventions in any other
State for whatever purpose it may think proper.

Michigan is as much a sovereign State as any other — dif
fering only, as I have said, as to her federal relations. If we
give our sanction to the assemblage of December, on the'
principle laid down by the Senator from Pennsylvania, then
we establish the doctrine that Congress has power to call, at
pleasure, conventions within the States. Is there a Senator
on this floor who will assent to such a doctrine ? Is there
one especially, who represents the smaller States of this
Union, or the weaker section ? Admit the power, and every
vestige of State Eights would be 'destroyed. Our system
would be subverted ; and instead of a confederacy of free
and sovereign States, we would have all power concentrated
here, and this would become the most odious despotism. He,
indeed, must be blind, who does not see that such a power
would give the Federal Government a complete control of all
the States. I call upon Senators now to arrest a doctrine so
dangerous. Let it be remembered, that, under our system,
bad precedents live for ever ; good one's only perish. We
may not feel all the evil consequences at once, but this pre
cedent, once set, will surely be revived, and will become the
instrument of infinite evil.

It will be asked, what shall be done ? Will you refuse
to admit Michigan into the Union ? I answer, no : I desire
to admit her ; and if the Senators from Indiana and Ohio
will agree, am ready to admit her as she stood at the begin-

596 SPEECHES.

ning of the last session, without giving sanction to the unau
thorized assemblage of December.

But if this does not meet their wishes, there is still an
other way, by which she may be admitted. We are told
two-thirds of the legislature and people of Michigan are in
favor of accepting the conditions of the act of last session.
If that be the fact, then all that is necessary is, that the leg
islature shall call another convention. All difficulty will
thus be removed, and there will be still abundant time for
her admission at this session. And shall we, for the sake of
gaining a few months, give our assent to a bill fraught with
principles so monstrous as this ?

We have been told that, unless she is admitted imme
diately, it will be too late for her to receive her proportion of
the surplus revenue under the Deposit Bill. I trust that, on
so great a question, a difficulty like this will have no weight.
Give her at once her full share. I am ready to do so at once,
without waiting her admission. I was mortified to hear, on
so grave a question, such motives assigned for her admission,
contrary to the law and the constitution. Such considerations
ought not to be presented when we are settling great consti
tutional principles. I trust that we shall pass by all such
frivolous motives on this occasion, and take ground on the
great and fundamental principle that an informal, irregular,
self-constituted assembly — a mere caucus, has no authority
to speak for a sovereign State in any case whatever ; to su
persede its constitution, or to reverse its dissent deliberately
given by a convention of the people of the State, regularly
convened under its constituted authorities.

SPEECHES. 597

SPEECH

On the same subject, delivered in the Senate, Janu
ary 5, 1837.

[MR. GRUBBY, chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, having
moved that the Bill to admit the State of Michigan into the Union be
now read a third time —

Mr. Calhoun addressed the Senate in opposition to the Bill.]

I HAVE, said Mr. C., been connected with this Govern
ment more than half the term of its existence, in various
capacities ; and during that long period I have looked on its
action with attention, and have endeavored to make myself
acquainted with the principles and character of our political
institutions, — and I can truly say that, within that time, no
measure has received the sanction of Congress which has ap
peared to me more unconstitutional and dangerous than the
present. It assails our political system in its weakest point,
and where, at this time, it most requires defence.

The great and leading objections to the bill rest mainly
on the ground that Michigan is a State. They have been
felt by its friends to have so much weight, that its advocates
have been compelled to deny the fact, as the only way of
meeting the objections. Here, then, is the main point at
issue between the friends and the opponents of the bill.
It turns on a fact, and that fact presents the question, Is
Michigan a State ?

If, said Mr. C., there ever was a party committed on a fact
— if there ever was one estopped from denying it — that party
is the present majority in the Senate, — and that fact is, that
Michigan is a State. It is the very party who urged through
this body, at the last session, a bill for the admission of the
State of Michigan — which accepted her constitution, and

598 SPEECHES.

declared in the most explicit and strongest terms that she
was a State. I will not take up the time of the Senate by
reading this solemn declaration. It has frequently been
read during this debate, is familiar to all who hear me, and
has not been questioned or denied. But it has been said
there is a condition annexed to the declaration, with which
she must comply, before she can become a State. There is,
indeed, a condition ; but it has been shown by my colleague
and others, from the plain wording of the act, that the con
dition is not attached to the acceptance of the constitution,
nor the declaration that she is a State, but simply to her
admission into the Union. I will not repeat the argument,
but, in order to place the subject beyond controversy, I shall
recall to memory the history of the last session, as connected
with the admission of Michigan. The facts need but to be
referred to, in order to revive their recollection.

There were two points proposed to be effected by the
friends of the bill at the last session. The first was to settle
the controversy, as to boundary, between Michigan and
Ohio ; and it was this object alone which imposed the con
dition that Michigan should assent to the boundaiy pre
scribed by the act as the condition of her admission. But
there was another object to be accomplished. Two respect
able gentlemen, who had been elected by the State as Sena
tors, were then waiting to take their seats on this floor ; and
the other object of the bill was to provide for their taking
their seats as Senators on the admission of the State, — and
for this purpose it was necessary to make the positive and
unconditional declaration that Michigan was a State, — as a
State only could choose Senators, by an express provision of
the constitution ; and hence the admission was made con
ditional, and the declaration that she was a State was made
absolute, in order to effect both objects. To show that I
am correct, I will ask the Secretary to read the third section
of the bill.

SPEECHES. 599

[The section was read accordingly as follows : —

" SECT. 3. And be it further enacted, That, as a compliance with the
fundamental condition of admission contained in the last preceding section
of this act, the boundaries of the said State of Michigan, as in that section
described, declared and established, shall receive the assent of a convention of
delegates elected by the people of said State, for the sole purpose of giving the
assent herein required ; and as soon as the assent herein required shall be
given, the President of the United States shall announce the same by pro
clamation ; and thereupon, and without any further proceedings on the
part of Congress, the admission of the said State into the Union, as one of
the United States of America, on an equal footing with all the original
States in every respect whatever, shall be considered as complete, and the
Senators and Representatives who have been elected by the said State as
its representative in the Congress of the United States, shall be entitled
to take their seats in the Senate and House of Reoresentatives respectively,
without further delay."]

Mr. Calhoun then asked — Does not every Senator see the
two objects — the one to settle the boundary, and the other to
admit her Senators to a seat in this body ; and that the sec
tion is so worded as to effect both, in the manner I have
stated ? If this needed confirmation, it would be found in the
debate on the passage of the bill, when the ground was openly
taken by the present majority, that Michigan had a right to
form her constitution, under the ordinance of 1787, with
out our consent ; and that she was of right, and in fact, a
State, beyond our control.

I will, said Mr, C., explain my own views on this point,
in order that the consistency of my course at the last and
present session may be clearly seen.

My opinion was, and still is, that the movement of the
people of Michigan in forming for themselves a State consti
tution, without waiting for the assent of Congress, was re
volutionary, as it threw off the authority of the United States
over the territory ; and that we were left at liberty to treat
the proceedings as. revolutionary, and to remand her to her
territorial condition, — or to waive the irregularity, and to re-

600 SPEECHES.

cognize what was done as rightfully done, — as our authority
alone was concerned.

My impression was, that the former was the proper
course ; but I also thought that the act remanding her back
should contain our assent in the usual manner for her to
form a constitution, and thus to leave her free to become a
State. This, however, was overruled. The opposite opinion
prevailed, — that she had a perfect right to do what she had
done, and that she was, as I have stated, a State both in
fact and right, and that we had no control over her ; and our
act accordingly recognized her as a State, from the time she
had adopted her constitution, and admitted her into the
Union on the condition of her assenting to the prescribed
boundaries. Having thus solemnly recognized her as a
State, we cannot now undo what was then done. There
were, in fact, many irregularities in the proceedings, all of
which were urged in vain against its passage ; but the Pre
sidential election was then pending, and the vote of Michigan
was considered of sufficient weight to overrule all objections,
and correct all irregularities. They were all accordingly
overruled, and we cannot now go back.

Such was the course, and such the acts of the majority
at the last session. A few short months have since passed.
Other objects are now to be effected, and all is forgotten as
completely as if they had never existed. The very Senators
who then forced the act through, on the ground that Michi
gan was a State, have wheeled completely round, to serve the
present purpose, and taken directly the opposite ground !
We live in strange and inconsistent times. Opinions are
taken up and laid down, as suits the occasion, without hesi
tation, or the slightest regard to principle or consistency. It
indicates an unsound state of the public mind, pregnant with
future disasters.

I turn to the position now assumed by the majority to
suit the present occasion ; and, if I mistake not, it will be

SPEECHES. 601

found as false in fact, and as erroneous in principle, as it is in
consistent with that maintained at the last session. They now
take the ground, that Michigan is not a State, and cannot,
in fact, be a State till she is admitted into the Union ; and
this on the hroad principle that a territory cannot become a
State till admitted. Such is the position distinctly taken by
several of the friends of this bill, and implied in the argu
ments of nearly all who have spoken in its favor. In fact,
its advocates had no choice. As untenable as it is, they
were forced on this desperate position. They had no other
which they could occupy.

I have shown that it is directly in the face of the law of
the last session, and that it denies the recorded acts of
those who now maintain it. I now go further, and assert
that it is in direct opposition to plain and unquestion
able matter of fact. There is no fact more certain than that
Michigan is a State. She is in the full exercise of sovereign
authority, with a legislature and a chief magistrate. She
passes laws ; she executes them ; she regulates titles ; and
even takes away life — all on her own authority. Ours has
entirely ceased over her ; and yet there are those who can
deny, with all these facts before them, that she is a State.
They might as well deny the existence of this Hall ! We
have long since assumed unlimited control over the consti
tution, to twist, and turn, and deny it, as it suited our pur
pose ; — and it would seem that we are presumptuously at
tempting to assume like supremacy over facts themselves,
as if their existence or non-existence depended on our
volition. I speak freely. The occasion demands that the
truth should be boldly uttered.

But those who may not regard their own recorded acts, nor
the plain facts of the case, may possibly feel the awkward
condition in which coming events may shortly place them.
The admission of Michigan is not the only point involved in
the passage of this bill. A question will follow, — which may

602 SPEECHES.

be presented to the Senate in a very few days, — as to the
right of Mr. Norvell and Mr. Lyon, the two respectable
gentlemen who have been elected Senators of Michigan, to
take their seats in this Hall. The decision of this question
will require a more sudden facing about than has been yet
witnessed. It required seven or eight months for the ma
jority to wheel about from the position maintained at the
last session to that taken at this, but there may not be allow
ed them now as many days to wheel back to the old position.
These gentlemen cannot be refused their seats after the ad
mission of the State by those gentlemen who passed the act
of the last session. It provides for the case. I now put it
to the friends of this bill, and I ask them to weigh the ques
tion deliberately — to bring it home to their bosoms and con
sciences before they answer — Can a territory elect Senators
to Congress ? The constitution is express ; States only can
choose Senators. Were not these gentlemen chosen long be
fore the admission of Michigan ; before the Ann Arbor
meeting, and while Michigan was, .according to the doctrines
of the friends of this bill, a territory ? Will they, in the face
of the constitution, which they are sworn to support, admit
as Senators on this floor those who, by their own statement,
were elected by a territory ? These questions may soon be
presented for decision. The majority, who are forcing this
bill through, are already committed by the act of the last
session, and I leave them to reconcile, as they can, the
ground they now take with the vote they must give when
the question of their right to take their seats is presented for
decision.

A total disregard of all principle and consistency has so
entangled this subject, that there is but one mode left of
extricating ourselves without trampling the constitution in
the dust ; and that is, to return back to where we stood when
the question was first presented ; to acquiesce in the right of
Michigan to form a constitution, and erect herself into a

SPEECHES. 603

%

State, under the ordinance of 1787 ; and to repeal so much
of the act of the last session as prescribed the condition on
which she was to be admitted. This was the object of the
amendment which I offered last evening, in order to relieve the
Senate from its present dilemma. The amendment involved
the merits of the whole case. It was too late in the day for
discussion, and I asked for indulgence till to-day, that I might
have an opportunity of presenting my views. Under the iron
rule of the present majority, the indulgence was refused, and
the bill ordered to its third reading ; and I have been thus
compelled to address the Senate when it is too late to amend
the bill, and after a majority have committed themselves both
as to its principles and details. Now, of such proceedings I
complain not. I, as one of the minority, ask no favors. All
I ask is, that the constitution be not violated. Hold it
sacred, and I shall be the last to complain.

I now return to the assumption, that a territory cannot
become a State till admitted into the Union, which is now
relied on with so much confidence to prove that Michigan is
not a State. I reverse the position. I assert the opposite,
that a territory cannot be admitted till she becomes a State ;
and in this, I stand on the authority of the constitution itself,
which expressly limits the power of Congress to admitting
new States into the Union. But, if the constitution had been
silent, he would indeed be ignorant of the character of our
political system, who does not see that States, sovereign and
independent communities, and not territories, can only be
admitted. Ours is a Union of States, a Federal Kepublic.
States, and not territories, form its component parts, bound
together by a solemn league, in the form of a constitutional
compact. In coming into the Union, the State pledges its
faith to this sacred compact ; an act which none but a sov
ereign and independent community is competent to perform ;
and, of course, a territory must first be raised to that con
dition before she can take her stand among the confederated

604 SPEECHES.

»

States of our Union. How can a territory pledge its faith
to the constitution ? It has no will of its own. You give it
all its powers, and you can at pleasure overrule all her actions.
If she enters as a territory, the act is yours, not hers. Her
consent is nothing without your authority and sanction. Can
you — can Congress, become a party to the constitutional
compact ? How absurd.

But I arn told, if this be so, if a territory must become
a State before it can be admitted, it would follow that she
might refuse to enter the Union after she had acquired the
right of acting for herself. Certainly she may. A State
cannot be forced into the Union. She must come in by her
own free assent, given in her highest sovereign capacity
through a convention of the people of the State. Such is the
constitutional provision ; and those who make the objection
must overlook both the constitution and the elementary prin
ciples of our Government, of which the right of self-govern
ment is the first; the right of every people to form their
own government, and to determine their political condition.
This is the doctrine on which our fathers acted in our glorious
Eevolution, which has done more for the cause of liberty
throughout the world than any event within the records of
history, — and on which the Government has acted from the
first, as regards all that portion of our extensive territory that
lies beyond the limits of the original States. Read the ordi
nance of 1787, and the various acts for the admission of new
States, and you will find the principle invariably recognized
and acted on, to the present unhappy instance, without any
departure from it, except in the case of Missouri. The ad
mission of Michigan is destined, I fear, to mark a great
change in the history of the admission of new States ; a total
departure from the old usage, and the noble principle of self-
government on which that usage was founded. Every thing,
thus far, connected with her admission, has been irregular
and monstrous. I trust it is not ominous. Surrounded by

SPEECHES. 605

lakes within her natural limits (which ought not 'to have
been departed from), and possessed of fertile soil and genial
climate, with every prospect of wealth, power, and influence,
who but must regret that she should be ushered into the
Union in a manner so irregular and unworthy of her future
destiny.

But I will waive these objections, constitutional and all.
I will suppose, with the advocates of the bill, that a terri
tory cannot become a State till admitted into the Union.
Assuming all this, I ask them to explain to me how the mere
act of admission can transmute a territory into a State ?
By whose authority would she be made a State ? By ours ?
How can we make a State ? We can form a territory ; we
can admit States into the Union ; but, I repeat the question,
how can we make a State ? I had supposed this Govern
ment was the creature of the States — formed by their au
thority, and dependent on their will for its existence. Can
the creature form the creator ? If not by our authority,
then by whose ? Not by her own — that would be absurd.
The very act of admission makes her a member of the Con
federacy, with no other or greater power than is possessed by
all the others ; all of whom, united, cannot create a State.
By what process, then, by what authority, can a territory
become a State, if not one before it is admitted ? Who can
explain ? How full of difficulties, compared to the long estab
lished, simple, and noble process which' has prevailed to the
present instant. According to old usage, the General Gov
ernment first withdraws its authority over a certain portion
of its territory, as soon as it has a sufficient population to
constitute a State. .They are thus left to themselves freely
to form a constitution, and to exercise the noble right of self-
government. They then present their constitution to Congress,
and ask the privilege (for one it is of the highest character)
to become a member of this glorious confederacy of States.
The constitution is examined, — and, if republican, as required

606 SPEECHES.

by the federal constitution, she is admitted, with no other
condition except such as may be necessary to secure the au
thority of Congress over the public domain within her limits.
This is the old, the established form, instituted by our ances
tors of the Revolution, who so well understood the great prin
ciples of liberty and self-government. How simple ! how
sublime ! What a contrast to the doctrines of the present
day, and the precedent which, I fear, we are about to estab
lish ! And shall we fear, so long as these sound principles are
observed, that a State will reject this high privilege — will
refuse to enter this Union ? No ; she will rush into your
embrace, so long as your institutions are worth preserving.
When the advantages of the Union shall have become a
matter of calculation and doubt ; when new States shall pause
to determine whether the Union is a curse or blessing, the
question which now agitates us will cease to have any im
portance.

Having now, I trust, established beyond all controversy,
that Michigan is a State, I come to the great point at issue
— to the decision of which all that has been said is but pre
paratory — Had the self-created assembly which met at Ann
Arbor the authority to speak in the name of the people of
Michigan ; to assent to the conditions contained in the act of
the last session ; to supersede a portion of the constitution of
the State, and to overrule the dissent of the convention of
the people — regularly called by the constituted authorities of
the State — to the condition of admission ? I shall not repeat
what I said when I first addressed the Senate on this bill.
We all, by this time, know the character of that assemblage ;
that it met without the sanction of the authorities of the
State ; and that it did not pretend to represent one-third of
the people. We all know that the State had regularly con
vened a convention of the people, expressly to take into con
sideration the condition on which it was proposed to admit
her into the Union ; and that the convention, after full

SPEECHES. 607

deliberation, had declined to give its assent by a considerable
majority. With a knowledge of all these facts, I put the
question — Had the assembly a right to act for the State ?
Was it a convention of the people of Michigan in the true,
legal, and constitutional sense of that term ? Is there one
within the limits of my voice, that can lay his hand on his
breast, and honestly say, it was ? Is there one that does not
feel that it was neither more nor less than a mere caucus —
nothing but a party caucus — of which we have the strongest
evidence in the perfect unanimity of those who assembled ?
Not ta vote was given against admission. Can there be
stronger proof that it was a meeting got up by party ma
chinery, for party purpose ?

But I go further. It was not only a party caucus, for
party purpose, but a criminal meeting — a meeting to subvert
the authority of the State, and to assume its sovereignty. I
know not whether Michigan has yet passed laws to guard her
sovereignty. It may be that she has not had time to enact
laws for this purpose, which no community is long without ;
but I do aver, if there be such an act, or if the common
law be in force in the State, the actors in that meeting
might be indicted, tried, and punished for the very act on
wliicli it is now proposed to admit the State into the Union.
If such a meeting as this were to undertake to speak in the
name of South Carolina, we would speedily teach its authors
what they owed to the authority and dignity of the State.
The act was not only in contempt of the authority of the
State of Michigan, but a direct insult to this Government.
Here is a self-created meeting, convened for a criminal
object, which has dared to present to this Government
an act of theirs, and to ask that we receive it as a
fulfilment of the condition which we had prescribed for
the admission of the State ! Yet, I fear, forgetting our own
dignity, and the rights of Michigan, that we are about to

608 SPEECHES.

recognize the validity of the act, and quietly to submit to the
insult.

The year 1836, said Mr. C., is destined to mark the
most remarkable change in our political institutions, since
the adoption of the constitution. The events of the year
have made a deeper innovation on the principles of the con
stitution, and evinced a stronger tendency to revolution, than
any which have occurred from its adoption to the present
day. Sir, said Mr. C. (addressing the Vice-President), duty
compels me to speak of facts intimately connected with
yourself. In deference to your feelings as presiding officer of
the body, I shall speak of them with all possible reserve —
much more reserve than I should otherwise have done if you
did not occupy that seat. Among the first of these events,
which I shall notice, is the caucus at Baltimore ; that too,
like the Ann Arbor caucus, has been dignified with the
name of a convention of the people. This caucus was got
up under the countenance and express authority of the Pre
sident himself ; and its edict, appointing you his successor,
has been sustained, — not only by the whole patronage and
power of the Government, but by his active personal influ
ence and exertion. Through its instrumentality he has suc
ceeded in controlling the voice of the people, and for the
first time the President has appointed his successor ; and
thus, the first great step — of converting our Government into
a monarchy, has been sustained. These are solemn and omi
nous facts. No one who has examined the result of the
last election can doubt their truth. It is now certain that
you are not the free and unbiased choice of the people of
these United States. If left to your own popularity, — with
out the active and direct influence of the President, and the
power and patronage of the Government, acting through a
mock convention of the people, — instead of the highest, you
would, in all probability, have been the lowest of the can
didates.

SPEECHES. 609

During the same year, the State in which this ill-omened
caucus convened, has been agitated by revolutionary move
ments of the most alarming character. Assuming the dan
gerous doctrine that they were not bound to obey the in
junctions of the constitution, because it did not place the
powers of the State in the hands of an unchecked numerical
majority, the electors belonging to the party of the Balti
more caucus, who had been chosen to appoint the State
Senators, refused to perform the functions for which they
had been elected, with the deliberate intention of subverting
the government of the State, and reducing her to the con
dition of a territory, till a new government could be formed.
And now we have before us a measure, not less revolution
ary, but of an opposite character. In the case of Mary
land, those who undertook, without the authority of law
or constitution, to speak and act in the name of the people
of the State, proposed to place her out of the Union by re
ducing her from a State to a territory ; but in this, those
who, in like manner, undertook to act for Michigan, have
assumed the authority to bring her into the Union without
her consent, the very condition which she had rejected
by a convention of the people, convened under the autho
rity of the State. If we sanction the authority of the
Michigan caucus to force a State into the Union without its
consent, why might we not here sanction a similar caucus in
Maryland, if one had been called, to place the State out of
the Union ?

These occurrences, which have distinguished the past
year, mark the commencement of no ordinary change in our
political system. They announce the ascendency of the cau
cus system over the regularly constituted authorities of the
country. I have long anticipated this event. In early life
my attention was attracted to the working of the caucus
system. It was my fortune to spend five or six years of my
youth in the northern portion of the Union, where, unfortu-
VOL. ii. — 39

610 SPEECHES.

nately, the system has so long prevailed. Though young,
I was old enough to take interest in public affairs, and to
notice the working of this odious party machine ; and,
after reflection, with the experience then acquired, has long
satisfied me that, in the course of .time, the edicts of the
caucus would eventually supersede the authority of law and
constitution. We have at last arrived at the commence
ment of this great change which is destined to go on till it
has consummated itself in the entire overthrow of all legal and
constitutional authority, unless speedily and effectually re
sisted. The reason is obvious : for obedience or disobe
dience to the edicts of the caucus, where the system is firmly
established, is more certainly and effectually rewarded or
punished, than obedience to the laws and to the constitution.
Disobedience to the former is sure to be followed by complete
political disfranchisement. It deprives the unfortunate indivi
dual who falls under its vengeance, of all public honors and
emoluments, and consigns him, if dependent on the Govern
ment, to poverty and obscurity ; while he who bows down
before its mandates, it matters not how monstrous, secures
to himself the honors of the State — becomes rich, and dis
tinguished, and powerful. Offices, jobs, and contracts, flow
on him and his connections. But to obey the law and re
spect the constitution, for the most part brings little except
the approbation of conscience — a reward, indeed, high and
noble, and prized by the virtuous above all other, — but, un
fortunately, little valued by the mass of mankind. It is
easy to see what must be the end, unless indeed, an effective
remedy be applied. Are we so blind as not to see in this,
why it is that the advocates of this bill — the friends of the
system, are so tenacious on the point that Michigan should
be admitted on the authority of the Ann Arbor caucus,
and on no other ? Do we not see why the amendment pro
posed by myself to admit her, by rescinding the condition
imposed at the last session, should be so strenuously op-

SPEECHES. 611

posed ? Why, even the preamble would not be surrendered ;
though many of our friends were willing to vote for the bill
on that slight concession, in their anxiety to admit the
State.

And here let me say, that I listened with attention to
the speech of the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Crittenden).
I know the clearness of his understanding, and the sound
ness of his heart ; and I am persuaded, in declaring that his
objection to the bill was confined to the preamble, that he
has not investigated the subject with the attention it de
serves. I feel the objections to the preamble are not with
out some weight ; but the true and insuperable objections
lie far deeper in the facts of the case, which would still
exist were the preamble expunged. It is these which render
it impossible to pass this bill without trampling under foot
the rights of the States, and subverting the first principles of
our Government. It would require but a few steps more to
effect a complete revolution, — and the Senator from North
Carolina has taken the first. I will explain. If you wish to
mark the first indications of a revolution, — the commencement
of those profound changes in the character of a people which
are working beneath before a ripple appears on the surface, —
look to the change of language. You will first notice it in
the altered meaning of important words ; — which, as it
indicates a change in the feelings and principles of the peo
ple, becomes, in turn, a powerful instrument in accelerating
the change, till an entire revolution is effected. The re
marks of the Senator will illustrate what I have said. He
told us that the terms " convention of the people " were of
very uncertain meaning, and difficult to be defined ; — but that
their true meaning was, any meeting of the people in their
individual and primary character for political purposes. I.
know it is difficult to define complex terms ; that is, to enu
merate all the ideas that belong to them, and exclude all
that do not ; but there is always, in the most complex,

612 SPEECHES.

some prominent idea which marks the meaning of the terms,
and in relation to which there is. usually no disagreement.
Thus, according to the old meaning (and which I had sup
posed was its legal and constitutional meaning), a convention
of the people invariably implied a meeting of the people,
either by themselves, or by delegates expressly chosen for the
purpose, in their high sovereign authority, — in express contra
distinction to such assemblies of individuals in their private
character, or having only derivative authority. It is, in a word,
a meeting of the people in the majesty of their power — in
that in which they may rightfully make or abolish constitu-
tutions, and put up or put down governments at their plea
sure. Such was the august conception which formerly en
tered the mind of every American, when the terms " conven
tion of the people " were used. But now, according to the
ideas of the dominant party, as we are told on the authority
of the Senator from North Carolina, it means any meeting
of individuals for political purposes, — and, of course, applies
to the meeting at Ann Arbor, or any other party caucus for
party purposes, which the leaders may choose to designate as a
convention of the people. It is thus the highest authority
known to our laws and constitution, is gradually sinking to
the level of those meetings which regulate the operation of
political parties, and through which, the edicts of their
leaders are announced, and their authority enforced ; or,
rather, to speak more correctly, the latter are gradually
rising to the authority of the former. When they come to
be completely confounded ; when the distinction between a
caucus and the convention of the people shall be completely
obliterated, — which the definition of the Senator, and the
acts q£ this body on this bill, would lead us to believe is not
far distant, — this fair political fabric of ours, erected by the
wisdom and patriotism of our ancestors, and once the gaze
and admiration of the world, will topple to the ground in
ruins.

SPEECHES. 613

It has, perhaps, been too much my habit to look more
to the future and less to the present, than is wise ; but such
is the constitution of my mind, that, when I see before me
the indications of causes calculated to effect important
changes in our political condition, I am led irresistibly to
trace them to their sources, and follow them out in their
consequences. Language has been held in this discussion
which is clearly revolutionary in its character and tendency,
and which warns us of the approach of the period when the
struggle will be between the conservatives and the destructives.
I understood the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchan
an) as holding language countenancing the principle, that
the will of a mere numerical majority is paramount to the
authority of law and constitution. He did not, indeed, an
nounce distinctly this principle, but it might fairly be in
ferred from what he said ; for he told us the people of a
State, where the constitution gives the same weight to a
smaller as to a greater number, might take the remedy into
their own hands ; meaning, as I understood him, that a
mere majority might, at their pleasure, subvert the constitu
tion and government of a State, — which he seemed to think
was the essence of democracy. Our little State has a con
stitution that could not stand a day against such doctrines,
and yet we glory in it as the best in the Union. It is a con
stitution which respects all the great interests of the State —
giving to each a separate and distinct voice in the manage
ment of its political affairs, — by means of which the feebler
interests are protected against the preponderance of the
stronger. We call our State a Republic — a Commonwealth,
not a Democracy ; and let me tell the Senator it is a far
more popular government than if it had been based on the
simple principle of the numerical majority. It takes more
voices to put the machine of government in motion, than
in those that the Senator would consider more popular. It
represents all the interests of the State, — and is in fact the

614 SPEECHES.

government of the people, in the true sense of the term,
and not that of the mere majority, or the dominant in
terests.

I am not familiar with the constitution of Maryland, to
which the Senator alluded, and cannot, therefore, speak of its
structure with confidence ; but I believe it to be somewhat
similar in its character to our own. That it is a government
not without its excellence, we need no better proof than the
fact, that, though within the shadow of Executive influence,
it has nobly and successfully resisted all the seductions by
which a corrupt and artful Administration, with almost
boundless patronage, has attempted to seduce her into its
ranks.

Looking, then, to the approaching struggle, I take my
stand immovably. / am a conservative in its broadest and
fullest sense, and such / shall ever remain, unless, indeed, the
Government shall become so corrupt and disordered, that
nothing short of revolution can reform it. I solemnly believe
that our political system is, in its purity, not only the best
that ever was formed, but the best possible that can be de
vised for us. It is the only one by which free States, so
populous and wealthy, and occupying so vast an extent of
territory, can preserve their liberty. Thus thinking, I can
not hope for a better. Having no hope of a better, I am a
conservative ; and because I am a conservative, I am a State
Eights man. I believe that in the rights of the States are
to be found the only effectual means of checking the over-
action of this Government ; to resist its tendency to concen
trate all power here, and to prevent a departure from the
constitution ; or, in case of one, to restore the Government
to its original simplicity and purity. State interposition, or,
to express it more fully, the right of a State to interpose
her sovereign voice as one of the parties to our constitutional
compact, against the encroachments of this Government, is
the only means of sufficient potency to effect all this ; and I

SPEECHES. 615

am, therefore, its advocate. I rejoiced to hear the Senator
from North Carolina (Mr. Brown), and from Pennsylvania
(Mr. Buchanan), do us the justice to distinguish between nul
lification and the anarchical and revolutionary movements in
Maryland and Pennsylvania. I know they did not intend it
as a compliment ; but I regard it as the highest. They are
right. Day and night are not more different — more unlike
in every thing. They are unlike in their principles, their
objects, and their consequences.

I shall not stop to make good this assertion, as I might
easily do. The occasion does not call for it. As a conserva
tive, and a State Eights man, or if you will have it, a nulli-
fier, I have resisted, and shall resist all encroachments on the
constitution — whether of this Government on the rights of
the States, or the opposite : — whether of the Executive on
Congre§s, or Congress on the Executive. My creed is to hold
both governments, and all the departments of each to their
proper sphere, — and to maintain the authority of the laws and
the constitution against all revolutionary movements. I be
lieve the means which our system furnishes to preserve itself
are ample, if fairly understood and applied ; and I shall resort
to them, however corrupt and disordered the times, so long-
as there is hope of reforming the Government. The result
is in the hands of the Disposer of events. It is my part to
do my duty. Yet, while I thus openly avow myself a con
servative, God forbid I should ever deny the glorious right
of rebellion and revolution. Should corruption and oppres
sion become intolerable, and not otherwise be thrown off —
if liberty must perish, or the government be overthrown, I
would not hesitate, at the hazard of life, to resort to revo
lution, and to tear down a corrupt government that could
neither be reformed nor borne by freemen. But I trust in
God things will never come to that pass. I trust never to
see such fearful times ; for fearful, indeed, they would be,
if they should ever befall us. It is the last remedy, and

616 SPEECHES.

not to be thought of till common sense and the voice of man
kind would justify the resort.

Before I resume my seat, I feel called on to make a few
brief remarks on a doctrine of fearful import, which has been
broached in the course of this debate — the right to repeal laws
granting bank charters, and, of course, of railroads, turnpikes,
and joint-stock companies. It^s a doctrine of fearful import
and calculated to do infinite mischief. There are countless
millions vested in such stocks, and it is a description of pro
perty of the most delicate character. To touch it is almost
to destroy it. But, while I enter my protest against all such
doctrines, I have been greatly alarmed with the thoughtless
precipitancy (not to use a stronger phrase) with which the
most extensive and dangerous privileges have been granted
of late. It can end in no good, and, I fear, may be the
cause of convulsions hereafter. We already feel the ef
fects on the currency, which no one competent of judging
can fail to see, is in an unsound condition. I must say (for
truth compels me) I have ever distrusted the banking sys
tem, at least in its present form, both in this country and
Great Britain. It will not stand the test of time ; but I
trust that all shocks, or sudden revolutions, may be avoided, —
and that it may gradually give way, before some sounder and
better regulated system of credit, which the growing intelli
gence of the age may devise. That a better may be substi
tuted I cannot doubt ; but of what it shall consist, and how
it shall finally supersede the present uncertain and fluctuat
ing currency, time alone can determine. All that I can see
is, that the present must, one day or another, come to an end,
or be greatly modified — if that, indeed, can save it from an
entire overthrow. It has within itself the seeds of its own
destruction.

SPEECHES. 617

SPEECH

On the Motion to recommit the Land Bill, introduced
by Mr. Walker, of Mississippi, to the Committee
on Public Lands; delivered in the Senate, Feb
ruary 4th, 1837.

[In the Senate, February 4th, 1837.— The Bill reported by Mr.
Walker, in respect to the proper disposition of the public lands, having
undergone various modifications, — and Mr. W. having declared that,
in the shape to which it had been reduced, the Bill could not receive
his support, it was about to be rejected : — when, to give the friends
of the measure a further chance, a motion was made to recommit it
to the Committee on Public Lands, in order that it might be reported
to the Senate in a more acceptable form. On this motion, Mr. C.
said :]

I SINCERELY hope that the motion for recommitment
will not prevail. The session is now far advanced ; but a
single month more remains, and this hill has already occu
pied more than its due share of the time and attention of
the Senate. The discussion which it has undergone has
shown that there exists in this body a great diversity of
opinion, not on the details only, hut on the principles of the
bill. A large portion of the Senate are under the impression
that nothing ought to he done ; and, among the residue who
are in favor of some hill, the difference of opinion seems to
he irreconcilable. If we recommit the bill, the inevitable
consequence will he, that we shall have a new set of propo
sitions to amend it, and a vast deal of time will be wasted
in vain attempts to reconcile things essentially irreconcilable.
For myself, I believe the bill to be radically wrong ; and
that no modifications which it is likely to assume can ever
make it right. I had intended to say something on the

618 SPEECHES.

general subject ; but it is now late, and I forego much of
what it was my purpose to have submitted to the Senate.
I will, however, as briefly as possible, throw out one or two
leading views in regard to it.

The proposed object of this bill is to restrict the sales of
the public lands, to put down speculation, and to prevent
the accumulation of a surplus revenue. Plausible objects,
I admit, and such as sound well to the ear ; but the prac
tical operation of the bill which promises them, will, as I
apprehend, lead to very different results. So many and so
subtle are the means by which those in power are able to
fleece the community without the people themselves being
aware of it, that the mere contemplation of the machinery is
almost enough to make any lover of his country despair. I
have long been sensible of this ; but if I were called upon to
select an instance, which, more than others, forcibly illus
trates the truth of the remark, I would refer any one who
doubted to the present bill. When we closely examine its
provisions, we shall perceive that, so far from repressing, its
effects will be to secure and consummate, the most enormous
speculations which have ever been witnessed on this con
tinent. These speculations have been produced by those in
power, — and the large profits they hope to realize are to be
consummated by the passage of this bill. The chairman of
the committee himself has told the Senate, that a body of
the public lands, greater in extent than the largest State
in the Union, has been seized upon by speculators. The
Senator from Georgia (Mr. King) states the amount at from
thirty to forty millions of dollars. This may be an over
estimate ; but, at the lowest calculation, the amount cannot
be less than twenty-five millions. What has produced this
vast investment ? What has thus suddenly rendered the
public lands an object of such enormous speculations ? What
but the state of the currency ? Our circulating medium has
nearly doubled in the space of three years. It has increased

SPEECHES. 619

from an average of six and a half dollars per head to an
average of ten dollars. And what has been the natural —
the inevitable consequence ? The rise of every thing, the
price of which is not kept down by some legal provision ;
the price of provisions and of labor has nearly doubled, while
the price of land has continued fixed by force of law. Is it,
then, any thing wonderful that land, under this restraint,
should have become an object of speculation ? There lies
the root of the evil. This enormous augmentation of the
circulating medium has filled all the channels of ordinary
business to repletion, and the overflow finds an outlet in
speculations. But who have been the authors of this state
of things ? Every body knows that it has been the work of
those in power. They began the experiment in 1833. They
were distinctly told what would be the result. They were
warned that bank capital would be increased, and, with it,
the circulation of paper money ; but, in the face of all
warning, all argument, the experiment went on. The only
existing check which had power to control the excessive issue
of bank paper was put down. The deposits of the public
money were transferred from where the laws had put them,
and placed in deposit banks arbitrarily selected at the will
of the Executive. The authors of the present state of things
are the very men who come here and propose to us this bill
as a remedy. These two facts should be put together, and
kept together, in the mind of every Senator who would form
a right judgment in the matter. The removal of the de
posits was the first step. We are now come to the second
step in the process. The men who accomplished the first
have already profited by it politically, and, if rumor speak
truly, in other ways also. Does any man here entertain
a doubt that high officers of Government have used those
depositories as instruments of speculation in the public
lands ? Is not the fact notorious ? Is not one in the imme
diate neighborhood of the Executive among those the most

620 SPEECHES.

deeply concerned ? Will this be denied ? Is it not well
known that several officers in the departments have pur
chased lands, to sell on speculation, with funds officially
under their own control ? How the same combination of
persons profited politically by the same movement, I shall
show hereafter.

Assuming, then, what cannot be denied, that the exces
sive increase of the circulating medium, produced by the
experiment, is the main cause of these speculations in the
public lands — and assuming, on the authority of universal
rumor, that high functionaries of the Government have
availed themselves of the state of things thus produced,
I come now to what is my main proposition, — namely, that
this bill is calculated to consummate those plans of specula
tion, and that without this measure, or something equivalent
to it, they must end in loss.

[Here some explanation took place between Mr. Calhoun and
Mr. Walker, as to the statements made by the latter in reference to the
probable effect of the rejection of this bill.]
9

Well, Sir, be it as the honorable chairman states. He
says now, that if the bill shall not become a law, the pur
chases of the public lands will continue to go on as they
have done for the last year. Admit it, and what must be
the consequence. Cannot all men perceive, that in this, as
in all other cases, over supply must operate to reduce the
price ? The honorable chairman tells us that the amount
of land required for fair and honest settlement, by the pro
gress of the country, is five millions of acres annually, and
that the amount taken upon speculation last year was thirty
millions. If this be so, then there is already in the hands
of speculators a six years' supply. Should all the land-
offices be closed to-morrow, the amount these speculators
hold would not be absorbed by the regular demands of the
country in less than six years. Now, the greater part of

SPEECHES. 621

these purchases has been made upon loans ; the interest is
running on ; and, unless the sales shall be in proportion, do
not all men see that the accumulation of unproductive lands
ifpon their hands must infallibly ruin those who are engaged
in such speculations ? Under these circumstances, the help
of legislation is the only thing that can relieve them. I re
peat it, — this bill, or something like it, is indispensable. It
puts a finish to the work. The land-offices being left open,
and no obstructions being thrown in the tvay of the purchase
for settlement, we may suppose that one -half of the five mil
lions annually required will be purchased from the Govern
ment. There will then remain only two and a half millions
to take of the thirty millions' stock which the speculators
already hold ; and, at this rate, it must be twelve years
before that stock can be disposed of ; and, if the stock is to
be augmented by new and large purchases during the present
year, the speculation must end in inevitable ruin. The
thing is plain — it cannot be denied — it calls for no demon
stration.

What, then, is resorted to, to prevent this disastrous
catastrophe ? The answer is found in the details of this
bill ; and I entirely concur with the Senator from Massa
chusetts (Mr. Davis), in pronouncing them most odious in
their character. No American citizen is to be left free to
purchase a portion of the public domain, the property of the
whole people of the United States, without a license. Yes ;
before he can buy the land which his own Government has
offered for sale, he must first take out a license. Odious as
I hold all licenses upon the press, or licenses upon trade,
I hold tins to be fully as obnoxious as either. A license to
purchase the public lands ! I cannot buy myself a farm,
though I have the money in my pocket, till I pay a dollar
and a quarter per acre for a license ; and then I do not get
a title until I have complied with the most onerous condi
tions ; and if, after I have paid my money, I see reasons to

622 SPEECHES.

change my mind, I cannot leave the land without forfeiting
all I have paid. If I find the situation to be sickly, I cannot
remain there without risking the lives of my family, — and I
cannot sell it to one more accustomed to the climate, without
incurring the pains of perjury as a speculator ; nor can I re
move without forfeiting the purchase-money.

But supposing the settler remains ; he is required to
consummate his title — not in a court of law, or before a
judicial officer, but before the register and receiver of the
district. I do not know how Senators from the new States
may feel, but this I know, that nothing under heaven could
induce me to place Carolinians in such circumstances. The
registers and receivers of a land-office to be judges in matters
of real estate ! Why, Sir, these persons, for the most part,
are political partisan^. They have obtained their offices as
a reward for services rendered at the election. Has not the
doctrine of the spoils been openly avowed on this floor ?
Has it not been unblushingly maintained, that the party
which obtains a political victory has, as a thing of course, a
right to all the offices of the State, and to the public money
into the bargain, so that they may control it entirely for
their own benefit ? I have a right, therefore, to assume
that, as a general thing, these registers and receivers will be
political partisans. What, then, will be the condition of a
large portion of our citizens ? Allowing the consumption of
public lands to be two and a half millions of acres a year,
you will have about a hundred thousand voters, the title to
whose earthly all will be in the hands of these registers
and receivers. Can any thing be conceived more odious ?
Would the license of the press itself be a measure more hate
ful or dangerous ? Sir, we have spent too much time in
considering so monstrous a proposition. I hope we shall not
waste upon it another moment.

But putting the political effects of this bill out of view —
let us inquire what will be its moral influence ? The Sena-

SPEECHES. 623

tor from New- York (Mr. Wright) told us, that he considered
the price of public land as already too high, and that he was
averse to placing it still higher. Sir, these were his words.
Now let us look at the face of the bill. Its practical effect
will be, an enormous increase in the price to be paid for the
public domain. I put it to any man of sound sense, whether
he would not rather give two dollars an acre, at once, for his
farm, and get a good title for his land, without further diffi
culty ? I would, most certainly. Consider the terms on
which he must buy. The moment he enters his land, under
this bill it becomes subject to State taxation ; but if he
buys from the speculators, it will not be so. The entire
mass of lands purchased last year, including some of the best
•parts of the public domain, is now held for sale free of taxa
tion, while lands purchased from the Government must im
mediately be taxed. What chance will the United States
lands have against such competition ? None at all ; the
speculators will have the complete monopoly. This, then, is
a question between the Government and the speculators. •
Our stock is one hundred and twenty millions ; theirs, thirty
millions. Our land is at a dollar and a quarter ; theirs, not
less than three dollars ; and here is a fair competition. But
this bill comes in and throws the market into the hands of
the speculators. In any other than these extraordinary
times, one would suppose that such objections would be fatal
to any bill. It is most obvious that, unless you throw re
strictions around the purchasers of land from the United
States, the object of the speculators must be defeated.

But we are asked, what is to be done with all this specu
lation ? I answer, let it alone, and it will run down of itself.
The times will react. The present state of things is arti
ficial ; it cannot possibly continue. Speculation, after it has
run its course, will run down, and that with far less injury
than will result from any attempt to put it down by legisla
tion. If, however, you do legislate, there are many expedi-

624 SPEECHES.

exits besides that proposed in this bill. In the first place,
you may raise the price of the public lands. This, to be
sure, will confer a great benefit on those who have already
purchased ; but it will check future speculation. I have,
however, no idea that any such measure will be resorted to ;
it would be very unpopular ; and the object which gentle
men have in view must be secured without the loss of per
sonal popularity. Then, in the second place, you may shut
the land-offices. This expedient, however, would be liable
to the same objections with the other, for you can hit upon
none which will not either be inoperative altogether, or of
great advantage to those who have already purchased. My
opinions in regard to the public lands have undergone a great
change in the course of this debate. I thought there was a
majority in this Senate who would resolutely object to all
rash changes in our land system. I hoped, most confidently,
that New England, at least, would have stood fast. I have
been disappointed. I hoped that the public lands would not
be drawn into our political contests. But in this, too, I have
been entirely disappointed. I see that the era has arrived
when our large capitalists are in a fair way to seize upon the
whole body of the public lands. This has compelled a great
change to take place in my mind. I greatly fear that we
have reached the time when the public domain must be lost
to the Government for all useful purposes. We may, in
deed, receive some amount of revenue from it, but it will be
accompanied with such agitations, and so much trouble and
political corruption, that the gain will not compensate for
the evil incurred.' I have made up my mind, if a fair con
cession can be made, to concede the whole to the new States,
on some fixed and well considered conditions. I am for
transferring the whole, on the condition that they shall pay
us a certain per cent, of the proceeds, and submit to the
necessary limitations as to the mode of bringing the lands
into market ; the permanent system of sale not to be dis-

SPEECHES. 625

turbed for some years ; and after that, the principle of
graduation to be prudently introduced. I have always felt
the force of the argument, that the new States are not now
placed upon an equal footing with the other members of the
Confederacy. They are full of land-officers, and other pub
lic agents under your control ; and in regard to the soil within
their limits, they sustain to us a relation which must ever be
productive of discontent and agitation. Whether a thing of
this kind can be safely done, I do not know ; but of this I
am fully persuaded — that such a measure would be infinitely
better than the scheme proposed in this bill. The Chairman
of the Committee on the Public Lands has avowed his own
earnest belief that the evils of the existing state of things
are such, that even a bill like this should be resorted to as a
preferable alternative. He considers a surplus in the treasury
as a great evil (and so do I, also, if it is to be permanent) ;
and his dread of a surplus is so great, that it has pre
vented him from regarding the details of this bill, as I am
persuaded he would have done, but for the bias thus
produced.

With these views, I conclude by expressing my hope
that the bill will not be recommitted ; but that we shall
either reject it, or suffer it to sleep by laying it on the
table.

SPEECH

On the reception of Abolition Petitions, delivered in
the Senate, February 6th, 1837.

IF the time of the Senate permitted, I would feel it to
be my duty to call for the reading of the mass of petitions
on the table, in order that we might know what language

VOL. II. 40

626 SPEECHES.

they hold towards the slaveholding States and their institu
tions ; but as it will not, I have selected, indiscriminately
_\ froinjthe pile, twoj one from those in manuscript, and the
other from the printed, and without knowing their contents
will call for the reading of them, so that we may judge, hy
them, of the character of the whole.

[Here the Secretary, on the call of Mr. Calhoun, read the two peti
tions.]

• Such, resumed Mr. C., is the language held towards us
and ours. The peculiar institution of the South — that, on the
maintenance of which the very existence of the slaveholding
States depends, is pronounced to he sinful and odious, in the
sight of God and man ; and this with a systematic design
of rendering us hateful in the eyes of the world — with a view
to a general crusade against us and our institutions. This,
too, in the legislative halls of the Union ; created by these
confederated States, for the better protection of their peace,
their safety, and their respective institutions ; — and yet, we,
the representatives of twelve of these sovereign States against
whom this deadly war is waged, are expected to sit here in
silence, hearing ourselves and our constituents day after day
denounced, without uttering a word ; for if we but open our
lips, the charge of agitation is resounded on all sides, and we
are held up as seeking to aggravate the evil which we resist.
Every reflecting mind must see in all this a state of things
deeply and dangerously diseased.

I do not belong, said Mr. C., to the school which holds
that aggression is to be met by concession. Mine is the op
posite creed, which teaches that encroachments must be met
at the beginning, and that those who act on the opposite
principle are prepared to become slaves. In this case, in par
ticular, I hold concession or compromise to be fatal. If we
concede an inch, concession would follow concession — com
promise would follow compromise, until our ranks would be

SPEECHES. 627

60 broken that effectual resistance would be impossible. We
must meet the enemy on the frontier, with a fixed determi
nation of maintaining our position at every hazard. Consent
to receive these insulting petitions, and the next demand will
be that they be referred to a committee in order that they
may be deliberated and acted upon. At the last session we
were modestly asked to receive them, simply to lay them on
the table, witnout any view to ulterior action. I then told
the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan), who so
strongly urged that course in the Senate, that it was a p'osi-
tion that could not be maintained ; as the argument in favor
of acting on the petitions if we were bound to receive, could
not be resisted. I then said, that the next step would be to
refer the petition to a committee, and I already see indica
tions that such is now the intention. If we yield, that will
be followed by another, and we will thus proceed, step by
step, to the final consummation of the object of these peti
tions. We are now told that the most effectual mode of ar
resting the progress of abolition is, to reason it down ; and
with this view it is urged that the petitions ought to be
referred to a committee. That is the very ground which
was taken at the last session in the other House, but instead
of arresting its progress it has since advanced more rapidly
than ever. The most unquestionable right may be rendered
doubtful, if once admitted to be a subject of controversy, and
that would be the case in the present instance. The subject
is beyond the jurisdiction of Congress — they have no right to
touch it in any shape or form, or to make it the subject of
deliberation or discussion.

In opposition to this view it is urged that Congress is
bound by the constitution to receive petitions in every case
and on every subject, whether within its constitutional com
petency or not. I hold the doctrine to be absurd, and do
solemnly believe, that it would be as easy to prove that it
has the right to abolish slavery, as that it is bound to receive

628 SPEECHES.

petitions for that purpose. The very existence of the rule
that requires a question to be put on the reception of peti
tions, is conclusive to show that there is no such obligation.
It has been a standing rule from the commencement of the
Government, and clearly shows the sense of those who formed
the constitution on this point. The question on the recep
tion would be absurd, if, as is contended, we are bound to
receive ; but I do not intend to argue the question ; I dis
cussed it fully at the last session, and the arguments then
advanced neither have been nor can be answered.

As widely as this incendiary spirit has spread, it has not
yet infected this body, or the great mass of the intelligent
and business portion of the North ; but unless it be speedily
stopped, it will spread and work upwards till it brings the
two great sections of the Union into deadly conflict. This
is not a new impression with me. Several years since, in a
discussion with one of the Senators from Massachusetts
(Mr. Webster), before this fell spirit had showed itself, I then
predicted that the doctrine of the proclamation and the Force
Bill, — that this Government had a right, in the last resort, to
determine the extent of its own powers, and enforce its deci
sion at the point of the bayonet, which was so warmly main
tained by that Senator, would at no distant day arouse the
dormant spirit of abolitionism. I told him that the doctrine
was tantamount to the assumption of unlimited power on the
part of the Government, and that such would be the impres
sion on the public mind in a large portion of the Union.
The consequence would be inevitable. A large portion of the
Northern States believed slavery to be a sin, and would
consider it as an obligation of conscience to abolish it if
they should feel themselves in any degree responsible for its
continuance, — and that this doctrine would necessarily lead to
the belief of such responsibility. I then predicted that it
would commence as it has with this fanatical portion of
society, and that they would begin their operations on the

SPEECHES. 629

ignorant, the weaK, the young, and the thoughtless, — and
gradually extend upwards till they would become strong
enough to obtain political control, when he and others hold
ing the highest stations in society, would, however reluc
tant, be compelled to yield to their doctrines, or be driven into
obscurity. But four years have since elapsed, and all this is
already in a course of regular fulfilment.

Standing at the point of time at which we have now ar
rived, it will not be more difficult to trace the course of fu
ture events now than it was then. They who imagine that
the spirit now abroad in the North, will die away of itself
without a shock or convulsion, have formed a very inadequate
conception of its real character ; it will continue to rise, and
spread, unless prompt and efficient measures to stay its pro
gress be adopted. Already it has taken possession of the
pulpit, of the schools, and, to a considerable extent, of the
press ; those great instruments by which the mind of the
rising generation will be formed.

However sound the great body of the non-slaveholding
States are at present, in the course of a few years they will be
succeeded by those who will have been taught to hate the
people and institutions of nearly one-half of this Union,
with a hatred more deadly than one hostile nation ever en
tertained towards another. It is easy to see the end. By
the necessary course of events, if left to themselves, we must
become, finally, two people. It is impossible under the
deadly hatred which must spring up between the two great
sections, if the present causes are permitted to operate un
checked, that we should continue under the same political
system. The conflicting elements would burst the Union
asunder, powerful as are the links which hold it together.
Abolition and the Union cannot co-exist. As the friend of
the Union I openly proclaim it, — and the sooner it is known
the better. The former may now be controlled, but in a
short time it will be beyond the power of man to arrest the

630 SPEECHES.

course of events. We of the South will not, cannot surren
der our institutions. To maintain the existing relations be
tween the two races, inhabiting that section of the Union,
is indispensable to the peace and happiness of both. It can
not be subverted without drenching the country in blood,
and extirpating one or the other of the races. Be it good
or bad, it has grown up with our society and institutions, and
is so interwoven with them, that to destroy it would be to
destroy us as a people. But let ine not be understood as
admitting, even by implication, that the existing relations be
tween the two races in the slaveholding States is an evil :—
far otherwise ; I hold it to be a good, as it has thus far
prowd itself to be to both, and will continue to prove so if
not disturbed by the fell spirit of abolition. I appeal to
facts. Never before has the black race of Central Africa,
from the dawn of history to the present day, attained a con
dition so civilized and so improved, not only physically, but
morally and intellectually. It came among us in a low,, de
graded, and savage condition, and in the course of a few gen
erations it has grown up under the fostering care of our in
stitutions, reviled as they have been, to its present com
paratively civilized condition. This, with the rapid increase
of numbers, is conclusive proof of the general happiness of
the race, in spite of all the exaggerated tales to the contrary.
In the mean time, the white or European race has not de
generated. It has kept pace with its brethren in other sec
tions of the Union where slavery does not exist. It is odious
to make comparison ; but I appeal to all sides whether the
South is not equal in virtue, intelligence, patriotism, courage,
disinterestedness, and all the high qualities which adorn our
nature. I ask whether we have not contributed our full
share of talents and political wisdom in forming and sustain
ing this political fabric ; and whether we have not constantly
inclined most strongly to the side of liberty, and been the
first to see and first to resist the encroachments of power.

SPEECHES. . 633

In one thing only are we inferior — the arts of gain ; we ac
knowledge that we are less wealthy than the Northern section
of this Union, but I trace this mainly to the fiscal action of
this Government, which has extracted much from, and spent
little among us. Had it been the reverse, — if the exaction
had been from the other section, and the expenditure with
us, this point of superiority would not be against us now, as
it was not at the formation of this Government.

But I take higher ground. I hold that in the present
state of civilization, where two races of different origin, and
distinguished by color, and other physical differences, as well
as intellectual, are brought together, the relation now existing
in the slaveholding States between the two, is, instead of an
evil, a good — a positive good. I feel myself called upon to
speak freely upon the subject where the honor and interests
of those I represent are involved. I hold then, that there
never has yet existed a wealthy and civilized society in which
one portion of the community did not, in point of fact, live
on the labor of the other. Broad and general as is this as
sertion, it is fully borne out by history. 'xThis is not the pro
per occasion, but if it were, it would not be difficult to trace
the various devices by which the wealth of all civilized com
munities has been so unequally divided, and to show by what
means so small a share has been allotted to those by whose
labor it was produced, and so large a share given to the non-
producing classes. The devices are almost innumerable, from
the brute force and gross superstition of ancient times, to the
subtle and artful fiscal contrivances of modern. I might
well challenge a comparison between them and the more di
rect, simple, and patriarchal mode by which the labor of the
African race is, among us, commanded by the European. I
may say with truth, that in few countries so much is left to
the share of the laborer, and so little exacted from him, or
where there Is more kind attention paid to him in sickness or
infirmities of age. Compare his condition with the tenants of

632 SPEECHES.

the poor houses in the more civilized portions of Europe — »
look at the sick, and the old and infirm slave, on one hand,
in the midst of his family and friends, under the kind super
intending care of his master and mistress, and compare it
with the forlorn and wretched condition of the pauper in the
poor house. But I will not dwell on this aspect of the ques
tion ; I turn to the political ; and here I fearlessly assert
that the existing relation between the two races in the South,
against which these blind fanatics are waging war, forms the
most solid and durable foundation on which to rear free and
stable political institutions. It is useless to disguise the
fact. There is and always has been in an advanced stage of
wealth and civilization, a conflict between labor and capital.
•Thev condition of society in the South exempts us from the
disorders and dangers resulting from this conflict ; and which
explains why it is that the political condition of the slave-
holding States has been so much more stable and quiet than
that of the North. The advantages of the former, in this
respect, will become more and more manifest if left undis
turbed by interference from without, as the country advances
in wealth and numbers. We have, in fact, but just entered
that condition of society where the strength and durability
of our political institutions are to be tested ; and I venture
nothing in predicting that the experience of the next gene
ration will fully test how vastly more favorable our condition
of society is to that of other sections for free and stable in
stitutions, provided we are not disturbed by the interference
of others, or shall have sufficient intelligence and spirit to
resist promptly and successfully such interference. It rests
with ourselves to meet and repel them. I look not for aid
to this Government, pr to the other States ; not but there are
kind feelings towards us on the part of the great body of the
non-slaveholding States ; but as kind as their feelings may
be, we may rest assured that no political paliy in those
States will risk their ascendency for our safety. If we do

SPEECHES. 635

not defend ourselves none will defend us ; if we yield we will
be more and more pressed as we recede ; and if we submit
we will be trampled under foot. Be assured that emancipa
tion itself would not satisfy these fanatics : — that gained, the
next step would be to raise the negroes to a social and polit
ical equality with the whites ; and that being effected, we
would soon find the present condition of the two races re
versed. They and their northern allies would be the mas
ters, and we the slaves ; the condition of the white race in
the British West India Islands, bad as it is, would be
happiness to ours. There the mother country is interested
in sustaining the supremacy of the European race. It is
true that the authority of the former master is destroyed,
but the African will there still be a slave, not to individuals
but to the community, — forced to labor, not by the authority
of the overseer, but by the bayonet of the soldiery and the
rod of the civil magistrate.

Surrounded as the slaveholding States are with such im
minent perils, I rejoice to think that our means of defence
are ample, if we shall prove to have the intelligence and spirit
to see and apply them before it is too late. All we want is u
concert, to lay aside all party differences, and unite with zeal
and energy in repelling approaching dangers. Let there be
concert of action, and we shall find ample means of security
without resorting to secession or disunion. I speak with full
knowledge and a thorough examination of the subject, and
for one, see my way clearly. One thing alarms me — the eager
pursuit of gain which overspreads the land, and which ab-
sorbs every faculty of the mind and every feeling of the heart.
Of all passions avarice is the most blind and compromising
— the last to see and the first to yield to danger. _. I dare
not hope that any thing I can say will arouse the South to a
due sense of danger ; I fear it is beyond the power of mor
tal voice to awaken it in time from the fatal security into
which it has fallen.

634 SPEECHES.

SPEECH

On his proposition to cede the Public Lands to the
new States upon the payment of one-third of the
gross amount of the sales ; delivered in the Senate
February 7th, 1837.

[THE Bill to suspend the sale of the Public Lands being under
consideration, Mr. Calhoun offered the following as a substitute : —

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That all the public
lands within the States of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas,
Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Michigan, with the exception of
the sites of fortifications, navy; and dock yards, arsenals, magazines,
and all other public buildings, be ceded to the States within the limits
of which they are respectively situated, on the following conditions :

First. That the said States shall severally pass acts, to be irrevo
cable, that they will annually pay to the United States thirty-three
and one-third per cent, on the gross amount of the sales of such lands,
on or before the first day of February of each succeeding year.

Secondly. That the minimum price, as now fixed by law, shall re
main unchanged until the first day of January, eighteen hundred and
forty-two ; after which time, the price of all lands heretofore offered at
public sale, and then remaining unsold ten years or upwards preced
ing the first day of January aforesaid, may be reduced by said States

to a price not less than per acre ; and all lands that may have

been offered at public sale, and remaining unsold fifteen years or up
wards, preceding the first day of January, eighteen hundred and forty-
seven, may thereafter be reduced by said States to a price not less

than per acre ; and all lands that may have been offered at

public sale, and remaining unsold twenty years or upwards, preceding
the first day of January, eighteen hundred and fifty-two, may then be

reduced by said States to a price not less than • per acre ; and all

lands that may have been offered at public sale, and remaining im-
^old twenty years or upwards, preceding the first day of January, eigh-

SPEECHES. 635

teen hundred and fifty-seven, may thereafter be reduced by said States

to a price not less than per acre ; and all lands that may have

been offered at public sale, and remaining unsold thirty years or up
wards, preceding the first day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-
two, may thereafter be reduced by said States to a price not less than

per acre ; and all lands that shall have been offered at public

sale, and remaining unsold thirty-five years or upwards, shall be ceded
immediately to the States in which said lands are situate : Provided,
That all lands which shall remain unsold after having been offered at
public sale for ten years, and which do not come under the above pro
visions, shall be subject to the provisions of graduation and cession
aforesaid at the respective periods of ten, fifteen, twenty, twenty-five,
thirty, and thirty-five years after said sale, commencing from the expi
ration of ten years after the same had been offered at public sale.

Thirdly. That the lands shall be subject to the same legal subdi
visions in the sale and survey as is now provided by law, reserving for
each township the sixteenth section, or the substitute, as heretofore
provided by law ; and the land not yet offered for sale, shall be first
offered by the State at public auction, and be sold, for cash only, in the
manner now provided by law. And any land now or hereafter re
maining unsold after the same shall have been offered for sale at public
auction, shall be subject to entry for cash only, according to the gradua
tion which may be fixed by the States respectively under the provi
sions of this act.

Fourth. This cession, together with the portion of the sales to be
retained by the States respectively under the provisions of this act.
shall be in full of the five per cent, fund, or any part thereof, not al
ready advanced to any State ; and the said States shall be exclusively
liable for all charges that may hereafter accrue from the surveys, sales,
and management of the public lands, and extinguishment of Indian
title within the limits of said States respectively.

Fifth. That, on a failure to comply with any of the above con
ditions, or a violation of the same, on the part of any of the said
States, the cession herein made to the State failing to comply with, or
violating said conditions, shall be thereby rendered null and void ; and
all grants or titles thereafter made by said State, for any portion of the
public lands within the limits of the same ceded by this act, shall be,
and is hereby declared to be null and void, and of no effect whatever.

636 SPEECHES.

SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That, whenever the President of
the United States shall be officially notified that any of the said States
has passed an act in compliance with the above conditions, it shall be
his duty forthwith to adopt such measures as he shall think proper to
close the land-offices, including the surveying department, within the
limits of said State ; and that the commissions of all officers connected
therewith shall expire on a day to be fixed by him, but which day
shall not be beyond six months from the day he received the official
notification of the passage of said act.

SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That on such notification being
made, the said State shall be relieved from all compacts, acts, or ordi
nances, imposing restrictions on the right of said State to tax any lands
by her authority subsequent to the sale thpreof, ceded by this act ; and
all maps, titles, records, books, documents, and papers, in the General
Land-Office at Washington, relative to said lands, shall be subject to
the order and disposition of the Executive of said State.

SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, That all lands of the United
States within the limits of the State of Tennessee, with the exceptions
enumerated in the first section of this act, shall be, and the same are
hereby, ceded to said State.

In reply to the objections urged against this substitute by Messrs.
Benton and Buchanan, Mr. Calhoun said :]

HE wished the Senate to be assured that, in offering the
proposition he had presented, he had no indirect or concealed
purpose. He was perfectly sincere in proposing and advocat
ing it, and that on the highest possible ground. When the
Senate entered upon the present discussion, he had had little
thought of offering a proposition like this. He had, indeed?
always seen that there was a period coming when this Govern
ment must cede to the new States the possession of their own
soil ; hut he had never thought till now that period was so
near. What he had seen this session, however, and especial
ly the nature and character of the bill which was now likely
to pass, had fully satisfied him -that the time had arrived.
There were at present eighteen Senators from the new States.
In four years there would be six more, which would make

SPEECHES. 637

twenty-four. All, therefore, must see that, in a very short
period, those States would have this question in their own
hands. And it had "been openly said, that they ought not to
accept of the present proposition, because they would soon be
able to get better terms. He thought, therefore, that, instead
of attempting to resist any longer what must eventually hap
pen, it would be better for all concerned that Congress should
yield at once to the force of circumstances, and cede the pub
lic domain. His objects in this movement were high and
solemn objects. He wished to break down the vassalage of the
new States. He desired that this Government should cease
to hold the relation of a landlord. He wished, further, to
draw this great fund out of the vortex of the Presidential con
test, with which, it had openly been announced to the Senate,
there was an avowed design to connect it. He thought the
country had been sufficiently agitated, corrupted, and debas
ed by the influence of that contest ; and he wished to take
this great engine out of the hands of power. If he were a
candidate for the presidency, he might desire to leave it
there. He wished to go further : he sought to remove the
immense amount of patronage connected with the management
of this domain — a patronage which had corrupted both the
old and the new States to an enormous extent. He sought
to counteract the centralism, which was the great danger of
this Government, and thereby to preserve the liberties of the
people much longer than would otherwise be possible. As to
what was to be received for these lands, he cared nothing
about it. He would have consented at once to yield the
whole, and withdraw altogether the landlordship of the Gen
eral Government over them, had he not believed that it
would be most for the benefit of the new States themselves
that it should continue somewhat longer.

These were the views which had induced him to present
the amendment. He offered no gilded pill. He threw in no
apple of discord. He was no bidder for popularity. He pre-

638 SPEECHES.

scribed to himself a more humble aim — which was, simply to
do his duty. He sought to counteract the corrupting ten
dency of the existing course of things. He sought to weaken
this Government by divesting it of, at least, a part of the im
mense patronage it wielded. He held that every great landed
ed estate required a local administration, conducted by persons
more intimately acquainted with local wants and interests
than the members of a central government could possibly
be. If any body asked him for a proof of the truth of
his positions, he might point them to the bill now before the
Senate. Such were the sentiments, shortly stated, which
had governed him on this occasion.

[The substitute being rejected, Mr. Calhoun, on the 9th February,
introduced the same as a substantive proposition in the form of a bill,
and in reply to Mr. Clay, said :]

That he came here with a fixed resolution to resist all at
tempts at innovation upon our system in relation to the pub
lic lands ; and he might add, with no small hope that he
would be successful.

Mr. C. said he took it as rather unkind, though he was
sure it had not been so intended, that the Senator from Ken
tucky should say that there was any analogy between this
bill and that from the Committee on the Public Lands, which
Mr. C. had strenuously opposed. This measure, reluctantly
forced upon him by the necessity of the case, had been intro
duced with a desire to terminate great political evils. He
assured that honorable Senator, whatever might be the obli
gation of duty which he felt in opposing this measure, a no
less imperative obligation urged him to bring it forward.
There is, said Mr. C., too much power here ; the tendency
of this Government to centralism is overpowering ; and among
the many powerful instruments which can be, and are brought
to bear on securing and extending Executive power, this con
trol of the public lands is one of the greatest and most effec-

SPEECHES. 639

tual. It now gives to any administration disposed so to use
it, control over perhaps nine States — eight certainly — of this
Union. These States, so far as the public lands are concern
ed, are the vassals of this Government. We are in the place
of a great landlord, and they of tenants ; we have the own
ership and control over the soil they occupy. Can there be
any doubt as to how such an ascendency will be used in the
present corrupt state of the country ? Is there any doubt
as to how it has been used ? or that the influence derived
from it is a growing influence ? We must find some reme
dy for such a state 6f things, or sink under it. It is in vain
to tell us, that the Senators from the new States are as capa
ble of giving an independent vote on measures connected with
the public lands as those from the old States. It is impos
sible, in the nature of things. Their constituents have that
feeling of ownership which is naturally inseparable from the
occupation of the soil ; and it must and will control the action
of their representatives.

And now I put it to the bosom of every Senator, whether
the mere moneyed income derived from the public domain, is
to be compared, for one moment, to the great advantage of
putting these Senators on the same independent footing with
ourselves ? I look with sympathy upon their condition, and
I feel very sure they will be liberated from it with joy. Such,
I am very sure, would be my feelings in the like circumstan
ces. So long as there was no attempt to use the control of
the public lands for purposes of a political character, their
condition was very different ; but, since this has been swept
into the great vortex of political influence, their situation is
wholly changed. I am for knocking off their chains. Sir,
said Mr. C., I have, on a deliberate view of the whole case,
entered upon this course, and I am resolved to go for this
measure with all my power. I seek not its popularity or in
fluence. I had rather that some other individual had moved
in it, as more than one Senator here can bear me witness :

640 SPEECHES.

but none would move ; and I have therefore determined to
proceed. I believe the time has arrived, and I am resolved
to go on in the face of all the imputations to which my mo
tives may be liable. I have often done my duty under very
difficult circumstances, as all who hear me well know. As to
popularity, I despise it. I would not turn on my heel to ob
tain it. It is a fleeting shadow, unworthy of the pursuit of
an upright man. No, sir, I move here on a conscientious
conviction of high and imperious duty ; and I shall therefore go
forward until I have effected my object, if it can be effected.
I believe it will prove, in its practical reslilts, a great blessing
to the country. I am convinced no stronger measure can be
devised for withdrawing the public lands from the great game
of political scrambling and gambling for the presidency.

As to the details of the bill : I am under the impression
that the sum demanded from the new States for the cession
of these lands should be moderate ; especially considering that
they will be charged with the whole trouble and expense of
their administration, and that, from the nature of the human
mind, they will necessarily have the feeling that they possess
a better right to these lands than others, from the fact of
their occupancy. The next reason is, that we may prevent
any disturbance from a feeling of discontent ; and that the
arrangement we make may be viewed as a liberal one, even
by the new States themselves. So desirous am I to effect
this object, that I will consent to modify this feature of the
bill, by inserting almost any rate per cent, which the new
States shall, on the whole, deem most prudent and advisable.
Another reason why I have set the per cent, at a low rate
is, a desire that the plan should operate as a benefit to the
new States. I wish to counteract the tendency to running
down of the price of land, and to secure its sale at prices cal
culated for the benefit of all parties. To secure this, I have
inserted a provision that, if there shall be any departure from

SPEECHES. 641

this condition of the cession, the grant itself shall be void, so
as to make it a judicial question.

[The bill was further opposed by Mr. Webster, when Mr. Calhoun
replied as follows :]

I must express my regret that this bill should bo opposed
at this early stage, and in so unusual a manner. As long as
I have been a member of this and the other House, I cannot
recollect more than three or four instances before the present,
in which a bill has been opposed at its second reading, and
then under very peculiar circumstances. And why, may I
ask, is the usual course departed from on tho present occasion ?
Why not let this bill receive its second reading and be re
ferred, as other bills are, to a committee, to be considered
arid reported on ? The reply is, to prevent agitation ; — that
is, as I understand it> to prevent the feelings of the public
from being excited, and its attention directed to this highly
important subject. If that be the intention, I tell gentle
men they will fail in their object. The subject is already
before the public ; and if my life be spared, I shall keep it
there — shall agitate it till the public attention shall be roused
to a full and thorough investigation of a measure which I
firmly believe is not less essential to the interest of the whole
Union, than it is to that of the new States. I tell them
more ; that the very unusual and extraordinary course they
have adopted in opposition to this bill, will but more deeply
agitate the public mind, and the more intensely attract its
attention to the subject. It will naturally excite the inquiry,
Why not let this bill take the ordinary course ? Why not
let it go to a committee to investigate its provisions, and
present all the arguments for and against it, fully and fairly,
so that its merits and demerits, such as they are, may be
clearly understood ? Opposition to so reasonable a course
will make the impression, that the object is to suppress in-

VOL. II. 4:1

642 SPEECHES.

vestigation, whatever may be the motive of gentlemen, and
will naturally excite suspicion and more diligent inquiry.

In making these remarks, I am not ignorant that the
merits of the hill are fully open to discussion on the pending
question ; but it is impossible that a hasty discussion, at
this late stage of the session, and when the time of the Senate
is so fully engrossed with other subjects, can be so satisfactory
as would be a report in which the views of the majority and
minority of the committee, after full consultation, might be
calmly and deliberately spread at large before the public.
And why not adopt so natural a course ? Besides being more
favorable to investigation, it would consume less time; a
point of no small importance at the present stage of the
session. If referred, the committee would doubtless be so
constituted as to comprehend both the friends and opponents
of the measure. Among the latter, if my wishes should be
consulted, I would be glad to see the name of the Senator
from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster), who is so capable of doing
full justice to whatever side he undertakes to defend. It is
thus that the whole merits of the measure would be fully pre
sented, and, if it be so liable to objection as is supposed, the
result might satisfy the new States themselves, that it ought
not to be adopted. But if, on the other hand, the argument
should prove to be decidedly in its favor, as I firmly and con
scientiously believe, the very agitation which gentlemen seem
so much to dread, would be promptly terminated by the
adoption of the measure. Thus regarding the subject, I
cannot but regret that this bill has not been permitted to
take the usual course ; and that I am compelled, in this hasty
manner, without premeditation, to reply to the arguments of
the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster), which, after
mature deliberation, he has urged with all his force against
the measure. I shall begin with my reply to his constitu
tional objections. He holds that the measure is unconsti-

SPEECHES. 643

fcutional, because we have no authority to give away the
public lands. ^s

I do not feel myself obliged to meet this objection. It is
not true in fact. The bill makes no gift. It cedes the public
lands to the States within which they are respectively sit
uated, subject to various conditions, and among others, that
they shall pay over one-third of the gross amount of the sales
to the United States ; that they shall surrender all their
claims against the Government under the two and three per
cent, funds, and take the whole trouble and expense of the
management of the land, including the extinguishment of the
Indian titles. But I waive this decisive answer. I meet the
Senator on his own ground, and with a conclusive argument,
as far, at least, as he is concerned. He admits, that it would
not be a violation of the constitution for Congress to make a
donation of land to an individual. And what, I ask, is there
to prevent it from making a donation to two ; to an hundred ;
or to a thousand ? and if to them individually, why not to
them in the aggregate, as a community or a State ? He, in
deed, admits, that Congress may make a donation of public
lands to a State for useful purposes. If to one State, why not
to several States — to the new States — if the measure should
be thought to be wise and proper ? If there be a distinction,
I acknowledge my intellect is too obtuse to perceive it ; but
as the bill makes no gift, I feel under no necessity of
pressing the argument further.

The Senator's next position is, that we have no right to
delegate the trust of administering the public domain con
fided to us by the constitution, to the States. Here, again,
I may object, that the argument has no foundation in truth.
The bill delegates no trust. It makes a concession — a sale
of the public lands, to the new States ; and what the Sena
tor calls trusts, are but conditions annexed to the sales — con
ditions alike beneficial to them and to the old States. The
simple question then is, Can Congress sell public lands to a

644 SPEECHES.

State ? Suppose the State of Ohio were to offer to pay $1.25
an acre for the remnant of the public lands, within her limits,
— could not Congress sell it to her ? And, if it may sell for
$1.25, may it not for a dollar ; for 75 cents ; or a less sum,
if it should be deemed the true value ? Again : if Congress
can make an absolute sale, may it not make a conditional one ?
and if so, why may it not make the disposition proposed in
this bill ? That is the question, and I would be glad to have
it answered. If I ever had any constitutional scruples on the
subject, the arguments of the Senator would have satisfied
me that they were without the shadow of foundation. His
reasoning faculties are well known ; and if these are the
strongest constitutional objections that he can advance, we
may be assured, that the bill is perfectly free from all objec
tions of that description.

Having now dispatched the objections against the consti
tutionality of this bill, I shall next consider the arguments
which the Senator urged against its expediency. He says,
that I placed the necessity of this bill on the fact of the pas
sage of the land bill reported by the Committee on Public
Lands ; and as it was still uncertain whether it would be
come a law, the ground on which the necessity of this bill
was based, may yet fail. The Senate will remember the
remarks I made on asking leave to introduce this bill, and
that I was far from placing it on the simple fact of the pas
sage of that bill. I took broader ground, and rested my
motion on the character of the bill and the circumstances
which attended its passage through this body. From these,
I concluded that the period we all acknowledge must at some
time come, had actually arrived, when the public lands with
in the new States should, on proper conditions, be ceded to
them. I do not deem it necessary now to go into a discus
sion of the character of the bill, or the history of its passage
through the Senate. We all have, no doubt, formed our
opinions in relation to both. From all I have seen and

SPEECHES. 645

heard, I am satisfied, that the bill had not the hearty assent
of its supporters, whether from the new or old States ; and
I doubt very much whether there was an individual who
voted for it, that gave it his hearty approbation. Many who
had uniformly opposed all measures of the kind, and who re
presented portions of the Union which had ever been vigilant
on all questions connected with the public lands, were found
in the ranks of those who supported the bill. The explana
tion is easy. It assumed the character of a party measure,
to be carried on party grounds, without reference to the true
interests of either the new or old States ; and, if we are to
credit declarations made elsewhere, to fulfil obligations con
tracted anterior to the late Presidential election. From all
this, I inferred, we had reached the period, when it was no
longer possible to prevent the public domains from becom
ing the subject of party contention, and being used by party,
as an engine to control the politics of the country. It was
this conviction, and not the mere passage of the bill, as the
Senator supposes, that induced me to introduce the measure.
I saw, clearly, it was time to cut off this vast source of
patronage and power, and to place the Senators and Repre
sentatives from the new States on an equality with those
from the old, by withdrawing our local control, and breaking
the vassalage under which they are now placed. The Sena
tor from Massachusetts objects to the term, and denies that
Congress exercises any local control over those States. I
acknowledge that the epithet is strong ; perhaps too much
so. I used it to express the strong degree of dependence
of the new States on tin's Government, whose power and
patronage are ramified over their whole surface, and whose
domains constitute so large a portion of their territory.
I certainly did not anticpate that the Senator from Massa
chusetts, or any other, would deny the existence of this de
pendence, or the local control of the Government within
their limits. Can any thing be more local than the lands of

646 SPEECHES.

a State ? and can any State be said to be free from depend
ence on a government, when that government has the ad
ministration of a large portion of its domain ? Is it no
hardship that the citizens of the new States should be com
pelled to travel nine or ten hundred miles to this place, and
to wait our tardy justice on all claims connected with the
public lands ; a subject, in its own nature the most local of
all, and which ought, above all others, to be under the
charge of the local authorities of the States ? I ask him if
he would be willing to see Massachusetts placed in the same
relation to this Government ? and, if it were, whether it
would not destroy its independence ? I ask him if it must not
give a great and controlling influence wherever it exists ?
Through its lands, the authority and action of this Govern
ment pervade the whole territory of the new States ; and
their citizens become claimants at your doors, session after
session, either for favor or justice. I do not say that all this
is incompatible with the sovereignty of those States, but I do
aver, that it is in derogation of their sovereignty.

The Senator next objects to this measure, that it would
not free Congress from its present difficulties, in reference to
the public domain. He says, that we should soon have the
new States here, besieging us with memorials to alter the
conditions of cession, with all the dependence and difficul
ties of which we now complain. My impression is very dif
ferent. Make the terms liberal, and they will be satisfied.
They will relieve Congress from the whole burden of busi
ness, as far as the lands are concerned, which now occupies
so much of its time ; and the public councils will no longer
be under the dangerous influence inseparable from their
management. If, hereafter, a new state of things should
arise, and the arrangement proposed in the bill should re
quire revision, it will be for those, who come after us, to
apply a remedy ; and I have no fear, but they will do their
duty.

SPEECHES, 647

The senator next insists, that the acquisition of these
lands will prove no benefit to the new States, and predicts,
that it would involve them in incessant agitation and trouble.
Such might be the case, if the cession was absolute ; but the
bill contains provisions, which will prove an effectual check
against these difficulties. To place its provisions beyond
alteration or attack, it is expressly provided that if they
should be violated by the States, the cession itself should be
void, and all grants made subsequent thereto, shall be null
and of no effect. They are thus placed under the safeguard
of the judiciary ; and the courts of the Union will determine
on questions growing out of their infraction. For this pur
pose, the cession has assumed the form of a compact, and I
feel confident that, under its provisions, the new States would
administer the land without agitation or any serious trou
ble or difficulty. If this can be effected, I appeal to the
Senators, whether the land within their limits ought not to
be under their local administration ? I, for one, feel that we
of the old States have not, arid cannot have, that full and
accurate local knowledge, necessary for their proper manage
ment. Of all the branches of our business, it is that which
I least understand. From this defect of information, the
Land Committee has it almost exclusively under its sole con
trol, whenever it is so constituted as to attract, in any de
gree, the confidence of the House. This has been the case
from the first. I well remember that, when I first took my
seat in the other House, Jeremiah Morrow, a member from
Ohio, a man of great integrity and good sense, was the Chair
man of the Committee on Public Lands, and was, in fact,
the sole legislator on all subjects connected with them ; and
in this body we have almost invariably yielded our judgment
to the committee, from a conscious want of information.
The difficulty is growing from year to year, with the vast
increase of the new States and territories, and the growing
complication of our land code ; and the consequent increase

648 SPEECHES.

of business is such, that we already have scarce time to dis
patch it with due attention. In a short time, the increase
will be doubled, and what shall we then do ? By passing
this bill, we will be wholly relieved from this burden ; and
the questions we are now compelled to determine, without
adequate knowledge, will then be settled by those whose
local knowledge will make them familiar and well acquainted
with the subject.

But, we are told by the Senator, that the public lands
have been well administered by the General Government ;
and that he cannot surrender his belief, but that they will
continue so to be. That they were well administered in the
early stages of the Government, while they were not an object
of much pecuniary or political interest, I am ready to admit ;
but I hold it not less certain, that as the number and popu
lation of the new States increase, and with them the value
of the public lands and the political importance of those
States, we must become year by year less and less competent
to their management, till finally we shall become wholly so.
I believe, that we are not now far from that period. Does
not the Senator see the great and growing influence of the
new States — and that it is in the power of any unprincipled
and ambitious man from one of them to wield that influence
at his pleasure ? Should he propose any measure in relation
to the public lands, be it ever so extravagant and dangerous,
the members from the new States dare not vote against it,
however adverse to the measure. It is useless to disguise
the fact, that our possession of so much land in the new
States, creates and cherishes an antagonist feeling on their
part towards the Government, as to every measure that re
lates to them. They naturally consider your policy as op
posed to their interest, and as retarding their growth and
prosperity, great as they are. We must take human nature
as it is, and accommodate our measures to it, instead of
making the vain attempt to bend it to our measures. We

SPEECHES. 649

must calculate that the means of control, which this state of
things puts into the hands of the ambitious and designing,
will not be neglected ; and, instead of idly complaining, let
us remove the cause by wise and timely legislation. The
difficulties and dangers are daily on the increase. Four
years more will probably add three more new States, and six
additional Senators, with a great increase of members in the
other House ; and, what is more important, a corresponding
increase of votes and influence in the electoral college. Can
you doubt the consequences ? The public lands, with their
immense patronage, will be brought to bear more and more
on the action of Congress ; will control the Presidential elec
tion ; and the result will be that he who uses this vast fund
of power with the least scruple, will carry away the prize.

The Senator himself sees and acknowledges the approach
of this dangerous period ; and agrees, that when it does
come, we must surrender the public lands within the new
States — but is for holding on till it shall have actually ar
rived. My opinion is the reverse. I regard it as one of the
wisest maxims in human affairs, that when we see an inevi
table evil, like this, not to be resisted, approaching — to make
concessions in time, while we can do it with dignity ; and
not to wait until necessity compels us to act, and when con
cession, instead of gratitude, will excite contempt. The
maxim is not new. I have derived it from the greatest of
modern statesmen, Edmund Burke. He urged its adoption
on the British Government, in the early stages of our Revolu
tion, — and, if the obstinate and infatuated statesman, Lord
North, then at the head of affairs, had listened to his warn
ing voice, it may be doubted whether our Revolution would
have taken place ; but events were ordered otherwise. The
voice of wisdom was unheeded, and the Revolution followed,
with all its consequences, which have so greatly changed the
condition of the world.

I have thus hastilv and without the advantage of pre-

650 SPEECHES.

vious reflection, replied to the arguments of the Senator from
Massachusetts. I would have been much gratified, if a course
better suited to the magnitude of the subject, and more
favorable for full and deliberate discussion, had been adopted ;
but, as it is, I have passed over no argument, as far as I can
remember, which he advanced, and, I trust, have replied to
none, which I have not successfully refuted.

I shall now conclude with a few remarks, in reply to the
Senator from New Jersey (Mr. Southard). He tells us,
that he will not bid for the new States. I regret, said
Mr. C., that I do not see him in his place. Does he mean
to intimate, that, in introducing this bill, I am bidding for
them ? If he does, I throw back the injurious imputation.
I indignantly repel the charge. No, Sir, I am not a bidder.
What I have done, has been from an honest conviction of
duty ; and not less for the benefit of the old than the new
States. The measure, I conscientiously believe, would be
alike serviceable to both.

[Mr. Southard, who had been absent, here returned to the Cham
ber. Mr. C. seeing him, repeated his remarks, on which Mr. S. dis
claimed having said any thing like what Mr. C. understood him to
have said. On which Mr. C. resumed :]

I am happy to hear it. I felt confident that the Senator
could not intend to cast so injurious an imputation on me,
and I rejoice to hear from his own lips the frank and honor
able disclosure he has made.

But I not only believe the measure to be beneficial and
expedient, but I firmly believe it to be indispensable, in
order to restore the Government to a sound and healthy
condition.

The tendency of our system to centralism, with its ruin
ous consequences, can no longer be denied. To counteract
this, its patronage must be curtailed. There are three great
sources to which its immense patronage may be mainly

SPEECHES. 651

traced, and by which the Government is enabled to oxert
such an immense control over public opinion — the public
lands, the post-office, and the currency. The first may be
entirely removed. This bill will cut it up, root and branch.
By a single stroke we would not only retrench this growing
and almost boundless source of patronage, but also free our
selves from the pressure of an immense mass of business,
which encumbers our legislation, and divides and distracts
our attention ; and this would be done without impairing, in
the long run, our pecuniary resources. In addition, the
measure would place the Senators from the new States on
the same equal and independent footing in this chamber
with ourselves. In such results who would not rejoice ?
The Senators from the new States would especially have
cause to rejoice in the change. Relieve them from the de
pendent condition of their States, and they would be found
in the front ranks, sustaining the laws and the constitution
against the encroachment of power.

But the Senator from New Jersey tells us that we have
no power to pass this bill, as it would be in violation of the
ordinance, which makes the public land a common fund for
benefit of all the States ; and that we, as trustees, are bound
to administer it strictly in reference to the object of the
trust. In reply, I might ask the Senator how he can recon
cile his construction of the ordinance with the constant prac
tice of the Government, in which, if I mistake not, it has
been sustained by his vote ? How many grants have been
made out of the public domain to colleges, academies, asy
lums for the deaf and dumb, and other institutions of like
character ? If such concession be consistent with the pro
visions of the ordinance, what prevents this bill from being
so also ? But I rest not my reply on that ground. I meet
the Senator according to his interpretation of the ordinance.
I assert boldly that the disposition this bill proposes to make
of the portion of the public domain within the new States, is

652 SPEECHES.

the very best, under existing circumstances, that can be made
— regarding it in reference to the common interest of all the
States. Let it be borne in mind, that all sides agree the
new States will soon be able to command their terms, when
others less favorable to the common interest may be imposed.
If we of the old States make it a point to hold on to the last,
they will, by a necessary reaction, make a point to extort all
they can when they get the power. But if we yield in time,
a durable arrangement may be made, mutually beneficial and
satisfactory to both parties.

The Senator further objects, that if this bill should pass,
its provisions would be extended, from necessity, to all the
States which may hereafter be admitted into the Union. I
must say, I see no such necessity ; but my present impres
sion is, that such would be the course that wisdom would
dictate. According to my mode of thinking, all the revenue
we may derive from the sales of lands in a State, after its
admission, is not to be compared in importance to its inde
pendence as a sovereign member of the Union ; for there is
no danger of the falling of our institutions for the want of
pecuniary means, while there is no small danger of their over
throw from the growing and absorbing attraction of this
central power.

END OF VOL. II.

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